Michael Dilworth v. Captain Adam

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-ct-03291-D. [999963343]. [15-6910]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6910

MICHAEL ANTHONY DILWORTH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CAPTAIN ADAMS; A R. FALES, JR.; LT. L. ROBINSON; LT. R.
JOHNSON; OFFICER COOKSON; OFFICER TROTT,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
ED MCMAHON, Sheriff; New Hanover County; LT. TRAVIS ROBINSON;
SGT. WHITMORE; OFFICER MARINO; MR. WHITE; MR. THOMAS,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-ct-03291-D)

Argued:

September 20, 2016

Decided:

November 7, 2016

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion.
Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Judges
Wilkinson and Motz joined.

ARGUED: E. Brantley Webb, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.
Scott Christopher Hart, SUMRELL, SUGG, CARMICHAEL,
HICKS & HART, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON

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BRIEF: Jason R. LaFond, MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
In 2013, Michael Anthony Dilworth was a pretrial detainee
at

North

While

Carolina’s

awaiting

New

trial,

Hanover

Dilworth

disciplinary

segregation

infractions,

one

as

arising

County

spent

a

punishment

from

an

Detention
total

for

of

two

altercation

85

Facility.
days

in

disciplinary
with

another

prisoner and one from an altercation with correctional officers.
Dilworth was not afforded a hearing in connection with either of
his placements in disciplinary segregation.
Dilworth sued various Detention Facility officials under 42
U.S.C.

§

1983,

segregation

arguing

without

a

that

the

hearing

imposition

violated

of

his

disciplinary

procedural

due

process rights.

The district court granted summary judgment to

the

reasoning

defendants,

that

due

process

requirements

were

satisfied by Dilworth’s opportunity to file a written appeal
after he was placed in disciplinary segregation.

We disagree,

and hold that as a pretrial detainee, Dilworth was entitled to a
hearing before he was punished.

As the defendants concede, no

such hearing was afforded, and we therefore direct that judgment
be entered for Dilworth on his due process claim.
Dilworth also raised an excessive force claim against the
two officers involved in his second fracas.

Again, the district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants, on the ground
that the record showed the officers had acted in good faith and
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without a culpable state of mind.

As the parties agree, a

subsequent Supreme Court decision has made clear that excessive
force claims by pretrial detainees are governed by an objective
standard, rather than the subjective one applied by the district
court.

Accordingly, we remand for consideration of Dilworth’s

excessive force claim under the proper standard.

I.
A.
Dilworth

was

held

in

the

Facility as a pretrial detainee.

New

Hanover

County

Detention

A pretrial detainee is someone

who has been charged with a crime – in Dilworth’s case, failing
to appear in court as ordered – but not yet tried.

Though

Dilworth had “not been adjudged guilty of any crime,” he could
be detained pending trial in order to ensure his presence at
that proceeding.
During

his

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979).
pretrial

detention,

at

4:20

p.m.

on

the

afternoon of May 11, 2013, Dilworth was involved in a physical
fight

with

supervising

another
guard,

inmate.

Officer

immediately

while he summoned assistance.

placed

Charles

the

unit

Thomas,
on

the

“lockdown”

Less than an hour later, at 5:05

p.m., Thomas filed an “Inmate Disciplinary Report” describing
the incident and stating that he had taken the “disciplinary
action” of placing Dilworth in segregation for 45 days.
4

J.A.

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58.

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By 5:30, the watch commander on duty, Lieutenant Robert

Johnson, had reviewed and approved that penalty.
Dilworth maintained that he had been disciplined in error,
as he was not the aggressor in the fight but had only protected
himself.

On May 21, he filed a written appeal pursuant to the

Detention Facility’s disciplinary procedures.

On May 23, two

days later and twelve days after Dilworth’s initial placement in
segregation, administrative review officer A.R. Fales dismissed
the appeal, finding that a videotape of the incident did not
make clear “who started the fight or how[.]”

J.A. 55.

Dilworth

ultimately was released from segregation on June 20, 2013.
no

point

during

his

time

in

disciplinary

segregation

At
was

Dilworth afforded a hearing.
Shortly

after

his

release,

Dilworth

was

involved

in

a

second altercation, this one involving Officers B.M. Cookson and
A. Trott.

The incident ended with Cookson using physical force

to restrain Dilworth, “throw[ing] multiple knee spears to his
legs

and

multiple

punches

to

his

head,”

and

with

“assist[ing] Cookson in taking Dilworth to the floor.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
disputed:

Trott

J.A. 126

How the incident began is

According to the officers, force was required because

Dilworth refused to comply with orders and resisted an effort to
handcuff him; according to Dilworth, Cookson rushed him after
the

two

exchanged

verbal

insults.
5

This

incident,

too,

was

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captured

on

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video

tape,

but

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although

Dilworth

requested

the

video in a “Motion for Production of Documents” filed with the
district court, there is no indication that the tape was turned
over to Dilworth or viewed by the district court.
Again,

Dilworth

for 45 days.
of

the

placed

in

disciplinary

Again, no hearing was provided.

July

5,

2013

Disciplinary

Report

disciplinary

action,

approved

was

the

fight,

calling
and

for

Trott
45

days

Lieutenant

sanction.

had

Dilworth

in

Johnson
once

segregation

Within five hours
filed

an

Inmate

segregation
had

more

as

a

reviewed

and

contested

his

sanction, and this time, he filed a grievance seeking a hearing
at which he suggested he would present witnesses supporting his
account of events.

And Dilworth again filed a written appeal of

the disciplinary action, which was again dismissed by Fales, who
emphatically

rejected

the

request

for

a

hearing:

“I

am

NOT

required to recommend a disciplinary hearing if grounds for such
do not exist.”

J.A. 60 (emphasis in original).

Dilworth served

the entirety of his 45-day sentence.
B.
In November 2013, Dilworth filed this pro se action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He alleges, first, that Detention Facility

officials including Johnson and Fales violated the Due Process
Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

by

failing

to

provide

adequate procedural safeguards – and, particularly, a hearing –
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in

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connection

Dilworth

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with

claims

his

that

two

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disciplinary

Cookson

and

Trott

sanctions.
used

Second,

excessive

force

against him, also in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on both claims,
and the district court granted their motion.

As to procedural

due process, the district court held that because Dilworth was a
pretrial detainee, he could not be “placed in segregation as a
punishment for a disciplinary infraction” without due process.
J.A. 129 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Due process was

satisfied here, the district court reasoned, because Dilworth
was

provided

with

notice

of

the

charges

against

him

and

permitted to file a written appeal of his disciplinary sanction.
On that basis, the district court awarded summary judgment to
the defendants.
On
applied

Dilworth’s
a

excessive

subjective

force

standard,

claim,

holding

the

district

that

court

Dilworth

was

required to establish that officers Cookson and Trott had used
force “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” rather than
in

a

“good-faith

effort”

to

maintain

(internal quotation marks omitted).

discipline.

J.A.

130

Because no reasonable juror

could find that the officers had a “sufficiently culpable state
of

mind,”

the

district

court

entitled to summary judgment.

concluded,

the

defendants

were

J.A. 131-32 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
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Dilworth timely appealed.

II.
We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de
novo.

Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if “no material facts are
disputed

and

the

matter of law.”

moving

party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.

2011) (en banc) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 352
F.3d

896,

899

(4th

Cir.

2003))

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
A.
We begin with Dilworth’s contention that the district court
erred when it granted summary judgment to the defendants on his
procedural due process claim.
two

related

placement

in

but

The due process question presents

distinct

whether

segregation

disciplinary

inquiries:

implicated

Dilworth’s
a

liberty

interest triggering procedural due process requirements; and, if
so,

whether

requirements.

the

procedures

See

Wolff

afforded

v.

Dilworth

McDonnell,

418

satisfied
U.S.

539,

those
556-57

(1974) (applying procedural due process analysis to denial of
prisoner good-time credits); Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 593–
94 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying procedural due process analysis to
prison classification system).

We hold that the disciplinary
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actions

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taken

against

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Dilworth

necessitated

compliance

with

procedural due process standards, and further hold that those
standards were not satisfied here.
1.
At the first step of the procedural due process inquiry, we
must

determine

segregation

whether

implicates

Dilworth’s
a

protected

warrants procedural safeguards.
472, 484–86 (1995).
in

the

affirmative,

placement
liberty

in

disciplinary

interest

and

thus

See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

The district court answered that question
holding

that

pretrial

detainees

like

Dilworth may not be placed in disciplinary segregation without
due process.

On this point, we agree with the district court.

By definition, pretrial detainees have not been convicted
of the crimes with which they are charged.

For that reason, the

Supreme Court held in Bell v. Wolfish, they retain a liberty
interest

in

freedom

from

“punishment,”

even

detained to ensure their presence at trial.

while

they

are

441 U.S. at 535-37.

Though “[l]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent
incidents” of pretrial detention, discrete “punitive measures”
imposed during pretrial detention intrude on a protected liberty
interest.

Id. at 537; Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5, 17 (1st

Cir. 2005) (“Pretrial detainees, unlike convicts, have a liberty
interest

in

avoiding

punishment[.]”);

Martin

v.

Gentile,

849

F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding pretrial detainees are
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protected with respect to “any form of ‘punishment’”) (emphasis
in original).
Though

Bell

defendants

would

take

a

appear

different

to

settle

position.

the

issue,

According

to

the
the

defendants, the Supreme Court clarified in Sandin v. Conner that
only

a

subcategory

protected

liberty

protections:
hardship”

of

on

prison

“punishments”

interests

those

that

prisoners.

and

infringe

necessitate

impose
See

will

“atypical

515

U.S.

due

and

at

on

process

significant

484.

Because

disciplinary segregation, the Court held in Sandin, does not
rise to this level, id. at 485-86, the defendants conclude that
Dilworth

had

no

protected

liberty

interest

and

thus

was

not

entitled to due process at all.
But

Sandin,

which

concerned

the

punishment

of

convicted

prisoners, id. at 474-75, 484-85, has no application to pretrial
detainees like Dilworth.

In Sandin, the Supreme Court explained

that prison regulations providing for procedures in connection
with

punishment

will

not

give

rise

to

a

protected

liberty

interest unless the punishment in question “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.”

Id. at 484.

reasoned,

range

because

a

wide

of

That was so, the Court

“[d]iscipline

by

prison

officials . . . falls within the expected perimeters of the
sentence imposed by a court of law.”
10

Id. at 485 (emphasis

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But pretrial detainees, as we have explained, have not

been convicted or sentenced by a court of law, and thus fall
plainly outside this rationale.

And indeed, the Court in Sandin

expressly distinguished Bell on precisely this ground.

Id. at

484 (rejecting prisoner’s reliance on Bell because “Bell dealt
with

the

interests

of

pretrial

detainees

and

not

convicted

prisoners”); see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466,
2475 (2015)

(“pretrial

detainees

(unlike

convicted

prisoners)

cannot be punished at all”).
Every federal court of appeals to consider the question has
concluded

that

Sandin’s

“atypical

and

significant

hardship”

standard does not govern the procedural due process claims of
pretrial detainees.

See Jacoby v. Baldwin Cty., No. 14-12932,

2016 WL 4506051, at *6 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016); Hanks v.
Prachar,

457

F.3d

774,

776

(8th

Cir.

2006)

(per

curiam);

Surprenant, 424 F.3d at 17; Peoples v. CCA Det. Ctrs., 422 F.3d
1090, 1106 n.12 (10th Cir. 2005); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d
175, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2001); Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999,
1004–05 (7th Cir. 1999); Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524
(9th Cir. 1996); see also Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 342
n.9 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding Sandin inapplicable to detainee
convicted
(2000).

but

not

yet

sentenced),

cert

denied,

531

U.S.

821

We join our sister circuits and hold that Dilworth, as

a pretrial detainee, was entitled under Bell to procedural due
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process in connection with any “punishment” imposed on him by
the Detention Facility.
It remains to be considered only whether Dilworth’s two
placements in disciplinary segregation constitute “punishment”
within the meaning of Bell.

That a “disability is imposed for

the purpose of punishment,” the Court held in Bell, may be clear
from “an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials[.]”

441 U.S. at 538.

If it is not, then a

court still may infer an intent to punish if a “restriction or
condition is not reasonably related” to some other legitimate
goal.

Id. at 539; see Martin, 849 F.2d at 870 (to establish

that restriction is “punishment,” pretrial detainee must show
“either that it was (1) imposed with an expressed intent to
punish

or

(2)

not

reasonably

related

to

a

legitimate

non-

punitive governmental objective”); Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l
Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 251 (4th Cir. 2005) (same).
In

this

manifestly

case,

clear

an

from

intent

the

to

record.

punish

is

Dilworth’s

express,
placement

and
in

segregation was identified as a “disciplinary action[] taken” on
the “Inmate Disciplinary Report” filed in connection with each
of his altercations.

J.A. 64, 69.

In dismissing Dilworth’s

appeals, administrative review officer Fales referred expressly
to the “disciplinary sanctions” and “disciplinary actions” on
review.

J.A.

55,

60.

And

in
12

their

brief

on

appeal,

the

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defendants
placement
“penalty

Filed: 11/07/2016

similarly,
as

for

and

Pg: 13 of 22

consistently,

describe

“disciplinary,”

a

[]

violations.”

disciplinary

“disciplinary

Dilworth’s

action,”

When

it

and

comes

a
to

intent, in other words, this is the easy case in which we need
not go beyond what is express.
The

defendants

suggested

for

the

first

time

at

oral

argument that the restriction imposed on Dilworth might be so
“de minimis” that it cannot amount to punishment under Bell,
whatever its intent.

See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21 (defining

“punishment” in terms of intent but noting that there is “a de
minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not
concerned”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Robles v. Prince
George’s Cty., Md., 302 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
pretrial detainee must show that official action was not “de
minimis” to invoke due process protections); Slade, 407 F.3d at
251 (same).

Though some cases may present close questions on

this score, see Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 545 (5th
Cir. 2004) (finding denial of phone calls and mattresses for
less than 24 hours to be de minimis), this one does not.
the

85

days

in

which

he

was

in

disciplinary

For

segregation,

Dilworth was confined to his cell for 23 hours each day and
denied all personal contact except with attorneys or clergy.
Other courts have had no difficulty classifying this sort of
disciplinary segregation as “punishment” under Bell.
13

See Kirk

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v. Boyles, 2010 WL 2720886, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2010)
(magistrate

report)

(rejecting

argument

that

three-day

disciplinary confinement is de minimis), adopted by, 2010 WL
3516630 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2010); see also Surprenant, 424 F.3d
at

13–14

Higgs

v.

(treating
Carver,

disciplinary

286

F.3d

437,

Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 524 (same).
in

its

agree,

policy

on

treating

implicating

inmate

protections.

interests

J.A. 105.

438

(7th

as

Cir.

punishment);
2002)

(same);

The Detention Facility itself,

disciplinary

disciplinary

liberty

segregation

procedures,

segregation
and

as

appears
a

triggering

to

sanction
procedural

We, too, conclude that disciplinary

segregation of a pretrial detainee, intended as a penalty for
disciplinary

infractions,

implicates

a

protected

liberty

interest under the Fourteenth Amendment and may not be imposed
without due process.
2.
Having determined that Dilworth was entitled to due process
before he was punished with disciplinary segregation, we turn to
the

question

of

whether

the

procedures

satisfied Fourteenth Amendment requirements.

afforded

Dilworth

We do not doubt,

as the Supreme Court has held, that the realities of the prison
environment

require

“some

amount

of

flexibility”

in

the

due

process inquiry, so as to accommodate the very real interest of
prison

officials

in

maintaining
14

order

and

safety.

Wolff

v.

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McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).

But the Supreme Court has

set out certain procedural minimums that pertain even in the
prison setting, and those requirements were not met here.
The

elements

proceedings

were

of

due

process

established

by

in

the

prison

Supreme

disciplinary

Court

in

Wolff.

Emphasizing the need for “mutual accommodation” of institutional
objectives
Court

and

struck

a

constitutional
careful

rights,

balance

id.

between

at

556,

inmates’

the

due

Wolff

process

interests and the legitimate goals and security concerns of a
penal

institution,

id.

at

556-63.

The

result

was

a

clear

explication of the necessary procedural safeguards, beginning,
most critically, with a hearing, at which an inmate may call
witnesses and present documentary evidence unless doing so would
present

an

undue

hazard.

Id.

at

557-58

(“The

Court

has

consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at some
time

before

interests

.

a
.

protected[.]”).

person
.

.

is

We

finally

think

a

deprived

person’s

of

his

liberty

property

is

equally

An inmate also is entitled, the Court held, to

written notice of the alleged disciplinary violation at least 24
hours before the hearing, and, after the hearing, to a written
statement
taken.

describing

the

reasons

for

the

disciplinary

action

Id. at 563-65.

We note that the requirements laid out in Wolff are clear
enough that the Detention Facility has incorporated them into
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its

Doc: 45

own

policy,

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published
as

per

policy

Wolff,

on

an

Pg: 16 of 22

inmate

inmate

discipline.

charged

with

a

Under

that

disciplinary

violation implicating a liberty interest is entitled, after 24
hours notice of the charges, to a hearing at which the inmate
may make a statement on his or her behalf, present witnesses and
evidence, and ask questions of his or her accuser.

After the

hearing, the inmate is provided a written report describing the
disciplinary findings made as a result of the hearing. 1
As the defendants concede, the process afforded Dilworth
complies with neither the Detention Facility’s policy nor the
dictates of Wolff.

There is no factual dispute as to what

process Dilworth received:

the opportunity to take a written

appeal after his sanction was finalized.
question

but

that

this

process

falls

Nor can there be any
short

of

what

Wolff

requires.
Under

Wolff,

the

core

component

of

due

process

prison discipline context is the right to a hearing.
1

in

the

To be

To be clear, Dilworth’s liberty interest, as explained in
Bell, arises from the Constitution itself, and not from any
mandatory language in the Detention Facility’s policy. See 441
U.S. at 535 (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not
be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law.”); cf. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84
(discussing circumstances under which state may create liberty
interest through mandatory regulatory language).
The Detention
Facility’s policy does, however, suggest both that Wolff’s
requirements are generally understood and that the Detention
Facility believes itself able to comply with them.

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sure, Wolff does not contemplate “full adversary proceedings,”
Benjamin,

264

F.3d

at

190,

and

prison

officials

retain

the

discretion to “keep [a] hearing within reasonable limits” in an
effort to avoid disruption and threats to safety.
U.S. at 566.
inmate

to

Wolff, 418

For instance, prison officials need not permit an

cross-examine

witnesses

against

him,

nor

allow

an

inmate to call witnesses who would “create a risk of reprisal or
undermine authority”; and inmates do not possess the right to
retained or appointed counsel.

Id. at 566-70; see also Baker v.

Lyles, 904 F.2d 925, 932–33 (4th Cir. 1990) (permitting use of
hearsay

statements

disciplinary

by

hearings).

unidentified
But

the

informants

hearing

itself,

in
at

prison
which

a

pretrial detainee like Dilworth may contest whether he has in
fact violated a disciplinary rule before he is punished, is the
minimal requirement of the Wolff process.

See 418 U.S. at 557-

58;

at

see

also,

e.g.,

Mitchell,

75

F.3d

524

(“[P]retrial

detainees may be subjected to disciplinary segregation only with
a

due

process

hearing[.]”);

Benjamin,

264

F.3d

at

190

(contrasting hearing required by Wolff with more minimal process
required for prison administrative actions). 2

2

Indeed, the petitioner in Wolff was afforded a hearing
before he was sanctioned; the issue in Wolff was whether that
hearing provided sufficient process, or whether more was
required.
418 U.S. at 559-60.
In holding that an inmate’s
right to call or cross-examine witnesses must be balanced
(Continued)
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That minimal requirement was not satisfied here.
defendants

acknowledge,

process hearing.

Dilworth

never

was

provided

As the
a

due

Instead, when Dilworth requested a hearing, a

Detention Facility official informed him that the official was
“NOT required to recommend a disciplinary hearing if grounds for
such do not exist.”

J.A. 60 (emphasis in original).

Nor can

Dilworth’s opportunity to file a written appeal substitute for
the missing hearing.

A statement in writing is not a hearing,

and it is not what is contemplated by Wolff – as is clear, for
instance, when Wolff holds that an inmate has a qualified right
to call witnesses to testify at his hearing.
67.

418 U.S. at 566-

And by definition, an appeal is a request for review of an

action already taken, whereas Wolff’s due process hearing is to
be provided before final deprivation of a liberty interest.

Id.

at 557-58.
That

is

not

to

say,

of

course,

that

prison

or

jail

officials are barred from taking immediate action, without a
prior hearing, in response to altercations like Dilworth’s or
other disciplinary offenses.

On the contrary, it is clear – and

Dilworth does not dispute – that for safety or security reasons,

against a prison’s need for order and security, in other words,
the Court cast no doubt on the necessity of the underlying
hearing itself.

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a jail may take immediate preventative action to segregate a
detainee after a fight or disruption.

See, e.g., Baker, 904

F.2d at 930-31; Higgs, 286 F.3d at 438.

And prisons and jails

may and routinely do place inmates charged with disciplinary
infractions

in

segregation”

pending

both

officials

and

inmates time to investigate and prepare for those hearings.

See

disciplinary

“administrative

hearings,

allowing

prison

their

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 463-65, 473-74 (1983) (approving
placement

of

inmate

in

administrative

segregation

pending

investigation and hearing on disciplinary charges), receded from
on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482–83; see Brown v.
Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 503 (4th Cir. 2004) (inmate placed in
“administrative

detention”

pending

disciplinary

officials investigated altercation).
disciplinary
inmate

may

policy
be

contemplates

placed

in

hearing

while

The Detention Facility’s

as

segregation

much,
prior

providing
to

a

that

hearing

an
and

formal disciplinary action to ensure order and security, and we
have

no

quarrel

with

that

understanding.

But

all

of

this

presupposes that there is, in fact, a hearing in connection with
the final imposition of disciplinary action, and that is the
element that is missing here.
On this record, it is plain that Dilworth was not provided
a hearing before he was subjected to punishment in the form of
disciplinary

segregation,

and

the
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not

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otherwise.
claim

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That is enough to resolve Dilworth’s due process
a

matter

of

law.

We

remand

for

resolution

of

Dilworth’s damages claim, consistent with this opinion.
B.
We

next

address

Dilworth’s

contention

that

the

district

court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment on his
excessive
applied

force

a

claim.

subjective

As

noted

standard

above,

to

the

Dilworth’s

district

claim,

court

requiring

Dilworth to show that Officers Cookson and Trott had acted “with
a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in the form of an intent
to

“maliciously

and

sadistically

[]

(internal quotation marks omitted).

cause

harm.”

J.A.

130

Because the record could

not support such a finding, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants.
After the district court issued its ruling, the Supreme
Court

held

standard

in

for

Kingsley
a

v.

pretrial

Hendrickson

detainee’s

solely an objective one.”

that

“the

excessive

135 S. Ct. at 2473.

appropriate

force

claim

is

It is enough,

the Supreme Court concluded, that a pretrial detainee show that
the

“force

purposely

or

knowingly

used

against

him

was

objectively unreasonable,” id., regardless of an officer’s state
of mind, id. at 2472.
The parties agree that the district court has not evaluated
Dilworth’s claim under the standard set out by the intervening
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decision

in

Kingsley.

district

court

may

Pg: 21 of 22

Accordingly,

consider,

in

the

we

remand

first

so

that

instance,

the

whether

under the “facts and circumstances” of this particular case, and
from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” the
force used against Dilworth was objectively excessive.

Id. at

2473; see Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262,
264 (4th Cir. 2001) (remanding for reconsideration in light of
intervening authority).

In deciding whether summary judgment

may be granted to the defendants under that objective standard,
the district court should view the video of the July 5 incident
and consider it along with other relevant evidence bearing on
objective reasonableness.

Cf. Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v.

Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding grant of
summary

judgment

on

excessive

force

claim

premature

where

district court has not considered videotape evidence).

III.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Dilworth’s due
process claim, order that judgment be entered for Dilworth, and
remand for resolution of Dilworth’s damages claim.

We vacate

the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants

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on the excessive force claim and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

22