John Corradi v. Old United Casualty Company
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-00488-GBL-MSN Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000005236].. [16-1150]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1150
JOHN CORRADI,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
OLD UNITED CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
FOREST AGENCY, INC.,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:15-cv-00488-GBL-MSN)
Submitted:
December 30, 2016
Decided:
January 18, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lee Robert Arzt, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
Donald R.
Anderson, Catherine M. Banich, TAYLOR ENGLISH DUMA LLP, Atlanta,
Georgia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
John Corradi appeals the district court’s orders denying
his motion for nonsuit under Virginia state law and granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Old United Casualty
Company
(“Old
United”).
On
appeal,
Corradi
argues
that
the
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Old United because, although the terms of the insurance policy
(“Policy”) excluded coverage for damages to Corradi’s aircraft
(“Aircraft”)
while
the
Aircraft
was
piloted
by
non
approved
pilots, that provision is void pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 38.22204 (2014).
Corradi also argues that the district court erred
in refusing to allow voluntary dismissal of the case pursuant to
Virginia’s nonsuit statute.
Corradi contends that this ruling
was erroneous because Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply
all substantive state laws, and Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-380 (2015)
is substantive rather than procedural.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de
novo,
applying
the
same
standard
as
the
district
court.”
Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir.
2014).
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to
Corradi and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.
Id.
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
“Under
Virginia
law,
courts
must
interpret
policies consistent with the parties’ intent.”
insurance
Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 792 F.3d 520, 532 (4th Cir.
2015).
“Ambiguities
favor of the insured.
in
the
instrument
must
be
construed
in
But we do not entertain an absurd result—
one that would ‘enlarge the obligations undertaken originally by
the insurer, and would permit a windfall to the insured.’”
Id.
(quoting Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman's, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894,
897 (Va. 1978)) (brackets omitted).
The Policy provided that “the aircraft must be operated
in-flight only by the ‘Approved Pilots’ shown [in Item 7 of the
Policy] . . . . There is no coverage under the policy if the
pilot does not meet these requirements.”
The language of the
Policy is not ambiguous, and the parties clearly intended to
provide coverage only when the Aircraft was operated by one of
the two pilots listed in Item 7.
The accident occurred with a
non approved pilot flying the Aircraft, and therefore, under the
terms
of
the
Policy,
Corradi
is
not
entitled
to
recovery.
Moreover, the restriction encompassed in the Policy does not
conflict
with
the
language
of
the
Virginia
omnibus
statute,
which was passed with the “purpose of protecting the public from
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loss caused by the negligence of permissive users of insured
vehicles.”
Hartman’s, 239 S.E.2d at 897.
The Virginia Supreme Court’s decision in Hartman’s does not
mandate a different outcome.
There, the Virginia Supreme Court
analyzed “whether a named insured may recover from his liability
insurance carrier for damage to his own property when the policy
excludes from coverage property owned by ‘the insured.’”
896.
Id. at
The court concluded that “the insured” referred to the
individual claiming coverage, and the policy excluded coverage
for damage to Hartman’s own property.
897.
In
reaching
that
conclusion,
Id. at 896-97.
the
court
noted
Id. at
that
in
“earlier case[s], involving claims of injured members of the
public, we construed the omnibus clause to serve its designed
purpose
of
protecting
the
public
from
loss
caused
negligence of permissive users of insured vehicles.”
Hartman’s
case,
however,
“only
the
interests
of
by
the
Id.
In
the
direct
parties to the insurance contract, the named insured and the
insurer, [were] in issue.”
Id.
Similarly, in Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire
Ins.
Co.,
addressed
785
a
F.2d
provision
480,
of
481
an
(4th
Cir.
insurance
1986),
contract
coverage for injuries sustained by the insured.
this
that
court
denied
The appellant
argued that the contract provision limiting coverage was void in
light of the omnibus statute.
Id.
4
After analyzing the statute,
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we concluded that the appellant, “like the insured in Hartman’s,
. . . [was] attempting to convert a liability policy into a
policy covering first-party loss. . . . [T]he Legislature of
Virginia did not by the enactment of the omnibus clause intend
to accomplish any such result.”
Id. at 482
In this case, excluding coverage for first-party losses due
to
the
use
of
the
Aircraft
by
an
unapproved
user
does
not
disrupt the omnibus statute’s stated purpose of protecting “the
public from losses caused by the negligence of permissive users
of insured vehicles,” and therefore does not run afoul of either
the statute’s intent or its plain language.
Corradi
relying
on
Virginia’s
next
the
Federal
nonsuit
“Congress
has
undoubted
power
created,
claims
so
Rules
statue.
undoubted
long
that
to
of
As
those
district
Civil
court
Procedure
the
Supreme
to
power
prescribe
as
the
Id.
supplant
rules
rules
for
regulate
capable of classification as procedure.”
rather
Court
the
erred
has
state
matters
than
noted,
law,
courts
in
it
and
has
rationally
Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 406 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
first
determine
dispute.”
whether
Id. at 398.
Rule
[41]
Consequently, “[w]e must
answers
the
question
in
“If it does, it governs . . . unless it
exceeds statutory authorization or Congress’s rulemaking power.
We do not wade into Erie’s murky waters unless the federal rule
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is inapplicable or invalid.”
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Id. (citations omitted).
If a
Federal Rule “governs only the manner and the means by which the
litigants’ rights are enforced, it is valid; if it alters the
rules
of
decision
by
rights, it is not.”
which
the
court
will
adjudicate
those
Id. at 407 (brackets omitted).
The question in dispute here, whether Corradi may as of
right
voluntarily
dismiss
his
case,
is
answered
by
Rule
41,
which provides that a plaintiff may dismiss his complaint after
an answer or motion for summary judgment has been filed only if
he files “a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who
have appeared.”
provision
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41.
answers
the
same
The relevant Virginia Code
question
differently,
by
allowing
voluntary dismissal at any time “before a motion to strike the
evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires from the
bar or before the action has been submitted to the court for
decision.”
Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-380.
But because Rule 41 is
undoubtedly procedural, it controls in this case.
A rule that
allows for voluntary dismissal if certain conditions are met
alters the manner and means of enforcing the litigant’s rights,
while
leaving
rights
the
unchanged.
rules
of
decision
Therefore,
the
for
adjudicating
district
court
those
correctly
applied Rule 41 to Corradi’s motion to voluntarily dismiss.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense
with
oral
argument
because
6
the
facts
and
We
legal
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contentions
are
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adequately
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presented
in
the
materials
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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