Brenda Toomer-Frazier v. City of Columbia

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:14-cv-04360-MBS Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000043235].. [16-2096]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-2096

BRENDA TOOMER-FRAZIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COLUMBIA, City of, an incorporated municipality,
Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:14-cv-04360-MBS)

Submitted:

February 27, 2017

Decided:

March 16, 2017

Before TRAXLER, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Glenn Walters, R. Bentz Kirby, Orangeburg, South Carolina, for
Appellant.
W. Allen Nickles, III, NICKLES LAW FIRM, LLC,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Brenda

Toomer-Frazier

appeals

from

the

district

court’s

order adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate
judge

and

Columbia

granting

(the

summary

“City”)

in

judgment

her

42

to

Defendant

U.S.C.

§ 1981

City

(2012)

of
suit

alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in relation to
her employment.

We have reviewed the record and the briefs on

appeal, and we find no reversible error.
substantially
Toomer-Frazier

for
v.

the

reasons

City

of

stated

Accordingly, we affirm
by

Columbia,

the

No.

district

court.

3:14-cv-04360-MBS

(D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2016).
On appeal, Toomer-Frazier asserts that City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), permits her to hold the City liable
under

§

1981

acquiescence,

for
even

deliberate
in

the

indifference

absence

and

municipal

policy or custom of discrimination or retaliation.

However,

employee

has

not

been

an

knowledge

official

Canton does not reach so far.

of

or

Canton holds that, if a municipal

properly

trained,

the

municipality’s

failure to train evidences deliberate indifference to the rights
of

its

inhabitants,

and

this

lack

of

training

causes

the

employee to unconstitutionally apply a facially valid policy,

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the city can be held liable under § 1983. *

489 U.S. at 388-89.

Importantly, the city’s failure to train must reflect deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of its inhabitants and
be “closely related” to the plaintiff’s ultimate injury.
391–92.

Id. at

Moreover, the Court made clear that the rule would only

apply in “limited circumstances.”

Id. at 387.

Toomer-Frazier’s allegations fall far short of stating a
claim under Canton.

Toomer-Frazier has not offered any evidence

(and does not even seem to allege) that City officials were
inadequately
failure

to

trained
train

about

amounted

an
to

official
deliberate

policy,

or

that

indifference

constitutional rights of the City’s inhabitants.

any

to

the

And she does

not submit any evidence showing that any alleged deficiency in
training

caused

the

officials

to

treat

her

differently

than

white employees or was otherwise related to her discrimination
or

retaliation

inapplicable.

claims.

Absent

See id. at 391.

these

allegations,

Canton

is

Because Toomer-Frazier has shown

no official policy or custom of discrimination or retaliation by

*

We have held that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jett v.
Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989), limits
claims against state actors for discrimination and retaliation
to those brought under § 1983.
Dennis v. City of Fairfax, 55
F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995); Crowley v. Prince George’s Cty.,
890 F.2d 683, 685–86 (4th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, and as the
district court concluded, the standards applicable to § 1983
claims apply in this case, which was brought under § 1981.

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the City, the district court correctly found that § 1981 relief
was not available.
Accordingly, we affirm.

We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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