Pam Kincaid v. James Anderson
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cv-00027-JPJ-PMS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000034807].. [16-1570]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1570
PAM KINCAID,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JAMES W. ANDERSON; RUSSELL COUNTY (VIRGINIA) DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL
SERVICES;
BOARD
OF
RUSSELL
COUNTY
(VIRGINIA)
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
RUSSELL COUNTY (VIRGINIA); HARRY FERGUSON, Chairman of the
Board of Social Services of Russell County (Virginia); ROGER
BROWN, Vice-Chairman of the Board of Social Services of
Russell County (Virginia); LAUREL RASNICK, Member of the
Board of Social Services of Russell County (Virginia); BILL
HALE, Member of the Board of Social Services of Russell
County (Virginia); REBECCA DYE, Member of the Board of
Social Services of Russell County (Virginia),
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon.
James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:14-cv-00027-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted:
February 28, 2017
Decided:
March 3, 2017
Before DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melvin E. Williams, MEL WILLIAMS PLC, Roanoke, Virginia, for
Appellant.
Edward G. Stout, Jr., Bristol, Virginia; Henry S.
Keuling-Stout, KEULING-STOUT, P.C., Big Stone Gap, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Pam Kincaid filed a complaint asserting numerous causes of
action arising from her employment as a social work supervisor
with the Russell County, Virginia, Department of Social Services
(“RCDSS”).
Kincaid
asserted
sex-
and
religion-based
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims under Title
VII
of
the
Civil
Rights
Act
of
1964,
42
U.S.C.
§§ 2000e
-
2000e-17 (2012), and claims under the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 2012 & Supp. 2016),
against Russell County, RCDSS, and the RCDSS Board.
She also
raised
as
claims
against
these
Defendants,
as
well
five
individual members of the Board and her former supervisor, James
W. Anderson, for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2012)
and
emotional
district
for
distress
court’s
defamation
under
orders
and
intentional
Virginia
law.
dismissing
most
infliction
Kincaid
of
of
appeals
the
claims
and
her
granting summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining claims.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Kincaid
RCDSS,
the
first
Board,
contests
the
and
Board
the
district
court’s
members
in
ruling
their
that
official
capacities were entitled to state sovereign immunity from all of
her claims except for those brought under Title VII.
We review
questions
v.
of
sovereign
immunity
de
novo.
Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir. 2015).
3
Wright
North
While states are
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generally immune from suit in federal court, this immunity “does
not extend to suits prosecuted against a municipal corporation
or other governmental entity which is not an arm of the State.”
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
In determining whether a governmental entity is an arm of
the
state,
the
most
important
factor
is
“whether
a
judgment
against the governmental entity would have to be paid from the
State’s treasury.”
Cash v. Granville Cty. Bd. of Educ., 242
F.3d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2001).
As the record here contains no
evidence regarding this factor, we look to “(1) the degree of
control that the State exercises over the entity or the degree
of autonomy from the State that the entity enjoys; (2) the scope
of the entity’s concerns—whether local or statewide—with which
the entity is involved; and (3) the manner in which State law
treats the entity.”
district
court’s
Id. at 224.
conclusion
that
We discern no error in the
these
considerations,
on
balance, weigh in favor of RCDSS functioning as an arm of the
state.
We
therefore
affirm
the
district
court’s
sovereign
immunity determination.
Next, Kincaid challenges the district court’s dismissal of
her due process and state-law causes of action against the Board
members in their individual capacities for failure to state a
claim.
failure
We
to
review
state
de
a
novo
claim,
a
district
accepting
4
court’s
the
dismissal
complaint’s
for
factual
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allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the
nonmoving party’s favor.
Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t v.
Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); see Fed. R.
Civ.
P.
12(b)(6).
To
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss,
the
complaint’s factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Under this standard, bare
legal conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption of truth”
and are insufficient to state a claim.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
We agree with the district court that Kincaid failed to
state a claim against the individual Board members with respect
to any of her causes of action.
First, because Kincaid held her
supervisory position with RCDSS on a probationary basis, she had
no constitutionally protected property interest in continuing to
hold that position.
See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261,
269 (4th Cir. 2009).
As a result, the Board’s decision to
demote
to
her
temporarily
a
nonsupervisory
position
violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Kincaid
adequately
state
a
due
process
claim
did
not
Nor did
concerning
a
protected liberty interest, for she failed to allege that any
Board member made public the reasons for her demotion.
5
See
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Sciolino v. City of Newport News. Va., 480 F.3d 642, 645-46 (4th
Cir. 2007).
Similarly,
members
the
published
absence
a
false
of
an
statement
undermines her defamation claim.
S.E.2d
203,
206-07
(Va.
allegation
about
that
the
Kincaid
Board
fatally
See Jordan v. Kollman, 612
2005).
Furthermore,
Kincaid’s
allegations against the Board members do not remotely approach
the
level
of
outrageousness
necessary
to
sustain
a
claim
of
intentional infliction of emotional distress under Virginia law.
See
Russo
v.
White,
400
S.E.2d
160,
162
(Va.
1991).
Consequently, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all
claims against the Board members in their individual capacities.
Finally, Kincaid argues that the district court erred by
granting summary judgment to RCDSS and the Board on her Title
VII claims, and to Anderson on all claims directed against him.
We
review
judgment.
Cir. 2015).
de
novo
a
district
court’s
order
granting
summary
Harris v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 784 F.3d 954, 962 (4th
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
56(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists, we view the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2014).
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reviewing
this
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issue,
we
first
conclude
that
the
district court committed no reversible error by declining to
consider
Kincaid’s
Defendants’
motions
interrogatory
judgment
responses
interrogatory
for
answers
purposes,
here
are
not
summary
R.
Civ.
properly
when
ruling
judgment.
appropriate
Fed.
were
responses
P.
materials
Although
for
56(c)(1)(A),
attested,
and
on
summary
Kincaid’s
the
district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept them.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3), (5); Nader v. Blair, 549 F.3d 953,
963 (4th Cir. 2008) (stating standard of review).
We further
agree with the district court that the other evidence in the
record fails to establish a genuine dispute of material fact
with regard to any of Kincaid’s remaining claims, and we thus
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We
dispense
contentions
with
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
facts
and
the
materials
legal
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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