US v. Roger Geddie

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00284-FL-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999792275]. [15-4478]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4478

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROGER ALVESTER GEDDIE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00284-FL-1)

Submitted:

March 31, 2016

Decided:

April 11, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
The district court sentenced Roger Alvester Geddie to 105
months’ imprisonment and a 5-year term of supervised release
after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm
and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
Geddie argues on appeal that his above-Guidelines sentence of
imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.

We affirm in part,

vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
We

review

deferential

a

sentence

for

abuse-of-discretion

reasonableness,
standard.”

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).

applying

Gall

v.

“a

United

Because Geddie does not assert

on appeal any procedural sentencing error, we review only the
substantive

reasonableness

account

totality

the

of

of

the

the

sentence,

circumstances,”

“tak[ing]
id.

at

into

51,

and

considering “whether the sentencing court abused its discretion
in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards
set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)],” United States v.
Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014), and cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 384 (2014).

“An appellate court owes ‘due

deference’ to a district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a)
factors,

and

mere

disagreement

with

the

‘insufficient

to

justify

reversal

of

United

v.

Howard,

773

519,

States

F.3d
2

sentence

the
531

below

district
(4th

is

court.’”

Cir.

2014)

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(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51); see id. at 529 n.8; see also
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52.
We

conclude

that

discretion

in

Guidelines

range

imprisonment.
U.S.

departing

may

and

district
from

court

Geddie’s

did

imposing

a

not

advisory

term

of

abuse

its

Sentencing

105

months’

The district court departed upwardly pursuant to

Sentencing

court

the

base

Guidelines
a

Manual

Guidelines

§ 4A1.3,

§ 4A1.3

p.s.

upward

(2014).

departure

“A
on

a

defendant’s prior convictions, even if those convictions are too
old to be counted in the calculation of the Guidelines range
under Guidelines § 4A1.2(e).”
349, 352 (4th Cir. 2015).

United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d

Here, the district court considered

Geddie’s argument that his past convictions were too remote but
concluded that considering these convictions was necessary to
better reflect Geddie’s criminal history.

See id.

We likewise conclude that Geddie’s sentence is consistent
with

the

considered

relevant
Geddie’s

§ 3553(a)
criminal

factors.
history

The
in

district

concluding

court

that

an

above-Guidelines sentence was necessary to promote respect for
the

law

and

§ 3553(a)(2)(A),

to

protect

(C).

the

public.

Furthermore,

See

the

18 U.S.C.

district

court

reasonably concluded that Geddie’s extensive criminal history,
including several firearms offenses, did not adequately deter
him

from

committing

the

instant
3

offense

and,

thus,

that

a

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lengthier sentence was necessary to afford adequate deterrence.
See

id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B);

see

also

United

States

v.

Montes-

Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A] shorter prison
term

was

inappropriate

for

a

defendant

who

had

repeatedly

committed a serious offense and who had already proven immune to
other means of deterrence.”).
that his sentence

creates

Moreover, while Geddie argues

unwarranted

sentencing

disparities,

the existence of USSG § 4A1.3, p.s., demonstrates that, when a
defendant’s

criminal

history

category

does

not

adequately

reflect the seriousness of his criminal history or the risk of
recidivism, such defendant is not similarly situated to other
defendants

whose

criminal

history

categories

are

not

so

inadequate and, thus, renders any resulting sentencing disparity
between them warranted.
of

unwarranted

Cf. Gall, 552 U.S. at 54 (“[A]voidance

disparities

was

clearly

considered

by

the

Sentencing Commission when setting the Guidelines ranges.”); see
also United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir.
2012)

(“Even

if

[defendant]’s

sentence

is

more

severe

than

average, that fact does not mean that it was unwarranted.”). *
Thus, we affirm Geddie’s term of imprisonment.

*

While Geddie also contends that the district court
considered an inappropriate factor because it stated it was
giving him the “benefit” of sustaining his objection to a
sentencing enhancement, we conclude that Geddie has taken this
statement out of context, as the district court proceeded to
(Continued)
4

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Turning to the supervised release portion of the sentence,
the

district

court

imposed

a

five-year

term

of

supervised

release which, as the government notes, exceeds the statutory
maximum

three-year

term.

See

3559(a)(3), 3583(b)(2) (2012).

18

U.S.C.

§§ 924(a)(2),

We conclude that the district

court plainly erred in so doing.

See United States v. Moore,

810 F.3d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2016) (setting forth standard of
review).

Thus, we vacate this portion of the district court’s

judgment and remand for the district court to correct the term
of supervised release.
In sum, we affirm the sentence in part, vacate it in part,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART;
AND REMANDED

explain
why
the
resulting
appropriate sentence.

Guidelines

5

range

was

not

an