US v. Mamadou Jallow

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 5:13-cr-00126-D-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999971888]. [16-4241]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4241

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MAMADOU JALLOW,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00126-D-1)

Submitted:

November 14, 2016

Before GREGORY,
Judges.

Chief

Judge,

Decided:

and

MOTZ

and

November 21, 2016

DUNCAN,

Circuit

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Elliot Sol Abrams, CHESHIRE PARKER SCHNEIDER & BRYAN, PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
John Stuart Bruce,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L.
Fritz,
Assistant
United
States
Attorneys,
Raleigh,
North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Mamadou
revoking

Jallow

his

appeals

supervised

the

release

district
and

court’s

sentencing

judgment

him

to

the

authorized statutory maximum term of 24 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Jallow challenges the district court’s rationale for
imposing the statutory maximum term of imprisonment, asserting
that the selected sentence runs afoul of United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638 (4th Cir. 2013).
We

have

supervised

routinely

release

We affirm.

recognized

revocation,

that,

“the

in

the

sentencing

context
court

of

a

retains

broad discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.”
(4th

Cir.)

United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373

(ellipsis

and

internal

quotation

cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015).

marks

omitted),

“We will not disturb a

district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the
statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
sentence,

we

utilize

the

familiar

Id.

In reviewing a revocation
procedural

and

substantive

considerations employed for evaluating the reasonableness of an
original criminal sentence, but “we strike a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A

revocation

sentence

is

procedurally

reasonable

if

the

district court considered the advisory policy statement range
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and

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the

18

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U.S.C.

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§ 3553(a)

(2012)

supervised release revocation.
461

F.3d

433,

substantively

438–40

if

applicable

to

Id.; United States v. Crudup,

(4th

reasonable

factors

Cir.
the

2006).

district

A
court

sentence

is

“sufficiently

stated a proper basis” for the selected sentence, up to the
statutory

maximum.

Crudup,

461

F.3d

at

440.

Only

if

we

determine that a revocation sentence is unreasonable need we
consider “whether it is plainly so.”

Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.

In exercising its sentencing discretion, the district court
“should

sanction

primarily

the

defendant’s

breach

of

trust,

while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of

the

underlying

violator.”

violation

and

the

Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.

criminal

history

of

the

In determining the length of

a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release, 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) requires a sentencing court to consider
all but two of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The
followed

record
this

calculating

confirms

process

Jallow’s

in

that

the

district

sentencing

policy

statement

court

faithfully

Jallow.

After

properly

range,

hearing

argument

from both attorneys, and allowing Jallow to allocute, the court
announced several bases for imposing on Jallow the statutory
maximum term of imprisonment.

The most significant of these

reasons was that Jallow egregiously breached the court’s trust
when, while on supervised release, he repeatedly engaged in the
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same criminal conduct for which he was initially convicted and
sentenced.
fact

The severity of the breach was exacerbated by the

that

Jallow’s

supervised

release

revoked for committing a similar crime.

had

previously

been

These facts established

Jallow’s staunch refusal to abide by the terms and conditions of
his supervised release, as well as his determination to flout
the court’s authority.

We thus readily uphold the revocation

sentence as reasonable.

See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding

that imposition of statutory maximum term of imprisonment was
substantively

reasonable,

given

that

the

district

court

expressly relied on defendant’s “admitted pattern of violating
numerous conditions of his supervised release,” despite several
extensions of leniency by the district court).
Against this backdrop, we consider Jallow’s argument that
the district court erred, under Webb, in imposing the statutory
maximum term of imprisonment available in this case.
the

defendant

being

found

violation.

received

to

have

a

32-month

committed

738 F.3d at 640.

a

revocation
Grade

A

In Webb,

sentence

supervised

release

This was near the bottom of Webb’s

policy statement range and thus presumptively reasonable.
at

642.

The

primary

issue

after

in

Webb

was

whether

a

Id.

district

court’s reference to § 3553(a) sentencing factors not identified
in

§ 3583(e)

renders

a

sentence

per

se

plainly

unreasonable, and we rejected this contention.
4

procedurally

Id. at 641-42

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(holding “that [the] mere reference to such considerations does
not render a revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when
those factors are relevant to, and considered in conjunction
with,

the

enumerated

§

3553(a)

factors”).

Jallow

seeks

to

demonstrate the unreasonableness of his sentence by comparing
the conduct leading to the revocation of his term of supervised
release to that at issue in Webb.

But this argument fails to

appreciate the considerable discretion judges have in selecting
a revocation sentence and overemphasizes the significance of the
court’s use of the word “felonious” in its explanation for the
selected

sentence.

Thus,

we

are

not

persuaded

by

this

assignment of error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

5