US v. Aaron Monroe

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:12-cr-00047-D-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999934063]. [15-4557]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4557

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
AARON MONROE,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (7:12-cr-00047-D-1)

Submitted:

September 9, 2016

Decided:

September 22, 2016

Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mitchell G. Styers, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC, Warrenton,
North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Aaron

Monroe

pleaded

guilty

to

robbery

of

a

business

engaged in interstate commerce and aiding and abetting the same,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

1951, 2 (2012) (count one), using

and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of
violence and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§

924(c), 2 (2012) (count two), and being a felon in

possession of a firearm, and aiding and abetting the same, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924, 2 (2012) (count three).
On resentencing, after determining that Monroe qualified as a
career offender, the district court sentenced him to 324 months’
imprisonment.

We affirm.

At resentencing, Monroe objected to the determination that
he was a career offender based on his North Carolina conviction
for

second

States v.

degree

Shell,

rape

789

in

F.3d

light
335

of

(4th

our
Cir.

decision
2015).

in

United

The

career

offender sentencing enhancement applies if the defendant is at
least 18 years old at the time of commission of the offense for
which he is being sentenced and the instant offense is either a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and the
defendant has at least two prior convictions that qualify as
either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2015).

Under the

force clause for career offender predicates, a crime of violence
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is any felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
USSG § 4B1.2(a).
The Government contends, however, that any error by the
district

court

in

determining

Monroe

qualified

as

a

career

offender and sentencing him to 324 months of imprisonment is
harmless because the district court asserted at sentencing that,
even if Monroe did not qualify as a career offender, it would
have imposed the same sentence based on its consideration of the
sentencing

factors,

errors

sentencing

at

review.”

18

U.S.C.
are

§

3553(a)

“routinely

(2012).

subject

to

Procedural
harmlessness

United States v. Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123

(4th Cir. 2011); see Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 141
(2009).
“‘[A]ssumed harmlessness inquiry’ requires (1) ‘knowledge
that the district court would have reached the same result even
if

it

had

decided

the

guidelines

issue

the

other

way,’

and

(2) ‘a determination that the sentence would be reasonable even
if

the

guidelines

favor.’”

is

had

been

decided

in

the

defendant’s

United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th

Cir. 2014).
court

issue

The error will be deemed harmless only where the

“certain”

of

these

two

factors.

Gomez, 690 F.3d 194, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).

United

States

v.

Because the district

court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence as an
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upward variance even if Monroe were not a career offender, we
find

that

the

first

prong

of

the

harmlessness

inquiry

is

satisfied.
We “review all sentences — whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range — under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”
38, 41 (2007).

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a

sentence, considering “the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding
that the sentence it chose satisfie[s] the standards set forth
in

§

3553(a).”

Gomez-Jimenez,

750

F.3d

at

382.

When

the

district court imposes a variant sentence, this court considers
“whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect
to its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to
the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”
States

v.

Hernandez-Villanueva,

473

F.3d

118,

123

United

(4th

Cir.

2007).
In

determining

Monroe’s

sentence,

the

district

court

expressly considered his history and characteristics — including
his numerous prior convictions, the nature and circumstances of
the offenses of conviction, the seriousness of the offenses, the
need to promote respect for the law, and the need to provide
punishment.

The court determined that there was a great need

for deterrence.

The court also emphasized the need to protect
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the public, opining that Monroe participated in a “crime wave of
terrible conduct that harms people” when he is not imprisoned.
After
district

considering
court

appropriate.

all

determined

of

In

the

light

that
of

the

§

a

3553(a)

324-month

district

factors,

the

sentence

was

court’s

thorough

consideration of the sentencing factors and its individualized
assessment of the factors as they related to Monroe, we conclude
that the 324-month upward variant sentence is reasonable and
that any error by the district court in concluding that Monroe
was a career offender, is harmless.

See Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d

at 382.
Accordingly, we affirm Monroe’s sentence.
oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

We dispense with
contentions
this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

5