US v. Seth Kamose Ali

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cr-00090-FDW-DSC-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999812272].. [15-4457]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4457

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SETH KAMOSE ALI,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00090-FDW-DSC-1)

Submitted:

April 21, 2016

Before SHEDD and
Circuit Judge.

AGEE,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

May 4, 2016

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anne M. Hayes, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Seth

Kamose

Ali

appeals

his

conviction

of

assault

on

a

federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
On appeal, Ali asserts two errors.

First, he argues that the

evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.

Second,

he argues that a clerical error exists in the district court’s
judgment and should be corrected.

For the reasons that follow,

we affirm Ali’s conviction but remand to correct the judgment’s
clerical error.
We review de novo a denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal.

United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 228 (4th Cir.

2016), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Mar. 22,
2016)

(No.

15-8637).

“The

question

is

whether,

viewing

the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of

the

crime

beyond

a

reasonable

quotation marks omitted).
not
sole

review

credibility

province

review.”

of

the

doubt.”

Id.

(internal

In conducting this analysis, we do

determinations,
jury

and

not

which

“are

susceptible

within
to

the

judicial

United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir.

1996) (en banc).
To

violate

18

U.S.C.

§ 111(a),

“a

defendant

must:

(1) forcibly; (2) assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate,
or interfere with; (3) a designated federal officer; (4) while
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engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties
. . . (5) [with] the intent to do the acts specified in the
subsection.”
Cir.

2002)

United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.
(footnote

and

internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

Here, the only element in dispute is whether Ali intended to
assault Peachey or whether he accidentally closed the car door
on Peachey’s hand.
Peachey testified at trial that he was behind Ali when he
attempted to throw a subpoena into the car through the car door.
Ali slammed the car door shut, but, with Peachey’s hand between
the door and the car frame, the door could not fully close.
Nevertheless, according to Peachey, Ali did not stop pulling on
the

door

but

maintained

Peachey’s left hand.

strong

pressure

on

it,

trapping

Peachey was forced to use his right hand

to attempt to pull the door open.

Ali continued to pull the

door shut on Peachey’s hand in an active “tug of war” with
Peachey.
Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude
that, when Ali realized the door would not close, he formed the
intent to assault Peachey by continuing to force the door closed
on Peachey’s hand.

While Ali’s version of events may be equally

plausible, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of
the Government.

Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863.

Because a reasonable

jury could have determined that Ali intended to assault Peachey,
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we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Ali’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
Ali also asserts that remand is appropriate to correct a
clerical error.

Courts may “at any time correct a clerical

error in a judgment.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.

The jury found that

Ali did not use a deadly or dangerous weapon when he assaulted
Peachey,

but

the

judgment

states

that

Ali

was

convicted

of

assault on a federal officer with a deadly and dangerous weapon.
The Government concedes this clerical error and agrees that we
should remand the case to correct it.

We therefore remand this

matter for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error
in the judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm Ali’s conviction.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with
contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

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