Lewis Duckett v. Marcia Fuller

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 6:13-cv-03205-JMC. [999802721]. [15-6568]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6568

LEWIS DUCKETT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARCIA FULLER, SCDC Dietician in their individual or personal
capacities; MRS. BALL, First Name Unknown Kershaw Cafeteria
Supervisor in their individual or personal capacities;
MICHAEL
L.
FAIR,
Legislative
Audit
Counsel
in
their
individual or personal capacities; SC DISTRICT 6, Greenville
County
State
Senate
in
their
individual
or
personal
capacities; BOYD H. PARR, Director of Poultry Products and
Inspection in their individual or personal capacities,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville.
J. Michelle Childs, District
Judge. (6:13-cv-03205-JMC)

Argued:

March 22, 2016

Decided:

April 25, 2016

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN,
Jr., United States District Judge for the District of North
Carolina, sitting by designation.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion.
Judge Niemeyer
wrote the opinion in which Judge Motz and Judge Cogburn joined.

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ARGUED: Ricardo Camposanto, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF
LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant.
Sheila M. Bias,
RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellees.
ON BRIEF: Stephen L. Braga, Counsel of Record,
Kaitlyn Tongalson, Third Year Law Student, Appellate Litigation
Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Caleb M. Riser, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN &
ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

2

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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
Lewis Duckett commenced this action against employees of
the

South

Carolina

Department

of

Corrections

(“SCDC”)

and

others, alleging that the food served to him at the Kershaw
Correctional Institution, a prison managed by the SCDC, was so
deficient as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights.

The form

of Duckett’s complaint and the claims made are virtually the
same as a complaint filed against SCDC employees by a fellow
inmate

in

2010,

which

the

district

court

dismissed

on

the

merits.
On the state defendants’ motion in this case, the district
court dismissed Duckett’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that, because Duckett would have
benefited if his fellow inmate’s 2010 suit had been successful,
he is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from pursuing the
present action.

As the court explained:

The claims are at their core identical, and thus
qualify as the same cause of action.
To allow this
claim to go forward would mean relitigating the same
issues this court litigated in [the earlier suit].
This goes against the principles behind res judicata.
We reverse.

As a nonparty to the earlier suit, Duckett is

not precluded from pursuing the same claims on his own behalf in
the

instant

demonstrate

action
that

at

unless

the

state

least

one

of

the

defendants
six

exceptions

general rule against nonparty preclusion applies.
3

are

able
to

to
the

See Taylor v.

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Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-95 (2008).
state

defendants

have

not

We conclude that the

demonstrated

that

any

of

the

exceptions applies and accordingly reverse the district court’s
dismissal

of

Duckett’s

complaint

and

remand

for

further

proceedings.

I
On April 4, 2013, Duckett and 15 other inmates at Kershaw,
all

proceeding

employees

and

pro

se,

other

filed

state

a

complaint

officials,

against

challenging,

two

SCDC

under

the

Eighth Amendment, the quality of the food served at Kershaw.

In

the complaint, which is labeled “Class Action Complaint,” the
inmates alleged that the prison authorities failed to serve food
satisfying

recommended

minimum

daily

amounts

of

vitamins

and

nutrients; that they served insufficient portions; and that they
misrepresented

food

as

beef

when

it

was

actually

made

from

ground poultry offal and organs, thereby violating the inmates’
Eighth Amendment rights.

The inmates sought declaratory and

injunctive relief, as well as damages.

The parties agree that

the complaint was drafted by Duckett’s fellow inmate, Bernard
McFadden, who was also one of the 16 plaintiffs in the action.
On review of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the
district court ruled that the complaint “should not be allowed
to

proceed

under

one

joint

action,”

4

explaining,

among

other

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things,

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that

illnesses

the

case

“Plaintiffs

resulting

individualized
“into

complaint

from

and

have

The

separate

court

actions,

directed

the

new

under

alleged

malnutrition

findings.”

sixteen

Plaintiff,”

Pg: 5 of 16

numbers,

case

clerk

wide

that

array

would

accordingly

file

severed
for

copies

different

of

require

individualized
to

a

a

one

the
each

of

the

for

each

paid

the

account

and

plaintiff.
Following
required

severance

$350

supplemented
allegations

filing

the
of

of

fee

the
out

allegations

his

specific

of

action,
of

his

his

injury,

Duckett
prison

complaint
claiming

with

further

“Bleeding

gums,

weight loss, High Cholesterol, teeth damage, [and] Heart burn,”
among other things.
The state defendants filed a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to
dismiss
matter

Duckett’s
of

this

complaint,
action

asserting

ha[d]

already

that

“[t]he

been

subject

litigated

by

Plaintiff’s privies and a full and final decision on the merits
[had been] rendered by this court.”

They specifically referred

to a similar complaint, which the district court had dismissed
on the merits, filed by inmate McFadden in 2010 against SCDC
employees while McFadden was housed in the Kirkland Correctional
Institution, another prison managed by the SCDC.
While
neither

the

res

magistrate
judicata

nor

judge

recommended

collateral
5

concluding

estoppel

bar[s]

“that
the

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plaintiff’s

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complaint,”

the

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district

court

granted

the

state

defendants’ motion to dismiss on res judicata grounds by order
dated March 19, 2015. 1

In its supporting opinion, the court

concluded that Duckett “[was] in privity with Plaintiff McFadden
in the prior case,” providing the following explanation:
Had McFadden I been a successful suit for Plaintiff,
Plaintiff in this case would have benefitted.
In
McFadden I, the Complaint sought “an Order directing
the Defendants to serve nutritious and balanced meals
according to the daily recommended food charts.”
Plaintiff here similarly seeks an Order requiring “a
gradual change to daily recommended foods that are
balanced and nutritious.”
Further, as far as any
damages
Plaintiff
seeks,
had
McFadden
I
been
successful, Plaintiff could have argued collateral
estoppel barred Defendants from denying the facts that
were litigated and thus would benefit from a favorable
decision. Thus, Plaintiff has the same legal right as
Plaintiff McFadden, and is in privity.
From the final judgment dismissing Duckett’s claims with
prejudice, Duckett filed this appeal.

By order dated October

27, 2015, we appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. 2

II
Duckett contends that he is not bound by the judgment in
McFadden’s 2010 suit because he was not a party to it; he never
had his day in court on the issues presented in it; and he had
1

In the same order, the district court dismissed, without
prejudice, the claims against defendants Michael Fair, SC
District 6, and Boyd Parr, a ruling that Duckett does not
challenge on appeal.
2

We are grateful for appointed counsel’s able service.
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“no meaningful way of participating” in it.

In short, he argues

that he cannot be bound by the judgment in that action unless
his circumstances fit into one of the exceptions to the rule
against nonparty preclusion recognized in Taylor.
that,

because

circumstances,

none
we

of

should

the

exceptions

reverse

the

He asserts

applies

district

to

court’s

his
order

dismissing his complaint.
The state defendants contend that Duckett is bound by the
judgment in McFadden’s 2010 suit because Duckett’s interests in
this action are “aligned with and even identical to” McFadden’s
interests in McFadden’s 2010 suit and, therefore, Duckett is “in
privity” with McFadden.

They assert that “‘privity’ between

parties exists, as a matter of law, when the interests of one
party

are

so

identified

with

the

interests

of

another

that

representation by one party is representation of the other’s
legal

right.”

The

state

defendants

maintain

that

the

applicability of Taylor to this case is, “at best, minimal,”
because Taylor rejected a preclusion doctrine based on what is
known

as

“virtual

representation”

and

“did

not

discuss

the

concept of privity,” on which the district court relied in this
case.

But even if Taylor were to control, they reason, at least

one exception identified in Taylor would apply because Duckett
“desires to create a substantive legal relationship with Inmate

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McFadden” and is, in this case, “acting as an agent or proxy for
Inmate McFadden to re-litigate his claims.”
The district court agreed with the state defendants and
dismissed Duckett’s suit as precluded by the doctrine of res
judicata.
The general rule is well established that once a person has
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim, the person
is

precluded,

under

relitigating it.
49

the

doctrine

of

res

judicata,

from

(2001).

See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748Sound

considerations

justify

the

doctrine.

“[P]reclud[ing] parties from contesting matters that they have
had

a

full

adversaries

and

fair

from

the

opportunity
expense

and

to

litigate

vexation

protects

attending

their

multiple

lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on
judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent
decisions.”
(1979).

Montana

v.

United

States,

440

U.S.

147,

153-54

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is

applied to bar a suit in light of a prior judgment when three
elements

are

demonstrated:

(1)

that

“the

prior

judgment

was

final and on the merits, and rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction

in

accordance

with

the

requirements

of

due

process”; (2) that “the parties are identical, or in privity, in
the two actions”; and (3) that “the claims in the second matter
are based upon the same cause of action involved in the earlier
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proceeding”

--

i.e.,

transaction

or

series

operative facts.”

the
of

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claims

“arise

transactions,

or

out

of

the

same

the

same

core

of

In re Varat Enterprises, Inc., 81 F.3d 1310,

1315-16 (4th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Thus,

in

this

case,

it

cannot

be

disputed

that

inmate

McFadden is precluded from relitigating the claims he asserted
and

lost

in

his

2010

suit.

The

question

presented

here,

however, is whether Duckett’s present action, raising the same
claims that McFadden made in the 2010 suit, is barred by the
doctrine of claim preclusion even though Duckett was not a party
to McFadden’s 2010 suit and did not participate in it.

The

answer is provided definitively by Taylor.
In Taylor, the Supreme Court noted that under the “deeprooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day
in court” with a “full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claims and issues,” a person not designated a party to an action
nor served with process in it “is [generally] not bound by a
judgment in personam” entered in the action.
(internal

quotations

marks

omitted)

553 U.S. at 892-93

(quoting

Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)).

Richards

v.

But the general

rule has exceptions such that the nonparty may nonetheless be
bound by a judgment entered in the action.
identified six such exceptions.

9

The Taylor Court

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First, a nonparty who agrees to be bound by a judgment in
an

action

“‘is

agreement.’”

bound

in

accordance

by

substantive

the

terms

of

his

Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting 1 Restatement

(Second) of Judgments § 40 (1980)).
bound

with

a

judgment
legal

“based

on

Second, a nonparty may be
a

relationships”

variety

between

of

the

pre-existing

nonparty

and

a

party in the action, such as “preceding and succeeding owners of
property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor.”
894

(alteration,

omitted).

internal

quotation

marks,

and

Id. at
citation

Third, a nonparty may be bound by a judgment when the

nonparty was adequately represented in the action by a party
with the same interests, such as in “properly conducted class
actions, and suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other
fiduciaries.”

Id. (citations omitted).

Fourth, a nonparty is

bound by a judgment if the nonparty “‘assume[d] control’ over
the litigation in which that judgment was rendered.”

Id. at 895

(alteration in original) (quoting Montana, 440 U.S. at 154).
Fifth, “a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive
force

by

relitigating

through

a

proxy,”

making

preclusion

“appropriate when a nonparty later brings suit as an agent for a
party who is bound by a judgment.”
circumstances

a

special

Id.

statutory

And sixth, “in certain
scheme

may

‘expressly

foreclos[e] successive litigation by nonlitigants . . . if the
scheme

is

otherwise

consistent
10

with

due

process.’”

Id.

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(alteration in original) (quoting Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
762 n.2 (1989)).
These six exceptions to the rule against nonparty claim
preclusion constitute an exhaustive list for cases such as this.
As

the

Taylor

Court

stated

unequivocally,

“The

preclusive

effects of a judgment in a federal-question case decided by a
federal

court

should

.

.

.

be

determined

according

to

the

established grounds for nonparty preclusion described in this
opinion.”

553 U.S. at 904 (emphasis added).

Despite the state defendants’ arguments to the contrary,
therefore, the resolution of the issue presented in this appeal
begins

and

ends

with

Taylor.

While

the

state

defendants

correctly point out that the Taylor Court declined to use the
term “privity” -- with the Court explaining that it was avoiding
the term to prevent confusion, 553 U.S. at 894 n.8 -- no one can
seriously dispute that the Court nonetheless sought to provide a
comprehensive synthesis of the “discrete exceptions that apply
in ‘limited circumstances’” to the “fundamental . . . rule that
a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a
party,”

id.

at

898

(quoting

Martin,

490

U.S.

at

762

n.2).

Consequently, the question of whether the judgment in McFadden’s
2010 suit bars Duckett from pursuing his claims in this case
must

be

determined

according

preclusion described in Taylor.

to

the

grounds

See id. at 904.
11

for

nonparty

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Turning to this case, the relevant facts to consider are
those alleged in Duckett’s complaint and the undisputed record
facts from McFadden’s 2010 suit, of which the district court in
this case took judicial notice.
521, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000).
McFadden,
alleging
thereby

while
that

incarcerated

SCDC

violated

employees

his

Eighth

See Andrews v. Daw, 201 F.3d
These facts show that, in 2010,

at

Kirkland,

had

served

Amendment

filed

complaint

deficient

rights.

court dismissed that action on the merits.

a

food

The

and

district

Duckett was not a

party to that action, nor was he in any way involved in its
process.

Indeed, he was, at the time, incarcerated at Kershaw,

a different prison.
After McFadden was transferred from Kirkland to Kershaw, he
drafted a complaint on behalf of himself and 15 other inmates,
including Duckett, to challenge the adequacy of the food served
at Kershaw.

This complaint made the same claims that McFadden

had made in 2010 while at Kirkland.

When the district court

severed the action, requiring each inmate to prosecute his own
claims, Duckett did indeed pursue his own, using the McFaddendrafted
injuries

complaint
he

and

claimed

adding
to

be

his

own

suffering.

allegations
The

about

district

the

court

dismissed Duckett’s action because the complaint was virtually
identical to McFadden’s 2010 complaint that had been dismissed,
stating that “to go forward would mean relitigating the same
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issues this court litigated in McFadden I.
the principles behind res judicata.”

This goes against

Because Duckett was not a

party to McFadden’s 2010 suit and was not served in that action,
however, he cannot be bound by the judgment of dismissal in that
action unless one of the six Taylor exceptions applies.
It

appears

exceptions

undisputed

clearly

have

that

no

four

of

applicability

the

here.

six

Taylor

There

is

no

indication that Duckett agreed to be bound by the judgment in
McFadden’s 2010 suit (exception one); that McFadden represented
Duckett in the 2010 suit through a class action mechanism or
other

type

of

functioned

as

representational
Duckett’s

action,

trustee,

such

guardian,

that
or

McFadden
fiduciary

(exception three); that Duckett assumed control over McFadden’s
2010 suit (exception four); or that Duckett’s action implicated
a

special

statutory

scheme

limiting

relitigation

(exception

six).
As to the second Taylor exception, which applies based on
“a

variety

of

pre-existing

substantive

legal

relationships

between the person to be bound [in the current action] and a
party

to

the

(alteration,
the

state

exception

[previous]
internal

defendants
applies

judgment,”

Taylor,

553

U.S.

quotation

marks,

and

suggest,

almost

in

passing,

this

casual

here.

But

citation

at

894

omitted),
that

this

assertion

misunderstands the nature of the exception, which is reserved
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for a variety of legal, property-based relationships.
Taylor

Court

explained,

second

exception

include

relationships
“preceding

qualifying

and

As the

under

succeeding

the

owners

of

property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor,” noting
further that this exception “originated ‘as much from the needs
of property law as from the values of preclusion by judgment.’”
Id. (quoting 18A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward
H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4448 (2d ed. 2002)).
Nothing in this record hints of any qualifying substantive legal
relationship between Duckett and McFadden that might implicate
the second exception.
The

state

defendants’

argument

for

nonparty

preclusion

therefore can rest only, if at all, on the fifth exception,
which

would

preclude

Duckett

from

bringing

his

suit

“as

a

representative or agent of [McFadden] who is bound by the prior
adjudication.”

Taylor, 553 U.S. at 905.

But nothing in the

record supports this exception, which, in essence, is aimed at
precluding McFadden from relitigating his 2010 case by using
Duckett as his foil.

To be sure, McFadden apparently drafted

the original complaint in this case for himself and 15 other
inmates,

and,

indeed,

“jailhouse lawyer.”

Duckett

has

referred

to

McFadden

as

a

But such jailhouse-lawyer assistance does

not prove that Duckett is acting “subject to the control” of
McFadden for the purpose of pursuing McFadden’s claim.
14

Id. at

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To the contrary, the record indicates that Duckett used

McFadden’s assistance to pursue his own claim.
the

original

consistent

complaint
with

his

as

a

plaintiff,

own

earlier

and

Duckett signed
his

grievance

joinder

was

about

the

institution’s food, which he filed in May 2012, nearly a year
before this action was commenced.
claim

was

severed

from

the

claims

In addition, when Duckett’s
of

the

other

15

inmates,

Duckett paid the filing fee from his own prison account and
supplied the court with language, in his own words, describing
the nature of his personal injuries.

Nothing in the record

suggests that Duckett was acting as an agent for McFadden to
pursue McFadden’s claims or that McFadden was serving as some
form of “puppeteer” controlling Duckett, as the state defendants
argue.

Taylor’s fifth exception thus does not apply to this

case.
At

bottom,

we

conclude

that

the

state

defendants

have

failed, at this stage, to meet their burden of demonstrating the
applicability of any of the six Taylor exceptions to the rule
against

nonparty

preclusion.

Accordingly,

as

a

nonparty

to

McFadden’s 2010 suit, Duckett is not barred by a judgment in
that suit from pursuing his own similar claims in this action.
The

district

court’s

judgment

dismissing

15

Duckett’s

complaint

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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is thus reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

16