US v. Arthur Crawley

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cr-00197-JAB-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999793212].. [15-4627]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4627

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARTHUR DEJUAN CRAWLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:14-cr-00197-JAB-1)

Submitted:

March 29, 2016

Decided:

April 12, 2016

Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Kyle D.
Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Arthur

Dejuan

Crawley

pled

guilty,

pursuant

to

a

conditional plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a
firearm,

in

violation

(2012).

The

of

district

18

court

U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1),

sentenced

Crawley

to

924(a)(2)
37

months’

imprisonment and imposed a 3-year term of supervised release.
Crawley’s plea agreement specifically permitted him to appeal
the

district

court’s

order,

which

was

entered

prior

to

the

guilty plea, denying Crawley’s motion to dismiss the indictment
on speedy trial grounds.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm

this ruling and the criminal judgment.
The

Sixth

Amendment

provides

that

“[i]n

all

criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial.”

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

The Supreme Court has

rejected a bright-line test to determine whether a defendant’s
speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment has been violated
and

instead

has

balancing test.

outlined

four

factors

to

be

weighed

in

a

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972).

Specifically, this court is to consider the “[l]ength of delay,
the

reason

for

the

delay,

the

defendant’s

right, * and prejudice to the defendant.”

*

assertion

Id. at 530.

of

his

For his

The district court concluded that this Barker factor
weighed in Crawley’s favor, and this determination is not
implicated in this appeal.

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claim to succeed, Crawley must “establish that on balance, the
four

separate

[Barker]

factors

weigh

in

his

favor.”

United

States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 271 (4th Cir. 2009) (alteration
and internal quotation marks omitted).

“The length of the delay

is to some extent a triggering mechanism.

Until there is some

delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity
for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
The record reflects, and the parties do not dispute, that
the

charging

Crawley’s

indictment

trial

was

was

returned

scheduled

to

on

May

27,

2014,

on

May

11,

begin

and

2015.

Consistent with this court’s precedent, the district court ruled
that this delay was presumptively prejudicial and proceeded to
analyze

the

remaining

Barker

factors.

See

United

States

v.

Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 598 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that
the

time

frame

for

presumptive

prejudice

is

flexible

and

observing that a shorter time frame (there, eight months) was
appropriate

because

defendant’s

prosecution

was

not

complex).

Although not challenged on appeal, we note our agreement with
this threshold determination.
We also agree with the district court’s balancing of the
other Barker factors.

Specifically, although the court opined

that the Government bore more responsibility for the delay than
did

Crawley,

it

weighed

the

second
3

Barker

factor

in

the

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Government’s favor because the reasons for the delay were either
valid or neutral.

We discern no error in this legal conclusion.

See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (opining that “[a] more neutral
reason

such

weighted

as

less

negligence

heavily

but

or

overcrowded

nevertheless

courts

should

should

be

be

considered

since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must
rest

with

the

government

rather

than

with

the

defendant”).

Compare United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 705-06 (6th
Cir.

2011)

(opining

defendant’s

that

indictment

a

near
his

and

three-year
initial

delay

between

appearance

and

arraignment, for which the district court found the Government
was solely responsible, was “rightly characterized as ‘beyond
simple negligence,’” and upholding decision to weigh the second
Barker factor in favor of defendant).
Finally, we are not persuaded by Crawley’s argument that he
was

prejudiced

by

the

delay.

With

inquiry, a court is to consider:
pretrial
anxiety
hampered

incarceration
and
the

concern;

was

and

defendant’s

regard

the

ability

the

prejudice

(1) whether the defendant’s

oppressive;

(3)

to

(2)

the

possibility
to

prepare

defendant’s

that

the

his

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992).

delay

defense.
At the

most, Crawley asserted nonspecific anxiety caused by inertia and
the lack of communication between the U.S. Attorney’s Office and
the district court upon Crawley’s arrival in the Middle District
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of North Carolina, but he cites to no authority to support the
proposition that this type of generalized anxiety establishes
prejudice to the defendant.
We

thus

find

no

reversible

error

in

any

aspect

of

the

district court’s rationale for rejecting Crawley’s speedy trial
arguments.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order denying

Crawley’s motion to dismiss, and we affirm the ensuing criminal
judgment.
legal
before

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

contentions
this

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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