Zarshed Ergashov v. Global Dynamic Transportation

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-01007-ADC. Copies to all parties and the district court. [1000029265]. [16-1591]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1591

ZARSHED ERGASHOV; DJAMSHED ERGASHOV; KHURSHED
ALISHER KHAMROKULOV; FARHOD YAROV; BOBIR YAROV,

ERGASHOV;

Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GLOBAL DYNAMIC TRANSPORTATION, LLC; VALERI BIGANISHVILI; DAVID
CHKHARTISHVILI; BESIKI CHKHARTISHVILI; EIGHT P CPL, LLC; DOES
1-10; RAM JAVIA,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge.
(1:15-cv-01007-ADC)

Submitted:

February 17, 2017

Decided:

February 23, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Dmitri A. Chernov, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Robert W.
Taylor, Jr., BUTLER, MELFA & TAYLOR, P.A., Towson, Maryland; Judd
Garrett Millman, LUCHANSKY LAW, Towson, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Appellants
Ergashov,

Zarshed

Alisher

Ergashov,

Khamrokulov,

Djamshed

Farhod

Ergashov,

Yarov,

and

Khurshed

Bobir

Yarov

appeal the district court’s orders granting the Appellees’ motion
to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissing
their complaint.

They contend that the district court erred in

dismissing their claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2012), as they had adequately pleaded both
individual and enterprise coverage.

Consequently, they argue, the

district court also erred in failing to retain jurisdiction over
their state-law claims.

We affirm.

We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction

under

Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

12(b)(1).

Demetres v. East West Const., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir.
2015).

A plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdiction.

Id. “[W]hen a defendant asserts that the complaint fails to allege
sufficient facts to support subject matter jurisdiction, the trial
court must apply a standard patterned on Rule 12(b)(6) and assume
the truthfulness of the facts alleged.”
585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).
contends

that

the

complaint’s

Kerns v. United States,

However, when a defendant

jurisdictional

allegations

are

simply not true, then a court may go beyond the complaint, conduct
an evidentiary hearing, and resolve any disputed facts.

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Id.

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We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of an action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim.

Trejo v. Ryman Hosp. Props., Inc., 795 F.3d 442, 445-46

(4th Cir. 2015).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The FLSA requires employers to pay covered employees overtime
if

they

work

more

§ 207(a)(1) (2012).

than

40

hours

in

a

workweek.

29

U.S.C.

A covered employee is one who either “is

engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
(known as “individual coverage”) or is employed in “an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
(known as “enterprise coverage”).

Id.

With respect to individual coverage, an employee “engaged in
commerce” is one who is “in the channels of interstate commerce,”
as opposed to merely affecting commerce.
U.S. 491, 494 (1943).

McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319

“The test is whether the work is so directly

and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or
facility of interstate commerce as to be, in practical effect, a
part of it, rather than isolated local activity.”

Mitchell v.

C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955).
Based on our review of the Appellants’ complaint, which
emphasizes how little the Appellants were involved in interstate
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commerce,

we

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conclude

individual coverage.
“Plaintiffs

were

the

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Appellants

have

failed

to

allege

For example, the Appellants allege that

assigned

by

Defendants

specific

routes

with

multiple retail locations, all, without exception, in the State of
Maryland.” (J.A. 16). Furthermore, “[n]one of the routes involved
deliveries to any location outside the State of Maryland or any
travel

to

any

Plaintiffs.”

location

outside

the

State

of

Maryland,

by

(J.A. 16).

The Appellants argue that they were engaged in commerce by
“deliver[ing] donuts in the Baltimore area to Dunkin Donuts stores,
a national franchise.”

(Appellants’ Br. at 6).

Yet the mere fact

that the stores to which they delivered donuts were part of a
national franchise is not enough by itself to establish that the
Appellants were engaged in interstate commerce, as opposed to
merely affecting it.
U.S. at 429.

See McLeod, 319 U.S. at 494; Mitchell, 349

Thus, we conclude the Appellants have not shown

individual coverage.
Turning

next

to

enterprise

coverage,

an

enterprise

is

“engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce”
when it both has at least $500,000 in annual sales and “has
employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce”

or

“has

employees

handling,

selling,

or

otherwise

working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced
for commerce by any person.”

§ 203(s)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
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Insofar
enterprise

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as

the

coverage

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Appellants
because

argue

they

they

were

have

demonstrated

employees

engaged

in

commerce, we conclude they fail to show enterprise coverage for
the same reason they have failed to show individual coverage: the
complaint does not adequately allege enterprise coverage, and
delivering to stores that are part of a national franchise is not
enough to show that the Appellants were engaged in interstate
commerce, as opposed to merely affecting it.

See McLeod, 319 U.S.

at 494; Mitchell, 349 U.S. at 429.
The Appellants also contend that they were required to fuel
their

delivery

trucks

with

fuel

produced

from

out

of

state.

However, as the district court noted, this statement is not in the
Appellants’ complaint, and because the Appellees contended the
complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support subjectmatter jurisdiction, the district court could not go beyond the
complaint.

See Kerns, 585 F.3d at 193; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

Thus, because the Appellants have failed to show either individual
or enterprise coverage, we conclude the district court did not err
in ultimately dismissing the Appellants’ complaint.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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