US v. Michael Casteen

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:05-cr-00029-F-2 Copies to all parties and the district court. [999828544]. [15-4681]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4681

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL WAYNE CASTEEN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (7:05-cr-00029-F-2)

Submitted:

May 18, 2016

Decided:

May 20, 2016

Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney,
Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael Casteen appeals the district court’s order imposing
a 60–month prison sentence upon revoking his supervised release.
On appeal, he claims that his sentence to the statutory maximum
is

substantively

than

necessary

plainly
to

unreasonable

satisfy

the

because

purposes

of

it

was

greater

sentencing.

We

affirm.
We will not disturb a district court’s revocation sentence
unless it falls outside the statutory maximum or is otherwise
“plainly unreasonable.”

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,

373 (4th Cir.) (citing United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
437 (4th Cir.2006)), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 494
(2015).

Only if the revocation sentence is unreasonable must we

assess whether it is plainly so.

Id. (citing United States v.

Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir.2007)).

“In determining

whether a revocation sentence is unreasonable,” we are informed
by the same procedural and substantive considerations that guide
our

review

deferential

of

original

appellate

sentences

posture.”

but

Id.

“we

strike

(citations

and

a

more

internal

quotation marks omitted).
A district court “retains broad discretion to ... impose a
term

of

imprisonment

up

to

the

statutory

maximum.”

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Id.

In exercising

such discretion, the district court “is guided by the Chapter
2

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Seven policy statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as
well as the statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).”
738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Webb,
“Chapter Seven instructs

that, in fashioning a revocation sentence, ‘the court should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into

account,

to

a

limited

degree,

the

seriousness

of

the

underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.’”
Id.

(quoting

U.S.

Sentencing

Guidelines

Manual

ch.

7,

pt.

A(3)(b) (2012)).
“Although § 3583(e) enumerates the factors a district court
should consider when formulating a revocation sentence, it does
not expressly prohibit a court from referencing other relevant
factors omitted from the statute.”
listed

in

§

3553(a)(2)(A)

are

Id.

Moreover, “the factors

intertwined

with

the

factors

courts are expressly authorized to consider under § 3583(e).”
Id. (citations omitted).

Thus, “although a district court may

not

sentence

impose

a

seriousness
sentence

revocation

of

to

the

promote

releasee’s
respect

based

violation
for

the

predominately

on

the

for

the

or

the

need

law

and

provide

just

punishment . . . mere reference to such considerations does not
render

a

revocation

sentence

procedurally

unreasonable

when

those factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction
with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.”
3

Id. at 642 (citation

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omitted); see USSG ch. 7, pt. A(3)(B) (punishing new criminal
conduct is not “the primary goal of a revocation sentence,” but
the

“nature

of

the

conduct

leading

to

the

revocation

[is]

considered in measuring the extent of the breach of trust”).
Here, the district court properly considered the Chapter 7
policy statements as well as the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
The

court

also

appropriately

considered

struggles with substance abuse.
that

the

unreasonable.
order.
legal
before

sentence

admitted

On these facts, we cannot say

imposed

Accordingly,

Casteen’s

was

we

affirm

substantively
the

plainly

district

court’s

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
contentions
this

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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