Venus Springs v. Ally Financial Incorporated

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000058497].. [16-2146]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-2146

VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS, a/k/a Yvette Springs,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN PATTERSON;
DAUTRICH,

YEQUIANG

HE,

a/k/a

Bill

He;

CYNTHIA

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK)

Submitted:

March 28, 2017

Decided:

April 10, 2017

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Herman
Kaufman,
HERMAN
KAUFMAN,
ESQ.,
Old
Greenwich,
Connecticut; Venus Yvette Springs, SPRINGS LAW FIRM PLLC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Kirk G. Warner,
Clifton L. Brinson, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT, MITCHELL &

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JERNIGAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Venus

Yvette

Springs

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

adopting the magistrate judge’s order granting Ally Financial
Incorporated (“Ally”) and Amy Bouque’s (collectively, Appellees)
motion for a protective order.*

Finding no reversible error, we

affirm.
Springs

first

contends

that

the

district

court

violated

this Court’s mandate by modifying a protective order and that
the

court

lacked

subject-matter

jurisdiction

to

enter

a

postjudgment protective order, even though we previously ruled
that it had such jurisdiction.
court’s

interpretation

of

“We review de novo the district

the

mandate.”

United

Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 679 (4th Cir. 2013).
“forecloses

relitigation

of

issues

States

v.

The mandate rule

expressly

or

impliedly

decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by
the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived.”
United

States

v.

Susi,

674

F.3d

278,

283

(4th

Cir.

2012).

Moreover, “any issue that could have been but was not raised on
appeal is waived and thus not remanded.”

Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d

461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

*

We

This case has been before us on two prior occasions,
Springs v. Ally Fin., Inc., 475 F. App’x 900 (4th Cir. 2012)
(No. 12-1258), and Springs v. Ally Fin., Inc., 657 F. App’x 148
(4th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1244, 15-1888).

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conclude

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that

the

district

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court

faithfully

carried

out

our

that

Appellees’

motion

was

not

authorizes

the

mandates.
Next,
timely

Springs

filed.

contends

Rule

26(c),

Fed.

R.

Civ.

P.,

district court to issue protective orders, but does not contain
a timeframe in which a party must seek such an order.

However,

“courts regularly have grafted reasonable time requirements onto
otherwise silent federal procedural rules in both the criminal
and civil contexts.”

Resolution Tr. Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs.,

Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1204 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

Here, Appellees first sought to resolve this

dispute without seeking judicial intervention, as required by
Rule

26(c).

We

further

conclude

that

Appellees

filed

their

motion within a reasonable time.
Finally, Springs contends that good cause does not support
the protective order and that it violates her First Amendment
rights.

We review a “district court’s entry of a protective

order . . . for abuse of discretion.”
415 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2005).

Fonner v. Fairfax Cty.,

“The district court abuses

its discretion if its conclusion is guided by erroneous legal
principles or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.”
Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 161 (4th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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The Supreme Court has held that “where . . . a protective
order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery,
and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if
gained

from

Amendment.”
(1984).
issue

in

other

sources,

it

does

not

offend

the

First

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37

Springs correctly notes that the video deposition at
the

protective

order

was

not

just

pretrial

civil

discovery, but was attached to her opposition to Ally’s motion
for summary judgment.

We have “held that the First Amendment

right of access [to judicial documents] attaches to materials
filed in connection with a summary judgment motion.”
Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014).
conclude

that

the

district

court

should

have

Doe v.
Thus, we

conducted

an

explicit First Amendment analysis.
However, “we may affirm a district court’s ruling on any
ground apparent in the record.”

United States ex rel. Drakeford

v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015).

In the sealing

context, the First Amendment limits restricting access to court
documents

to

restrictions

“necessitated

by

a

compelling

government interest” and that are “narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.”
omitted).

Doe, 749 F.3d at 266 (internal quotation marks

Applying this framework to the protective order at

issue, we readily conclude that the district court’s order does
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not unduly infringe on Springs’ First Amendment rights.

The

district court has a compelling interest in preventing litigants
like Springs from using discovery to mock and harass a private
party on the Internet.

See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34 (“Rule

26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the

suppression

of

expression.”).

Moreover,

the

district

court’s order is narrowly tailored to support that interest,
only

preventing

Springs

from

using

the

video

and

audio

recordings to distribute her message.
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that good cause supports issuing
the

protective

order.

“Broad

allegations

of

harm,

unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,
do not satisfy” Rule 26(c).

Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,

785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).

However, Springs accused

Bouque

defamation

of

perjury,

North Carolina law.

which

amounts

to

per

se

under

See Gudger v. Penland, 13 S.E. 168, 170

(N.C. 1891).
Accordingly,
dispense

with

contentions

are

we

oral

affirm

the

argument

adequately

district

because

presented

in

court’s

the
the

facts

order.

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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