US v. Gary Antonio Jone

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:14-cr-00176-DKC-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency [999827414]. [15-4402]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4402

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARY ANTONIO JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District
Judge. (8:14-cr-00176-DKC-1)

Submitted:

March 31, 2016

Decided:

May 19, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marc Gregory Hall, LAW OFFICES OF MARC G. HALL, P.C., Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Joseph R. Baldwin, Mara Zusman Greenberg, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Gary Antonio Jones was convicted by a jury of being a felon
in

possession

§ 922(g)(1)

by

a

(2012),

imprisonment.
erred

of

firearm,
and

in

was

violation

sentenced

of
to

18
96

U.S.C.
months’

On appeal, Jones argues that the district court

denying

his

three

motions

to

suppress

evidence,

considering certain information at his sentencing hearing, and
applying a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of
justice.

We affirm.

When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, we
review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its
factual findings for clear error.

United States v. McGee, 736

F.3d

Because

263,

269

(4th

Cir.

2013).

the

district

court

denied Jones’ suppression motion, we construe the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Government, id., and defer to
the

district

court’s

credibility

findings,

United

States

v.

erred

in

Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir. 2015).
First,

Jones

asserts

that

the

district

court

denying his motion to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle,
arguing that the ATF agents’ actions exceeded the scope of the
traffic stop.

Crediting the testimony of the ATF agents, which

included testimony that an agent asked Jones to exit the car in
order to investigate the odor of alcohol, the district court
determined that the stop was reasonable.
2

We find that Jones’

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conclusory,
establish

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unsupported
that

the

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assertions

district

to

court’s

the

contrary

decision

fail

was

to

clearly

erroneous.
Jones

also

contends

that

the

district

court

erred

in

denying his motion to suppress recordings of statements he made
while seated in the back of a police vehicle.

In order to

succeed on this motion, Jones was required to show that he had a
subjective expectation of privacy in the police vehicle and that
this expectation was objectively reasonable.
Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010).

United States v.
The district court

determined that, although Jones had a subjective expectation of
privacy when he made the statements, this expectation was not
objectively reasonable, given that Jones knew he was in a police
vehicle
vehicle.

and

could

see

radio

and

electronic

equipment

in

the

We discern no error in the district court’s analysis.

Jones asserts that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the statements he made during his interview
at

the

police

station.

Jones

claims

that

he

made

the

incriminating statements after involuntarily waiving his Miranda *
rights.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the

district court did not clearly err in finding that the officers
provided a full and complete recitation of Jones’ Miranda rights
*

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

3

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and

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exhibited

no

coercive

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conduct.

Accordingly,

we

reject

Jones’ contention that his Miranda waiver was involuntary.
Next,

Jones

considering,

contends

and

the

that

the

Government

arguments at sentencing.

district

erred

court

in

erred

making,

in

certain

Because Jones was the party who first

raised the challenged subject, we conclude that any error from
the court’s consideration of this material was invited.

United

States v. Jackson, 124 F.3d 607, 617 (4th Cir. 1997).

Jones has

not

and

demonstrated

any

extraordinary

argument is therefore waived.

circumstances

this

United States v. Hickman, 626

F.3d 756, 772 (4th Cir. 2010).
Finally
applying

a

Jones

asserts

two-level

that

enhancement

the

district

for

court

obstruction

based on Jones’ perjured testimony at trial.

erred

of

in

justice

Because Jones did

not object to the enhancement, this court’s review is for plain
error.

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir.

2010).

We conclude that Jones fails to demonstrate such error.

Contrary

to

Jones’

assertion,

the

district

court

made

a

sufficient explanation of its perjury finding, as required by
United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1993).
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ conviction and sentence. We
dispense

with

oral

argument

because

4

the

facts

and

legal

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contentions

are

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adequately

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presented

in

the

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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