US v. Michael Woodard, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:10-cr-00191-BO-1,5:12-cv-00106-BO. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999790543]. [15-7446]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL LEONARD WOODARD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00191-BO-1; 5:12-cv-00106-BO)

Submitted:

March 30, 2016

Decided:

April 7, 2016

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Paul K. Sun, Jr., Kelly Margolis Dagger, ELLIS & WINTERS LLP,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D.
Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael Leonard Woodard appeals the district court’s order
denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion.
originally

pleaded

guilty

distribute

marijuana

and

to

possession

ecstasy,

in

with

violation

Woodard

intent

of

21

to

U.S.C.

§ 841(a) (2012), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2012), pursuant to a plea agreement in which the Government
agreed to move to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm
by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).

The

agreement included a waiver of Woodard’s right to appeal any
sentence

not

in

excess

established

at

attack

convictions

the

the

of

the

sentencing
or

advisory

hearing,

sentence

Guidelines

and

except

to

range

collaterally

for

claims

of

ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct
not known to Woodard at the time of his guilty plea.
The court originally sentenced Woodard below the advisory
Guidelines

range

to

180

months

of

imprisonment

based

on

the

Government’s motion for a departure for Woodard’s substantial
assistance.
pursuant

to

Woodard
Anders

appealed,
v.

and

California,

counsel
386

filed

U.S.

738

a

brief
(1967),

questioning whether the court erred in determining that Woodard
was a career offender.

We granted the Government’s motion to

dismiss Woodard’s appeal of his sentence based on the appellate
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waiver.

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United States v. Woodard, 450 F. App’x 310 (4th Cir.

2011) (No. 11-4373).
Woodard then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, arguing that
he

was

no

longer

a

career

offender

following

this

court’s

decision in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.
2011) (en banc).

The district court granted Woodard’s motion

and resentenced him.

On the Government’s appeal, we vacated the

district court’s order and remanded, concluding that Woodard had
waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence.
States

v.

Woodard,

12-7937).

523

F.

App’x

262

Cir.

2013)

(No.

The district court reinstated the original judgment

and appointed new counsel for Woodard.
a

(4th

United

supplemental

§ 2255

motion,

Substitute counsel filed

arguing

that

Woodard’s

trial

counsel rendered ineffective assistance in advising Woodard that
he

could

challenge

his

career

offender

review, despite his appellate waiver.
relief

on

Woodard’s

appealability.
appeals.

28

motion,
U.S.C.

but

status

on

collateral

The district court denied
granted

§ 2253(c)

a

certificate

(2012).

Woodard

of
now

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo
and its factual findings for clear error.
Fulks, 683 F.3d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 2012).
his

counsel

rendered

a

deficient

United States v.
Woodard argues that

performance

by

erroneously

informing Woodard that he could collaterally attack his sentence
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in the face of his enforceable appellate waiver.

Woodard also

argues that he demonstrated that counsel’s error prejudiced him
as, had he been correctly advised, he would have rejected the
Government’s plea offer and instead pleaded guilty to all three
counts without the benefit of a plea agreement.
We conclude that the court did not err in denying relief on
Woodard’s claim. *

To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a defendant must show (1) “that counsel’s performance
was

deficient,”

and

(2)

prejudiced the defense.”
668, 687 (1984).

“that

the

deficient

performance

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

Under the second prong of the test in the

context of a conviction following a guilty plea, a defendant can
show prejudice only by demonstrating “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

*

In reaching this conclusion, we reject the Government’s
argument that Woodard’s numerically second § 2255 motion was an
unauthorized successive motion, as the district court reinstated
the judgment following our remand of the court’s order granting
Woodard’s first § 2255 motion. See In re Goddard, 170 F.3d 435,
436-38 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that vacating and reinstating a
judgment following successful § 2255 motion to allow defendant
to appeal “resets to zero the counter of collateral attacks
pursued”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We also reject the Government’s contention that Woodard’s
claim is barred by his appellate waiver. The waiver explicitly
excepted claims of ineffective assistance not known to Woodard
at the time of his guilty plea.

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and would have insisted on going to trial.”

Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Here,

assuming

that

counsel

erroneously

advised

Woodard

that he could challenge his career offender status on collateral
review,

we

prejudice

conclude

for

his

that

claim

Woodard
of

has

failed

ineffective

to

demonstrate

assistance.

Woodard

explicitly conceded that he would not have proceeded to trial
had

counsel

correctly

advised

him

that

he

could

not

later

challenge his sentence on direct appeal or on collateral review
if the law changed after our decision in Simmons.
U.S. at 59.

See Hill, 474

Moreover, Woodard has also failed to demonstrate

that he would have pleaded guilty to all three counts rather
than accepting the plea agreement.

At the time of Woodard’s

guilty plea, he would have been an armed career criminal based
on

his

prior

convictions.

See

18

U.S.C.

§ 924(e)

(2012).

Without the benefit of the plea agreement, therefore, Woodard
would have faced a combined statutory mandatory minimum sentence
of

240

months

government

of

imprisonment,

substantial

assistance

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(c), (e).
that

it

would

have

been

without

the

motion.

benefit
See

18

of

a

U.S.C.

Woodard has failed to demonstrate
rational

to

plead

guilty

to

such

penalties based on the chance that the law would change in the
future.

See

Padilla

v.

Kentucky,

559

U.S.

356,

372

(2010)

(petitioner must demonstrate “that a decision to reject [a] plea
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bargain would have been rational under the circumstances” to
satisfy the Strickland standard).
Accordingly,
dispense

with

contentions

are

we

oral

affirm

the

argument

adequately

district

because

presented

in

court’s

the
the

facts

order.

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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