US v. Juan Willi

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 8:12-cr-00623-PJM-2. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999908379].. [15-4454]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4454

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUAN CARLOS WILLIS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cr-00623-PJM-2)

Submitted:

August 1, 2016

Decided:

August 11, 2016

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Brian K. McDaniel, MCDANIEL LAW GROUP, PLLC, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Sujit
Raman, Chief of Appeals, Leslie Caldwell, Assistant Attorney
General, Sung-Hee Sun, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
James I.
Pearce,
UNITED
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Juan Carlos Willis appeals his convictions for conspiracy
to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012),
and

aggravated

§ 1028A(a)(1)

identity

(2012).

theft,
On

in

violation

appeal,

Willis

of

18

alleges

U.S.C.

that

the

district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
withdraw

his

statements

guilty

at

and

plea

the

plea,

hearing

participation in plea negotiations.
We

review

withdraw

a

the

guilty

district
plea

for

alleges

that

the

amounted

to

court’s
improper

We affirm.

court’s
abuse

denial
of

of

a

motion

discretion.

to

United

States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012).

“A

district

an

arbitrary

court

abuses

manner,

its

discretion

when

it

when
fails

it

acts

to

in

consider

judicially-recognized factors limiting its discretion, or when
it

relies

on

erroneous

factual

or

legal

premises.”

Id.

Although there is “no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,”
courts may permit it where “the defendant can show a fair and
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”

Id. at 383-84.

“The most important consideration in resolving a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy
at which the guilty plea was accepted.

Thus, . . . the inquiry

is ordinarily confined to whether the underlying plea was both
counseled

and

voluntary.”

Id.
2

In

determining

whether

a

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defendant has established a fair and just reason for withdrawing
the plea, courts should consider the six factors identified in
United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991).
In reviewing the district court’s denial of Willis’ motion,
we note that the court conducted a thorough and appropriate plea
colloquy and confirmed multiple times that Willis was knowingly
and

voluntarily

pleading

guilty.

Consequently,

“there

is

a

strong presumption that [Willis’] plea is valid and binding.”
Nicholson,

676

F.3d

at

384.

Moreover,

the

district

court

reliably applied the Moore factors to the facts of this case.
We therefore cannot conclude that the district court abused its
discretion

in

denying

Willis’

motion

to

withdraw

his

guilty

plea.
As to Willis’ second argument, although Willis attempted to
withdraw his guilty plea, he did not assert in the district
court

any

issue

negotiations;
participation

we
in

related

to

the

therefore
the

process

court’s

review
for

involvement

the

plain

district

error

only.

in

plea

court’s
United

States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2150 (2013).
“To prevail on a claim of plain error, [an appellant] must
demonstrate not only that the district court plainly erred, but
also that this error affected his substantial rights.”
States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule

11

context,

[appellant]

must
3

demonstrate

a

United
“In the

reasonable

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probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded
guilty.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Even if a

plain error occurred, we will not correct the error unless it
“seriously

affect[s]

the

fairness,

reputation of judicial proceedings.”

integrity

or

public

Id.

We conclude that Willis has failed to establish plain error
in

the

district

court’s

statement

during

the

plea

First, the court’s disputed comment was not coercive.

hearing.
It was

made well into the plea hearing, after Willis stated that he
wished to plead guilty and had admitted to the factual basis set
forth by the Government, while the court was considering whether
it could accept Willis’ guilty plea.

After Willis hesitated in

admitting his guilt, the court emphasized that “the facts that
have been recited” by the Government and agreed to by Willis “do
constitute the crimes” charged.

The court was not stating that

Willis was in fact guilty, but was merely informing Willis that
the facts he had admitted were sufficient to establish guilt for
the crimes charged.
The court’s comment “occurred during the district judge's
attempts to ensure that [Willis] was knowingly and voluntarily
entering into the agreement, which the judge, of course, was
required

to

do,”

militating

against

a

finding

of

coercion.

United States v. Cannady, 283 F.3d 641, 645-46 (4th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, the court did not suggest that Willis “should plead
4

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guilty or otherwise advocate[] a particular course of action.”
Id. at 645.
The court did not “intimate that a plea” was in Willis’
best

interests

or

suggest

that

Willis

would

receive

favorable sentence in exchange for pleading guilty.
F.3d

at

816.

Nor

did

the

court

comment

on

a

more

Sanya, 774

the

perceived

strength of the Government’s case or state that it believed the
Government would actually be able to prove at trial the factual
basis

that

it

had

set

forth.

Rather,

the

district

court

attempted to resolve the inconsistent positions taken by Willis
when

he

agreed

with

the

factual

basis

provided

by

the

Government, but hesitated to state that he was guilty of the
crimes charged.
Because the single, isolated comment occurred toward the
end of the plea hearing, after Willis had accepted the plea
agreement, conceded to a factual basis, and professed his desire
to

plead

guilty,

no

error

occurred.

See

United

States

v.

Braxton, 784 F.3d 240, 243-44 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that error
occurred because “[t]his is not a case involving a single or
even a few brief remarks by the court, or comment made only
after a plea agreement already has been reached.”).
Accordingly, we affirm Willis’ convictions.

We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

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adequately

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presented

in

the

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materials

before

this

court

and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

6