Rodney Parker v. Warden Stevenson

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-cv-02795-TLW Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999665315]. Mailed to: Rodney Parker. [15-6613]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6613

RODNEY PARKER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WARDEN STEVENSON; MAJ. SUTTON; CPT. WASHINGTON; LT. SYLVIA
JACKSON; SGT. ESTERLINE; SGT. J. C. WILLIAMS; OFC. BECKETT;
OFC. MCCOY; OFC. SUAREZ; OFC. DOOLEY; NURSE K. MCCULLOUGH;
NURSE JANE DOE,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (5:13-cv-02795-TLW)

Submitted:

August 31, 2015

Decided:

September 23, 2015

Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Rodney Parker, Appellant Pro Se.
Drew Hamilton Butler,
Charleston, South Carolina, Carmen Vaughn Ganjehsani, Caleb
Martin Riser, RICHARDSON PLOWDEN & ROBINSON, P.A., Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rodney Parker appeals the district court’s order accepting
the

recommendation

of

the

magistrate

judge

and

granting

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying relief on
his

42

raises

U.S.C.
Eighth

§ 1983

(2012)

Amendment

complaint.

excessive

punishment,

and

deliberate

complaint,

Parker

alleges

Parker’s

force,

indifference
that

(1)

an

cruel

complaint

and

unusual

claims.

In
team

extraction

his
of

correctional officers beat him and used excessive force when
removing him from his cell and placing him in a restraint chair;
(2) his placement in a control cell without clothing,
bedding,

or

constituted

a

mattress

cruel

and

for

an

unusual

extended
punishment

utensils,

period
and

of

time

deliberate

indifference; and (3) Defendants were deliberately indifferent
for

not

providing

adequate

medical

care

for

swelling

in

his

lower extremities.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment,

adopting

the

magistrate

judge’s

report

and

recommendation that concluded that (1) the extraction team used
reasonable force when removing Parker; (2) the record did not
substantiate

Parker’s

claim

that

the

extraction

team

members

beat him; (3) Defendants acted reasonably in placing Parker in a
control cell given his conduct and history of prison violations;

3

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(4)

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medical

repeatedly
Eleventh

records

evaluated
Amendment

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demonstrated
Parker’s

immunity

that

medical

barred

prison

officials

condition;

Parker’s

Defendants in their official capacities.

and

claims

(5)

against

We affirm in part,

vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de

novo,

viewing

the

facts

and

the

reasonable

inferences

therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).

“Summary

judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”

Hoschar v. Appalachian Power Co., 739 F.3d 163,

169 (4th Cir. 2014).

Where the moving party makes an initial

showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and rely on some
form of evidence, including affidavits, to demonstrate that a
genuine

issue

of

material

fact

exists.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

Celotex

Corp.

v.

Finally, “[w]hen opposing

parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could
believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for

purposes

of

ruling

on

a

motion

for

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

4

summary

judgment.”

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Turning

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Eighth

first

to

Amendment’s

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Parker’s

excessive

prohibition

against

force

claim,

‘cruel

and

“the

unusual

punishments’ [extends] to the treatment of prisoners by prison
officials . . . [,] forbid[ding] ‘the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.’”
2013)

(quoting

Whitley

Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir.
v.

Albers,

475

U.S.

312,

319

(1986),

abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34
(2010) (per curiam)).
we

first

inquire

In analyzing an excessive force claim,

“whether

the

prison

official

acted

with

a

sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) .”
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 238 (4th Cir. 2008).
judicial

inquiry’

regarding

the

subjective

“[T]he ‘core

component

of

an

excessive force claim is ‘whether force was applied in a goodfaith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously
and sadistically to cause harm.’”

Id. at 239 (quoting Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)).
We

hold

that

the

magistrate

judge’s

report

and

recommendation, adopted by the district court, contains three
errors necessitating remand.
an

incorrect

Parker’s

standard

excessive

to

force

First, the magistrate judge used

review

the

claim,

a

subjective

standard

that

considered the “extent of the injury inflicted.”
Court

held

in

Wilkins,

there

5

is

no

component

of

incorrectly

As the Supreme

“significant

injury”

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threshold

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to

sustain

an

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excessive

force

claim

because

a

de

minimis injury, if the product of malicious and sadistic use of
force, can sustain the claim.

Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37-38 (“An

inmate who is gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his
ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has
the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”
38.).

Accordingly,

concluded,

that

even

Parker

assuming,

sustained

as

only

the

Id. at

magistrate

bruising,

judge

redness,

and

scratches, the lack of further injury does not bar Parker from
prevailing if those injuries were the result of the extraction
team

beating

Parker

or

maliciously

overtightening his restraints.
should

consider

the

following

and

sadistically

On remand, the district court
four

nonexclusive

factors

when

analyzing the subjective component of Parker’s excessive force
claim:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used; (3) the extent of any reasonably
perceived threat that the application of force was
intended to quell; and (4) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response.
Iko, 535 F.3d at 239 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321).
Second, and a product of the first error, the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation placed too much weight on the
injuries

it

concluded

Parker

sustained

when

extent of the force used by the extraction team.
6

determining

the

In determining

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the amount of force used and whether the force was excessive,
“the nature of the force, rather than the extent of the injury,
is

the

relevant

inquiry.”

Hill,

727

F.3d

at

321.

As

highlighted by the Supreme Court, although “the extent of injury
suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the
use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a
particular

situation,”

“imperfectly

injuries

the

force

Wilkins,

correlated.”

and

559

U.S.

used
at

are

37-38.

Accordingly, while Parker’s injuries are relevant to determining
whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
force used by the extraction team, the existence of a genuine
issue

of

material

fact

does

not

rise

and

fall

on

this

consideration alone.
Third, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, in
concluding

that

the

record

did

not

substantiate

Parker’s

allegations, failed to view the facts and the inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to Parker.
F.3d at 380.

See Bonds, 629

To support his claim that the extraction team beat

him and used excessive force, Parker proffered (1) an affidavit
attesting that when “officers entered [his] cell they commenced
to

beating

[him]

severely”

and

that

they

punched,

kicked,

choked, and dropped knees on him; (2) a prison grievance he
submitted detailing his injuries in a manner consistent with the

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allegations in his affidavit; and (3) an affidavit from a fellow
inmate

who

beating

attested

Parker

that

and

he

that

could

Parker

hear

was

the

extraction

“moaning

and

team

groaning.”

Although several pieces of evidence offered by Defendants may
significantly

draw

into

question

Parker’s

allegations,

a

district court has limited ability to discount evidence offered
by a nonmoving party in support of his allegations.

See Scott,

550 U.S. at 378-80 (noting that courts usually must adopt the
plaintiff’s version of events for purposes of summary judgment
except where evidence “blatantly contradicted” nonmoving party’s
allegations and permits grant of summary judgment).
Because

the

district

court

did

not

apply

the

correct

standard when viewing the record, it is possible that a genuine
issue of material fact exists with respect to the amount of
force and the reasonableness of the force used by the extraction
team.

Accordingly,

on

remand,

the

district

court

should

consider not whether the record substantiates the evidence put
forward

by

videotape
record)

Parker

offered

and

any

but
by

other

whether

the

Defendants

(but

evidence

the

record,
not

including

made

parties

may

part

of

present

the
the
on

remand, “blatantly contradict[s]” the evidence Parker proffered.
Having noted the above errors in the district court’s summary
judgment

analysis,

we

vacate

the

8

district

court’s

grant

of

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summary judgment with respect to Parker’s excessive force claim
against the extraction team in their individual capacities and
remand for further proceedings. 1
We next turn to Parker’s cruel and unusual punishment and
deliberate indifference claims stemming from the conditions of
his

confinement

in

a

control

cell.

The

Eighth

Amendment

“provides protection with respect to ‘the treatment a prisoner
receives

in

confined.’”

prison

and

the

conditions

under

which

he

is

Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)).

For

Parker to prevail on his claims stemming from the conditions of
his confinement, he “must prove (1) that the deprivation of a
basic

human

need

was

objectively

sufficiently

serious,

and

(2) that subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.”
(4th

Cir.

2013)

De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525

(emphasis

and

brackets

omitted).

However,

unlike an excessive force claim that may be sustainable where
only

a

de

deprivation,

minimis
that

is,

injury
a

resulted,

serious

1

or

“[o]nly

significant

an

extreme

physical

or

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgement
to the extraction team in their official capacities because
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars suit and recovery
from the state “even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.” Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).

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emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or
substantial risk thereof, will satisfy the objective component
of

an

Eighth

confinement.”

Amendment

claim

challenging

the

conditions

of

Id.

In an effort to satisfy this objective component, Parker
first alleges that he suffered mental and emotional problems
from his confinement in the control cell.
allegation,

however,

is

conclusory

and

Parker’s one line

fails

to

sufficiently

allege any specific mental or psychological condition that was
caused or aggravated by his time in the control cell.

Parker’s

bald assertion that he suffered mental and emotional problems
from

his

confinement

in

the

control

cell

is

insufficient

to

demonstrate a serious or significant emotional injury adequate
to

survive

Power

summary

Co.,

“[c]onclusory

312
or

judgment.

F.3d

645,

speculative

See
649

Thompson
(4th

allegations

Cir.
do

v.

Potomac

2002)
not

Elec.

(holding

suffice”

to

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact).
Second, Parker alleges that he suffered swelling in his
lower extremities because Defendants refused him a mattress in
the control cell.

The uncontroverted record shows that, over a

month after being placed in the control cell, Parker presented
to the prison medical staff with diffuse edema in his lower
extremities.

X-rays of Parker’s lower extremities confirmed the

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diagnosis of diffuse level 1-2+ edema but showed no injury to
any of his bones, no evidence of trauma, and no evidence of
osseous abnormalities.

Finally, medical records submitted by

Defendants and Parker demonstrate that Parker received Tylenol
and Lasix for the swelling, which resolved within 11 days of
Parker

reporting

Accordingly,

the

although

condition
the

to

swelling

prison
Parker

medical

staff.

experienced

is

a

physical injury arguably stemming from the conditions of his
confinement,

it

is

not

a

“serious

or

significant”

physical

injury capable of sustaining an Eighth Amendment claim based on
conditions of confinement.
Therefore, although we vacate the district court’s grant of
summary judgment with respect to Parker’s excessive force claim
against Defendants in their individual capacities, we affirm the
district

court’s

grant

Parker’s

excessive

of

force

summary
claim

judgment

against

with

respect

Defendants

in

to

their

official capacities and with respect to his cruel and unusual
punishment and deliberate indifference claims stemming from his
conditions

of

confinement. 2

We

2

dispense

with

oral

argument

We also affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Nurse K. McCullough and Nurse Jane Doe because
Parker does not present any arguments in his informal brief
regarding why the tests and treatments administered by prison
medical staff did not satisfy Eighth Amendment requirements.
(Continued)
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because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the material before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

See 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (“The Court will limit its review to the
issues raised in the informal brief.”).

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