US v. Martin Jenkin
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:14-cr-00049-JKB-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999992649].. [16-4118]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4118
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARTIN LOUIS JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:14-cr-00049-JKB-1)
Submitted:
November 30, 2016
Decided:
December 22, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland, Meghan
Skelton, Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant.
Rod
J.
Rosenstein,
United
States
Attorney,
P.
Michael
Cunningham,
Assistant
United
States
Attorney,
Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Martin
Louis
Jenkins
was
convicted
for
possession
of
a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2012), and received a sentence of 84 months of imprisonment,
which was above the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Jenkins
argues
that
the
district
court
erred
On appeal,
in
denying
his
motion to suppress the firearm found in his fiancée’s residence
and
that
his
unreasonable.
sentence
is
procedurally
and
substantively
Finding no error, we affirm.
I
Jenkins argues that the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), good-faith exception does not apply to this case because
the affidavit in support of the search warrant was “bare bones”
and did not provide adequate supporting particularized facts and
therefore it was objectively unreasonable for officers to rely
on the warrant because it was devoid of any indicia of probable
cause.
Jenkins
argues
that
the
nexus
between
his
fiancée’s
residence (“target residence”), where the firearm was found, and
the
evidence
conclusory
sought
by
statements.
police
Thus,
was
based
insufficient
on
assumptions
evidence
and
connected
him to the target residence.
“We
review
factual
findings
regarding
[a]
motion
suppress for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”
States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 2014).
2
to
United
When the
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district court has denied the motion, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government.
United States v.
Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
In cases where a
defendant challenges both probable cause and the applicability
of the good-faith exception, a court may proceed directly to the
good-faith analysis without first deciding whether the warrant
was supported by probable cause.
240, 243 (4th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d
Here, because it was objectively
reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant, we conclude
the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement applies.
The
which
Fourth
Amendment
protects
provides,
cause,
that
to
the
individuals
“no
supported
from
Warrants
by
Oath
United
shall
or
States
Constitution,
“unreasonable
issue,
but
affirmation,
searches,”
upon
and
probable
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
To deter future police
misconduct, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is
generally
barred
from
trial
under
the
exclusionary
rule.
United States v. Andrews, 577 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2009).
However,
“[u]nder
requirement,
the
evidence
good[-]faith
obtained
exception
from
an
to
the
warrant
invalidated
search
warrant will be suppressed only if the officers were dishonest
or
reckless
in
preparing
their
affidavit
or
could
not
have
harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of
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probable cause.”
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United States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1583
(4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926).
Our
case
law
establishes
four
situations
in
which
an
officer’s reliance on a search warrant would not be considered
reasonable:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
the magistrate was misled by information in an
affidavit that the officer knew was false or
would have known was false except for the
officer’s reckless disregard of the truth;
the magistrate wholly abandoned his detached and
neutral judicial role;
the warrant was based on an affidavit that was so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official
belief
in
its
existence
entirely
unreasonable; and
the warrant was so facially deficient, by failing
to particularize the place to be searched or the
things to be seized, that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1156 (4th Cir. 1995)
(citing
Leon,
468
U.S.
at
923).
Under
any
of
those
circumstances, the good-faith exception does not apply, and any
evidence
gathered
pursuant
excluded from trial.
to
the
deficient
warrant
must
be
Andrews, 577 F.3d at 236.
On appeal, Jenkins asserts that the good-faith exception to
the
warrant
requirement
does
not
apply
because
the
search
warrant affidavit was so lacking in probable cause as to render
reliance on it entirely unreasonable; and, further, the state
court judge abandoned her neutral role and merely rubber stamped
the warrant.
Jenkins alleges that it was unreasonable for the
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officers to rely upon the warrant because the search warrant
affidavit
allegedly
failed
to
provide
a
sufficient
nexus
to
establish probable cause that evidence of drug trafficking could
be found inside the target residence.
An
officer’s
unreasonable
even
reliance
if
the
on
a
warrant
application
is
fails
to
not
rendered
establish
a
sufficient nexus between a target’s residence and the suspected
criminal activity.
Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582.
We have applied
the good-faith exception to uphold the search of a suspect’s
residence
“on
the
basis
of
(1)
evidence
of
the
suspect’s
involvement in drug trafficking combined with (2) the reasonable
suspicion
(whether
explicitly
articulated
by
the
applying
officer or implicitly arrived at by the magistrate judge) that
drug traffickers store drug-related evidence in their homes.”
United States v. Williams, 548 F.3d 311, 319 (4th Cir. 2008).
Even assuming the affidavit failed to provide a sufficient
nexus to establish probable cause, we determine that its absence
is not so severe so as to preclude reasonable reliance on the
warrant.
To the contrary, “it is reasonable to suspect that a
drug dealer stores drugs in a home to which he owns a key.”
Grossman,
400
F.3d
at
218.
In
addition,
disagreement
among
judges as to the existence of probable cause indicates that an
officer’s reliance on an affidavit was objectively reasonable.
See Lalor, 996 F.2d at 1582 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 926).
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Although
the
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district
court
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concluded
that,
if
the
warrant
application were before it in the first instance, it may have
found that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that
evidence
target
related
to
residence,
drug
the
trafficking
state
could
judge
who
be
found
issued
the
at
the
warrant
determined that the affidavit provided probable cause to search.
Given the circumstances, we conclude that it cannot be said that
the officers’ reliance on the warrant was entirely unreasonable.
Jenkins also argues that the state court judge functioned
as
a
rubber
warrant.
stamp
for
the
police
when
she
authorized
the
An issuing official acts as a rubber stamp for police
when she approves a “bare bones” affidavit.
A “bare bones”
affidavit is one that contains “wholly conclusory statements,
which lack the facts and circumstances from which a magistrate
can independently determine probable cause.”
Wilhelm,
80
F.3d
116,
121
(4th
Cir.
1996)
United States v.
(quoting
United
States v. Laury, 985 F.2d 1293, 1311 n.23 (5th Cir. 1993)).
An
affidavit is “bare bones” when an affiant merely recites the
conclusions
of
others
without
corroboration
investigation of the facts alleged.
or
independent
See, e.g., Wilhelm, 80 F.3d
at 120.
However, here there is no basis for concluding that this
affidavit
was
“bare
bones.”
To
the
contrary,
nonconclusory
information supported the affiants’ statements that Jenkins was
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involved in drug dealing.
calls
and
observations
detectives’ statements.
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The affidavit detailed intercepted
by
officers,
which
supported
the
Jenkins used language associated with
dealing cocaine and heroin in at least one call, his actions
with movements in and out of suspected stash houses were also
consistent, in the detectives’ experience, of drug dealing.
affidavit
with
further
persons
related
whose
observations
behavior
was
of
also
Jenkins
The
associating
consistent
with
drug
dealing and verified by intercepted calls pointing to a likely
connection to drug trafficking.
Once
the
affidavit
established
some
evidence
of
drug
dealing by Jenkins, the question became whether the information
in the affidavit related to the target residence was sufficient
to establish that Jenkins lived there, at least periodically.
The
district
court
determined
that
the
nexus
to
the
target
residence was established by the telephone call with Baltimore
Gas and Electric, in which Jenkins identifies his address as the
target residence.
He further stated during the call that the
account holder was his fiancée, a relationship that establishes
an
inference
that
Jenkins
may
reside
at
that
location
periodically.
Therefore, the affidavit, based upon the affiants’ personal
knowledge,
is
not
“wholly
magistrate
or
judge
could
conclusory,”
not
7
have
such
that
independently
a
neutral
determined
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probable cause.
affidavit
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Thus, even assuming the alleged defects in the
demonstrate
an
absence
of
probable
cause,
officers’ reliance on the warrant was in good faith.
no
contention
that
the
officers
acted
in
bad
the
There is
faith
or
intentionally misinformed the state judge about the facts.
It
was not objectively unreasonable for the officers to rely on the
warrant issued by a neutral and detached judge.
not
clear
error
for
the
district
court
As such, it was
to
apply
the
Leon
good-faith exception and deny the motion to suppress.
II
Next, Jenkins argues that the court imposed a procedurally
and
substantively
unreasonable
upward
variant
sentence.
He
claims procedural error because the court allegedly dismissed
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range and failed to explain
the reason for the extent of the upward variance and that the
sentence
created
an
unwarranted
sentencing
disparity.
He
further contends that the court placed undue weight on the need
for the sentence to provide adequate deterrence, resulting in a
sentence
that
was
greater
substantively unreasonable.
than
necessary
and
therefore
The Government counters that the
district court carefully and deliberately weighed the sentencing
factors and addressed the aspects of Jenkins’ sentence of which
Jenkins
now
complains
and
that
reasonable.
8
the
sentence
was
just
and
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“[A]ny sentence, within or outside of the Guidelines range,
as a result of a departure or a variance, must be reviewed by
appellate
courts
for
reasonableness
discretion standard.”
pursuant
to
an
abuse
of
United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d
359, 365 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350
(2007).
Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness.
51.
In
determining
procedural
Gall, 552 U.S. at
reasonableness,
we
consider
whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s
advisory Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
argue
for
an
§ 3553(a)
appropriate
(2012)
factors,
selected sentence.
In
selected
sentence,
evaluating
sentence,
and
considered
sufficiently
the
18
U.S.C.
explained
the
Id. at 49-51.
a
sentencing
this
court
court’s
explanation
consistently
has
held
of
a
that,
although the district court must consider the statutory factors
and explain the sentence, “it need not robotically tick through
the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Helton, 782 F.3d 148,
153 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
same
time,
the
district
court
“must
make
assessment based on the facts presented.”
an
At the
individualized
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
While the “individualized assessment need not be elaborate or
lengthy, . . .
it
must
provide
9
a
rationale
tailored
to
the
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particular
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case
at
appellate review.”
hand
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and
adequate
to
permit
meaningful
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
If a sentence is free of “significant procedural error,”
then
the
court
“tak[ing]
into
reviews
account
it
the
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
for
substantive
totality
of
the
reasonableness,
circumstances.”
A substantively reasonable sentence is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes [of sentencing].”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The fact that the court strongly emphasized the need for
specific
deterrence
and
the
need
to
protect
the
public
as
sentencing factors does not render the sentence unreasonable.
See United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 476 (4th Cir. 2007)
(“In Gall, the Supreme Court held it quite reasonable for the
sentencing
factor
.
court
.
omitted)).
extensive
.
to
.”
have
(internal
Moreover,
upward
this court.
attached
quotation
Jenkins’
variances
great
sentence
found
weight
marks
is
to
and
similar
substantively
a
single
alteration
to
other
reasonable
by
See, e.g., United States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156,
163-65 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding no substantive error in 60-month
sentence imposed from Guidelines range of 0 to 6 months, given
court’s “thorough individualized assessment” under § 3553(a) and
extent and cruelty of dogfighting offense); United States v.
Rivera Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 106 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding 2010
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year statutory maximum sentence, above Guidelines range of 57 to
71 months, was substantively reasonable considering defendant’s
egregious criminal history, and where “decision to vary upward
to
the
statutory
maximum
reflects
a
thorough,
individualized
assessment of [defendant’s] situation, in light of the § 3553(a)
factors”).
We
conclude
substantively
that
the
reasonable.
sentence
The
court
is
procedurally
properly
calculated
and
the
Guidelines range, carefully considered the § 3553(a) factors,
considered the arguments presented at sentencing, and adequately
explained
its
reasons
84-month sentence.
for
varying
upward
and
imposing
an
We further conclude that Jenkins’ sentence
is substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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