US v. Alison Hill

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:14-cr-00079-F-4. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999962407]. [15-4782]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4782

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALISON PAIGE HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00079-F-4)

Submitted:

October 19, 2016

Decided:

November 4, 2016

Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

Elisa Cyre Salmon, SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alison Paige Hill pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, dispense, and
produce

with

the

intent

to

distribute

methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012).

50

grams

or

more

of

She was sentenced within

her advisory Guidelines range to 108 months in prison.

However,

with respect to her supervised release, the district court varied
upward and imposed a 10-year term.

On appeal, Hill challenges the

district court’s decisions with respect to certain Guidelines in
fashioning her sentence, the reasonableness of her Guidelines
sentence, and the reasonableness of her 10-year variant term of
supervised release.

The Government seeks to enforce the appellate

waiver as to all but the last claim.

For the reasons that follow,

we dismiss in part and affirm in part.
“We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within
the scope of the waiver.”

United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d

522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The

validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.”
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir 2005).

To

determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine
“the

totality

of

the

circumstances . . .,

including

the

background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (internal
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quotation

marks

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omitted).

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“Generally,

if

a

district

court

questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights
during the [plea] colloquy and the record indicates that the
defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the
waiver is valid.”

Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
In her plea agreement, Hill waived her right to appeal her
“conviction

and

whatever

sentence

is

imposed

on

any

ground,

including any issues that relate to the establishment of the
advisory Guideline range, reserving only the right to appeal from
a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guideline range
that is established at sentencing.”

The language of this appeal

waiver is clear and unambiguous, and the record reveals that Hill
understood the full significance of the waiver.

The court also

confirmed that Hill was competent to plead guilty and was entering
her plea in the absence of threats, force, or promises outside of
those contained in the plea agreement.

Accordingly, we conclude

that Hill’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable as to issues
within its scope.
In her first two claims, Hill argues that the district court
erred in imposing an enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual

§ 2D1.1(b)(1)

(2015)

for

possession

of

a

firearm

in

connection with her drug offense and (2) denying her a reduction
under USSG § 3B1.2 for her mitigating role.
3

In her third claim,

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she argues that her 108-month Guidelines sentence and 10-year
variant term of supervised release are unreasonable.
challenges

to

her

within-Guidelines

sentence

of

108

Hill’s
months’

imprisonment are clearly within the scope of, and consequently,
barred by the appellate waiver. We therefore dismiss these claims.
Because the district court imposed an upward variance on the
supervised release term, however, Hill’s challenge to this aspect
of her sentence is outside the scope of the waiver.

Hill argues

that the district court did not explain why a 10-year term of
supervised release was necessary or why the 4-to-5-year advisory
Guidelines range was inadequate to address its concerns.

Because

Hill did not object to the term of supervised release below, this
court reviews the record for plain error.
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Webb,

To establish plain error, Hill

must show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error is
clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected her substantial
rights, meaning that it “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).
Even when this burden is met, this court has discretion whether to
recognize the error and may deny relief unless the district court’s
error

“seriously

affect[s]

the

fairness,

reputation of judicial proceedings.”
A

“term

of

supervised

release

integrity

or

public

Id. at 736.
.

.

.

[is]

part

of

the

sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir.
4

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1998), and is therefore reviewed for reasonableness.
United

States,

procedurally

552

U.S.

reasonable,

reasonableness . .

.

38,
this

under

51

(2007).

court

an

If

reviews

a

Gall v.

sentence

for

is

“substantive

abuse-of-discretion

standard.”

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).

The

sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes” of sentencing.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

(2012).
A district court is required to consider the following factors
when determining the length of a term of supervised release:

the

nature

and

and

circumstances

of

the

offense,

the

history

characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protection of the
public, the need to provide the defendant with treatment or care,
the applicable sentencing range, public policy, and any need for
restitution.
Here,

18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012).
the

district

court

noted

the

severity

of

methamphetamine addiction and expressly considered Hill’s troubled
youth, addiction, and criminal history.

The court stressed that

Hill had a history of probation violations and that she had
committed the instant offense while on a sentence of probation.
The court then tailored a term of supervised release that would
monitor future criminal activity and payments of restitution,
noting the upward variance was warranted in light of the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the dangers of methamphetamine
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production, and the need to protect the community.

The 10-year

term was well within the statutory maximum supervised release term
of life.

We conclude that the supervised release variance was

procedurally and substantively reasonable and, therefore, affirm
this portion of Hill’s sentence.

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART

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