Ronald Starleper v. Mercantile Mortgage, LLC

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-02402-JFM. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999937847]. Mailed to: Ronald Starleper & Constance Starleper. [16-1061]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1061

RONALD W. STARLEPER; CONSTANCE M. STARLEPER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
MERCANTILE MORTGAGE, LLC; WELLS FARGO
FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; FEDERAL
ASSOCIATION,

BANK, N.A.; WELLS
NATIONAL MORTGAGE

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:15-cv-02402-JFM)

Submitted:

September 9, 2016

Decided:

September 29, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald W. Starleper, Constance M. Starleper, Appellants Pro Se.
Virginia Wood Barnhart, Justin E. Fine, Sarah E. Meyer, Douglas
Brooks Riley, TREANOR, POPE & HUGHES, PA, Towson, Maryland, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald and Constance Starleper appeal the district court’s
orders dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim
and denying reconsideration.

We affirm the district court’s

orders.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting factual allegations in
the complaint as true and “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences
in favor of the [nonmoving party].”

Kensington Volunteer Fire

Dep’t v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012)
(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).

To

survive

a

motion

to

dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570

(2007).
Confining our review to the issues raised in Appellants’
opening brief, see 4th Cir. R. 34(b), we discern no error in the
district court’s orders.

While a district court must liberally

construe a pro se complaint, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007), this does not excuse the Starlepers from meeting the
required pleading standards.

See Giarratano v. Johnson, 521

F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “Erickson
[did

not]

undermine

Twombly’s
2

requirement

that

a

pleading

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contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).

The Starlepers’ contention that their mortgage

is defective because the deed of trust and mortgage note were
assigned separately “is not[] the law.”
N.Y.,

N.A.,

Rosenberg,

641
40

F.3d

A.3d

617,

494,

624
507

(4th

See Horvath v. Bank of
Cir.

(Md.

Ct.

2011);
Spec.

Svrcek

App.

v.

2013).

Moreover, to the extent that the Starlepers challenge Appellees’
failure

to

identify

“Fannie

Mae

REMIC

Trust

2010-122,”

the

Starlepers have waived appellate review of this claim by failing
to raise it before the district court.

See In re Under Seal,

749 F.3d 276, 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2014).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

3