US v. Samuel Parri

Filing

UNPUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:08-cr-00063-MR-7 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999753558].. [15-7021]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7021

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL PARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00063-MR-7)

Argued:

December 8, 2015

Decided:

February 11, 2016

Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and Theodore D. CHUANG,
United States District Judge for the District of Maryland,
sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished opinion.
Judge Agee wrote
the opinion, in which Judge Harris and Judge Chuang joined.

ARGUED: Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: Ross Hall Richardson,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC.,
Asheville,
North
Carolina,
for
Appellant.
Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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AGEE, Circuit Judge:
Samuel Parris appeals the district court’s order denying
his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction based
on an amendment to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
and

remand

the

district

court’s

order

because

We vacate
the

court

erroneously found that it the lacked legal authority to reduce
Parris’

sentence

below

the

statutory

minimum

term

of

incarceration.

I.
A.
In 2008, Parris pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846.

This offense carries a mandatory-minimum sentence of 120

months

imprisonment.

See

21

U.S.C.

§

841(b)(1)(A). 1

The

probation office prepared a presentence report that calculated
Parris’ offense level at 29 and his criminal history category at
VI,

resulting

in

a

guideline

range

of

151-188

months

imprisonment.
Before

sentencing,

the

Government

moved,

pursuant

to

“Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United

1

This opinion omits internal marks, alterations, citations,
emphasis, or footnotes from quotations unless otherwise noted.

3

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States Code, Section 3553(e),” for a downward departure from the
applicable
assistance.

guideline

range

to

reflect

J.A. 28 (emphasis added).

Parris’

substantial

The Government’s motion

recommended that Parris receive a four-level departure, thereby
putting his guideline range at 110-137 months, with the low-end
of

that

range

below

the

statutory

minimum

sentence

of

120

months.
A

substantial-assistance

motion

authorizes

a

sentencing

court to deviate from the guideline range should it deem that
course appropriate under the sentencing factors.

Such a motion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) authorizes the court to sentence a
defendant below the term otherwise required by an applicable
statutory minimum sentence.

See United States v. Williams, 687

F.3d 283, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2012).
contrast,

only

authorizes

a

A motion under § 5K1.1, by

departure

from

the

calculated

guideline range, but not below the statutory minimum sentence
otherwise required.

See United States v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 466,

470 n.4 (4th Cir. 2004).

In other words, “[a] § 3553(e) motion

allows the district court to depart below both the statutory
minimum

sentence

and

the

low-end

of

the

Guideline

range.

However, a § 5K1.1 motion does not allow the court to depart
below the statutory minimum sentence.”

Id.

“When a statutory

minimum sentence is involved in the case, a § 5K1.1 motion is
less defendant-friendly than a § 3553(e) motion.”
4

Id.

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At

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Parris’

sentencing

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hearing,

the

court

heard

argument

from the Government in support of its substantial assistance
motion.

The court then granted the Government’s motion without

limitation:
For the reasons set forth in the written
motion for downward departure, as well as
those
orally
articulated
by
the
U.S.
attorney, the court determines that the
motion for downward departure should be and
the same is allowed.
And the court
concludes that a final offense level of 25,
criminal
history
category
VI
with
a
guideline range of 110 to 137 months is
correct in this case.
J.A.

21.

sentence

Following
of

120

further

months,

argument,

equal

to

a

21%

the

court

reduction

imposed
below

a

the

original guideline range, but at the statutory minimum.
Although
motion

in

the

full

sentencing

during

the

court

hearing,

granted
the

the

Government’s

corresponding

docket

entry stated “MOTION for Downward Departure pursuant to U.S.S.G.
5K1.1 – granted.”

J.A. 4.

In the statement of reasons form,

the sentencing court checked the box indicating that a mandatory
minimum sentence was entered, and a separate checkbox indicating
that the sentence was below the mandatory minimum pursuant to
§

3553(e)

motion

went

unmarked.

Thus,

in

contrast

to

a
the

court’s ruling stated ore tenus from the bench at the sentencing
hearing, the court’s written judgment arguably indicates that
the Government’s motion was granted only under § 5K1.1.

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This distinction is relevant because this case ultimately
centers on whether the sentencing court granted the Government’s
substantial-assistance motion under § 3553(e), § 5K1.1, or both.
In turn, that finding governs whether the district court abused
its

discretion

under

the

in

belief

ruling

the

current

lacked

it

on

the

power

§
to

3582(c)(2)
depart

motion

below

the

statutory minimum sentence.
B.
Parris

filed

the

instant

motion

seeking

a

sentence

reduction under Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
which

generally

reduces

by

two

points

the

offense

levels

assigned to the drug quantities described in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.
The

probation

office

prepared

a

resentencing

report

that

indicated Parris’ offense level fell to 27 using Amendment 782,
resulting

in

a

new

guideline

range

of

130-162

months.

The

report further noted that, because Parris’ current sentence was
below the original guideline range based on his assistance to
the Government, he was eligible for a comparable reduction below
the new guideline range.

Finally, the report explained that

Parris also qualified for a revised sentence below the mandatory
minimum because the substantial-assistance motion was based on §
3553(e).

The

probation

report

ultimately

comparable sentence reduction to 103 months.

6

recommended

a

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The Government filed a response in which it agreed with the
probation report’s recommendation, noting that “[s]ince Parris
received a downward departure pursuant to the Government’s §
3553(e) and § 5K1.1 motion, a reduction comparably less to the
low-end of Parris’ amended Guidelines range results in a term of
imprisonment of 103 months.”
As

the

judge

retired,

the

another

judge.

concluding
sentence
sentence.

current

he

of

who

The
lacked

120

J.A. 74.

originally
sentencing

sentenced
proceeding

assigned

judge

authority

to

months

because

Parris

it

was

denied

depart
was

a

Parris’

from

the

statutory

Defendant is not eligible for a reduction.
He received the mandatory minimum sentence.
It is true that the Government moved for a
downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1
and for a sentence below the mandatory
minimum pursuant to 18 USC § 3553(e).
It
appears, however, that only the 5K1.1 was
granted.
There is nothing in the record to
show that the 3553(e) was granted. The text
order of January 28, 2009, reflects only the
granting of the 5K1.1, and the Statement of
Reasons does not show any § 3553(e) motion
being
granted.
Most
tellingly,
the
Government had moved for the Court to depart
downward to 110 months, which is below the
mandatory minimum, but the Court nonetheless
imposed a sentence at the mandatory minimum
of 120 months. . . . In sum, Defendant has
pointed to nothing in the record showing
that any § 3553(e) motion was ever granted.
received
the
and no motion
7

since

assigned

In relevant part, the court held:

Since
Defendant
minimum sentence

had

mandatory
has been

to

motion,
existing
minimum

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granted allowing a sentence below that
mandatory minimum, Defendant is not eligible
for any relief pursuant to 18 USC § 3582.
J.A. 38.

In sum, the district court determined that it lacked

authority

to

depart

any

further

from

the

current

sentence

because it was the statutory minimum and the original sentencing
court had not granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion which
would have permitted a departure below that threshold.
Parris timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291.

II.
Parris
grounds.
§

3553(e)

challenges

the

district

court’s

judgment

on

two

First, he disputes the court’s legal conclusion that a
motion

must

be

granted

before

a

sentence

may

be

reduced below the statutory minimum under Amendment 782 and the
applicable regulations.

Alternatively, he contests the court’s

finding that the sentencing judge did not grant the Government’s
§ 3553(e) motion.

We address only the latter argument because

it is dispositive of this appeal.
The

district

court’s

finding

at

issue

--

that

the

Government’s § 3553(e) motion was never granted –- is based on
its interpretation of the sentencing court’s earlier judgment.
Our case law instructs that the interpretation of a prior order
is

ultimately

a

legal

question
8

with

substantial

deference

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afforded to the district court’s construction.
Stephens,

875

“substantial

F.2d

76,

deference”

discretion review.

80

n.8

(4th

essentially

See Anderson v.

Cir.

1989).

amounts

to

This

abuse

of

See Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d 277, 284 (4th

Cir. 2013) (“[W]e review a district court’s interpretation of
its

own

orders

for

abuse

of

discretion.”);

see

also

United

States v. Luskin, 16 F. App’x 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001). 2
A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is
guided

by

erroneous

legal

erroneous factual findings.

principles

or

rests

upon

clearly

See United States v. Barber, 119

F.3d 276, 283 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

We are authorized to

review the record and reasons offered by the district court and
reverse

if

conviction

the
that

“appellate
the

court

court
below

has

a

committed

definite
a

clear

and

firm

error

of

judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the
relevant factors.”

Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d

494, 506 (4th Cir. 1977).
To be sure, we will afford a wide berth to a trial court
interpreting

its

own

prior

judgment

2

and

will

question

that

There is out of circuit authority suggesting that de novo
review without any degree of deference is more appropriate when
the reviewing judge did not direct or author the first judgment,
as is the case here. See, e.g., United States v. Spallone, 399
F.3d 415, 423-24 (2d Cir. 2005).
We need not wade into that
issue today because Parris prevails even applying the abuse of
discretion standard.

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interpretation only in rare cases.
case.

This, however, is such a

The district court abused its discretion here by failing

to give appropriate deference to the sentencing court’s oral
findings stated from the bench.
Although a court speaks through its judgments and orders,
in federal criminal cases the general rule is that the oral
pronouncement

of

the

sentence

governs.

See

States, 309 F.2d 686, 687-88 (4th Cir. 1962). 3

Rakes

v.

United

Consequently, a

court “should carry out the true intention of the sentencing
judge as this may be gathered from what he said at the time of
sentencing.”

United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 30 (4th Cir.

1965); see also United States v. Schultz, 855 F.2d 1217, 1225
(6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]hen an oral sentence conflicts with the
written sentence, the oral sentence controls.”).

Only in the

event of an unresolvable ambiguity at the sentencing hearing
have we before authorized turning to the criminal judgment and
other written evidence to discern intent.

See United States v.

Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1450 (10th Cir. 1987) (en
banc)

(“When

an

orally

pronounced

3

sentence

is

ambiguous,

While the rule is the opposite in many state courts, see
Amin v. Cty. of Henrico, 63 Va. App. 203, 209 (2014) (“Because
a circuit court speaks only through its orders, we look to the
sentencing order . . . to discern its holding.”), the federal
rule is clear.

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however, the judgment and commitment order is evidence which may
be used to determine the intended sentence.”).
Instead

of

letting

the

oral

pronouncements

of

the

sentencing court guide its analysis, the district court below
turned immediately to the written clerical record and statement
of reasons, remarking that they “reflect[ed] only the granting
of the 5K1.1.”

J.A. 38.

The court’s conclusion rested entirely

on its observation that the original written sentencing order
and

corresponding

docket

entries

Government’s § 3553(e) motion.

did

not

evidence

the

This approach is contrary to the

controlling case law and is an abuse of the district court’s
discretion.

See United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381, 383

(6th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a “district court abuses its
discretion when it . . . applies the law improperly”).
Focusing on the sentencing colloquy, as we must, we have
little trouble concluding that the sentencing judge granted the
§

3553(e)

motion.

The

Government’s

substantial

assistance

motion unequivocally cited both § 3553(e) and § 5K1.1 as grounds
for departure.
distinction

At the sentencing hearing, the court made no

between

the

statutory

and

guidelines

grounds

for

departure, and instead endorsed the Government’s motion “[f]or
the reasons set forth in the written motion.”

J.A. 21.

The

clear conclusion to be drawn from the sentencing court’s oral
ruling

is

that

the

court,

in

fact,
11

granted

the

Government’s

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motion on both grounds.

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See United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d

528, 533 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he intent of the sentencing court
must guide any retrospective inquiry into the term and nature of
a sentence.”).
Moreover,

after

granting

the

Government’s

substantial

assistance motion without qualification, the court recited the
applicable guideline range as 110-137 months.
this

range

months.

plainly

falls

below

the

The lower end of

statutory

minimum

of

120

The court’s conclusion that the applicable sentencing

range was below the statutory minimum sentence reflects that the
court

did

not

consider

itself

constrained

to

the

statutory

sentencing floor, which could only be the case if the court had
granted the § 3553(e) motion.

As Parris points out, “[i]f the

court had considered itself bound by the mandatory minimum . . .
it would have stated here that the low end of the range was 120
months, not 110 months.”
observation on point.

Opening Br. 17.

We find Parris’

See United States v. Glover, 686 F.3d

1203, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because the statutory mandatory
minimum

sentence

was

greater

than

the

otherwise

applicable

guidelines range, the statutory mandatory minimum . . . became
the guidelines range . . . .”).
On appeal, the Government has changed its position from
that taken below.

It now maintains that the district court

correctly looked to the written materials in this case because
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the

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record

motion.

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is

ambiguous

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about

the

outcome

of

its

§

3553(e)

The sentencing court did not “explicitly state that

[he] was granting the . . . § 3553(e) motion,” the Government
contends.

Response Br. 17.

sentencing

judge

wholly

adopted

expressly invoked § 3553(e).
the

Government

moves

As recited above, however, the
the

Government’s

motion

that

That motion plainly states that

pursuant

to

“Section

5K1.1

of

the

Sentencing Guidelines and Title 18, United States Code, Section
3553(e)” for a downward departure to reflect Parris’ substantial
assistance.
court’s

J.A. 28 (emphasis added).

ruling

ore

tenus

was

In turn, the district

explicit:

“For

the

reasons

set

forth in the written motion for a downward departure . . . the
court determines that the motion for downward departure should
be

and

the

same

is

allowed.”

Id.

at

21.

Nothing

in

the

sentencing court’s bench ruling indicates anything but a grant
of

the

substantial

assistance

5K1.1 and § 3553(e).
uphold

orders

that

motion

on

the

grounds

pled:

§

In the context of sentencing, we often
are

granted

by

reference

to

a

written

submission without added clarification, see, e.g., United States
v. Brame, 448 F. App'x 364, 367 (4th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Trotman, 406 F. App’x 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2011), and we see no
reason to require more here.
Alternatively, the Government argues that the fact that the
judge imposed a sentence of 120 months, which falls right at the
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statutory minimum, indicates that the § 3553(e) motion was not
granted.

We are unpersuaded this point creates ambiguity, let

alone a discrepancy sufficient to allow the district court to
consult only the written record.

See Equitable Life Assur. Soc.

of U.S. v. Deem, 91 F.2d 569, 575 (4th Cir. 1937) (“[I]t is not
permissible

for

construction

of

would

not

courts

by

ordinary

otherwise

a

words

strained
to

exist.”).

and

create

an

fact

that

The

over-refined

ambiguity
the

which

sentencing

court imposed the statutory minimum sentence does not prove that
the

sentencing

motion

and

judge,

recited

a

who

had

just

guideline

granted

range

the

below

Government’s

the

statutory

minimum, thought that he lacked the authority to impose a lesser
sentence.
the

The Government fails to appreciate that nothing from

sentencing

thought

himself

sentence.

transcript

hints

constrained

Instead,

as

the

impose

to

that

the

described,

the

sentencing
statutory

court

judge
minimum

specifically

identified the applicable guideline range as falling below the
statutory

minimum

due

to

the

Government’s

motion.

On

this

record, we find it more likely that the sentencing judge simply
found 120 months to be the most appropriate sentence, not that
he silently rejected the § 3553(e) motion.
In sum, the district court erred when it failed to focus on
the sentencing court’s oral ruling in its inquiry as to whether
the sentencing court granted the Government’s § 3553(e) motion.
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Instead,

it

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looked

only

to

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the

written

record

to

find

an

ambiguity, and with this view of the evidence, wrongly surmised
that

the

§

3553(e)

motion

was

never

granted.

Applying

the

correct framework, we must reach the opposite conclusion: the
substantial assistance motion was granted under § 3553(e) and
therefore the district court was authorized to depart below the
statutory
abused

minimum

its

sentence.

discretion

in

Accordingly,
rejecting

the

Parris’

district
18

court

U.S.C.

§

3582(c)(2) motion on the ground that it lacked legal authority
to award a sentence reduction.

See Williams, 687 F.3d at 285-

86.
Parris appears to suggest that we should forge ahead and
award

the

downward

departure

ourselves.

This

we

cannot

do.

Parris’ eligibility for a reduction does not entitle him to a
lower sentence.
warranted

here

Whether, and to what extent, a reduction is
are

decisions

left

to

the

discretion

of

the

district court, as guided by the applicable sentencing factors.
See

United

States

v.

Williams,

808

F.3d

253,

263

(4th

Cir.

2015).

III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand this case for further proceedings.
VACATED AND REMANDED
15