US v. Samuel Hill

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00206-F-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000047620].. [15-4700]

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4700

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL WAYNE HILL, a/k/a Sam Hill,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00206-F-1)

Submitted:

March 14, 2017

Decided:

March 23, 2017

Before MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Cindy H. Popkin-Bradley, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, First Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L.
Fritz,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Raleigh,
North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:
Samuel Wayne Hill pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or
substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012).
court

sentenced

Hill

to

480

months’

The district

imprisonment,

which

was

within his Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life.
The court also imposed a lifetime term of supervised release,
which was an upward variance from the Guidelines range of five
years.
In

his

opening

brief

on

appeal,

Hill

argued

that

the

district court committed procedural sentencing error by failing
to explain adequately the 480-month sentence, to address his
arguments for a downward variance, and to explain the reasons
supporting
release.
end

of

the

upward

variance

in

the

term

of

supervised

Hill also contended that the court’s comments at the
the

sentencing

hearing

demonstrated

judicial

bias

in

violation of due process.
We previously granted the Government’s motion to dismiss
this appeal, in part, based on the waiver-of-appellate-rights
provision included in Hill’s plea agreement, pursuant to which
Hill waived his right to appeal a within-Guidelines sentence.
We ruled that Hill’s acceptance of this waiver was knowing and
2

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Pg: 3 of 6

voluntary and that the first two appellate issues fell within
the scope of the waiver.
the

reasonableness

of

However, neither Hill’s challenge to

his

upward

variant

term

of

supervised

release nor his due process claim is foreclosed by the appellate
waiver.

We address each of these claims in turn.

First,

pursuant

to

Rule

28

of

the

Federal

Rules

of

Appellate Procedure, the argument section of the brief “must
contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them,
with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
which

the

appellant

relies.”

Fed.

R.

App.

P.

28(a)(8)(A).

Issues not raised in a party’s opening brief are waived.

United

States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327, 335 (4th Cir. 2013).
To be sure, Hill’s opening brief identifies the lifetime
term of supervised release as part of the issue on appeal. 1

But

the argument portion of the brief frames the claimed procedural
sentencing
either

the

error

in

480-month

terms

of

the

custodial

court’s

sentence

failure
or

rejecting the requested downward variance.
comes

to

asserting

an

argument

1

relevant

its

to

explain

reasons

for

The closest Hill
to

the

supervised

Specifically, the statement of the argument is as follows:
“Whether the district court committed procedural error when it
did not adequately explain why it imposed 480 months as the term
of imprisonment, why it rejected Mr. Samuel Hill’s arguments for
a variance, and why it ordered a term of life for supervised
release.” (Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 35) at 20).

3

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Pg: 4 of 6

release term is his statement that, “[i]t was also a violation
of the law not to give reasons for rejecting a request for
downward variance and upwardly depart on supervised release and
use

key

words

and

phrases

(Appellant’s Br. at 31).

to

justify

the

upward

departure.”

This simply is not enough to raise the

issue sufficiently to entitle Hill to appellate review by this
court.

See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n.7

(4th Cir. 2006) (holding that a single sentence in an opening
brief

asserting

a

district

court’s

alleged

error

“is

insufficient to raise on appeal any merits-based challenge to
the

district

court’s

ruling”).

We

thus

hold

that

Hill

has

waived appellate review of this particular claim. 2

2

Even if it were not waived, Hill’s challenge to the
district court’s explanation for the supervised release term
would not garner Hill any relief. Because Hill did not ask for
any specific term of supervised release and did not object to
the selected term of supervised release, we would review Hill’s
procedural reasonableness challenge only for plain error.
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).
To
establish plain error, Hill must show that (1) the district
court erred, (2) the error is clear or obvious, and (3) the
error affected his substantial rights, meaning that it “affected
the outcome of the district court proceedings.”
United States
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993). Our review of the record
satisfies us that there is no such plain error here.
Prior to sentencing Hill, the district court identified and
addressed itself to Hill’s criminal history, his personal
circumstances (including his ongoing drug addiction and early
exposure to the culture of methamphetamine production), and
Hill’s
significant
involvement
with
the
long-lasting
methamphetamine production operation that was underlying the
charged conspiracy.
The court concluded by observing that the
(Continued)
4

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Finally,

then,

there

is

Pg: 5 of 6

Hill’s

claim

that

the

district

court violated due process when, at the end of the sentencing
hearing, it made two statements regarding the societal harms
caused by cooking methamphetamine.

While the district court’s

strongly worded comments conveyed a disdain for methamphetamine
cooks

and

the

serious,

long-lasting,

detrimental

effects

of

methamphetamine on a community, the challenged comments do not
suggest bias amounting to a due process violation.
comments

reflected

methamphetamine

the

epidemic

court’s
and

its

frustration
consideration

Rather, the
with
of

the
Hill’s

criminal conduct — specifically, that Hill participated in the
conspiracy for four years, distributed nearly three kilograms of
methamphetamine in his community, cooked in multiple locations
where

on

one

occasion

an

explosion

occurred

and

resulted

in

serious injuries, and remained addicted to the drug himself.
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994) (“Not
establishing

bias

or

partiality

.

.

.

are

expressions

of

impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are
within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after

imposed sentence, which included both the custodial term of
imprisonment and the term of supervised release, was appropriate
given the extensive and ongoing nature of Hill’s egregious
criminal conduct.
We thus readily conclude that there was no
procedural error — let alone plain error — in this regard.

5

Appeal: 15-4700

Doc: 63

Filed: 03/23/2017

Pg: 6 of 6

having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.”).
Such comments are well within bounds and thus do not offend due
process.

See United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 740 (4th

Cir. 1991) (“We recognize that a sentencing court can consider
the impact a defendant’s crimes have had on a community and can
vindicate

that

considerable
public

community’s

extent

condemnation

a

interests

sentencing

and

social

in

justice.

is

the

judge

outrage.

As

To

a

embodiment

of

the

community’s

spokesperson, a judge can lecture a defendant as a lesson to
that

defendant

and

as

a

deterrent

to

others.”

(citations

omitted)).
Accordingly,

we

criminal judgment.
facts

and

materials

legal
before

affirm

the

remaining

portion

of

Hill’s

We dispense with oral argument because the

contentions

are

adequately

this

and

argument

court

presented

would

not

in

the

aid

the

decisional process.
AFFIRMED

6