US v. Robert LeCraft

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:10-cr-00021-FL-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999795281].. [15-4411]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4411

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT LEON LECRAFT,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:10-cr-00021-FL-1)

Submitted:

March 30, 2016

Decided:

April 14, 2016

Before GREGORY and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Robert Leon LeCraft was convicted
of possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2012). 1

The district court sentenced LeCraft

to 180 months’ imprisonment.

LeCraft appeals his conviction,

claiming that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress

evidence

seized

following

a

traffic

stop.

For

the

reasons that follow, we affirm.
“When considering a district court’s denial of a motion to
suppress, we review the [trial] court’s factual findings for
clear error and all legal conclusions de novo.”
v. Stover, 808 F.3d 991, 994 (4th Cir. 2015).

United States
Because the

Government prevailed on the suppression issue below, we construe

1

LeCraft initially pled guilty to the charge, pursuant to a
plea agreement under which he reserved his right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. However, by
failing to file objections, LeCraft had waived appellate review
of the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to deny the motion to suppress.
Because the
parties and the district court had mistakenly assumed that
LeCraft could appeal the suppression decision, LeCraft’s plea
could not be treated as a knowing and voluntary unconditional
guilty plea. Accordingly, this court vacated LeCraft’s original
criminal judgment and remanded for further proceedings, noting
that LeCraft “may be able to renew the suppression issue if he
proceeds to trial.” United States v. LeCraft, 544 F. App’x 185
(4th Cir. 2013).
Upon remand, LeCraft once again moved to
suppress the evidence and, after an evidentiary hearing, the
district court denied the motion.
LeCraft proceeded to trial
and was ultimately convicted.

2

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“the

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evidence

presented

[G]overnment.”

in

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the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Id.

The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable
searches

and

searches

seizures.

are

per

se

U.S.

Const.

unreasonable,

amend.
but

IV.

“‘there

Warrantless
are

a

few

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to that
general rule.’”

United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241-42

(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746,
760 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is the voluntary
consent given by an individual possessing the authority to do
so.

Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990); United

States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
In

this

case,

the

district

court

found

that

the

search

was

consensual.
“The [G]overnment has the burden of proving consent,” and
“[w]e review for clear error a district court’s determination
that a search [was] consensual . . . [and] apply a subjective
test

to

analyze

whether

consent

totality of the circumstances.”
F.3d

677,

680

(4th

Cir.

was

given,

looking

to

the

United States v. Robertson, 736

2013)

(citations

omitted).

Courts

examine such factors as the officer’s conduct, the number of
officers

present,

the

time

of

3

the

encounter,

and

the

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characteristics of the individual who was searched.

Lattimore,

87 F.3d at 650.
LeCraft argues that he only consented to a search of his
vehicle — not his person — and that his consent to the vehicle
search was invalid because of the manner in which his consent
was obtained and because he was detained beyond the completion
of the valid traffic stop.
The district court observed that LeCraft was in his 60’s
and had extensive experience — both as a defendant and as an
informant

—

in

the

criminal

justice

system.

As

to

the

circumstances under which LeCraft gave consent, the record shows
that Detective Marquie Morrison-Brown stopped LeCraft’s vehicle
for failing to stop at a stop sign, advised him why she had
stopped him, issued a warning, handed back his driver’s license,
and briefly engaged in friendly conversation before requesting
his consent to search.
the

district

court

Under the totality of the circumstances,

did

not

clearly

err

in

finding

LeCraft’s

consent to be consensual.
Turning

to

LeCraft’s

argument

that

the

initially

legal

detention for the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged, a
temporary detention of an automobile, even if only for a limited
time or purpose, constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure.
v.

United

States,

517

U.S.

806,

809-10

(1996).

Whren

Because

a

routine traffic stop is more like an investigative detention
4

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than

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a

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custodial

arrest,

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courts

evaluate

the

legality

of

a

traffic stop by applying the two-prong test in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
(4th Cir. 2014).

United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279

Under this test, the police officer’s decision

to stop the vehicle must be both “justified at its inception”
and sufficiently “limited both in scope and duration.”

United

States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07 (4th Cir. 2011).

A

routine traffic stop involves requesting the driver’s license
and

registration,

citation.

running

a

computer

Green, 740 F.3d at 280.

check,

and

issuing

a

A traffic stop “become[s]

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required
to

complete

th[e]

Rodriguez

v.

(internal

quotation

Therefore,
beyond

to

the

purpose,

United

of

States,
marks

lawfully

time

the

mission

issuing

135

S.

omitted;

“extend

necessary

authorities

to

Ct

a

1609,

detention

accomplish
either

a

Williams,

808

F.3d

238,

245-46

(4th

in
of

(2015)

original).
a

traffic

possess

suspicion or receive the driver’s consent.’”

ticket.”

1614-15

alterations

the

must

warning

motorist
stop’s

‘reasonable

United States v.

Cir.

2015)

(quoting

Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 507).
In

this

case,

as

LeCraft

concedes,

Morrison-Brown

justified in stopping him for a traffic violation.

was

However, the

traffic stop ended when the officer issued the warning citation
and

returned

LeCraft’s

driver’s
5

license

and

registration.

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Arizona

v.

evidence

Filed: 04/14/2016

Johnson,

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555

323,

in

presented

U.S.
the

333

light

(2009).

most

Viewing

favorable

to

the
the

Government, no more than five minutes transpired between the
initial stop and LeCraft’s consent to search.

Within this brief

time frame, after the traffic stop ended and before the officer
asked

for

friendly

permission

to

search,

conversation.

encounter,

culminating

We
in

she

and

conclude

LeCraft’s

LeCraft
that

consent

engaged

the
to

in

continued

search,

was

consensual and, therefore, was constitutionally permissible.
LeCraft

also

argues

that

the

district

court

finding that he consented to a search of his person.

erred

in

LeCraft

points to the fact that the written police reports stated only
that

Morrison-Brown

vehicle

and

requested

contends

that

permission

this

to

contradicts

search

LeCraft’s

Morrison-Brown’s

testimony that she requested, and LeCraft gave, permission to
search

both

his

vehicle

and

person.

However,

at

the

first

evidentiary hearing, Morrison-Brown explained that she had in
fact requested to search LeCraft’s person and simply omitted it
from her notes through an oversight.
In

finding

that

LeCraft

consented

to

the

search,

the

district court credited Morrison-Brown’s testimonial explanation
for the seeming discrepancy between her written report of the
traffic stop and her later account at the evidentiary hearing.
Credibility of witnesses is the sole province of the factfinder.
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Cf. United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d 390, 396 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“[I]t was for the jury, not this court, to decide which version
of

the

events

-

the

[G]overnment’s

or

Moye’s

-

was

more

credible.”); United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th
Cir. 1989)
sole

(recognizing that witness credibility is within the

province

of

the

jury

and

the

appellate

court

will

not

reassess the credibility of testimony).

We conclude that the

district

finding

court

did

not

clearly

err

in

that

LeCraft

consented to the search of his person.
Even

assuming

arguendo

that

LeCraft’s

valid

consent

to

search extended only to his vehicle and not to his person, upon
stepping out of his vehicle so that the two officers on the
scene could perform the consensual search, instead of following
Morrison-Brown’s instructions to go to the back of his vehicle,
LeCraft

walked

past

his

vehicle

at

an

unusually

quick

pace.

Combined with LeCraft’s initial failure to immediately pull over
when

the

officers’

patrol

car’s

knowledge

blue

of

his

lights
criminal

were

activated

history,

which

and

the

included

drugs and weapons, we conclude that the officers had reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and, therefore, were
legally permitted to search his person.
Finally, LeCraft appears to challenge the denial of the
motion
officer

to

suppress

that

he

his

only

subsequent

possessed
7

the

in-custody
firearm

remark
for

to

an

protection,

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arguing that the statement did not “purge the taint” of the
earlier

alleged

stated,

we

violation.

Fourth

conclude

Amendment
that

there

violation.
was

no

As

previously

Fourth

Amendment

Furthermore, we conclude that the district court did

not clearly err in finding that LeCraft’s incriminating remark
at

the

police

enforcement

station

interrogation

Miranda 2 rights.

was
and

not

made

therefore

in

response

did

not

to

law

violate

his

Rhodes v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-31 (1980).

Accordingly, we affirm LeCraft’s conviction.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

8