US v. Latroy Dugger

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:06-cr-00028-FL-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999985486]. [16-4153]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4153

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LATROY KRISHAWAN DUGGER,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:06-cr-00028-FL-1)

Submitted:

November 18, 2016

Decided:

December 13, 2016

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Latroy

Krishawan

Dugger

appeals

the

46-month

sentence

imposed following the revocation of his supervised release term.
On

appeal,

Dugger

asserts

that

his

sentence

was

plainly

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately

explain

its

reasons

for

rejecting

arguments in support of a downward variance.

his

sentencing

For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.
A

district

sentence

after

court

has

revoking

“broad
a

discretion”

defendant’s

in

imposing

supervised

a

release.

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We

will

applicable

affirm

a

statutory

revocation
maximum

sentence
and

not

that

is

“plainly

within

the

unreasonable.”

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015).
To

determine

whether

a

revocation

sentence

is

plainly

unreasonable, we must first assess the sentence for procedural
and substantive unreasonableness, considering the same general
principles utilized in review of original sentences.

United

States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006).

In so

doing, we assume “a more deferential appellate posture” than
that employed in review of original sentences.
F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Padgett, 788
Only if we find

the revocation sentence unreasonable need we determine whether
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it is “plainly” so.

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United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657

(4th Cir. 2007).
A

sentencing

court

generally

must

provide

an

“individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and
rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
[18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)].”

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d

572, 584 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court “need not robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection” in explaining the sentence it imposes, “particularly
when imposing a within-Guidelines sentence.”

United States v.

Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks

omitted).

“nonfrivolous
that

set

should

However,

reasons

forth

address

in
the

for

the

if

imposing

advisory

party’s

rejected those arguments.”

the

defendant
a

different

Guidelines,

arguments

and

a

has

presented

sentence
district

explain

why

than
judge

he

has

United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d

325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s explanation for its sentence must be
adequate

to

“demonstrate

that

it

considered

the

parties’

arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal
decisionmaking authority.”

Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576 (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted).

In the revocation context,

the court’s statement of reasons need not be as specific or as
detailed as that required in imposing an original sentence, “but
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it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.”

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks

omitted).
“Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a revocation
sentence, the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s
breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree,
the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal
history of the violator.”

United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638,

641 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The

court also should consider, among other factors, “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” as well as the need for the sentence “to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant.”
§ 3553(a)(1),

(2)(B),

(enumerating

applicable

court’s

explanation

(C);

see

18

sentencing

is

brief,

U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)

factors).

“[t]he

18 U.S.C.

context

Even

(2012)

where

surrounding

the
a

district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content
for

us

§ 3553(a)

to

evaluate

factors

and

both

whether

whether

it

the
did

court
so

considered

properly.”

the

United

States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude the court
provided an adequate explanation to support Dugger’s revocation
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sentence.

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As Dugger acknowledges, the court’s statements at the

close of the hearing evidence its consideration of counsel’s
sentencing arguments and Dugger’s allocution.
explanation

was

adequately

brief,

expressed

§ 3553(a)

factors

its

its

when

comments

during

contemplation

rejecting

While the court’s

of

Dugger’s

the

the

hearing

applicable

arguments

for

a

variance.

The court appropriately emphasized the significant

breach

trust

of

produced

by

Dugger’s

return

to

the

trafficking conduct underlying his original offense.

drug

The court

demonstrated its consideration of Dugger’s offense, history, and
characteristics by observing that Dugger had not reformed his
conduct, despite his advancing age and family support.
of

the

significant

deference

accorded

a

district

In light

court

when

imposing a revocation sentence, see Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547,
we conclude these statements articulated sufficient support for
the

court’s

determination

that

Dugger’s

conduct

warranted

a

sentence within the policy statement range.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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