US v. Reginald Grant

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00296-FL-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999900160].. [15-4703, 15-4706]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4703

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT, a/k/a Dog,
Defendant - Appellant.

No. 15-4706

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGINALD DWAYNE GRANT,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00296-FL-1; 5:06-cr-00100-FL-1)

Submitted:

July 20, 2016

Decided:

July 29, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Terry F. Rose, Smithfield, North Carolina, for Appellant. John
Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P. MayParker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Reginald

Dwayne

Grant

appeals

the

46-month

sentence

he

received upon pleading guilty to two counts of distributing a
quantity of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2012), and the 18-month sentence he received after the district
court revoked his supervised release.
contends

that

the

sentences,

which

In these appeals, Grant
the

court

consecutively, are substantively unreasonable. *

ordered

to

run

We disagree.

When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a sentence
imposed

upon

conviction,

we

consider

“the

totality

circumstances” under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

of

the

Gall v.

In evaluating a sentence

for an abuse of discretion, “we give[] due deference to the
[d]istrict [c]ourt’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, on the whole, justified
the sentence.”
but

not

greater

sentencing.
Guidelines

Id. at 59-60.
than

The sentence must be “sufficient,

necessary,”

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
sentence,

as

here,

is

to

satisfy

the

goals

of

We presume that a withinsubstantively

reasonable.

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).

Grant may rebut that presumption

*

Grant does not claim that the district court committed any
procedural error in sentencing him for either the crimes of
conviction or the revocation of supervised release.

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only “by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”

Id.

A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court stated a proper basis for concluding that the
defendant should receive the sentence imposed.
Crudup,

461

F.3d

433,

440

(4th

Cir.

United States v.

2006).

Although

the

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to
satisfy

the

goals

of

sentencing,

see

18

U.S.C.

§§ 3553(a),

3583(e) (2012), “the sentencing court retains broad discretion
to revoke a defendant’s [supervised release] and impose a term
of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum,” United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Grant fails to rebut the presumption that
either sentence is substantively reasonable.

In fashioning the

46-month sentence for the crimes of conviction, the district
court considered Grant’s request for a lesser sentence in light
of

the

§ 3553(a)

factors,

such

as

Grant’s

history

and

characteristics, the nature and circumstances of the offense,
and

the

need

adequately

for

explained

the
its

sentence
reasons

imposed.
in

The

imposing

court
a

also

revocation

sentence within the statutory maximum.
Additionally, Grant’s argument fails because the revocation
sentence

is

separate

crimes of conviction.

and

distinct

from

the

sentence

for

the

See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 437-38 (observing
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that

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revocation

sentence

is

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designed

to

punish

failure to abide by terms of supervised release).

defendant’s

Moreover, the

argument also runs contrary to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 7B1.3(f),

p.s.

(2015),

which

provides

for

imposition

consecutive sentences in situations such as Grant’s.

of

Accord

United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 208 (6th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that, although not binding, district court should
consider

§ 7B1.3(f),

p.s.,

in

determining

whether

to

impose

consecutive sentences and that such decision is discretionary).
Accordingly,
substantively
judgments.
legal
before

conclude

reasonable,

and

that
affirm

we

the
the

sentences
district

are

court’s

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

contentions
this

we

court

are

adequately

and

argument

presented

would

not

in
aid

the
the

materials
decisional

process.
AFFIRMED

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