US v. Michael Rankin

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:14-cr-00003-BO-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [1000001755]. [15-4436]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4436

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL RANKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
Terrence W.
Boyle, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00003-BO-1)

Argued:

October 28, 2016

Before GREGORY,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

KEENAN

and

January 11, 2017

FLOYD,

Circuit

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Richard Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, PC, Wilmington,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Appellant

Michael

robbery

and

aiding

Rankins

attended

and

a

Rankins

was

abetting.

hearing

charged
Prior

regarding

a

to

with
being

armed

motion

he

bank

arraigned,
had

filed.

During this hearing, the district court noted several times that
Rankins was unlikely to reach a plea bargain in the present case
because he had not done so in other cases.

The court stated

that Rankins’s case was “open and shut” and that the trial would
only take “a day or two, then he’ll get life in prison.”
19–20.

The

court

also

detailed

the

government’s

J.A.

evidence

against Rankins.
Rankins eventually signed a plea agreement and pled guilty
to the charges.

Rankins now asks this Court to vacate his

guilty plea, arguing that the district court committed plain
error by involving itself in plea negotiations in violation of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).
court’s

comments

constitute

improper

We agree that the

involvement

in

plea

negotiations and were a plain error, and we therefore vacate
Rankins’s guilty plea.

I.
Rankins was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Eastern
District of North Carolina on March 18, 2014, for one count of
armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting in violation of 18
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U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 2113(d), and 2.

Prior to being arraigned,

Rankins filed a pro se Motion to Appoint New Counsel.

The

district court conducted a hearing on this motion on December 5,
2014.
At the beginning of the hearing, there was confusion about
whether

Rankins

had

been

arraigned

yet;

it

was

eventually

established that he had not.

The court then noted that the

government

particularly

had

a

strong

case,

because

Rankins’s

accomplice had agreed to testify against him, stating, “He’s
going to nail him and tell everything they did together.”
19.

J.A.

The court said that it was “an open and shut case,” and

then remarked:
[Rankins has] historically gone to trial every time he
has been arrested.
That’s his MO.
So he’s probably
not going to break that pattern. So we’ll try him in
Elizabeth City.
You got all your people down there,
it will take us a day or two, then he’ll get life in
prison.
J.A. 19–20.

The court then denied Rankins’s motion for new

counsel, explaining that Rankins seemed to be in the habit of
alleging problems with his appointed counsel and would likely
reject the next attorney appointed to him as well.
Later in the hearing, the court was trying to decide if it
should arraign Rankins that day or at a later time.

Rankins’s

attorney requested that they wait, because he had not yet had a
chance to discuss plea options with Rankins.

3

The court stated,

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“He’s taken every case that he’s ever been charged with in any
court to jury trial, and I don’t think he’s going to alter that,
but I don’t know any better.”
proclaim,

“It’s

an

easy

J.A. 28.

case,”

and

The court went on to

then

commented

on

the

evidence the government had against Rankins, noting that there
was photographic evidence and that Rankins had been caught near
the scene of the crime with the items taken from the bank.
30.

J.A.

Ultimately, the court decided to arraign Rankins at a later

date.

At the end of the hearing, Rankins stated again that he

did not want his appointed attorney to represent him, and said
to

the

court,

right.”

“I

don’t

want

to

plead

guilty,

as

you

know,

J.A. 34.

An arraignment hearing was held on December 18, 2014.

When

asked how he wanted to plead, Rankins stated that he did not
know how he was going to plead.
his

attorney

therefore

disagreed

they

had

Rankins explained that he and

about

not

his

defense

gone

over

the

strategy

plea

Rankins stated, “I don’t know what to do.”

and

matters

J.A. 39.

that

at

all.

He later

added, “the circumstances [are] very –- to me, very unique as to
how should I enter a guilty plea or not.”

J.A. 41.

The court

responded by saying Rankins was intentionally frustrating the
criminal

process

and

trying

to

cause

delays.

The

court

eventually entered a plea of not guilty on behalf of Rankins.

4

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On March 25, 2015, Rankins signed a plea agreement under
which he agreed to plead guilty to the indictment.

The same

day, a hearing pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was conducted, at which the court established
that Rankins was competent and that he understood he was waiving
his trial rights and his rights to appeal.
guilty.

Then, Rankins pled

On July 10, 2015, Rankins was sentenced to 150 months

in prison.

On July 11, 2015, Rankins timely noted this appeal.

II.
Rankins contends that his guilty plea should be vacated due
to improper judicial involvement in plea negotiations.

Rankins

raises this issue for the first time on appeal, so it will be
reviewed for plain error.

See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).

There are

four elements in plain error analysis.
First, there must be an error or defect . . . .
Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious,
rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the
error must have affected the appellant’s substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means he must
demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings.
Fourth and finally, [the
error should only be remedied if it] seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).

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A.
Under the first two elements of the plain error analysis,
Rankins must show that the district court committed an error,
and that this error was plain.

Rankins claims that the district

court’s

December

comments

during

his

5th

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1).

hearing

violated

This rule states,

“An attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or
the defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach a
plea

agreement.

discussions.”
explained

court

must

not

participate

in

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added).

that

interests:

The

this

“[1]

it

prohibition
diminishes

serves

the

three

possibility

these

We have
important

of

judicial

coercion of a guilty plea; [2] it protects against unfairness
and partiality in the judicial process; and [3] it eliminates
the misleading impression that the judge is an advocate for the
agreement

rather

than

a

neutral

arbiter.”

United

States

v.

Bradley, 455 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Rankins contends that the court committed error because its
comments violated Rule 11(c)(1).

We agree.

The court clearly

brought up the subject of plea bargaining and the likelihood of
Rankins

entering

commented
speed

on

with

into

the
which

a

plea

strength
Rankins

of

agreement.
the

would
6

The

government’s
be

court

evidence,

convicted,

and

also
the
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inevitability of his receiving a life sentence -- all statements
likely to induce Rankins to enter into a plea agreement.
11(c)(1)
Here,

prohibits

the

court

discussions.

judicial
was

involvement

extensively

in

plea

involving

Rule

discussions.

itself

in

such

This violates Rule 11(c)(1), and was an error.

The government contends that Rule 11(c) does not apply in
this situation, because plea negotiations between the government
and Rankins were not ongoing when the court made the comments in
question.

This

argument

is

unavailing

--

the

fact

that

government-defendant negotiations were not already ongoing does
not

change

our

analysis.

Rule

11(c)(1)

states

that

the

government and a defendant may participate in plea discussions,
and that the court must not.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1).

If the

court itself initiates plea discussions, it is clearly still
participating

in

them.

The

district

court’s

behavior

falls

squarely within the scope of Rule 11(c)(1)’s prohibition.
Under

the

plain

error

standard,

an

error

must

also

be

“plain,” meaning that it “must be clear or obvious, rather than
subject

to

reasonable

dispute.”

Here, the error is plain.

Puckett,

556

U.S.

at

135.

The court openly brought up plea

bargaining and made a variety of harsh comments that would tend
to make Rankins more likely to plead guilty.
violation of Rule 11(c)(1).

7

This is a clear

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B.
Under the third element of the plain error test, Rankins
must

show

that

the

error

affected

his

substantial

rights,

meaning that he “must show a reasonable probability that, but
for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.”

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338,

1343

(internal

(2016)

violation

of

quotations

substantial

marks
by

rights

omitted).
Rule

a

11

To

show

a

violation,

a

defendant “need only demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that
he would not have pleaded guilty absent the court’s comments.”
United

States

v.

Sanya,

774

F.3d

812,

820

(4th

Cir.

2014)

(quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83
(2004)).

In assessing a defendant’s showing, “particular facts

and circumstances matter.”

United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct.

2139, 2149 (2013).

With that said, we have previously explained

that

rare

“it

will

prohibition

be

against

that

judicial

a

clear

involvement

does not affect substantial rights.”
The

government

first

violation

argues

in

plea

of

Rule

11’s

negotiations

Bradley, 455 F.3d at 463.
that

because

three

months

passed between the court’s comments and Rankins’s decision to
plea, there is not a “reasonable probability” that he would not
have pleaded guilty absent the court’s comments.
that,

in

the

past,

we

have

considered

the

It is true

passage

of

time

between judicial intervention and a defendant’s guilty plea to
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be

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important

factor

an

in

Pg: 9 of 12

determining

described “reasonable probability” exists.
818.

whether

the

above-

Sanya, 774 F.3d at

In this case, however, Rankins and his attorney had major

problems

with

communication

up

until

his

decision

to

plea.

Because this may have contributed to the temporal gap in this
case,

we

decline

to

place

great

weight

on

the

three-month

passage of time.
The

government

next

asserts

that

Rankins’s

show that he was not swayed by the court.

own

comments

In Sanya, we noted

that the defendant’s “sudden and significant shift in attitude
. . . strongly suggest[ed] that his . . . change of heart was
the product of the district court’s urging.”

Id.

Here, the

government argues that in the time after the court’s comments,
Rankins made statements that suggest that the comments had not
affected him.

At the end of the December 5th hearing, after the

court made the statements in question, Rankins stated that he
did not want to plead guilty.

This statement does indicate that

the comments did not immediately change Rankins’s mind.
Then, at the December 14th hearing, Rankins stated that he
did not know how to plead and that his circumstances were “very
unique.”

J.A. 41.

The government argues that these statements

also show that the court’s comments did not have an effect on
Rankins.

However, although these statements do indicate that

Rankins still did not want to plead guilty at the December 14th
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hearing,

they

also

December

14th,

show

Rankins

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that

that

changed

between

from

December

definitively

5th

wanting

and
to

plead not guilty, to feeling confused and not knowing how to
plead.

Thus, these statements can also be interpreted as a sign

that the court’s comments did have an effect on Rankins.
best,

these

two

statements

by

Rankins

are

ambiguous,

At
and

therefore are not particularly probative as to the effect that
the court’s comments had on him.
Moreover,

the

decisive

factor

in

this

case

egregiousness of the court’s comments themselves.
dictates

that

if

the

court

emphasizes

the

is

the

Common sense

strength

of

the

government’s case, and then tells a defendant that his case is
“open and shut” and that he is going to receive life in prison,
these statements are highly likely to cause the defendant to
enter

into

a

plea

agreement

commentary

regarding

conviction

weighs

the

to

avoid

defendant’s

heavily

in

favor

trial.

guilt
of

and

finding

Such

blatant

likelihood
a

of

“reasonable

probability” that the comments here caused Rankins to agree to a
plea.
In sum, Rankins did not want to plead guilty initially, was
then exposed to highly inappropriate commentary by the court
regarding the likelihood of conviction and a life sentence, soon
after

expressed

confusion

about

eventually signed a plea agreement.
10

what

he

should

do,

and

In our view, this sequence

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of events creates more than a “reasonable probability” that the
court’s

statements

government’s
otherwise.
mind

does

led

arguments

Rankins
to

the

to

plead

contrary

guilty,

do

not

and

the

convince

us

The fact that Rankins did not immediately change his
not

overcome

the

obvious

impact

that

these

harsh

statements were likely to have on someone in Rankins’s position.

C.
Finally, to prevail under the plain error standard, Rankins
must also show that the error seriously affects “the fairness,
integrity

or

public

reputation

of

judicial

proceedings.”

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This standard is undoubtedly met.

When a defendant, before he

has even been arraigned, is told by the court -- the neutral
arbiter -- that he will certainly be convicted and receive life
in prison, the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
that proceeding are all gravely damaged.

See Bradley, 455 F.3d

at 460-61.
Notwithstanding
Rankins’s

conduct,

inappropriate.

the

court’s

these

comments

apparent
are

frustration

astonishing

and

with
wholly

Such behavior is antithetical to the very role

that the court is meant to serve, and does nothing but undermine
“the

fairness,

proceedings.”

integrity
Puckett,

[and]
556

public

U.S.
11

at

reputation
135

of

(internal

judicial
quotation

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marks omitted).

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As a result, the fourth and final prong of the

standard is met.

III.
The district court’s comments constitute plain error that
cannot go uncorrected.

Accordingly, the conviction below is
VACATED AND REMANDED.

12