Leon Cheatham v. William Muse

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:13-cv-00320-CMH-TRJ Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999614607]. Mailed to: Cheatham. [15-6309]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6309

LEON CHEATHAM,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM MUSE, Chairman Virginia Parole Board; HAROLD
CLARKE, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:13-cv-00320-CMH-TRJ)

Submitted:

June 19, 2015

Before DUNCAN
Circuit Judge.

and

DIAZ,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

and

July 6, 2015

DAVIS,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Leon Cheatham, Appellant Pro Se. James Milburn Isaacs, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Leon

Cheatham

appeals

from

the

district

court’s

order

granting summary judgment to Defendants in Cheatham’s 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2012) action.

Cheatham sued William Muse, Chairman of

the Virginia Parole Board (“Board”), and Harold Clarke, Director
of the Virginia Department of Corrections, alleging that he was
denied parole consideration in violation of his due process and
equal

protection

rights.

The

district

court

ruled

that

(1) Clarke played no personal role in the case; (2) Muse could
not be liable for his supervisory actions; and (3) Muse was
entitled

to

absolute

quasi-judicial

immunity.

On

appeal,

Cheatham avers that (1) Muse was personally involved and not
entitled

to

immunity,

and

(2)

the

district

court

erred

by

failing to consider the merits of his equal protection claim.
Cheatham

does

against Clarke.

not

challenge

the

dismissal

of

the

complaint

Further, he does not challenge the application

or interpretation of the Virginia statute under which he was
found to be ineligible; instead, Cheatham claims only that “he
was treated differently from his co-defendant.”
Virginia’s

“three-strikes”

statute

provides

that

“[a]ny

person convicted of three separate felony offenses . . . when
such offenses were not part of a common act . . . shall not be
eligible for a parole.”

Va. Code § 53.1-151(B)(1).

Cheatham

contends that both he and his co-defendant were convicted of the
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same offenses; while he was found ineligible for parole, his
co-defendant
these

was

findings

found

cannot

eligible,
be

and

reconciled

Cheatham
as

the

contends

two

cases

that
were

identical for these purposes.
Members of the Parole Board, who perform a quasi-judicial
function, are immune from suits for damages.
Shields,

569

Wilkinson

v.

F.2d

784,

Dotson,

544

798

(4th

U.S.

74,

Cir.

See Franklin v.

1977).

81-84

However,

(2005),

the

in

Supreme

Court held that a prison inmate may bring an action against
parole

officials

seeking

declaratory

and

injunctive

challenging the procedures used in denying parole.

relief

Accordingly,

while Cheatham’s claims against Muse for damages were properly
dismissed as barred by Muse’s immunity, the district court erred
in dismissing Cheatham’s claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief which sought rulings requiring his eligibility for parole
review.
However,

we

find

that

Cheatham’s

equal

protection

claim

against Muse, the only claim he pursues on appeal, is without
merit.

“To succeed on an equal protection claim, a [prisoner]

must first demonstrate that he has been treated differently from
others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal
treatment

was

the

discrimination.”
Cir.

2001).

result

of

intentional

or

purposeful

Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654 (4th

Cheatham’s

claim
3

is

reviewed

under

a

“relaxed

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standard of scrutiny,” as prisoners are not a suspect class and,
moreover, Cheatham has not alleged any class that he is a member
of that his co-defendant is not.
686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989).

See Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d

We conclude that Cheatham has failed

to allege how the Board’s denial of parole consideration was the
result of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
At most, Cheatham contends that Muse found him ineligible
for

parole

based

on

some

unexplained

personal

dislike

or

vendetta against him that Muse did not have against Cheatham’s
co-defendant. *
on

his

Cheatham also points to Muse’s changing stories

co-defendant’s

hiding something.
the

state

parole

details

proof

that

Muse

is

While it appears that, in situations where

action

complained

like

individual

“treating

as

of

is

discretionary

differently

is

in

an

nature,
accepted

consequence,” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591
(2008),

in

this

case,

Cheatham

argues

that

Va.

Code

§ 53.1-151(B)(1) does not implicate discretion and that the same
set of facts must result in the same conclusion.
As

discussed

sufficient

to

show

above,
that

Cheatham
Muse

discriminated against him.

*

Muse contends that
eligibility was a mistake.

must

provide

intentionally

or

allegations
purposefully

This is so because “[t]o prove that

Cheatham’s

4

co-defendant’s

parole

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a statute has been administered or enforced discriminatorily,”
and so violates equal protection rights, a plaintiff must show
“more . . . than the fact that a benefit was denied to one
person

while

Calvert

County,

added).
Muse

conferred
48

on

F.3d

another.”

810,

819

Sylvia

(4th

Cir.

Dev.
1995)

Corp.

v.

(emphasis

Instead, Cheatham must also specifically allege that

intended

to

discriminate

against

him.

See

Townes

v.

Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543, 552 (4th Cir. 2009).
Here,

Cheatham

alleges

no

facts

that,

if

proved,

would

demonstrate that Muse intentionally discriminated against him.
He never alleges any of the factors that “have been recognized
as probative of whether a decisionmaking body was motivated by a
discriminatory intent.”

Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 819.

example,

not

Cheatham

arbitrary

and

does

inconsistent

allege

a

decisions

“consistent
by

Muse,

a

For

pattern”

of

“history

of

discrimination” by him, a “specific sequence of events” leading
up

to

the

Muse's

ineligibility

finding,

or

“contemporary

statements” by Muse evidencing intentional discrimination. Id.
In sum, Cheatham sets forth no facts--indeed no allegations-supporting the contention that Muse intentionally discriminated
against

him.

negligence,

At

mistake,

most,
or

his
a

allegations

lack

of

care;

and

evidence

however,

show

there

is

absolutely no showing of intentional discrimination, much less a
showing satisfactory to survive summary judgment.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court
granting summary judgment to Clarke and Muse.

We dispense with

oral

contentions

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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