US v. Allen Stanley

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:12-cr-00335-TDS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court. [999940699].. [16-4101]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4101

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ALLEN DONNELL STANLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00335-TDS-1)

Submitted:

September 27, 2016

Decided:

October 4, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

George E. Crump, III, Rockingham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Kyle David Pousson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Allen Donnell Stanley was convicted of violating several
terms of his supervised release and was sentenced to 24 months in
prison.

Stanley now appeals.

His attorney has filed a brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that

there

questions,

are

no

however,

meritorious
whether

issues

evidence

for

at

appeal.

Stanley’s

Counsel
revocation

hearing supported a finding that Stanley possessed a firearm in
violation of the terms of his release and whether the sentence is
reasonable.

Stanley was advised of his right to file a pro se

brief but has not filed such a brief.

We affirm.

I
Stanley

initially

contends

that

there

was

insufficient

evidence upon which to find that he possessed a firearm.

“We

review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a defendant’s
supervised release for abuse of discretion.”

United States v.

Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
494 (2015).

To revoke release, the district court need only find

a violation of a condition of release by a preponderance of the
evidence.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012).

This “simply requires

the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more
probable than its nonexistence.”

United States v. Manigan, 592

F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[W]e review a district court’s factual findings underlying a
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revocation
Credibility

for

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error.”

determinations

Padgett,

made

788

by

district

the

F.3d

at
court

373.
at

revocation hearings are rarely reviewable. United States v. Cates,
613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010).
At Stanley’s revocation hearing, an officer testified that,
during a traffic stop, he ordered Stanley to exit the vehicle in
which he was a passenger.

As he got out of the car, Stanley bent

over and had his back to the officer.
was immediately apprehended.

Stanley began to flee but

A handgun was discovered in the area

where Stanley had exited the vehicle.

The officer testified that

the gun was not there when he initiated the stop.

Records revealed

that Stanley had been charged three months earlier with possession
of the same firearm.
Based on this testimony, which the district court found
credible, the court determined that a preponderance of the evidence
established that Stanley had violated a term of his release by
possessing a firearm.

After reviewing the record and giving due

deference to the district court’s credibility determination in
favor of the officer, we conclude that the court did not clearly
err

in

finding

that

Stanley

violated

the

terms

of

release.

Further, in light of the statutory requirement that release be
revoked when the defendant possesses a firearm, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(g)(2) (2012), revocation of Stanley’s supervised release
was not an abuse of discretion.
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II
Stanley

also

contends

that

A

sentence

imposed

unreasonable.

his

24-month

is

revocation

following

sentence

of

supervised release will be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006).

United States

Stanley does not

dispute that he received the maximum sentence to which he was
statutorily subject. We conclude that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable:

the district court considered both the Chapter 7

policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors that
it was permitted to consider.

See id. at 438-40.

Finally, we

hold that the sentence also is substantively reasonable.

The

district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing the
sentence, noting that Stanley possessed a firearm after having
been previously convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and that Stanley had absconded from probation twice.

The

court

its

expressed

the

need

for

deterrence

and

said

that

overarching concern was protecting the public.
III
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
therefore affirm.

We

This court requires that counsel inform his

client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review.
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If the client requests that

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a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
to withdraw from representation.

Counsel=s motion must state that

a copy of the motion was served on his client.

We dispense with

oral

contentions

argument

because

the

facts

and

legal

are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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