US v. Jahbou Drake

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case numbers: 3:14-cr-00062-JFA-1, 3:15-cr-00079-JFA-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999746427].. [15-4406, 15-4407]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4406

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAHBOU RUDOLPH DRAKES,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4407

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAHBOU RUDOLPH DRAKES,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cr-00062-JFA-1; 3:15-cr-00079-JFA-1)

Submitted:

January 19, 2016

Decided:

February 2, 2016

Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, James Hunter May, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jahbou

Rudolph

Drakes

pled

guilty

to

possession

of

a

firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012), and, in
a

separate

supervised

criminal

case,

release.

to

The

violating

matters

certain

were

terms

consolidated

of
for

sentencing.

Drakes was sentenced to 71 months for the firearm

offense

27

release.

and

months,

consecutive,

for

violating

supervised

Drakes appeals both sentences; the appeals have been

consolidated.
I
Drakes
calculating

first
his

claims

that

Guidelines

the

district
for

range

court

firearm

the

erred

when

offense.

Specifically, he contends that the court wrongly enhanced his
offense level by two levels based on reckless endangerment, see
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.2 (2014).

We evaluate

Drakes’ legal claim de novo and review relevant factual findings
for clear error.

United States v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 346 (4th

Cir. 2015).
The record reveals that, on January 14, 2014, Drakes was
involved

in

a

car

accident.

Following

threw a loaded firearm over a fence.
a

hospital.

When

officers

went

to

the

accident,

Drakes

Drakes was transported to
the

hospital

to

arrest

Drakes, who was a prohibited person, they discovered that he had
left the hospital against medical advice.
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On April 16, 2014, officers went to Drakes’ residence in
response

to

a

suspicious/wanted

person

call.

Responding

officers were advised of the existence of both state and federal
warrants

relating

to

Drakes’

possession

of

the

pistol

in

January.

When officers confronted Drakes, he resisted arrest by

pulling away when an officer attempted to put a handcuff on his
right wrist.

An officer pulled out a taser and ordered Drakes

to put his hand behind his back.

When Drakes complied, the

officer holstered the taser, and Drakes pulled away again, this
time reaching for the officer’s handgun.
Drakes chiefly contends that his actions on April 14 were
too remote in time from the underlying § 922(g) offense, which
occurred in January, for the § 3C1.2 enhancement to be proper.
Resolution of Drakes’ claim requires us to read USSG § 3C1.2
together with USSG § 1B1.3, which provides in relevant part:
[A]djustments in Chapter Three .
determined on the basis of . .
omissions committed . . . by the
[t]hat occurred . . . in the course
avoid detection or responsibility for
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).

. . shall be
. all acts and
defendant . . .
of attempting to
[the] offense.

While we have not previously addressed

the precise issue before us, the Eleventh Circuit has observed
that “nothing in the Guidelines establishes that conduct ceases
to

be

relevant

after

a

specified

period

of

time.”

United

States v. Rivera-Gomez, 634 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2010).

We

conclude that, given the plain language of the Guidelines, the
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enhancement

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was

correctly

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applied.

Drakes

resisted

the

officers’ attempt to arrest him for possession of the firearm.
It

is

immaterial

that

the

arrest

occurred

some

three

months

after he possessed that firearm.
II
The

27-month

sentence

for

the

release

violation

consecutively to the sentence for the firearm offense.

runs
Drakes

contends that the court erred by imposing consecutive, rather
than concurrent, sentences.
“A

district

when

imposing

release.”

United

States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

We will

sentence

affirm

a

upon

court

has

revocation

revocation

broad

of

sentence

discretion

supervised

that

is

within

statutory range and not plainly unreasonable.

the

prescribed

United States v.

Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).
We find no merit to Drakes’ claim.

The relevant policy

statement provides:
Any term of imprisonment imposed upon the revocation
of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment
that the defendant is serving, whether or not the
sentence of imprisonment being served resulted from
the offense that is the basis of the revocation of
. . . supervised release.
USSG § 7B1.3(f) (p.s.).
Thus,

in

ordering

that

the

supervised

release

sentence

would run consecutively to the § 922(g) sentence, the district
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court deferred to the policy statement.
not required, was proper.

Such deference, while

See United States v. Thompson, 595

F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Moulden, 478
F.3d 652, 656-57 (2007).

Further, in the face of such a clear

policy statement, the court was not obligated to explain its
decision to impose consecutive sentences.

See, e.g., Rita v.

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356-57 (2007).

(“[W]hen a judge

decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case,
doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”).
III
We

therefore

affirm.

We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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