Ohio Valley Environmental Coal v. Fola Coal Company, LLC
Filing
PUBLISHED AUTHORED OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:13-cv-05006. [999997465]. [16-1024]
Appeal: 16-1024
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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1024
OHIO
VALLEY
ENVIRONMENTAL
COALITION;
HIGHLANDS CONSERVANCY; and SIERRA CLUB,
WEST
VIRGINIA
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
FOLA COAL COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant - Appellant.
-----------------------------------AMERICAN FOREST AND PAPER ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN PETROLEUM
INSTITUTE; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN WATER AGENCIES;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME BUILDERS; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MANUFACTURERS; NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION; UTILITY WATER
ACT GROUP,
Amici Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (2:13-cv-05006)
Argued:
October 27, 2016
Decided:
January 4, 2017
Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Gerald Bruce LEE,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Diaz and Judge Lee joined.
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ARGUED: Michael Shane Harvey, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellant.
Joseph Mark Lovett, APPALACHIAN
MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, Lewisburg, West Virginia, for Appellees.
Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST
VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for Amici The State of West
Virginia
and
West
Virginia
Department
of
Environmental
Protection.
ON BRIEF: Robert G. McLusky, Jennifer L. Hughes,
JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
J. Michael Becher, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN ADVOCATES, Lewisburg,
West Virginia; James M. Hecker, PUBLIC JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Appellees.
Karen C. Bennett, Samuel L. Brown, Brian
R. Levey, Kristy Bulleit, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, Washington,
D.C.; Jan A. Poling, AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER ASSOCIATION,
Washington,
D.C.;
Amanda
Waters,
Erica
Spitzig,
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CLEAN WATER AGENCIES, Washington, D.C.; Linda E.
Kelly, Quentin Riegel, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS,
Washington, D.C.; Peter Tolsdorf, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE,
Washington, D.C.; Tom Ward, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME
BUILDERS, Washington, D.C., for Amici American Forest & Paper
Association, American Petroleum Institute, National Association
of Clean Water Agencies, National Association of Home Builders,
National
Association
of
Manufacturers,
National
Mining
Association and Utility Water Act Group.
John C. Cruden,
Assistant
Attorney
General,
David
S.
Gualtieri,
Jennifer
Neumann, Environment and Natural Resources Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
United
States
Environmental
Protection
Agency.
Patrick
Morrisey, Attorney General, Elbert Lin, Solicitor General, Erica
N. Peterson, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia; Kristin
Boggs, General Counsel, Thomas L. Clarke, Senior Policy Advisor
and
Counsel,
WEST
VIRGINIA
DEPARTMENT
OF
ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION, Charleston, West Virginia, for Amici The State of
West Virginia and West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection.
2
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DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Several environmental groups brought this action against a
coal company, alleging that the company had violated the Clean
Water Act and seeking appropriate injunctive relief.
bench
trial,
indeed
the
violated
measures.
district
the
Act
court
and
found
ordered
that
it
to
the
After a
company
take
had
corrective
The company appeals, principally asserting that its
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit
shields it from liability.
Because the company did not comply
with the conditions of its permit, the permit does not shield it
from liability under the Clean Water Act, and the district court
properly ordered appropriate remedial measures.
Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
A.
The Clean Water Act forbids all discharges of pollutants
into waters of the United States, unless the discharger holds a
permit.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342, 1362 (2012).
The Act
shields NPDES permit holders from liability if their discharges
comply with their permits.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(k).
A typical
NPDES permit lists numerical limitations on specific types of
effluents and includes other conditions required for compliance
with state and federal law.
The Act requires that effluent
3
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limits
reflect
applicable
U.S.C.
§ 1312(a).
These
Pg: 4 of 33
water
quality
water
standards.
quality
See
may
standards
33
be
numerical or narrative, 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2016), and may,
but need not be, contained in a permit.
Under
the
Act,
if
a
state
receives
approval
from
the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), it can administer its
own NPDES permitting program.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
EPA
reviews and must approve any substantive changes to a state’s
permit program.
See id.
In 1981, West Virginia received EPA
approval to administer its own permit program and has done so
ever since.
West
Virginia
has
promulgated
a
number
of
regulations
necessary to comply with the national NPDES program.
Virginia
reference)
NPDES
permits
numerous
incorporate
provisions
of
(either
the
West
All West
expressly
Virginia
or
by
Code
of
State Rules.
These include a series of regulations governing
NPDES
in
permits
general,
as
well
as
a
separate
regulations governing NPDES permits for coal mining.
series
of
Compare
W. Va. Code R. § 47-10 (2016) (general NPDES regulations), with
W. Va. Code R. § 47-30 (coal mine NPDES regulations).
In 1996, Fola Coal Company, LLC obtained a West Virginia
NPDES coal mine permit to discharge into Stillhouse Branch, a
tributary of Twentymile Creek and a waterway adjacent to Fola’s
surface mining facility in central West Virginia.
4
Fola applied
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for and received a renewed NPDES permit in 2009.
The provisions
of that permit lie at the heart of this case.
B.
On
March
Valley
13,
2013,
Environmental
three
environmental
Coalition,
West
groups
Virginia
--
Ohio
Highlands
Conservancy, and Sierra Club (collectively “the Coalition”) -filed
this
action
under
the
provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
violated
5.1.f,
Fola’s permit.
a
West
Clean
Water
Act’s
citizen
suit
The Coalition alleged that Fola
Virginia
regulation
incorporated
in
At the time Fola’s renewal permit was issued in
2009, 5.1.f provided:
The discharge or discharges covered by a WV/NPDES
permit are to be of such quality so as not to cause
violation
of
applicable
water
quality
standards
adopted by the Department of Environmental Protection,
Title 47, Series 2.
W. Va. Code R. § 47-30-5.1.f (2009).
Fola
violated
5.1.f
by
sufficient
quantities
Stillhouse
Branch,
quality standards.
to
which
The Coalition alleged that
discharging
cause
resulted
ions
and
increased
in
a
sulfates
in
conductivity
in
violation
of
water
Specifically, the Coalition asserted that
Fola’s discharges violated two narrative water quality standards
contained
in
Fola’s
permit.
See
id.
§§ 47-2-3.2.e,
-3.2.i
(2016); see infra n.8.
In response to the Coalition’s allegations, Fola pointed
out
that
it
disclosed
the
nature
5
of
its
discharges
when
it
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applied for the 2009 renewal permit.
At that time, Fola had
stated that its discharges would include ions and therefore be
highly conductive.
Despite this disclosure, the West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) set no specific
limitations on conductivity in Fola’s permit.
By declining to
do so, Fola asserted, WVDEP made an affirmative choice not to
impose
any
followed
limit
that
conductivity
on
5.1.f
of
resulted
in
a
reasoned
that,
conductivity.
did
its
not
obligate
discharges
violation
because
of
it
According
Fola
even
water
if
with
to
that
quality
complied
to
Fola,
limit
the
conductivity
standards.
the
it
effluent
Fola
limits
expressly set out in its permit, the permit shielded it from all
liability under the Act.
To
gain
support
for
its
view
that
5.1.f
imposed
no
obligation on it, in 2013 Fola sought clarification from WVDEP
regarding
a
new
involving
the
West
permit
“Notwithstanding
any
Virginia
shield.
rule
law
enacted
The
or
new
permit
a
law
year
earlier,
provided
condition
to
that
the
contrary, . . . compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this
article shall be deemed compliance for purposes of” the Clean
Water
Act’s
permit
shield.
2012
W.
Va.
codified at W. Va. Code § 22-11-6(2) (2013)).
SB
615
(formerly
WVDEP responded
that, in its view, this legislation did not substantively change
existing
law
but
simply
clarified
6
West
Virginia’s
consistent
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interpretation
consistent
of
view,
the
a
permit
permit
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shield.
holder
Under
need
this
only
assertedly
disclose
its
discharges of effluents to WVDEP and comply with the effluent
limits in the permit.
If the permit holder did this, according
to WVDEP, the permit would shield the permit holder from all
liability under the Clean Water Act.
In 2015, WVDEP attempted to remove from 5.1.f the language
at issue in this case, which requires permit holders to comply
with water quality standards.
In doing so, WVDEP admitted that
when the agency had issued Fola a renewal permit in 2009, 5.1.f
“require[d]
coal
NPDES
permittees
to
meet
water
quality
standards, whether or not such standards are delineated in the
permit
or
contained
permitting process.”
in
the
administrative
record
of
the
WVDEP, Response to Comments, 47 CSR 30,
WV/NPDES Rule for Coal Mining Facilities, at 1 (2014), http://
apps.sos.wv.gov/adlaw/csr/readfile.aspx?DocId=26342&Format=PDF.
Nonetheless,
WVDEP
opined
that
its
removal
of
the
relevant
language from 5.1.f “does nothing more than make [state law]
consistent with” the Clean Water Act, which, according to WVDEP,
did not require compliance with water quality standards.
Id.
Notwithstanding WVDEP’s views, EPA did not approve WVDEP’s
attempted changes to 5.1.f.
Instead, in a series of letters to
WVDEP, EPA explained its concerns that the elimination of the
water quality standards language in 5.1.f could cause state law
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conflict
program.
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with
federal
Pg: 8 of 33
law
and
weaken
the
state’s
NPDES
WVDEP’s explanations did not assuage EPA’s concerns,
and EPA did not approve any changes to 5.1.f or to any other
language
incorporated
in
Fola’s
permit.
In
2015,
the
West
Virginia Legislature enacted another provision similar to SB 615
that
explicitly
violations
prohibited
against
permit
enforcing
holders.
water
But
quality
again,
standard
EPA
did
not
approve the removal of the relevant portion of 5.1.f or any
similar changes to the state’s NPDES permit program that might
affect Fola’s permit.
Nevertheless, armed with WVDEP’s interpretation of SB 615
and
the
legislative
district
court
to
prohibit
Fola
from
actions
hold
outlined
that
above,
Fola
urged
permit
provision
5.1.f
West
Virginia
water
violating
did
the
not
quality
standards.
Fola further contended that it could not be held
accountable
for
quality
within
increased
violations
the
because
numerical
conductivity
the
levels
effluents
allowed
in
and
it
its
resulting
water
discharged
fell
permit
were
or
disclosed during the permitting process.
C.
After a bench trial, at which the district court considered
mountains of expert testimony, reports, and charts, the court
issued a thorough written opinion.
The court found that 5.1.f
constituted an enforceable permit provision that required Fola
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refrain
standards,
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from
violating
including
the
Pg: 9 of 33
West
Virginia’s
narrative
water
water
quality
quality
standards
contained in §§ 47-2-3.2.e and -3.2.i.
The court found that mine drainage like that which Fola
discharged into Stillhouse Branch deposited significant amounts
of ions into the receiving water. 1
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition,
Inc. v. Fola Coal Co., 82 F. Supp. 3d 673, 686–87 (S.D. W. Va.
2015).
the
These ions are measured by conductivity, id. at 687, and
conductivity
of
Stillhouse
Branch
had
markedly
increased
since Fola began discharging mine drainage into the water, id.
at 696–98.
As conductivity in Stillhouse Branch increased, the experts
explained and the court found, sensitive insect species, which
could not adapt to the sudden and dramatic change, died.
687.
Id. at
The decrease in aquatic diversity caused a decrease in the
stream’s score on the West Virginia Stream Condition Index (“the
1
In order to extract coal, Fola blasted rock and dumped it
into Stillhouse Branch. See Gregory J. Pond et al., Downstream
Effects
of
Mountaintop
Coal
Mining:
Comparing
Biological
Conditions Using Family- and Genus-Level Macroinvertebrate
Bioassessment Tools, 27 J. N. Am. Benthological Soc’y 717, 718
(2008) (explaining surface coal mining).
The minerals in the
rock reacted with the flowing water to release calcium,
bicarbonate, and sulfate ions.
See Emily S. Bernhardt et al.,
How Many Mountains Can We Mine? Assessing the Regional
Degradation of Central Appalachian Rivers by Surface Coal
Mining, 46 Envtl. Sci. & Tech. 8115, 8115 (2012).
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Index”), 2 which WVDEP and EPA had long used to measure the health
of streams.
The court noted that EPA considered Index scores
below 68 to indicate impairment and that, in 2009 when WVDEP
issued Fola’s renewal permit, WVDEP had generally shared that
view.
See
id.
at
677,
679
&
n.4.
The
trial
evidence
established that since 2003 Stillhouse Branch had consistently
scored well below 68, ranging from 31.6 to 58.17.
The
district
court
concluded
that
Id. at 696.
“when
conductivity
reaches 300 [µS/cm], it is more likely than not that” the Index
score
will
drop
below
68
biologically impaired.”
and
“the
subject
stream
will
be
Id. at 687 (citing EPA, A Field-Based
Aquatic Life Benchmark for Conductivity in Central Appalachian
Streams
(Final
Report),
EPA/600/R-10/023F,
at
A-36
(2011)).
Samples from Stillhouse Branch reported conductivity that was
ten times higher than this 300 µS/cm threshold.
Id. at 696–98.
The court found that Fola’s mining increased conductivity in
Stillhouse
Branch
and
that
“high
conductivity
in
downstream
Stillhouse Branch is causing -- or, at the very least materially
contributing to -- a significant adverse impact to the chemical
and biological components of the stream’s aquatic ecosystems” in
2
See A Stream Condition Index for West Virginia Wadeable
Streams 1-2 (2000), http://www.dep.wv.gov/WWE/watershed/bio_fish
/Documents/WVSCI.pdf.
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violation of the West Virginia narrative water quality standards
incorporated into Fola’s permit.
With
urging,
respect
to
rejected
burdensome.
Id. at 698.
remedy,
the
the
district
Coalition’s
court,
proposed
at
remedy
Fola’s
as
too
Instead, the court appointed a Special Master of
Engineering to monitor Fola’s implementation of less burdensome
methods Fola proposed.
Fola timely noted this appeal.
D.
A
court
contract.
must
interpret
NPDES
permit
as
it
would
a
Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs, 268 F.3d 255,
269 (4th Cir. 2001).
the
an
district
court
Thus, to the extent that the judgment of
rests
on
interpretation
of
Fola’s
NPDES
permit, that interpretation constitutes a legal question, which
we review de novo.
Id.
But to the extent that judgment rests
on factual findings made after a bench trial, we can reverse
only if those findings are clearly erroneous.
Id.
II.
Fola
principally
contends
that
the
district
court
misinterpreted its permit.
In doing so, Fola presents a narrow argument.
expressly
Reply
Br.
acknowledges
at
3.
Fola
that
its
admits
permit
that
“incorporates”
“permit
shielded from violations of permit conditions.”
11
The company
holders
5.1.f.
are
Id. at 1.
not
And
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the company forgoes any claim that 5.1.f does not impose water
quality standards, including those found in 3.2.e and 3.2.i.
Fola’s
sole
argument
is
that
5.1.f
controls
the
conduct
of
WVDEP, the state regulator, and imposes no requirements on Fola,
the regulated entity.
Fola
argument.
but
is
offers
three
points
assertedly
supporting
this
First, the company maintains that 5.1.f is ambiguous
best
interpreted
as
a
regulation
authority, not the permit holder.
of
the
permitting
Second, Fola contends that
the district court failed to examine “extrinsic evidence,” which
it argues eliminates any ambiguity and demonstrates that, in the
“contemplation
of
the
parties,”
obligation on the permit holder.
5.1.f
clearly
imposed
no
Finally, Fola claims that our
holding and analysis in Piney Run requires a court to conclude
that 5.1.f imposes obligations only on the permitting authority.
We consider each of these arguments in turn.
A.
We
initially
examine
the
language
determine if it is indeed ambiguous.
of
Fola’s
permit
to
As we recognized in Piney
Run, “if ‘the language [of a permit] is plain and capable of
legal
construction,
permit’s meaning.”
the
language
alone
must
determine’
the
Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 270 (quoting FDIC v.
Prince George Corp., 58 F.3d 1041, 1046 (4th Cir. 1995)).
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Contrary to Fola’s assertions, the text of 5.1.f of the
permit
seems
prohibits
straightforward
“discharges
covered
water quality standards.
and
unambiguous.
by”
the
The
permit
provision
from
violating
Of course, it is the permit holder
that generates “discharges covered by” the permit.
Thus, the
provision controls the activities of the permit holder -- here
Fola.
The state agency simply drafts the permit.
That agency,
WVDEP, has no control over the permit holder’s discharges.
Further,
there
is
no
mention
in
5.1.f
of
“regulating,”
“drafting a permit,” or “determining effluent limits,” all core
activities
of
the
state
regulator.
Rather,
5.1.f focuses on the discharges themselves.
the
language
of
One would have to
rewrite 5.1.f substantially to read it as imposing obligations
on WVDEP. 3
applies
to
As written, the plain language of 5.1.f indicates it
Fola,
the
permit
holder,
not
WVDEP,
the
agency
granting the permit.
Review of the provisions surrounding 5.1.f further supports
this conclusion.
5.1.f is contained in a section of the permit
3
For example, if 5.1.f imposed requirements on the state
regulator rather than the permit holder, it would more naturally
read: “The discharge or discharges covered by a WV/NPDES permit
are to be of such quality regulated by the Department of
Environmental Protection so as not to cause violation of
applicable water quality standards adopted by the Department of
Environmental Protection that agency, Title 47, Series 2.”
Notably, these changes would require both insertions and
deletions.
13
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entitled
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“Conditions
subsection
entitled
Pg: 14 of 33
Applicable
“Duty
to
to
All
Comply;
Permits,”
and
The
Penalties.”
in
a
first
mandate of the subsection states, “The permittee must comply
with all conditions of a WV/NPDES permit.”
See W. Va. Code R.
§ 47-30-5.1.a (2009) (emphasis added).
This subsection then lists several ways a permit holder can
violate the permit separate and apart from violations of the
permit’s effluent limits.
For example, under this subsection, a
permit holder violates the permit when it “falsifies, tampers
with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any monitoring device or
method required to be maintained under a WV/NPDES permit.”
§ 47-30-5.1.d.
“knowingly
required
And a permit holder violates a permit when it
makes
certification
to
Id.
in
be
any
any
false
record
maintained
statement,
or
under
other
this
representation,
document
submitted
permit.”
Id.
or
or
§ 47-30-
5.1.e.
It seems unlikely that immediately following these clear
restrictions
on
permit
holders,
in
a
subsection
specifically
addressed to permit holders, the drafters inserted in 5.1.f a
directive
agency.
not
to
Indeed,
permit
it
holders,
makes
but
little
only
sense
to
for
the
regulating
5.1.f
to
be
incorporated into all coal mining permits, see id. § 47-30-5, if
5.1.f does not obligate the permit holder in any way.
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Accordingly,
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the
district
Pg: 15 of 33
court’s
conclusion
that
5.1.f
unambiguously regulates permit holders seems entirely warranted. 4
B.
Furthermore, rather than supporting Fola’s interpretation,
all relevant extrinsic evidence points to the conclusion that
5.1.f imposes obligations on the permit holder, not the state
permitting agency.
Fola’s argument to the contrary relies almost entirely on
statements from WVDEP and the West Virginia Legislature.
Fola
contends that these statements prove that neither body intended
5.1.f to create an obligation on permit holders to meet water
quality standards beyond the numerical effluent limits in the
permit.
The Legislature’s 2013 and 2015 amendments and WVDEP’s
statements certainly evince West Virginia’s present desire to
cease
enforcement
holders.
of
water
quality
standards
against
permit
But neither WVDEP’s current interpretation nor the
Legislature’s actions in amending state law in 2013 and 2015
constitute extrinsic evidence supporting Fola’s interpretation
of its 2009 permit.
4
Fola contends that the district court’s holding renders
the effluent limits in the permit superfluous.
But by Fola’s
own admission, the effluent limits do not delineate all the
discharges disclosed to the regulating agency.
5.1.f captures
those discharges, not explicitly regulated by effluent limits,
which nonetheless decrease water quality and harm the aquatic
ecosystem.
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And Fola is simply wrong in contending that “[t]here is no
evidence
that
West
Virginia
ever
intended”
to
hold
permit
holders liable for violations of water quality standards.
of Appellant at 34 (emphasis added).
Br.
In fact, Fola has provided
no evidence that the Legislature or WVDEP lacked this intent
when Fola’s renewal permit was issued in 2009.
Rather, the
record evidence indicates this was precisely what was intended.
In 2011, two years after the issuance of Fola’s current
permit,
WVDEP
pursued
an
enforcement
action
against
Fola’s
parent company based on violations of the exact water quality
standards at issue here as incorporated into the NPDES permit
through
5.1.f.
See
Complaint
in
Intervention
at
12,
United
States v. Consol Energy, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-0028 (N.D. W. Va.
Mar. 14, 2011), ECF No. 6-1.
to
injunctive
relief
to
And Fola’s parent company agreed
remedy
these
violations.
Consent
Decree, Consol Energy, No. 1:11-cv-0028 (N.D. W. Va. Jun. 15,
2011),
ECF
interpreted
No.
3-1.
5.1.f
to
Moreover,
require
coal
as
amend 5.1.f.
as
companies
permits to meet water quality standards.
Comments, at 1.
late
2015,
WVDEP
holding
NPDES
See WVDEP, Response to
This was the very reason why WVDEP attempted to
See id.
Fola nonetheless insists that 5.1.f cannot subject it to
any
substantive
obligations
because,
during
the
formal
rulemaking in which 5.1.f was added to West Virginia’s NPDES
16
Appeal: 16-1024
Doc: 74
program,
EPA
Filed: 01/04/2017
stated
rights
“substantive
that
or
the
Pg: 17 of 33
new
rules
would
obligations.”
not
alter
Revision
of
any
West
Virginia’s NPDES Program Transferring Authority over Coal Mines
and Coal Preparation Plants from the West Virginia Department of
Natural Resources; Division of Water Resources to Its Division
of Reclamation, 50 Fed. Reg. 2996, 2997 (Jan. 23, 1985).
argument
both
misreads
the
history
of
5.1.f
and
That
ignores
important record evidence.
5.1.f’s
standards
mining
prohibition
originated
in
regulations.
Reclamation
against
pre-1984
See
Regulations,
ch.
violating
West
water
Virginia
West
Virginia
20-6,
ser.
quality
surface
Surface
VII,
coal
Mining
§ 6B.04
(1983)
(“Effluent Limitations - Discharge from the permit area shall
not violate effluent limitations or cause a violation of water
quality standards.”).
At that time, the surface coal mining
regulations clearly recognized that permit holders were subject
to enforcement actions for violating both effluent limitations
and
water
quality
standards.
Id.
In
1984,
West
Virginia
consolidated its surface coal mining regulations with its water
pollution
regulations.
See
Preamble
to
Proposed
Regulations
Consolidating the Article 5A and Article 6 Program (filed Nov.
9, 1984).
governing
As a result of this consolidation, the regulations
NPDES
permits
for
coal
17
mines
thereafter
included
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Pg: 18 of 33
provisions like 5.1.f that were previously found in the surface
mining regulations.
See WVDEP, Response to Comments, at 1.
The origin of 5.1.f renders untenable Fola’s reliance on
EPA’s determination that the consolidated new regulations did
not alter “substantive rights or obligations.”
The
new
regulations
did
not
alter
any
EPA was correct.
obligations
under
a
permit; they simply brought existing obligations on surface coal
mines
into
a
facilities
were
obligations
Thus,
single
EPA
already
prior
had
regulatory
to
no
the
reason
scheme.
subject
to
Surface
substantively
consolidation
to
coal
conclude
mining
identical
of
the
regulations.
that
the
consolidated
regulations altered any “substantive rights or obligations.”
Moreover, although ignored by Fola, EPA’s view as to the
reach of 5.1.f has been consistent, as has the acceptance by
courts of EPA’s view when interpreting similar water quality
provisions.
has
In contrast to WVDEP’s recent change of heart, EPA
remained
clear
through
the
obligations on permit holders.
years
that
5.1.f
imposes
Before us, EPA has filed an
authoritative amicus brief pointing this out and reiterating its
position.
As EPA notes in its brief, some of the NPDES permits
that
itself
EPA
has
issued
impose
18
narrative
water
quality
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Filed: 01/04/2017
standards
like
those
standards
have
been
in
Fola’s
enforced
Pg: 19 of 33
permit. 5
against
That
quality
permit
NPDES
water
holders
demonstrates the error in Fola’s contention that 5.1.f cannot
reasonably
be
interpreted
to
impose
obligations
on
permit
holders like Fola.
In sum, both the plain language of the provision and the
extraneous evidence support the district court’s holding that
5.1.f
constitutes,
enforceable
against
as
it
NPDES
has
for
permit
decades,
holders,
a
not
regulation
the
state
permitting agency.
C.
Finally, Fola argues that our holding in Piney Run somehow
prohibits this conclusion.
that
permit
holders
“who
According to Fola, Piney Run held
disclose
their
pollutants
to
the
permitting agency and thereafter comply with the effluent limits
5
See, e.g., EPA NPDES Permit No. NH0100099 for the Town of
Hanover, New Hampshire, pt. I.A.2, .3 and .6, https://www3.epa
.gov/region1/npdes/permits/2015/finalnh0100099permit.pdf;
EPA
2015 Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges
Associated
with
Industrial
Activity,
pt.
2.2.1,
https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/msgp2015
_finalpermit.pdf.
Moreover, courts have enforced water quality
standards
provisions
when,
as
here,
the
NPDES
permit
incorporates these standards.
See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 725 F.3d 1194, 1199, 1205
(9th Cir. 2013); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56
F.3d 979, 985–90 (9th Cir. 1995); Nat. Res. Def. Council v.
Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 175 F. Supp.
3d 1041, 1049–54 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
In support of its contrary
view, Fola relies on inapposite, unpublished, and overruled
cases.
19
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Pg: 20 of 33
in their NPDES permits are shielded from liability” under the
Clean Water Act.
Br. of Appellant at 43.
Therefore, Fola
contends, since it “disclosed the presence of conductivity in
its
discharges
and
has
complied
with
the
effluent
limits
established by . . . WVDEP,” it too is shielded from liability
under
the
permit.
Act,
Id.
even
if
it
violated
provision
5.1.f
of
its
There are multiple problems with this contention.
First, and most fundamentally, Fola misstates our holding
in Piney Run.
We expressly held that a permit shields “its
holder from liability . . . as long as . . . the permit holder
complies with the express terms of the permit and with the Clean
Water Act’s disclosure requirements.”
259 (emphasis added). 6
wishes
away
its
Piney Run, 268 F.3d at
Fola ignores the emphasized language and
violation
permit” -- provision 5.1.f.
of
one
of
“express
terms
of
the
Piney Run offers no support for
this approach.
Fola attempts to bolster its misunderstanding of Piney Run
by misinterpreting the careful examination of the history of the
Clean Water Act we set forth in that case.
See id. at 264-66.
We recognized that requirements that permit holders meet water
6
Of course, to obtain the benefits of the permit shield a
permit holder must also not discharge a pollutant in excess of
the effluent limitations for that pollutant as listed in the
permit. Piney Run, 268 F.3d at 259. That requirement is not at
issue here.
20
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quality
Filed: 01/04/2017
standards
had
been
Pg: 21 of 33
the
“primary
means
of
federal
regulation” prior to the 1972 enactment of the Clean Water Act.
Id. at 264.
The Act provided regulators with another tool --
“direct limitations on the discharge of pollutants” in the form
of numerical caps on those discharges -- and a means to regulate
-- NPDES permits.
Id. at 265 (quoting Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 151 (4th
Cir. 2000)(en banc)).
In Piney Run, we explained that adherence to its permit
shielded a permit holder from liability under the Act.
contrary
to
numerical
Fola’s
apparent
limitations
constituted
the
Clean Water Act.
only
belief,
on
proper
we
specific
subject
did
not
pollutant
of
regulation
Id.
But
hold
that
discharges
under
the
Rather, we noted that, despite the Clean Water
Act’s “shift in focus of environmental regulation towards the
discharge of pollutants, water quality standards still have an
important role in the [Clean Water Act’s] regulatory scheme.”
Id. (emphasis added).
Compounding its error, Fola refuses to recognize that Piney
Run involved very different issues than those presented here.
In
Piney
permit’s
Run,
we
did
requirement
not
that
consider
the
permit
the
enforceability
holder
adhere
to
of
a
water
quality standards, let alone the enforceability of the specific
narrative water quality standards required by West Virginia’s
21
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NPDES permit.
limitations
Filed: 01/04/2017
Pg: 22 of 33
Piney Run involved the enforcement of numerical
on
the
discharge
of
different Maryland NPDES permit. 7
that
the
holder
of
a
Maryland
pollutants
under
a
very
In that context, we concluded
NPDES
permit
who
“discharges
pollutants that are not listed in its permit” was nonetheless
shielded
from
liability
“adequately
disclosed”
authority.”
under
those
the
Clean
discharges
Water
“to
Act
the
if
it
permitting
Id. at 268.
But this conclusion in Piney Run does not allow an NPDES
permit holder in West Virginia to ignore 5.1.f’s requirement
“not to cause violation of applicable water quality standards.”
Indeed, although Piney Run involved a permit that regulated only
numerical
effluent
limitations,
rather
than
also
directing
adherence to water quality standards like the permit at issue
here,
we
iterated
and
reiterated
that
only
“follow[ing]
the
terms of their NPDES permits” allows permit holders to avoid
liability.
Id. at 265; see also id. at 259 (explaining that to
be shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, a permit
holder must comply “with the express terms of [its] permit”).
Piney Run provides Fola no way to avoid liability if Fola has
7
Maryland’s NPDES permits do not contain a provision
similar to 5.1.f. Rather, unlike in West Virginia, the Maryland
permitting agency simply will not issue a permit unless it
“finds that the discharge meets . . . applicable State and
federal water quality standards.”
Md. Code Ann., Envir. § 9324(a)(1) (West 2016).
22
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not complied “with the express terms of its permit,” including
provision 5.1.f.
Nothing in Piney Run forbids a state from incorporating
water quality standards into the terms of its NPDES permits.
Rather, Piney Run held, as we do today, that a permit holder
must comply with all the terms of its permit to be shielded from
liability.
The terms of Fola’s permit required it to comply
with water quality standards.
If Fola did not do so, it may not
invoke the permit shield.
III.
Having
imposes
no
rejected
Fola’s
obligations
on
principal
it,
we
contention
turn
to
that
Fola’s
5.1.f
remaining
argument -- that the district court erred in finding that Fola
violated 5.1.f.
A.
Through 5.1.f., Fola’s permit incorporates narrative water
quality standards prohibiting discharges into Stillhouse Branch
that are “harmful” or have a “significant adverse impact” on
aquatic ecosystems. 8
In a long, remarkably thorough opinion, the
8
These standards provide in relevant part:
3.2 No sewage, industrial wastes or other wastes
present in any of the waters of the state shall cause
therein or materially contribute to any of the
following conditions . . .
(Continued)
23
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district court explained its reasons for concluding that Fola’s
discharges into Stillhouse Branch violated these narrative water
quality standards in Fola’s permit.
testimony,
reports,
charts,
The court relied on the
studies,
and
exhibits
from
experienced scientists who had published extensively in peerreviewed journals.
contention
that
All of the experts supported the Coalition’s
Fola
violated
the
the
experts
used
to
determine
permit’s
narrative
water
the
Virginia
Stream
quality standards. 9
In
doing
Condition
so,
Index
West
whether
biologically compromised Stillhouse Branch.
Fola’s
discharges
Both EPA and WVDEP
have long used the Index to measure water quality.
When a
. . .
3.2.e. Materials in concentrations which are
harmful, hazardous or toxic to man, animal or
aquatic life;
. . .
3.2.i.
Any
other
condition,
including
radiological exposure, which adversely alters the
integrity of the waters of the State including
wetlands; no significant adverse impact to the
chemical, physical, hydrologic, or biological
components
of
aquatic
ecosystems
shall
be
allowed.
W. Va. Code R. § 47-2-3 (2016).
9
Fola offered a witness whom the district court found
“h[eld] no training in the study of ecology” and, prior to being
retained by Fola as an expert in this litigation, “had never
analyzed the type of ecological data” at issue here.
Fola, 82
F. Supp. 3d at 681. On appeal, Fola does not suggest that the
district court should have credited this witness’s testimony.
24
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Pg: 25 of 33
stream’s Index score falls below 68, EPA considers the stream
impaired
under
experts
explained
discharges
33
caused
U.S.C.
§
that
the
the
1313(d).
See
release
conductivity
of
in
infra
ions
n.11.
from
Stillhouse
The
Fola’s
Branch
to
increase and sensitive insect species to die, thereby causing
the stream’s Index score to fall well below 68.
Supp. 3d at 696.
Fola, 82 F.
On the basis of the expert evidence, the
district court found that Fola’s discharges caused or materially
contributed to the impairment of Stillhouse Branch by increasing
the conductivity of the stream.
On appeal, Fola makes no contention that the district court
erred
in
materially
finding
that
contributed
Stillhouse Branch.
Fola’s
to
discharges
the
in
fact
biological
caused
impairment
or
in
And Fola does not argue that narrative water
quality standards cannot be enforced; it could not do so given
that the Supreme Court has held to the contrary.
See PUD No. 1
of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 716
(1994) (explaining that the Clean Water Act “permits enforcement
of broad, narrative criteria” and “only one class of criteria,
those
governing
‘toxic
pollutants
listed
pursuant
to
section
1317(a)(1),’ need be rendered in numerical form”).
Instead, Fola offers brief and largely derivative “process”
arguments.
A substantial portion of those arguments involve
Fola’s mischaracterization of the district court’s careful and
25
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Filed: 01/04/2017
detailed
fact-finding.
finding,
which
of
Fola
course
Pg: 26 of 33
attempts
can
only
to
be
treat
reversed
that
if
factclearly
erroneous, as “rulemaking” subject to de novo review.
B.
First, Fola maintains that it was deprived of “fair notice”
that water quality standards were enforceable provisions of its
permit.
the
This assertion rests on Fola’s own misinterpretation of
language
acknowledge
above.
in
that
its
2009
language’s
permit
and
history,
a
all
studied
of
which
refusal
we
to
detail
Suffice it to say again that, when the Coalition filed
this lawsuit in March 2013, Fola had been bound by the 2009
permit at issue here for four years.
Moreover, in 2011, two
years prior to the commencement of this action, WVDEP brought
suit
to
enforce
the
water
quality
against Fola’s parent company.
standards
at
issue
here
And, prior to initiation of this
case, Fola’s parent company had in fact agreed to take measures
to remedy its violations of those water quality standards.
thus
had
ample,
personalized
notice
that
the
water
Fola
quality
standards in a West Virginia NPDES permit were enforceable, and
would be enforced, against a permit holder.
Fola next contends that it relied on guidance from WVDEP
that the State would not pursue any enforcement action based on
conductivity or water quality standards.
But again as explained
above,
WVDEP
Fola
offers
no
evidence
26
that
made
any
such
Appeal: 16-1024
Doc: 74
assurance
in
Moreover,
Filed: 01/04/2017
2009
such
when
Pg: 27 of 33
WVDEP
contemporaneous
last
renewed
assurances
Fola’s
seem
permit.
unlikely
given
WVDEP’s decision in 2011 to bring an enforcement action based on
these very water quality standards.
Further, even if Fola had
offered evidence that WVDEP made such assurances when it issued
Fola’s renewal
permit
in
2009,
that
would
Coalition from bringing this lawsuit.
citizen
suit
situations,
provision
like
the
of
one
the
at
the
Water
in
enforcement agency declines to act.
foreclose
For Congress enacted the
Clean
hand,
not
Act
to
address
which
the
traditional
See Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53, 60 (1987).
An
agency’s
informal
assurance
that
it
will
not
pursue
enforcement cannot preclude a citizen’s suit to do so.
See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
Finally, Fola argues that the district court engaged in
unlawful
rulemaking.
Hornbook
law
defines
principle
or
That
standard
“a
The
applicable
as
“a
developed
by
some
findings
case.
district
principle
based
on
is
rule”
administrative authorities.”
2016).
argument
or
the
court
similarly
generally
authority
unsound.
applicable
including
1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 1:20 (3d ed.
did
standard.”
evidence
not
create
The
presented
any
court
in
“generally
made
this
factual
particular
The only rules for which the court found Fola liable are
contained in its permit, specifically §§ 47-30.5.1.f and 47-227
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3.2.e and -3.2.i.
Pg: 28 of 33
These rules have long been incorporated into
Fola’s permit, and EPA has never approved their removal.
They
remain unchanged and controlling.
We must reject Fola’s attempts to transform the district
court’s detailed fact-finding into rulemaking.
After carefully
assessing the record before it, the district court found as a
fact
that
that
a
failing
Index
score
indicated
an
impaired
stream and that Fola’s mining caused the increased conductivity
that
resulted
in
that
impairment.
supported by the record evidence.
These
findings
are
well
None are clearly erroneous.
Some even rest on undisputed facts.
For example, EPA has
identified, and Fola does not dispute, “mining” as the source of
the impairment of Stillhouse Branch.
Virginia
Integrated
Water
Quality
See WVDEP, 2012 Final West
Monitoring
and
Assessment
Report List Page 14 (reviewing the 2012 Clean Water Act Section
303(d) Impaired Waters List).
its
mine
the
And
Branch.
is
WVDEP
disagree,
that
assessment
of
§ 3.2.i
only
itself
the
the
narrative
mine
Moreover, Fola stipulated that
that
has
Index
criteria”
Stillhouse
Branch.
WVDEP,
Permitting
Guidance
for
explained,
“was
biological
discharges
of
applicable
Justification
Surface
and
Coal
and
Mining
does
designed
the
to
Stillhouse
Fola
specifically
component
as
into
47
waters
not
for
C.S.R.
2
such
as
Background
Operations
for
to
Protect West Virginia’s Narrative Water Quality Standards, 47
28
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Doc: 74
C.S.R.
2
Filed: 01/04/2017
§§
3.2.e
Pg: 29 of 33
and
3.2.i,
at
4
(2010),
http://www.dep.wv.gov/pio/Documents/Narrative/Narrative Standard
s Guidance Justification.pdf.
Despite this historic consensus, Fola argues that WVDEP has
recently
rejected
the
Index
as
a
sole
determinant
of
water
quality, and that the court has therefore “usurped” the agency’s
role
in
its
use
of
the
Index.
This
argument
rests
on
a
mischaracterization of the district court’s use of the Index.
The court did not enshrine the Index as the sole acceptable
method of establishing violations of water quality standards.
Rather, the court explained that it only relied on the Index
“[i]n
the
absence
of
methodological alternative.”
[WVDEP]
advancing
a
meaningful
Fola, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 679.
On
appeal, neither Fola nor WVDEP points to any “methodological
alternative” to the Index.
In the absence of any alternative,
the district court simply applied the methodology both WVDEP and
EPA have applied for years.
The district court found that, until 2012, EPA and WVDEP
had generally agreed to use an Index score of 68 to determine
whether water quality standards were being met.
If a stream
scored below 68, the stream was to be listed as impaired.
29
Id.
Appeal: 16-1024
Doc: 74
at 677. 10
See,
Filed: 01/04/2017
Pg: 30 of 33
The record offers abundant support for this finding.
e.g.,
Administrator,
Letter
to
from
Shawn
Randy
C.
M.
Garvin,
Huffman,
EPA
Regional
Secretary,
WVDEP
[hereinafter Garvin Letter], Enclosure 1, at 16 (Mar. 25, 2013)
(“When
determining
whether
to
add
waters
to
West
Virginia’s
Section 303(d) list, EPA used West Virginia’s narrative water
quality criteria (W. Va. CSR §§ 47-2-3.2(e) & (i)) as applied to
the
aquatic
life
uses,
and
WVDEP’s
bioassessment
listing
methodology for its 2010 Section 303(d) list (i.e., [the Index])
. . . .”); see also WVDEP, 2010 West Virginia Integrated Water
Quality Monitoring and Assessment Report 14 (2010) (explaining
the direct relationship between § 47-2-3.2.i, Index scores, and
impaired water listing).
Indeed, Fola concedes that EPA and WVDEP have long used the
Index.
Neither agency -- nor anyone else before this case --
suggested that this use required promulgation of a formal rule.
Rather, the Index has been used, as the district court used it,
as
a
method
for
assessing
compliance
10
with
narrative
water
Prior to 2012 when it ceased using the Index to determine
impairment, WVDEP had attempted to include a “gray-zone” listing
between 60.6 and 68.0.
EPA rejected this approach as
“unsupportable,” and continues to use 68 as the threshold. See
Garvin Letter, Enclosure 1, at 12 n.3.
For our purposes, this
dispute is immaterial because the district court found that
Stillhouse Branch had an Index score ranging from 31.60 to
58.17.
Fola, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 696.
Fola does not challenge
these findings.
30
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quality standards.
Pg: 31 of 33
Far from creating a rule for determining
violations of water quality standards, the court simply made a
factual
determination
methodology.
using
Employing
the
this
Index
as
methodology,
a
well-established
the
district
court
came to the same conclusion as EPA had -- Stillhouse Branch was
impaired. 11
Similarly,
court’s
contrary
determinations
to
as
Fola’s
to
assertions,
conductivity
findings of fact, not rulemaking.
also
the
district
constituted
The court heard extensive
expert testimony on the causal relationship between increased
conductivity in Appalachian streams and impairment as evidenced
by declining Index scores.
court
credited
authoritative
the
EPA
Fola, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 679-86.
testimony
publication.
of
accepted
All
experts
concluded
that
and
The
an
mining
activities cause increases in conductivity, which in turn cause
impairment.
The
Id. at 686–96.
court
noted
that
peer-reviewed
scientific
articles
first recognized the relationship of mining, conductivity, and
11
While Fola focuses on notice as it relates to procedure,
it is worth mention that Fola also had notice of the court’s
factual determination that Stillhouse Branch was impaired.
WVDEP (with EPA approval) has listed Stillhouse Branch on its
impaired waters list based on biological impairment since 2006.
See WVDEP, 2006 Integrated Water Quality Monitoring and
Assessment Report List Page 15 (2006); id. at 20 (explaining
that WVDEP assessed biological impairment using the Index).
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decreased Index scores in 2008, a year before issuance of Fola’s
renewal permit.
See id. at 690 (citing Pond et al., supra n.1).
Other articles strengthened these findings.
Id. (citing, among
others, M.A. Palmer et al., Mountaintop Mining Consequences, 327
Sci. 148 (2010) (finding that as conductivity increased, Index
scores decreased)).
In rebuttal, Fola offered an expert whom
the district court found unqualified -- an assessment Fola does
not challenge on appeal.
Finally, the relief the district court ordered belies any
suggestion that it engaged in rulemaking.
The court had the
“discretion to determine” appropriate relief.
See Friends of
the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 192 (2000).
In exercising that discretion, the district
court
order
refused
to
Fola
to
implement
the
Coalition proposed, a reverse osmosis system.
this
solution
“too
expensive
and
too
solution
the
The court deemed
uncertain.”
Order
Specifying Relief at 5, Fola, No. 2:13-cv-5006 (S.D. W. Va. Dec.
8, 2015), ECF No. 183.
Instead, the court appointed a special
master to oversee implementation of Fola’s proposed solution,
which focused on water management practices that respond to the
unique characteristics of Stillhouse Branch.
Id. at 6–7.
The
court did not require Fola to achieve any particular Index score
or
conductivity
level,
but
simply
ordered
Fola
to
take
appropriate measures either to reduce the conductivity in its
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discharges or to increase the Index score of Stillhouse Branch.
Id. at 1.
The relief ordered by the district court reflects its
careful fact-based findings, not unprincipled rulemaking.
In sum, Fola’s arguments as to why the district court erred
in finding that Fola violated its permit, like Fola’s arguments
as to the permit’s reach, uniformly fail.
IV.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the judgment
of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
33
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