US v. Ronald Johns, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:15-cr-00024-MSD-LRL-1. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999906593].. [15-4599]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4599

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD LAVERNE JOHNS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Mark S. Davis, District Judge.
(2:15-cr-00024-MSD-LRL-1)

Submitted:

August 2, 2016

Decided:

August 9, 2016

Before TRAXLER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD &
MORECOCK, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J.
Boente, United States Attorney, Darryl J. Mitchell, Assistant
United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald Laverne Johns, Jr., pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
conditional guilty plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), to possession
of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012), and being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).

Johns

preserved his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his car
and during searches, pursuant to warrants, of two residences.
now presents that issue on appeal.

He

We affirm.

When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo, construing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.

United States v. Lull, ___

F.3d, ___, ___, No. 15-4216, 2016 WL 3006286, at *4 (4th Cir. May
25, 2016).
“Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an
automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for
a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’ within the
meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].”
U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996).

Whren v. United States, 517

“As a result, such a stop must be

justified by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, of unlawful conduct.”

United

States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
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quotation marks omitted).

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“When an officer observes a traffic

offense — however minor — he has probable cause to stop the driver
of the vehicle.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In

addition, when there is probable cause, police are authorized to
arrest a person committing “even a very minor criminal offense”
without violating the Fourth Amendment.
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

Atwater v. City of Lago

Furthermore, when a person is

arrested in a traffic stop, police may conduct an inventory search
of that person’s car, which is “merely an incidental administrative
step following arrest and preceding incarceration” that does not
require a warrant.

United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 738-39

(4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Johns contends that the traffic stop was illegal because it
was pretextual.

However, according to uncontroverted evidence

introduced at the suppression hearing, Johns was straddling two
lanes and driving erratically, in violation of Virginia state law.
And regardless of the officer’s subjective intent, the stop was
lawful because the police objectively had probable cause to stop
the car after observing Johns’ erratic driving.
F.3d at 312.

See Williams, 740

Because the traffic stop was lawful, the arrest was

lawful, and because the arrest was lawful, the inventory search
was lawful.

Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in

denying Johns’ motion to suppress evidence seized during the
traffic stop.
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As to the residence searches, Johns argues that he is entitled
to a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to
determine the veracity of the affidavits supporting the search
warrants.
“An

accused

is

generally

not

entitled

to

challenge

veracity of a facially valid search warrant affidavit.”
States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011).

the

United

An exception

is made for those who can meet the two-pronged test first announced
in Franks.

Under that test, in order to secure a Franks hearing,

“the accused must make a substantial preliminary showing that false
statements were either knowingly or recklessly included in an
affidavit supporting a search warrant and that, without those false
statements,
finding.”

the

affidavit

cannot

Allen, 631 F.3d at 171.

support

a

probable

cause

“Probable cause” does not have

a precise definition, but it “plainly exists where the known facts
and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found.”

Id. at 172 (alterations and internal quotation marks

omitted).
We conclude that there is no evidence to suggest the affiant
falsely or recklessly made his statements that he personally saw
Johns go to and from the Virginia Beach and Hampton residences
within the preceding six months.

Moreover, our review convinces

us that probable cause supported the issuance of both warrants
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even without the challenged statements.

Consequently, we conclude

the district court did not err in denying Johns’ motion to suppress
evidence seized from the Virginia Beach and Hampton residences.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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