US v. Kofi Agyekum
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cr-00197-1. [1000008890]. [15-4479]
Appeal: 15-4479
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4479
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KOFI OHENE AGYEKUM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00197-1)
Argued:
September 23, 2016
Decided:
January 24, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz concurred and Judge Wynn concurred
in part. Judge Wynn wrote a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Monica D.
Coleman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Christian M. Capece, Federal
Public Defender, Rachel E. Zimarowski, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant.
R. Booth Goodwin II, United
States
Attorney,
OFFICE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
ATTORNEY,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kofi Agyekum pleaded guilty
to
two
counts
of
structuring
cash
transactions
to
evade
reporting requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324, and
agreed to forfeit significant assets.
When, at sentencing, the
district court calculated Agyekum’s sentencing range under the
Sentencing
Guidelines,
it
increased
Agyekum’s
offense
level
based on his leadership role and his abuse of a position of
trust in connection with a drug distribution conspiracy that the
district court found to be “relevant conduct” under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3.
On
appeal,
Agyekum
challenges
the
district
court’s
conclusion that his participation in a drug conspiracy qualified
as “relevant conduct” to his structuring convictions.
And in
connection with his agreement to forfeit assets, he contends
that the district court failed to ensure that he was adequately
aware of all of the procedural protections he was waiving.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
I
In
Agyekum,
October
opened
Virginia.
a
licensed
2012,
A+
Kofi
Care
Agyekum
Pharmacy
and
his
wife,
Patricia
in
Barboursville,
West
Patricia was the licensed pharmacist, while Kofi was
pharmacist
intern.
Kofi
2
had
completed
pharmacy
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school but
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had
failed
the
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board
examination.
Kofi
Agyekum,
nonetheless, functioned as the chief executive officer of A+
Care
Pharmacy,
“controll[ing]
everything,”
as
his
wife
later
explained.
In June 2014, as IRS and DEA agents were investigating a
drug
trafficking
organization
that
was
illegally
distributing
oxycodone pills in and around Lincoln County, West Virginia, the
agents began to focus on A+ Care Pharmacy as a source of the
drugs.
Specifically, after agents searched the Florida home of
the suspected head of the drug trafficking organization, the
suspect
agreed
to
telling
agents
that
prescriptions
because
at
the
of
A+
he
as
and
Care
pharmacy
prescriptions.
months
serve
a
confidential
his
fiancée
Pharmacy
was
in
informant
had
started
November
willing
to
2012,
fill
(“CI”),
filling
in
part
out-of-state
The CI indicated that after approximately four
dealing
with
A+
Care
Pharmacy,
Kofi
Agyekum,
who
appeared to be in charge of the pharmacy, told him to have his
physician
addition
start
to
the
DEA’s suspicion.
writing
narcotic
prescriptions
prescriptions
for
to
non-narcotics
avoid
raising
in
the
Agyekum also directed that the CI pay for
future prescriptions in cash.
The
law
enforcement
agents
twice
used
the
CI
to
make
controlled purchases of oxycodone and other drugs from A+ Care
Pharmacy.
During the first transaction on June 13 and 16, 2014,
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Agyekum
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charged
the
CI
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$1,100
more
than
he
had
previously
charged him for the same prescriptions; asked the CI what he was
doing with the prescription pill bottles; responded “Ok” when
the CI said that he burned the bottles; agreed to fill other
out-of-state prescriptions for the CI’s employees; and tore off
dosing
receipts
identifying
A+
Care
Pharmacy
as
the
filling
pharmacy before handing over the prescriptions, stating that he
did
not
want
to
leave
a
paper
trail.
During
the
second
transaction on July 21, 2014, when the CI asked if he could
purchase
oxycodone
tablets
without
a
prescription,
Agyekum
responded that the CI should check with him the following month.
The
investigation
of
A+
Care
Pharmacy
and
Agyekum
also
revealed their connection with a drug trafficking operation led
by
Anthony
Ferguson,
which
operated
out
of
Owingsville,
Kentucky, and which also used A+ Care Pharmacy as a supplier of
oxycodone pills for illegal distribution.
July
2014,
Ferguson
paid
for
a
number
Between January and
of
people
to
travel
regularly to Georgia, Florida, and Virginia to obtain oxycodone
prescriptions and fill them at A+ Care Pharmacy, visiting the
pharmacy about two or three times a week and filling five to six
prescriptions at a time.
Ferguson or his lieutenant always paid
cash for the prescriptions, and Agyekum charged Ferguson more to
fill
prescriptions
“doctor
shoppers.”
for
In
members
March
of
or
4
the
April
organization
2014,
who
Agyekum
were
began
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selling oxycodone to Ferguson without a prescription, usually
charging $1,500 for 100 30-milligram oxycodone pills.
On one
occasion
Nissan
Maxima
in
in
July
2014,
exchange
for
Ferguson
200
gave
oxycodone
Agyekum
pills,
a
2004
and
on
another
occasion later that month, Ferguson bought 1,000 oxycodone pills
from Agyekum for $15,000.
According to DEA records, “A+ Care Pharmacy was the third
largest distributor of oxycodone in West Virginia for 2014,” and
the drug made up 70% of the pharmacy’s annual dosage units for
2014.
The
law
enforcement
Agyekum’s banking practices.
agents
also
began
investigating
A bank teller at the Fifth Third
Bank in Barboursville told agents that when Agyekum attempted to
deposit $16,000 in cash into a savings account on December 23,
2013, the teller began completing a currency transaction report
for
the
deposit,
as
banks
are
required
to
do
for
transfers
involving more than $10,000 in U.S. currency, prompting Agyekum
to ask how he could avoid the reporting paperwork.
After the
teller explained the reporting paperwork, Agyekum asked if the
report would still have to be filed if he made the deposits on
different days or used different branches.
He then asked for
$7,000 of the cash back, depositing only $9,000 that day.
He
returned later in the week and made additional cash deposits of
just under $10,000.
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In a similar manner, Agyekum opened a savings account at
J.P.
Morgan
Chase
Bank
on
February
24,
2014,
$13,500 in cash into that account the next day.
and
deposited
When a teller
asked for his identification in order to prepare the currency
transaction
asked
report,
about
requirement.
the
Agyekum
was
amounts
reluctant
that
to
triggered
provide
the
it
and
reporting
After the teller told Agyekum that deposits over
$10,000 would require the filing of the report, Agyekum never
again deposited over $10,000 in a single transaction.
Moreover,
in the two-month period after he opened the J.P. Morgan Chase
savings account, Agyekum opened six additional accounts on which
he was listed as the sole owner and signer.
In total, from March 3 through August 9, 2014, Agyekum made
structured cash deposits of $469,930 into bank accounts at five
different banks.
For example, after A+ Care Pharmacy had taken
in approximately $40,647 in cash proceeds during the three-day
period from April 22 through April 24, 2014, Agyekum made a
series of deposits on April 25, depositing $8,000 in cash at
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank; $8,000 in cash at Fifth Third Bank;
$9,500
at
Huntington
National
Bank;
$2,500
in
cash
at
First
Sentry Bank; and another $6,000 in cash into a different account
at First Sentry Bank.
When he made the deposit at Fifth Third
Bank, Agyekum attempted to explain the deposit by telling the
branch manager that the cash was coming from his business and
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that he did not accept checks or credit card payments from his
clientele.
After the Fifth Third Bank branch manager then gave
Agyekum
brochure
a
reporting
on
requirements,
structuring
Agyekum
and
opened
currency
two
new
transaction
accounts
that
same day at First Sentry Bank, telling an employee there that he
was aware that any cash deposits over $10,000 would have to be
reported and assuring the teller that all of his deposits would
fall under that threshold.
Similarly, after A+ Care Pharmacy
took in approximately $40,109 in cash during the period from
June 2 through June 4, Agyekum deposited $31,600 in cash in six
transactions at four different banks on June 5 and 6, 2014.
When law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at A+
Care Pharmacy on August 14, 2014, they recovered $38,000 in cash
that
was
lying
pharmacy’s
on
safe.
top
of
Patricia
51,000
Agyekum
oxycodone
later
led
pills
the
in
the
agents
to
another $30,000 in cash that was hidden under Agyekum’s desk at
the
pharmacy.
In
addition
to
the
cash
recovered
at
the
pharmacy, agents also seized 20 bank accounts associated with
Agyekum,
as
well
as
$442,200
in
cash
contained
deposit boxes, for a total of $2,361,109.17.
seized
Agyekum’s
2011
Lexus
station
wagon,
in
two
safe
The agents also
which
he
had
purchased with a cashier’s check from one of the bank accounts.
After Agyekum was arrested, a grand jury returned a third
superseding indictment that charged him with participating in a
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conspiracy
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from
August
2013
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to
August
2014
to
distribute
oxycodone outside the usual course and scope of professional
practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
The indictment also charged him with three
counts of distributing oxycodone, and aiding and abetting the
same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
Finally,
the
indictment
charged
him
with
40
counts
of
money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), and 11
counts of structuring currency transactions to evade reporting
requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), (d).
The
indictment also contained a forfeiture notice, informing Agyekum
that his 2011 Lexus station wagon, a residence located at 3
Castle Gate, Ona, West Virginia, and a sum of more than $2.3
million in U.S. currency were subject to forfeiture.
More
than
six
months
after
his
arrest,
in
April
2015,
Agyekum signed a written plea agreement in which he agreed to
plead
guilty
to
Counts
44
and
45
of
the
third
superseding
indictment, which charged him with structuring cash deposits to
evade reporting requirements on April 25, 2014 and on June 5 and
6, 2014.
He also agreed not to contest the judicial forfeiture
of his assets, acknowledging that “all property covered by this
agreement
[was]
subject
to
forfeiture”
and
that
“the
United
States could establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a
criminal and/or civil forfeiture proceeding against [him] . . .
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arising out of his involvement in a money laundering scheme” and
“his involvement in . . . a conspiracy to distribute quantities
of oxycodone.”
He also acknowledged “that the forfeiture of
assets [was] part of the sentence that [could] be imposed in
this case” and agreed to “waive[] any failure by the court to
advise him of this, pursuant to Rule 11(b)(1)(J), at the time
his guilty plea is accepted.”
He also agreed to waive “all
constitutional and statutory challenges in any manner . . . to
any
forfeiture
Agreement.”
carried
out
in
accordance
with
this
Plea
In return, the government agreed to dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment.
When Agyekum appeared before the district court to plead
guilty pursuant to the plea agreement, he told the court that he
had
reviewed
all
the
paragraphs
of
the
agreement
with
his
attorney and agreed to them with the exception of the paragraph
containing
the
“disagree[d]”
forfeiture
with
that
provision.
paragraph
because
trying to take everything away from me.”
He
stated
“the
that
Government
he
is
The court thereupon
terminated the plea hearing.
A week later, however, Agyekum again appeared before the
district court to plead guilty under the plea agreement.
He
stated that after further discussion with his attorney, he had
decided to go through with the agreement.
He stated that he
understood “about the forfeiture provisions that are in the plea
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agreement”
agreement.
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and
that
he
wanted
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the
court
to
accept
the
plea
When the court inquired specifically whether Agyekum
now accepted the plea agreement’s forfeiture provision, Agyekum
responded that he had “no choice” but to accept the forfeiture.
When the district court explained that he did have a choice and
that
his
“choice
would
be
to
either
comply
with
the
plea
agreement or refuse to comply with the plea agreement,” Agyekum
stated that he understood that and that his decision was to
comply with the plea agreement.
After
sufficient
explained
plea.
receiving
factual
to
With
testimony
basis
Agyekum
the
respect
and
for
the
various
to
finding
the
guilty
that
plea,
consequences
plea
there
of
agreement’s
was
a
the
court
his
guilty
forfeiture
provision, Agyekum again acknowledged that he was agreeing to
forfeit
more
residence
and
than
$2.3
that,
if
million,
he
had
a
Lexus
chosen
automobile,
not
to
agree
and
his
to
the
forfeiture, “the Government would have [had] to prove to the
Court that [his] criminal activity was substantially involved in
[his] generating or obtaining the [assets].”
At the conclusion
of the hearing, the district court accepted the guilty plea,
finding that Agyekum understood the rights he was giving up by
entering a guilty plea and that his plea was voluntary.
The
following day, the court entered a preliminary forfeiture order
consistent with the plea agreement.
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In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared
a presentence report, which concluded that Agyekum had a base
offense level of 20, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.3.
The report
concluded
should
further
that
the
base
offense
level
be
increased by:
two levels pursuant to § 2S1.3(b)(1)(A) because
Agyekum
or
“knew
believed
that
the
funds
were
proceeds
of
unlawful activity”; two levels pursuant to § 2S1.3(b)(2) because
Agyekum “committed the offense as part of a pattern of unlawful
activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period”; two
levels pursuant to § 3B1.1(c) on the ground that Agyekum “was an
organizer,
leader,
manager,
or
supervisor
in
. . .
criminal
activity”; and two levels pursuant to § 3B1.3 for “abus[ing] a
position of public or private trust . . . in a manner that
significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the
offense.”
With
probation
respect
to
officer
relied
on
distribution conspiracy.
offense
level
responsibility
the
last
Agyekum’s
two
enhancements,
conduct
in
the
the
drug
When the probation officer reduced the
by
three
levels
and
applied
the
for
Agyekum’s
resulting
acceptance
offense
level
of
to
a
criminal history category of I, Agyekum’s recommended advisory
guideline range became 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment.
At
the
sentencing
hearing,
Agyekum
objected
to
the
enhancements based on his leadership role and his abuse of a
position of trust.
He argued that “[t]he offensive conduct that
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he pled guilty to was the structuring, and the evidence that was
presented today shows that he . . . didn’t oversee or supervise
anyone to make these deposits, and he certainly didn’t supervise
anyone
trying
to
defraud
the
bank
to
avoid
reporting.”
He
similarly argued that “with the crime of structuring, he was
actually depositing h[is] and his wife’s money[,] [s]o there was
no abuse of trust from a third party.”
presentence
report,
Agyekum’s
After considering the
objections
to
it,
and
the
testimony of three witnesses, the district court concluded that
“[t]he
relevant
conduct
here
includes
the
unlawful
criminal
activity that underlies the structuring,” finding that Agyekum
was part of “an illegal drug distribution conspiracy . . . and
that’s why he had the money that he then structured to try to
hide.”
The
court
found
further
that
it
was
“clear
that
[Agyekum] was a manager or supervisor” in the conspiracy because
“he
ran
the
pharmacy.”
objection
to
the
reasoning
that
he
abuse
had
The
of
a
court
also
position
“utilized
the
of
overruled
trust
limited
Agyekum’s
enhancement,
authority
of
a
pharmacy and of a pharmacist . . . to order huge quantities of
controlled substances that he knew he was going to turn around
and sell as part of this illegal distribution scheme.”
After
accepting the presentence report’s recommended Guidelines range
of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment, the district court sentenced
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Agyekum to 64 months’ imprisonment, followed by a three-year
term of supervised release.
The next day, the court also entered a final forfeiture
order, ordering forfeiture to the United States of roughly $2.3
million
and
the
Lexus
station
wagon,
but
dismissing
the
preliminary order’s forfeiture of Agyekum’s residence inasmuch
as the residence had been “sold by the lien holder at a public
auction.”
From the final judgment, Agyekum filed this appeal.
II
Agyekum contends first that the district court erred in
calculating his sentencing range when it imposed two sentencing
enhancements
--
namely,
a
two-level
enhancement
for
his
leadership role, as provided in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), and a twolevel
enhancement
for
his
abuse
provided in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
of
a
position
of
trust,
as
He argues that because he pleaded
guilty only to two structuring offenses -- which simply involved
his individual conduct as a bank customer -- he could not be
imputed with a leadership role or abusing a position of trust.
Moreover, he argues that his drug dealing activity, on which the
district
court
relied
to
impose
the
enhancements,
was
not
relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, for which he could be
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held
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accountable
when
being
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sentenced
for
his
structuring
violations.
The government contends that “[t]he district court properly
found that defendant’s illegal drug distribution conspiracy was
properly
treatable
conviction
when
as
he
relevant
was
conduct
structuring
the
for
his
proceeds
offense
of
dealing to hide the source and nature of his cash.”
his
of
drug
It argues,
accordingly, that the enhancements were supported by his role in
the drug distribution activity and were properly applied.
To
begin,
Sentencing
we
note
Guidelines
that
is
the
aimed
overarching
at
design
sentencing
of
the
defendants
in
substantial part for “the actual conduct in which the defendant
engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or
convicted.”
U.S.S.G. § 1A1.4(a).
“Thus, despite the limited
scope of conduct for which the defendant was convicted, he may
nonetheless
United
be
States
(emphasis
sentenced
v.
added);
McVey,
see
more
752
also
broadly
F.3d
for
606,
U.S.S.G.
relevant
610
§
(4th
conduct.”
Cir.
1B1.3(a)
2014)
(defining
“relevant conduct” for purposes of sentencing accountability and
recognizing
that
such
defendant’s
specific
introductory
cmt.
accountability
criminal
(noting
is
liability);
that
the
broader
id.
role
in
Ch.
than
3,
the
the
pt.
B
offense
adjustments are based on “all conduct within the scope of §
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1B1.3 . . . and not solely on the basis of elements and acts
cited in the count of conviction”).
As
pertinent
here,
U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3
defines
relevant
conduct to include “all acts and omissions committed . . . by
the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility
for that offense.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
The operative term “during,” as relevant here, provides the link
between relevant conduct and the conduct constituting the crime
of
conviction.
But
necessarily,
when
defining
“relevant
conduct,” the term “during” conveys a linkage that is more than
a mere temporal overlap; it also conveys a qualitative overlap
such that the conduct must be related or connected to the crime
of conviction.
See United States v. Wernick, 691 F.3d 108, 115
(2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “[o]ne criminal act does not become
‘relevant’ to a second act under [§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)] by the bare
fact of temporal overlap” and that there must also be “proof of
a connection between the acts”).
In
this
case,
Agyekum
argues
that
the
two
structuring
offenses to which he pleaded guilty occurred on three discrete
dates -- April 25, June 5, and June 6 -- and that he did not
engage in drug activity “during the commission of” those charged
offenses.
This
argument,
however,
15
overlooks
the
nature
and
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context of his drug distribution activity and the role that it
played in his structuring conduct.
It is true that the offenses of conviction were discrete
structuring acts committed on April 5, June 5, and June 6, 2014.
But those acts were also temporally and qualitatively linked to
Agyekum’s drug distribution activity.
sentencing
supported
engaged
a
August
in
2013
included
drug
and
the
indictment’s
distribution
that
dates
transactions
the
his
involving
charge
that
conspiracy
that
2014,
a
Agyekum
had
in
concluded
of
The evidence presented at
August
structuring
hundreds
of
activity
thousands
oxycodone and millions of dollars in cash.
begun
year
and
of
by
that
numerous
units
of
While the evidence
does not reveal any drug transactions on the specific dates in
which
he
activity
engaged
was
in
broader
structuring,
than
the
the
ongoing
individual
conspiratorial
drug
transactions.
During the entire year of the conspiracy, Agyekum was ordering
oxycodone
units
from
the
drug
manufacturer’s
then providing them illegally to customers.
and
on
oxycodone
a
continuous
and
basis,
illicitly
Agyekum
obtained
cash
was
in
distributor
and
At the same time
also
storing
the
the
pharmacy
and
engaging in ongoing deception by altering records and failing to
comply with reporting requirements of the West Virginia Board of
Pharmacy.
And perhaps most importantly, Agyekum’s ongoing drug
distribution
activity
produced
the
16
illicit
cash
that
Agyekum
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deposited in banks in a manner designed to conceal his overall
illegal
activity.
Specifically,
by
evading
reporting
requirements at the banks, in violation of the structuring law,
Agyekum concealed his illicit drug activity from law enforcement
investigators.
difficulty
In
in
light
affirming
of
the
this
evidence,
district
court’s
we
have
little
conclusion
that
Agyekum’s ongoing drug dealing activity was conduct engaged in
during
his
structuring
offenses,
making
it
relevant
conduct
under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
The question remains whether this relevant conduct showed
that Agyekum was in a leadership role and abused a position of
trust
so
as
to
support
the
two
enhancements
applied
by
the
district court.
Section 3B1.1(c) provides for a two-level enhancement for a
defendant’s
leadership
role
“[i]f
the
defendant
was
an
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” in a relatively small
criminal
enterprise.
The
commentary
identifies
a
number
factors that indicate such a leadership role, including:
the
[defendant’s]
exercise
of
decision
making
authority,
the
nature
of
[the
defendant’s]
participation in the commission of the offense, the
recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a
larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of
participation in planning or organizing the offense,
the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the
degree of control and authority exercised over others.
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U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.
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The district court applied these
factors and found it “clear that [Agyekum] was a manager or
supervisor” in the illegal drug distribution conspiracy, citing
his role in running the pharmacy and directing:
pharmacy
pharmacy
would
fill
would
out-of-state
only
accept
(1) that the
prescriptions;
cash
for
(2)
filling
that
the
oxycodone
prescriptions; (3) that the pharmacy charged different prices
depending on the risk involved in the transaction; and (4) that
those seeking to fill suspicious oxycodone prescriptions were
also
required
substances.
to
prescriptions
for
non-controlled
The court found further that Agyekum “handled all
the money[,] . . .
every way.”
submit
controll[ing] all the [bank] accounts in
In sum, the district court found that “while there
was a pharmacist [at the pharmacy] and she technically filled
the prescriptions,” the evidence was that Agyekum actually “ran
the business” and directed her activities and the activities of
the pharmacy.
the
record,
These factual findings, which are supported by
justify
the
application
of
the
leadership-role
enhancement.
As to the enhancement for the abuse of a position of trust,
the record likewise supports the district court’s application of
the
enhancement.
Section
3B1.3
provides
for
a
two-level
enhancement if “the defendant abused a position of public or
private trust . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated
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the commission or concealment of the offense.”
are
“characterized
(i.e.,
given
substantial
considerable
by
professional
discretionary
deference.)”
or
Such positions
managerial
judgment
that
U.S.S.G.
§
discretion
is
ordinarily
3B1.3
cmt.
n.1.
This enhancement therefore may be applied if a defendant abuses
the
substantial
discretion
given
him
as
a
professional
manager in order to commit or conceal the offense.
or
The “central
purpose” of the enhancement “is to penalize[] defendants who
take advantage of a position that provides them with the freedom
to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong.”
651
F.3d
388,
393
(internal
quotation
there
be
to
relationship
an
(4th
marks
abuse
between
Cir.
of
[the
and
2011)
United States v. Brack,
(alteration
citation
trust,
original)
omitted).
“[t]here
defendant]
in
and
Thus,
must
his
be
a
victim,”
for
trust
United
States v. Caplinger, 339 F.3d 226, 236 (4th Cir. 2003) (second
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Moore, 29 F.3d
175,
180
“tak[ing]
(4th
Cir.
advantage
1994)),
of
[it]
which
to
the
defendant
perpetrate
or
abuses
conceal
by
the
offense,” id. at 237 (quoting United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d
199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996)).
Here, Agyekum was both a professional and a manager who
abused the considerable discretion inherent in these positions.
Specifically, he was a licensed intern in a pharmacy in West
Virginia and, at the same time, functioned as the CEO of A+ Care
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Pharmacy, with full control of it.
Inherent in these positions
was the professional and managerial discretion with which he
designed and implemented the way the pharmacy functioned vis-àvis
the
oxycodone
purchased
distributor
oxycodone;
Pharmacy,
to
requirements;
the
whom
State
A+
employees,
from
of
Pharmacy
including
whom
A+
Care
Pharmacy
West
Virginia
Board
had
ongoing
reporting
his
wife
as
the
of
licensed
pharmacist; the pharmacy’s banks; the pharmacy’s patients and
customers;
and
the
public
at
large.
In
some
of
these
relationships, but surely not all, Agyekum’s role amounted to a
position
of
“substantial
trust
as
used
discretionary
in
§
judgment
3B1.3
that
in
that
is
it
involved
ordinarily
given
considerable deference” and was “subject to significantly less
supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily
non-discretionary in nature.”
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.
And
in some of these relationships, Agyekum used that discretion to
commit or conceal his illegal activities.
For instance, rather
than purchasing oxycodone from his distributor for dispensation
to patients with prescriptions to serve legitimate purposes, as
the distributor assumed he was doing, he purchased oxycodone to
supply
drug
dealers
illegally
and
without
prescriptions;
and
rather than reporting filled prescriptions to the West Virginia
Board of Pharmacy as required, he altered computer records to
avoid proper reporting and to conceal the extent of his illegal
20
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activities.
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Pg: 21 of 30
In this manner, Agyekum abused his positions as a
licensed intern in a pharmacy and as the functioning CEO with
complete control of A+ Care Pharmacy by taking advantage of his
role
in
the
relationships
with
Virginia Board of Pharmacy.
Moreover,
Agyekum’s
his
distributor
and
the
West
See Caplinger, 339 F.3d at 237.
conduct
corrupted
many
of
his
other
professional relationships, including his relationship with his
wife in her capacity as an employee and the licensed pharmacist
at
the
pharmacy
legitimate
and
customers,
illegal conduct.
these
or
Agyekum’s
any
whose
relationship
purchases
he
with
used
the
pharmacy’s
to
shield
his
We need not, however, rely on the abuse of
other
clear
his
relationships
abuse
of
his
because,
positions
of
at
a
minimum,
trust
with
the
distributor and the West Virginia Board of Pharmacy justified
the district court’s application of the two-level enhancement.
III
Agyekum also contends that “[t]he district court plainly
erred by failing to ensure that [his] waiver of rights related
to
forfeiture
inquiring
as
was
to
made
whether
knowingly
Agyekum
and
was
intelligently
aware
of
the
by
myriad
not
of
procedur[al] rights and protections which he was waiving.”
The government contends that the record simply does not
support Agyekum’s position and that, in any event, Agyekum has
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failed to show that but for the alleged error he would have not
gone through with his guilty plea.
Because
review
is
rights.”
Agyekum
for
did
“plain
not
preserve
error
that
this
affects
issue
[his]
below,
our
substantial
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the
district court fully informed Agyekum of the terms of the plea
agreement and its provision for waiver of any challenge to his
agreement to forfeit assets.
forth
Agyekum’s
agreement
The plea agreement itself sets
“that
the
United
States
could
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a criminal and/or
civil forfeiture proceeding [against him] . . . arising out of
his
involvement
in
a
money
laundering
scheme”
and
“his
involvement in . . . a conspiracy to distribute quantities of
oxycodone
. . .
$2,500,000.”
which
generated
gross
proceeds
of
at
least
The agreement makes clear that Agyekum “consents
to, and otherwise agrees not to contest,” such a proceeding.
And it states that Agyekum “agrees to waive all constitutional
and statutory challenges in any manner (including direct appeal,
habeas corpus, or any other means) to any forfeiture carried out
in accordance with this Plea Agreement.”
When Agyekum first appeared before the district court to
plead
guilty
pursuant
to
the
plea
agreement,
his
attorney
summarized the plea agreement in open court, after which the
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court asked Agyekum, “[D]o you understand what this agreement
does and what it requires of you?”
sir.”
Agyekum responded, “Yes,
When the court asked Agyekum whether he reviewed each
paragraph of the plea agreement with his attorney, Agyekum said,
“Yes,”
but
forfeiture
added
that
provision
he
“disagree[d]
because
take everything away from me.”
“the
with”
Government
the
agreement’s
[was]
trying
to
The court concluded the hearing
because Agyekum had not agreed to all of the plea agreement’s
terms.
Nonetheless, these facts indicate that Agyekum fully
understood the proposed forfeiture provision, although he was
troubled by its scope.
A week later, however, Agyekum again appeared before the
court after discussing all of his options with his lawyer and
stated that he was prepared to accept the plea agreement as
written.
When
asked
again
whether
he
went
over
the
plea
agreement paragraph by paragraph with his attorney, Agyekum said
that he had and that he was accepting the agreement as written.
When the court pressed Agyekum further, Agyekum explained that
he was agreeing because he had “no choice.”
The court then
stated, “Well, your choice would be to either comply with the
plea agreement or refuse to comply with the plea agreement.
you understand that?”
Do
And Agyekum said, “Yes, sir,” adding that
his decision was “to comply with the plea agreement.”
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Against these facts, Agyekum simply cannot claim that his
waiver was not knowingly and intelligently given.
In any event, Agyekum has also failed to establish that his
substantial
rights
were
affected,
succeed under plain error review.
that
Agyekum
was
unhappy
with
as
necessary
for
him
to
While the record does reveal
the
forfeiture
provision,
he
ultimately decided to accept it as the price of receiving the
government’s agreement to dismiss 53 counts of the indictment.
There is no indication that Agyekum would have made a different
decision
with
respect
to
his
plea
had
the
district
court
provided some different explanation of the forfeiture provision.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Agyekum’s conviction
and sentence.
AFFIRMED
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WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority opinion that Kofi Agyekum’s plea
was knowing and voluntarily.
I also agree that the district
court correctly concluded that Kofi Agyekum’s activities related
to
the
drug
distribution
conspiracy
constituted
“relevant
conduct” for purposes of his sentencing, and that, relying on
that conduct, the district court properly imposed a sentencing
enhancement related to Kofi Agyekum’s leadership role in the
drug
conspiracy.
But
I
disagree
that
the
district
court
properly enhanced Kofi Agyekum’s sentence on the basis that he
abused a position of trust.
not
have
the
trust
To the contrary, Kofi Agyekum did
relationship
necessary
to
support
the
imposition of an abuse of a position of trust enhancement with
either the West Virginia Board of Pharmacy or the distributor
from which A+ Care Pharmacy purchased oxycodone.
Therefore, I
respectfully dissent as to Part II of the majority opinion.
As
the
majority
opinion
correctly
states,
a
two-level
enhancement for abuse of a position of trust is proper if “the
defendant
abused
a
position
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3--that
is,
“a
of
public
or
position . . .
private
trust,”
characterized
by
professional or managerial discretion,” id. § 3B1.3 cmt. n.1.
The defendant’s abuse of a position of trust must be effected
“in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission of
the offense.”
Id. § 3B1.3.
Moreover, “[w]hether a defendant
25
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held a position of trust must be assessed from the perspective
of the victim,” United States v. Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d 602, 611
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 874 (2010), and “[t]here must
be a trust relationship between [the defendant] and his victim
for the enhancement to apply,” United States v. Moore, 29 F.3d
175,
180
(4th
Cir.
1994)
(alteration
in
original)
(emphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e generally weigh three factors to determine whether a
particular defendant abused a position of trust, including (1)
whether the defendant had special duties or special access to
information not available to other employees, (2) the extent of
the
discretion
defendant’s
others
in
the
defendant
possessed,
indicate
that
positions
who
actions
similar
Abdelshafi, 592 F.3d at 611.
he
and
is
engage
(3)
more
in
whether
culpable
criminal
the
than
acts.”
Under this test, establishing a
trust relationship “requires more than a mere showing that the
victim had confidence in the defendant.
a fiduciary function is required.”
Something more akin to
United States v. Ebersole,
411 F.3d 517, 536 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v.
Caplinger,
339
F.3d
226,
237
(4th
Cir.
2003))
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here,
the
majority
opinion
identifies
the
West
Virginia
Board of Pharmacy and the pharmacy’s distributor as the victims
of Kofi Agyekum’s abuse of a position of trust.
26
Ante, at 21.
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The majority opinion, however, fails to establish that a trust
relationship existed between Kofi Agyekum and either the Board
of
Pharmacy
or
the
distributor.
Regarding
the
Board
of
Pharmacy, as a “Pharmacy Intern,” Kofi Agyekum was “licensed to
engage
in
the
practice
of
pharmacist
supervision of a pharmacist.”
care
while
under
the
W. Va. Code § 30-5-4 (emphasis
added).
Accordingly, Kofi Agyekum’s state licensure expressly
deprived
Kofi
supervisory
Agyekum
and
of
managerial
discretionary
discretion
authority
supervisor--here, Patricia Agyekum.
in
and
his
placed
pharmacist
Indeed, West Virginia law
renders Kofi Agyekum’s authority with regard to the dispensing
of pharmaceuticals entirely derivative of Patricia Agyekum, as
Kofi Agyekum’s pharmacist supervisor.
See W. Va. Code § 30-5-
4(51)
a
(“‘Pharmacist-in-charge’
means
pharmacist
currently
licensed in this state who accepts responsibility for . . . the
distribution of drugs and who is personally in full charge of
the pharmacy and pharmacy personnel.”).
To
that
end,
West
Virginia
law
entrusts
pharmacists-in-
charge, like Patricia Agyekum--not Pharmacy Interns, like Kofi
Agyekum--with
federal
laws
the
responsibility
and
pharmaceuticals.
preventing
of
the
complying
diversion
with
of
state
and
prescription
See, e.g., W. Va. Code § 30-5-4(51) (providing
that the pharmacist-in-charge is responsible “for the operation
of
a
pharmacy
in
conformance
with
27
all
laws
and
legislative
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rules . . . and the distribution of drugs”); W. Va. Code § 30-523(b)
(“The
pharmacist-in-charge
is
responsible
for
the
pharmacy’s compliance with state and federal pharmacy laws and
regulations and for maintaining records and inventory.”); W. Va.
Code R. § 15-1-20(3.2.2) (“The pharmacist-in-charge shall notify
the
pharmacy
permit
holder
of
potential
violations
of
any
statute, rule or court order existing within the pharmacy. If
appropriate action has not been taken within a reasonable amount
of time the pharmacist-in-charge shall reduce to writing the
above and submit to the pharmacy permit holder with a copy to
the Board.”); W. Va. Code R. § 15-1-20(3.2.8) (providing that
the pharmacist-in-charge is responsible for “[m]aking or filing
any
reports
required
regulations”).
Patricia
The
by
Board
Agyekum--as
state
of
or
federal
Pharmacy,
laws,
therefore,
pharmacist-in-charge--with
rules,
and
entrusted
special
duties
and responsibilities, not Kofi Agyekum--a Pharmacy Intern under
her supervision.
Accordingly, a trust relationship existed between the Board
of Pharmacy and Patricia Agyekum, as the pharmacist-in-charge
and Kofi Agyekum’s supervisor, not between the Board of Pharmacy
and Kofi Agyekum.
Patricia Agyekum may have abused the trust
the Board of Pharmacy placed in her by allowing Kofi Agyekum to
illegally dispense oxycodone and by failing to report the loss
of
oxycodone
from
A+
Care
Pharmacy’s
28
inventory.
However,
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Patricia Agyekum’s abuse of her relationship of trust with the
Board of Pharmacy does not serve as a basis to enhance Kofi
Agyekum’s
sentence.
defendant’s
Moore,
sentence
cannot
29
be
F.3d
at
enhanced
179
on
(holding
grounds
that
of
a
a
co-
conspirator’s abuse of a position of trust).
There is also no evidence of a trust relationship between
Kofi Agyekum and the distributor from which A+ Care Pharmacy
purchased oxycodone.
Because something “akin to a fiduciary
function” is required to create a trust relationship, Ebersole,
411 F.3d at 536, “an ordinary commercial relationship between
the perpetrator and victim is insufficient to support the abuse
of trust enhancement,” United States v. Akinkoye, 185 F.3d 192,
204 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Moore, 29 F.3d at 178); see also,
e.g., United States v. Septon, 557 F.3d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 2009)
(finding
that
“an
arms-length
commercial
relationship
will
ordinarily not suffice for the [abuse-of-trust] enhancement to
apply”).
A+
Care
Accordingly, Kofi Agyekum’s purchase of oxycodone on
Pharmacy’s
relationship
behalf
between
Kofi
cannot,
Agyekum
by
itself,
and
the
create
a
trust
distributor
or,
accordingly, amount to an abuse of a position of trust.
The district court rightly noted that Kofi Agyekum could
purchase
oxycodone
distributor
only
and
other
through
controlled
use
of
substances
Patricia
from
Agyekum’s
the
Drug
Enforcement Administration Registration Number (“DEA Number”).
29
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Doc: 33
this
Filed: 01/24/2017
amounts
to
Pg: 30 of 30
nothing
more
than
evidence
that
the
distributor placed trust in Patricia Agyekum--the holder of the
DEA Number and the individual authorized to dispense controlled
substances--not in Kofi Agyekum.
Again, that Patricia Agyekum
may have abused the distributor’s trust by allowing Kofi Agyekum
to use her pharmacist license and DEA Number to order oxycodone
does not support enhancing Kofi Agyekum’s sentence.
F.3d
at
179.
Therefore,
Kofi
Agyekum’s
use
of
Moore, 29
Patricia
Agyekum’s DEA Number to place orders with the distributor does
not establish a trust relationship between Kofi Agyekum and the
distributor and, thus, cannot support a sentencing enhancement
based upon abuse of a position of trust.
In sum, a trust relationship did not exist between Kofi
Agyekum and the Board of Pharmacy or between Kofi Agyekum and
the
distributor.
imposing
the
The
enhancement
district
for
court,
abuse
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
30
of
therefore,
a
position
erred
of
in
trust.
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