US v. Dennis Paulsen

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:15-cr-00286-MBS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000058609].. [16-4286]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4286

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DENNIS OWEN PAULSEN,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:15-cr-00286-MBS-1)

Submitted: March 27, 2017

Decided:

April 10, 2017

Before MOTZ, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

G. Wells Dickson, Jr., WELLS DICKSON, P.A., Kingstree, South
Carolina, for Appellant.
William E. Day, II, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Dennis
sentence

Owen

imposed

Paulsen
after

appeals
his

his

jury

conviction

trial

for

and

41-month

knowingly

and

willfully stealing money from the Department of Veterans Affairs
and the Social Security Administration by accepting payments to
which he knew he had no entitlement, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 641

(2012).

On

appeal,

Paulsen’s

counsel

filed

a

brief

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that he found no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
six

aspects

of

the

proceedings

below.

Paulsen

filed

a

supplemental pro se brief expanding on some of the issues raised
by counsel.

The Government elected not to respond.

Taking each

of the six issues in turn, we conclude that the district court
did not commit any reversible errors and affirm.
First, Paulsen raises as an affirmative defense the fiveyear statute of limitations for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 641.
Because Paulsen engaged in “a recurring, automatic scheme of
embezzlement” from 1997 to 2015, his offense must be treated as
a

continuing

one

for

which

the

during the pendency of the scheme.

statute

of

limitations

tolls

See United States v. Smith,

373 F.3d 561, 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2004).

Thus, although the

grand jury did not indict Paulsen until 2015, the statute of
limitations does not bar any part of the scheme.

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Second, Paulsen argues that the district court erred when
it denied his motion to dismiss for lack of venue.

We review a

district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of venue
de novo.
2012).

United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir.
“[A]ny offense against the United States begun in one

district and completed in another, or committed in more than one
district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in
which

such

offense

was

U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012).

begun,

continued,

or

completed.”

18

Here, Paulsen started the offense in a

district in Virginia, but completed it in the District of South
Carolina.

Thus, under § 3237, the district court did not err

when it denied Paulsen’s motion to dismiss based on lack of
venue.
Third, Paulsen challenges the district court’s limits on
the cross-examination of three prosecution witnesses.
such limits for abuse of discretion.
451

F.3d

209,

220

(4th

Cir.

We review

United States v. Smith,

2006).

The

district

court

“possesses wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on crossexamination, premised on such concerns as prejudice, confusion,
repetition, and relevance.”

Id. at 221.

Here, the district

court acted within its discretion to limit cross-examination on
topics such as an unrelated divorce, administrative hearing, and
income.

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion.
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Fourth, Paulsen argues that the district court should have
given

four

refusal

jury

to

instructions.

give

particular

We
jury

review

a

district

instructions

for

court’s

abuse

of

discretion.

United States v. Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 308 (4th

Cir. 2012).

We will reverse on this basis only if the omitted

instruction was “(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by
the court’s charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial
so important, that failure to give the requested instruction
seriously

impaired

defense.”

Id.

the

defendant’s

Paulsen

ability

requested

to

conduct

instructions

on

his
the

requirements for disability, but no party disputed that Paulsen
had some disability from 1997 to 2015.
court

found,

received

the

issue

greater

warranted.

at

trial

disability

Instead, as the district

concerned

benefits

whether

than

his

Paulsen
condition

Because the charges regarding disability did not

affect an issue important, or even relevant, to the trial, we
conclude
error.

that

the

district

court

did

not

commit

reversible

See id.

Fifth, Paulsen claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict.

We review de novo the sufficiency

of

a

the

evidence

Barefoot,

754

challenging

supporting

F.3d

226,

evidentiary

233

conviction.
(4th

sufficiency

Cir.

United

2014).

bears

a

States

A
heavy

defendant
burden.

United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 630 (4th Cir. 2015).
4

v.

We

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will “uphold a defendant’s conviction if, viewing the evidence
in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

government,

there

substantial evidence in the record to support the verdict.”

is
Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Substantial evidence means

“evidence

of

that

a

reasonable

finder

fact

could

accept

as

adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).
Under § 641, the Government had to prove four elements:
(1)

Paulsen

took

money;

(2)

the

money

came

from

the

United

States; (3) Paulsen intended to convert the money for his own
use or gain; and (4) Paulsen knew he was not entitled to the
money.

18

U.S.C.

§ 641.

Paulsen

Government failed to prove intent.

only

argues

that

the

However, the inconsistencies

between Paulsen’s conduct at medical appointments or benefits
hearings

and

all

factfinder

to

reasonable

doubt.

other

conclude
See

times
that

would

Paulsen

Cornell,

780

permit
was
F.3d

a

reasonable

guilty
at

630.

beyond
Such

a
a

factfinder could also conclude from the record that Paulsen’s
entrapment defense lacked merit.

Thus, the jury had sufficient

evidence to support its guilty verdict.
Finally, Paulsen argues that the district court imposed an
unreasonable sentence.

We review sentences for reasonableness,

applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
5

Gall v.

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States,

procedural

and

552

U.S.

38,

substantive

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51

(2007).

Reasonableness

components.

Id.

In

has

assessing

procedural reasonableness, we consider factors such as whether
the district court properly calculated the Sentencing Guidelines
range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
sufficiently explained the sentence imposed.

Id.

If no significant procedural errors exist, we consider the
substantive

reasonableness

totality

the

of

sentences

of

a

circumstances.”

within

the

sentence,
Id.

Guidelines

We

evaluating

“the

presume
United

range.

reasonable
States

v.

Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Applying this standard, we conclude that the district court
imposed a reasonable sentence.
sentencing

errors,

and

the

The record reveals no procedural

court

imposed

a

within-Guidelines

sentence, which we presume reasonable absent a rebuttal of that
presumption.
In

See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306.

accordance

with

Anders,

we

have

reviewed

the

entire

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal.

We

therefore

affirm

the

district

court’s

judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Paulsen, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review.

If Paulsen requests that a petition be filed,

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Paulsen.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions

are

adequately

presented

in

the

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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