Jesus Rios v. Tremont Veale

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-ct-03143-BO Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999826126]. Mailed to: appellant. [15-7933]

Appeal: 15-7933

Doc: 14

Filed: 05/18/2016

Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7933

JESUS ADAN CRUZ RIOS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
TREMONT VEALE,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:13-ct-03143-BO)

Submitted:

April 18, 2016

Decided:

May 18, 2016

Before DUNCAN and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jesus Adan Cruz Rios, Appellant Pro Se.
Assistant
Attorney
General,
Raleigh,
Appellee.

Judith Maria Estevez,
North
Carolina,
for

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 15-7933

Doc: 14

Filed: 05/18/2016

Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:
Jesus Adan Cruz Rios appeals the district court’s order
granting Defendant’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim and dismissing with prejudice Rios’
42 U.S.C.

§ 1983

(2012)

complaint

in

which

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
follow,

we

vacate

the

district

court’s

Rios

asserted

an

For the reasons that
order

and

remand

for

further proceedings.
We review de novo the district court’s ruling on a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Kensington Volunteer Fire

Dep’t, Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir.
2012).

“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the

sufficiency of a complaint.”

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178

F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999).

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, a complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what
the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Pardus,

551

U.S.

89,

quotation marks omitted).

93

(2007)

(alteration

Erickson v.
and

internal

While a pro se litigant’s pleadings

are “to be liberally construed,” id. at 94 (internal quotation
marks omitted), the facts alleged must “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” and the complaint must contain
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007).
2

Appeal: 15-7933

Doc: 14

Filed: 05/18/2016

Pg: 3 of 5

Where, as here, the motion to dismiss involves “a civil
rights complaint, we must be especially solicitous of the wrongs
alleged and must not dismiss the complaint unless it appears to
a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief
under any legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the
facts alleged.”
quotation

Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244 (emphasis and internal

marks

plausibility,

we

omitted).
accept

contained therein.”
Cir. 2013).
savvy

judge

as

“In
true

assessing
all

the

the

factual

complaint’s
allegations

De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th

A complaint thus may proceed “even if it strikes a
that

actual

proof

of

[the

alleged]

facts

is

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids ‘the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain’” on prisoners by prison officials.

Hill v.

Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).

The core inquiry in an

excessive force case is “whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and

sadistically

for

the

very

purpose

of

causing

harm.”

Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, a plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim when he alleges that there was an unnecessary application

3

Appeal: 15-7933

Doc: 14

Filed: 05/18/2016

Pg: 4 of 5

of force, regardless of whether a significant injury resulted
therefrom.

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-40 (2010).

On this record, we conclude that Rios adequately pled an
Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.

We accept as true the

facts pled in Rios’ complaint, see De’lonta, 708 F.3d at 524,
and construe them in the light most favorable to Rios, see U.S.
ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d
131,

136

(4th

Cir.

2014).

With

complaint alleged as follows.

the

stage

thus

set,

Rios’

On or about December 8, 2012,

Defendant Veale approached Rios’ cell to retrieve his meal tray.
Veale saw that Rios’ arm was in the trap located on his cell
door, which is used to receive and return meal trays.

While his

arm was in the trap, Rios asked to speak with one of Veale’s
superior officers about the prison’s lockdown status.

Then,

with Rios’ arm still in the trap, Veale forcefully closed the
trap with his leg, causing Rios to seek medical attention.

In

our view, these allegations, although brief, are sufficient to
state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim in that they
reflect that Veale utilized more than de minimis force in a
situation
force.

that

does

not

appear

to

have

See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.

required

any

use

of

Thus, dismissal of this

claim at the pleading stage was premature.
Accordingly,
dismissing

with

we

vacate

prejudice

the

Rios’
4

district
excessive

court’s
force

judgment

claim.

We

Appeal: 15-7933

Doc: 14

Filed: 05/18/2016

Pg: 5 of 5

remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion but express no opinion about the merits of Rios’ claim.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

5