US v. Roberto Chay-Chay

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:15-hc-02064-BR Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999916418].. [15-7491]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7491

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
ROBERTO CHAY-CHAY,
Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:15-hc-02064-BR)

Submitted:

August 19, 2016

Decided:

August 24, 2016

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Joseph Bart
Gilbert, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United
States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
The

district

court

committed

Roberto

Chay-Chay,

a

Guatemalan national, to the custody and care of the Attorney
General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2012).

The court found

that Chay-Chay, who was being detained at the Federal Medical
Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC-Butner”) for a mental
health evaluation following his illegal reentry into the United
States after deportation, was suffering from a mental disease or
defect

as

a

result

of

which

his

release

would

create

a

substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to the property of another.
A person may be committed to the custody of the Attorney
General

for

“medical,

psychiatric,

or

psychological

care

or

treatment” “[i]f, after [a] hearing, the [district] court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which
his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another

person

or

serious

18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).
dangerousness
overturn

exists

unless

it

damage

to

property

of

another.”

The district court’s finding that such
is
is

a

factual

clearly

determination

erroneous.

we

United

will
States

not
v.

LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).

2

We review issues of

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statutory interpretation de novo.

United States v. Joshua, 607

F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, Chay-Chay does not argue that the Government
failed to establish his dangerousness by clear and convincing
evidence.

Rather,

statutory

first

interpretation

commitment
because

he

involved

the

of

challenges
§

4246,

improper

district

court

the

district

arguing

that

extraterritorial

found

that

the

court’s

the

civil

application

requirement

of

“substantial risk of bodily injury to another person” includes
risk to persons anywhere in the world.
In this case, the district court did not expressly find
that

Chay-Chay’s

release

would

create

a

substantial

risk

of

bodily injury to, or serious damage to the property of, a person
outside

of

the

United

States.

In

fact,

if

Chay-Chay

were

released, he would be released in the United States, and there
is

no

proceeding

preclude

his

or

detainer

presence

in

pending

the

United

against
States

him

that

upon

would

release.

Having concluded that the district court did not give § 4246
extraterritorial effect, we need not reach the issue of whether
§ 4246 applies extraterritorially.
Chay-Chay also posits constitutional challenges to allowing
a court in the United States to civilly commit “mentally ill
undocumented noncitizens . . . to serve de facto life sentences
at the expense of American taxpayers.”
3

However, § 4246 provides

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numerous avenues by which a person in Chay-Chay’s situation can
be released after commitment.
(g) (2012).
“civil

See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)(2), (e),

With respect to Chay-Chay’s due process rights,

commitment

for

any

purpose

constitutes

a

significant

deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”
Addington

v.

Texas,

441

U.S.

418,

425

(1979).

Furthermore,

Chay-Chay does not argue that he was denied due process through
the commitment hearing.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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