Dewayne Cox v. Bradley Quinn

Filing

PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:12-cv-00154-GEC. [999879532]. [15-6943, 15-6944]

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6943

DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN;
BENJAMIN BAXLEY,

OFFICER

JOSHUA

PINKERMAN;

OFFICER

Defendants – Appellants,
and
CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH; MAJOR GREG
WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER MYLES,
a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES OF THE
WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX; JUSTIN
MILES,
Defendants.

No. 15-6944

DEWAYNE JACKSON COX, a/k/a Dwayne Cox,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN MILES,
Defendant – Appellant,
and

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OFFICER BRADLEY QUINN; OFFICER JOSHUA PINKERMAN; OFFICER
BENJAMIN BAXLEY; CAPTAIN CHAD KELLER; SERGEANT WILLIE SMITH;
MAJOR GREG WINSTON; LIEUTENANT SHELTON; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER
MYLES, a/k/a Miles; OTHER UNKNOWN OFFICERS AND/OR EMPLOYEES
OF THE WESTERN VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL; BRANDON JAMAL REDDIX,
Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Glen E. Conrad, Chief
District Judge. (7:12-cv-00154-GEC)

Argued:

May 11, 2016

Decided:

July 6, 2016

Before DUNCAN, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Duncan and Judge Wynn joined.

ARGUED: Jim H. Guynn, Jr., GUYNN & WADDELL, P.C., Salem,
Virginia; Christopher Carey Newton, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE,
P.C., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellants.
Melvin Edward
Williams, MEL WILLIAMS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: John C. Johnson, FRITH ANDERSON & PEAKE, P.C., Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant Justin Miles.

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PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:
In
fellow

2011,

appellee

inmate

while

Regional

Jail.

Quinn,

Cox

incarcerated

Cox

officials — including
Bradley

Dewayne

had
the

Joshua

was
at

severely
the

repeatedly
appellants,

Pinkerman,

beaten

Western

to

correctional
Baxley,

a

Virginia

complained

Benjamin

by

jail

officers

and

Justin

Miles — that he was being threatened, harassed, and robbed by
the group of inmates who ultimately orchestrated the beating.
Cox

filed

alleging

suit
that

against
they

Baxley,

had

been

Quinn,

Pinkerman,

deliberately

and

indifferent

Miles,
to

a

substantial risk to his safety, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Eighth Amendment.

The district court denied summary

judgment to the correctional officers, finding that they were
not entitled to qualified immunity on Cox’s claims.

We agree,

and we affirm.

I.
A.
Because

this

is

an

interlocutory

appeal

of

a

denial

of

qualified immunity, we consider only “the facts as the district
court viewed them as well as any additional undisputed facts.”
Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 2014).
In

2010

and

2011,

Dewayne

Western Virginia Regional Jail.

Cox

was

incarcerated

at

the

Cox was housed in “Pod 3A” with
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about fifty other men, including Terrence Jackson, David Cabell,
Sheron Harris, and Brandon Reddix.

Jackson, Cabell, and Harris

formed an informal gang or group in the pod.

At some point,

Reddix joined their group as well.
Cox and other inmates found the Jackson-Cabell-Harris group
to be loud, aggressive, intimidating, and threatening.

As one

inmate, Gerald Garlic, explained,
They would snatch the T.V. remote from others[’]
hands, and take radio[]s or unplug headphones, and
disrupt board games or card games by pushing them out
of reach or taking p[ie]ces and issuing a challenge to
who-ever they chose to pick on at the time by saying
things like “what ya gonna do pops” “say something”
“I’ll fuck you up” [“]we rule this pod and if y[’]all
don’t like it just say something and we’ll take care
of you” or “say something to the [correctional
officers] we will beat your old toothless stinking ass
to death,” or [“]we are []Bloods and we run shit in
here.”
J.A.

317–18.

“Harris[,]

According

Cabell

and

to

another

Jackson

inmate,

[were]

Joe

Rutherford,

constantly

loud

and

intimidating and more or less [were] in a gang all their own.
They were trouble waiting to happen.”
Cox

and

at

least

one

other

J.A. 324.
inmate

submitted

informal

complaints, or “blue slips,” describing the group’s aggressive
and threatening behavior to jail officials, and Cox discussed
his concerns with Captain Chad Keller on March 8, 2011.

Cox

informed Keller that Harris was harassing and stealing from him
and requested that either he or Harris be moved to a different

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According to Cox, Keller responded that he knew Harris was

“an asshole” who “creates problems everywhere he goes.”
282.

J.A.

But Keller asked Cox if he and Harris could remain in the

pod together if he talked to Harris and “ke[pt] him on a chain.”
Id.

Cox agreed.
After

however,

Keller

the

talked

situation

to

in

Harris

the

pod

about
only

Cox’s

got

complaints,

worse

for

Cox.

Harris called Cox a “snitch” and threatened that he “was going
to get” him.

J.A. 283.

Then, a few weeks later, Harris and

Cabell instigated a physical altercation with Cox and issued
explicit

threats

in

front

of

other

inmates.

As

one

inmate

described:
[T]here were about six of us playing poker together.
. . . Dewayne [Cox] won a hand.
Harris and Cabell
started raising their voices, telling Dewayne he was a
p[ie]ce of shit.
Mr. Cabell jerked the sheet we had
covering the table[] off the table and threw cards
everywhere.
He reached across the table and knocked
other cards . . . out of Dewayne’s hands and got in
Dewayne[’]s face and said “Do something punk,[] say
anything you old toothless son of a bitch and I’ll
stomp your white ass all over this pod.” Then Cabell
went to the telephone area, still angry, upset, and
threw a blue plastic chair . . . across the floor, and
issued a challenge for the whole pod, for “anybody say
one fucking word about it I will fuck em up” “Go on!
Anybody, please say something so I can beat some ass.”
J.A.

324–25

(affidavit

of

inmate

Rutherford).

In

addition,

Harris and Cabell stole commissary items from Cox and harassed
him on other occasions.

Cox submitted several more blue slips

complaining about these issues and requesting that either he or
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the inmates who were threatening him be moved to a different
pod.

He never received any response.
Appellants

Quinn,

Baxley,

and

Pinkerman

were

certified

correctional officers at the jail, and appellant Miles was an
uncertified

officer — essentially,

a

trainee.

On

April

11,

2011, Quinn, Baxley, and Miles were on duty in Pod 3A, and
Pinkerman was working nearby.

Cox approached Miles that morning

and asked “what they were going to do about what was going on in
the pod . . . with Cabell and Jackson and Harris.”

J.A. 218.

He

that

also

inquired

about

the

number

of

blue

officials had received about those inmates.

slips

jail

Miles stated that

he was aware of blue slips from Cox and one other inmate, and he
asked Cox to step out into the hallway to discuss his concerns
further.
Cox, along with inmate Garlic, went into the hall to talk
further

with

Miles.

They

explained

that

they

“were

being

harassed” and that Cabell and Harris were stealing from Cox.
J.A. 219.
both

Cox

Cox told Miles that he feared for his safety, and
and

Garlic

requested

that

either

they

or

the

problematic inmates be moved out of the pod.
Officers Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman eventually joined the
conversation

and

Cox

repeated

his

concerns

to

them.

Miles

assured Cox and Garlic that they would “take care of it,” and
the other officers agreed.

J.A. 221.
6

Cox asked the officers

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what they planned to do, saying “[s]omebody needs to be moved,
somebody is going to get hurt.”

Id.

Miles stated that they

would “talk to the guys,” and Cox responded:

“Don’t do that

because that will put an X on me and make the situation worse
than what it is.”

J.A. 222.

Garlic agreed with Cox, expressing

concern that if the officers spoke to the inmates, “they would
only get angry and retaliate against us.”

J.A. 319.

And both

Cox and Garlic again requested to either be moved from the pod
or to have the other inmates moved.

The officers instructed Cox

and Garlic to return to the pod.
After speaking with Cox and Garlic, Miles reached out to
Sergeant Willie Smith for advice.

According to Miles, Smith

responded that he was “busy” and that Miles needed to “get [his]
guys to handle it.”

J.A. 102.

But according to Smith himself,

he told the officers, “[I]f Cox is being threatened in any way
or if anybody is being threatened, remove them out of the pod,
lock the inmates down, lock the whole pod and question all of
the inmates in the pod to find out what was going on.”

J.A.

343.
When Cox returned to the pod, he called a friend on the
telephone in the pod’s common area and spoke to her for several
minutes.

While

Cox

was

on

the

telephone,

return to the pod from the recreation area.

inmates

began

to

Cox noticed that

Cabell, Jackson, and Harris — who had been at recreation — did
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not reenter the pod with the others.

Then, about five minutes

later, the three men returned to the pod.

Right away, Harris

“hollered at” Cox, loudly yelling, “You are a fucking snitch and
we are going to get your ass.”

J.A. 225.

Cox returned to his

cell, but he continued to hear Harris, as well as Jackson and
Cabell, yelling, “Miles told us what you said, that you told on
us,” that Cox was a “snitch,” and that they were “going to get”
him.

J.A.

228.

Cox

also

heard

Jackson

shout

that

he

offering fifty dollars “for somebody to beat [Cox’s] ass.”

was
J.A.

229.
Later that day, Cox left his cell for dinner and approached
Miles, who was serving the inmates’ meal.

Cox said:

Mr. Miles, why did you all talk to these guys?
Why
did you say anything to these guys? . . .
Now they
are threatening me, going to do something to me. . . .
I want out of here, Miles.
You all got to do
something.
J.A. 231–32.

According to Cox, Miles responded by throwing up

his hands, saying, “What now, Cox?” and then turning around and
walking away.

J.A. 232.

Cox sat down with Garlic to eat, and Harris stood up and
yelled, “We are going to get you, snitch, we are going to get
you.

We are going to beat your ass before lockdown.”

J.A. 232.

Cox returned to his cell without finishing his dinner.
came out of his cell and saw Cabell and Jackson walk by.

8

He later
Cabell

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warned that Cox was “going to get fucked up” before the end of
the day.

J.A. 236.

At that point, Brandon Reddix approached Cox and said, “I
want to talk to you, man.”

J.A. 237.

Cox had not previously

had any problems with Reddix and he started through his own cell
door to talk with Reddix there, but then he realized that Reddix
“was kind of buddy-buddy” with Harris, Cabell, and Jackson.

Id.

Cox started to reverse course, but Reddix punched him in the
back

of

his

neck

and

knocked

him

across

the

cell.

Reddix

continued to beat Cox on his head, ribs, and back until another
inmate yelled that correctional officers were on the way.

Cox

estimates that the assault lasted between 45 and 75 seconds, and
he suffered broken ribs, a loosened tooth, bruising, swelling,
and abrasions.
Miles

later

Reddix’s attack.

discovered

Cox

bloodied

and

injured

from

Cox reminded Miles, as well as Officer Quinn,

that he had warned them something bad was going to happen to
him.
Miles filed an incident report recommending that Cabell,
Harris, and Jackson be given “Major Violations” for assault.
According

to

Miles,

even

though

none

of

those

three

inmates

actually attacked Cox, “they were a little group in that pod and
they were . . . notorious.”

J.A. 147–48.

Miles believed that

“they needed to be cited for planning” the attack on Cox.
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Sergeant Smith concurred with this recommendation in a

separate report.
B.
In 2012, Cox filed suit against Quinn, Baxley, Pinkerman,
and Miles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1

Relevant here, Cox alleged

that the correctional officers had violated his Eighth Amendment
right

to

“protect[ion]

prisoners,”

which

from

flows

violence

from

the

“cruel and unusual punishments.”

at

the

hands

Amendment’s

of

other

prohibition

on

See Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994); U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
The correctional officers moved for summary judgment.

They

argued that they had not violated Cox’s Eighth Amendment rights
because

they

were

not

“deliberately

indifferent”

to

a

substantial risk that Cox would be assaulted by a fellow inmate.
See

Farmer,

violation

is

511

U.S.

that

at

834

(element

defendant

prison

of

Eighth

officials

Amendment

acted

with

“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety” (citation
omitted)).

They

also

argued

that

they

were

entitled

to

qualified immunity because reasonable correctional officers in
the

same

circumstances

would

not

have

violated Cox’s clearly established rights.

1

known

that

they

had

See Parrish ex rel.

Cox’s original and amended complaints also named other
defendants and included other claims, but those defendants and
claims are not pertinent to this appeal.
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Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004) (element of
qualified immunity analysis is that the right in question “was
‘clearly

established’

at

the

time

of

the

alleged

offense”

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001))).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Cox, the
district

court

determined

that

there

was

a

genuine

issue

of

material fact in dispute as to whether the correctional officers
had acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial threat
to

Cox’s

safety.

See

Farmer,

511

U.S.

at

834.

The

court

further found that the officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity because the duty of jail officials to protect prisoners
from inmate violence was clearly established in April of 2011.
Accordingly,

the

court

denied

summary

judgment

to

the

appellants.
Quinn, Baxley, and Pinkerman filed one interlocutory appeal
of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, and Miles
filed

another.

We

consolidated

the

two

appeals,

which

we

consider below.

II.
Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction
to review a denial of qualified immunity at summary judgment
only “to the extent that the court’s decision turned on an issue
of law.”

Danser, 772 F.3d at 344; see Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
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225, 234 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting this exception to the rule that
“interlocutory appeals are generally disallowed”).

Thus, we may

consider only “the facts as the district court viewed them as
well

as

any

additional

undisputed

facts,”

and

our

review

is

limited to the legal question of whether the court correctly
denied summary judgment on those facts.

Danser, 772 F.3d at

345.
We review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity
at summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Cox, the non-moving party.
summary

judgment

to

the

correctional

Id.

We may grant

officers

only

if

“no

material facts are disputed and [they are] entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”

See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am.
Corp., 352 F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003)).
A.
At the first step of the qualified immunity inquiry, we
must

determine

whether,

viewing

the

facts

in

the

light

most

favorable to Cox, the correctional officers’ conduct violated a
constitutional
correctional

right.

officers

See

Parrish,

contend

that

372

the

F.3d

at

undisputed

301.

The

facts

show

that they were not, as a matter of law, deliberately indifferent
to a serious risk of harm to Cox, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
12

We disagree.

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1.
The

Eighth

Amendment

requires

prison

officials

to

“take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Id. at 832 (citation omitted); accord Makdessi v. Fields, 789
F.3d

126,

132

(4th

Cir.

2015).

And

they

have

a

specific

“duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of
other

prisoners.”

Farmer,

511

original) (citation omitted).

U.S.

at

833

(alteration

in

But a prison official will not be

liable for failing to protect a prisoner from inmate violence
unless two requirements are met.
“First,
sufficiently

the

deprivation

serious.”

Id.

See id. at 834.
alleged

(citation

must
and

be,

objectively,

internal

quotation

marks omitted); see Brown v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 612 F.3d 720,
723 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A] prisoner must allege a serious or
significant

physical

or

emotional

injury

resulting

from

the

challenged conditions.” (quoting Odom v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003))).

In this case, the parties

do not dispute that Cox’s injuries meet this standard.
Second, and central to this appeal, the defendant prison
officials must have had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer,

511

U.S.

at

834

(citation

omitted).

“In

prison-

conditions cases” like this one, “that state of mind is one of
‘deliberate

indifference’

(citation omitted).

to

inmate

health

or

safety.”

Id.

“Deliberate indifference” requires “‘more
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than mere negligence,’ but ‘less than acts or omissions [done]
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will

result.’”

Makdessi,

789

F.3d

at

133

original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835).
standard

requiring

that

a

prison

official

(alteration

in

It is a subjective
“both

be

aware

of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and . . . also draw the inference.”
Farmer,

511

U.S.

at

837.

And,

in

addition

to

subjectively

recognizing that substantial risk, the prison official must also
subjectively be aware that “his actions were ‘inappropriate in
light of that risk.’”

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303 (quoting Rich v.

Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 n.2 (4th Cir. 1997)).
Whether

a

prison

official

acted

with

“deliberate

indifference” is a question of fact that can be proven through
direct or circumstantial evidence.
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.

Makdessi, 789 F.3d at 133;

A plaintiff can make a prima facie

case of deliberate indifference “by showing ‘that a substantial
risk

of

[serious

harm]

was

longstanding,

pervasive,

well-

documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past,
and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being
sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and
thus must have known about it.’”

Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303

(alteration in original) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).

And

a prison official may not avoid liability simply because he was
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unaware that the inmate was “especially likely to be assaulted
by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843.
Furthermore, a prison official’s response to a known threat
to inmate safety must be reasonable.
officials
health

who

or

actually

safety

may

knew
be

of

a

found

See id. at 844 (“[P]rison
substantial

free

from

risk

to

liability

inmate

if

they

responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately
was

not

averted.”

(emphasis

added)).

Prison

officials

are

deliberately indifferent if they are aware that “the plaintiff
inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert
the danger easily yet they fail to do so.”

Brown, 612 F.3d at

723 (quoting Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2002)).
And “a factfinder may conclude that the official’s response to a
perceived

risk

inference

that

was

so

the

patently

official

inadequate
actually

as

to

justify

recognized

that

an
his

response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.”
Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.
2.
In light of the facts as we may view them, and drawing
reasonable inferences in Cox’s favor, we find that the district
court

correctly

held

that

material

issues

of

fact

precluded

summary judgment for the correctional officers on the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
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First,

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there

is

ample

Pg: 16 of 22

evidence

suggesting

that

Quinn,

Pinkerman, Baxley, and Miles were subjectively “aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exist[ed], and . . . also dr[ew] the inference,”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837:

Cox submitted numerous “blue slips”

complaining that he was being threatened and robbed by Harris,
Cabell,

and

possibly

others;

Cox

repeatedly

informed

the

appellants that he feared for his safety and wished either to be
moved from the pod or to have the other inmates moved; and Cox
expressly requested that the correctional officers not discuss
his concerns with Harris and the others because he feared that
would put him at even greater risk.

Moreover, Cox renewed his

plea for help to Miles only a short time before the beating
actually occurred.

A reasonable jury could thus conclude that

the appellants “had been exposed to information concerning the
risk” to Cox’s safety and therefore “must have known about it.”
See id. at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, a reasonable jury could also decide that the
correctional officers knew Cox “face[d] a serious danger to his
safety”

and

could

have

“fail[ed] to do so.”
omitted).

Sergeant

“avert[ed]

the

danger

easily”

but

See Brown, 612 F.3d at 723 (citation
Smith

testified

at

deposition

that

he

specifically told the appellants to remove Cox from the pod and
lock it down if Cox feared for his safety.
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But instead of

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taking this — or another — reasonable action to protect Cox, the
officers opted to do the very thing Cox warned them would lead
to

disaster:

They

directly

confronted

the

inmates

who

were

threatening Cox.
The correctional officers contend that the fact that they
took any action at all means that they were not deliberately
indifferent

as

a

matter

of

law.

requires more than some action:
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
most

favorable

appellants’

to

Cox,

response

a

to

But

the

Eighth

Amendment

It requires reasonable action.
Viewing the facts in the light

jury
Cox’s

could

conclude

that

concerns — seeking,

the
but

disregarding, Sergeant Smith’s advice, and taking the one action
Cox specifically warned would put him at greater risk — was not
only unreasonable, but “so patently inadequate as to justify an
inference that the official[s] actually recognized that [their]
response to the risk was inappropriate under the circumstances.” 2
See Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303.
The appellants also argue that there is no evidence they
ever drew the inference that Cox faced a substantial risk of
serious harm, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, because, they say,

2

And Miles’s relative inexperience does nothing to alter
this analysis; indeed, we are hard-pressed to imagine a more
inappropriate response than throwing up one’s hands and walking
away when informed that an attack on an inmate is imminent.

17

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when

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they

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addressed

Cox’s

Pg: 18 of 22

concerns

with

the

inmates

who

had

threatened him, the inmates assured the officers there would be
no trouble.

But we do not have jurisdiction to consider this

argument because it is based on facts that the district court
did not consider and that remain in dispute. 3

See Danser, 772

F.3d at 345.
Accordingly,

we

affirm

the

district

court’s

denial

of

summary judgment on the constitutional violation prong of the
qualified immunity inquiry.
B.
Even if a correctional officer has violated a prisoner’s
constitutional right, however, he is shielded from liability by
qualified immunity if an objectively reasonable officer could
have believed that his actions were lawful “in light of clearly
established law.” 4

Henry, 652 F.3d at 531.

A right is “clearly

3

Furthermore, by the correctional officers’ own account,
Harris and Cabell’s response to their inquiry was, “We will stay
to ourselves if they stay to the[m]selves,” J.A. 374 — hardly an
ironclad
assurance.
A
reasonable
jury
crediting
the
correctional officers’ account of this conversation might still
conclude that they were subjectively aware that Cox remained in
danger.
4

Although we need not reach the issue here, we note that
some courts have concluded that it is not necessary to consider
the objective reasonableness prong of the qualified immunity
inquiry at all when summary judgment is denied on deliberate
indifference.
See, e.g., Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030,
1037 (7th Cir. 2002); Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120,
142 n.15 (3d Cir. 2001).
Prison officials violate the Eighth
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established” if “[t]he contours of the right” were “sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he
is

doing

violates

that

right.”

original)

(quoting

Anderson

(1987)).

In conducting this inquiry, we must define the right

v.

Id.

at

534

(alteration

Creighton,

483

U.S.

635,

in
640

“in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general

proposition.”

Parrish,

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).

372

F.3d

at

301

(quoting

It is not necessary, however, that

“the exact conduct at issue” have been previously held unlawful;

Amendment through deliberate indifference if they are aware of a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate, Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837, yet disregard that risk by taking action that they know
to be inappropriate, Parrish, 372 F.3d at 303. In other words,
for purposes of deliberate indifference, the Eighth Amendment
violation must have been committed knowingly. As we have noted
in the past, “applying an objective qualified immunity standard
in the context of an Eighth Amendment claim that is satisfied
only by a showing of deliberate indifference” — that is, a
knowing violation of the law — presents a “special problem.”
Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1098 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997).
Accordingly, some of our sister circuits have concluded that
deliberately indifferent conduct can never be objectively
reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. See Walker, 293
F.3d at 1037 (holding that deliberate indifference and qualified
immunity inquiries “effectively collapse into one” and that
“[i]f there are genuine issues of fact concerning” a defendant’s
deliberate indifference, the “defendant may not avoid trial on
the grounds of qualified immunity”); Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at
142 n.15 (“Conduct that is deliberately indifferent to an
excessive risk to [juvenile detention center] residents cannot
be objectively reasonable conduct.”). But see Estate of Ford v.
Ramirez-Palmer,
301
F.3d
1043,
1049–50
(9th
Cir.
2002)
(rejecting approach that “collapses the deliberate indifference
part of the constitutional inquiry into the qualified immunity
inquiry”).
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“[r]ather, our analysis must take into consideration ‘not only
already

specifically

included

within

constitutional

adjudicated

more

rights,

general

principle

but

those

applications

invoked.’”

Odom,

manifestly

of

349

the

F.3d

core

at

773

(quoting Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 362–63 (4th Cir. 2001)).
The correctional officers contend that the district court
erred

in

clearly

denying

them

established

at

qualified

immunity

the

of

time

the

because
assault

it
on

was
Cox

not
that

“interceding and discussing” Cox’s concerns “with the allegedly
threatening

prisoners

Appellants’ Br. at 9.

violated

Cox’s

constitutional

rights.”

They argue that they “received assurances

that there would be no trouble” from the inmates, id. at 12, and
that

they

had

no

reason

to

believe

that

accepting

those

assurances would be unreasonable in light of clearly established
law.

But, again, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument

because it is premised on facts about the officers’ conversation
with the inmates that the district court did not consider and
that remain in dispute.

See Danser, 772 F.3d at 345.

On the record as we may view it here, we find that the
district

the

correctional

officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

It has long

been

court

established

correctly

that

jail

concluded

officials

that

have

a

duty

to

protect

inmates from a substantial and known risk of harm, including
harm inflicted by other prisoners.
20

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833.

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Moreover, by 2011, we had made it clear that “a prison official
acts

with

deliberate

indifference

when

he

ignores

repeated

requests from a vulnerable inmate to be separated from a fellow
inmate who has issued violent threats which the aggressor will
likely

carry

out

in

the

absence

of

official

intervention.”

Odom, 349 F.3d at 773.
Here, Cox repeatedly informed the appellants that he was
being threatened and robbed and that he feared for his safety,
and his concerns were corroborated by other inmates.

But the

only action the correctional officers took in response to this
information — despite the instructions of their sergeant — was
to do the one thing Cox specifically warned them would increase
the risk to his safety.

And when confronted with Cox’s concerns

again, Miles just threw up his hands and walked away.
law

of

this

Circuit,

an

objectively

reasonable

Under the

correctional

officer — certified or uncertified — would have known that these
actions were unreasonable, ran afoul of clearly established law,
and

violated

rights

“manifestly

included

within

more

general

applications of the core constitutional principle” articulated
in

Farmer.

Accordingly,

See

Odom,

349

F.3d

the

correctional

at

773

officers

qualified immunity.

21

(citation

are

not

omitted).

entitled

to

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity to the appellants.
AFFIRMED

22