US v. Jermaine William
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:15-cr-00175-JAG-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. . [16-4320]
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
JERMAINE RODNEY WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
John A. Gibney, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:15-cr-00175-JAG-1)
November 30, 2016
December 15, 2016
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory R. Sheldon, BAIN SHELDON, PLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Olivia L.
Norman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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Jermaine Rodney Williams of Count 1 of a three-count indictment,
which charged Williams with being a felon in possession of a
facts underlying this charge occurred on December 21, 2013.
district court subsequently sentenced Williams to 95 months in
As set forth below, we conclude these arguments
do not garner Williams any relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Williams’ first assignment of error pertains to the denial
of his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment.
In that order, the court found that the prosecution’s
failure to bring Williams to trial within 70 days of indictment
violated Williams’ rights under the Speedy Trial Act, see 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2012), and that the delay was attributable
to the Government and not excusable.
The court ordered the case
dismissed, but did not specify whether the dismissal was with or
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indictment—the indictment underlying the criminal judgment that
is before us on appeal—in which the Government charged Williams
with three crimes, two of which were the subject of the first
different district judge.
Williams moved to dismiss the second
Williams on these charges.
The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss
at which it heard from both the prosecutor and Williams’ new
defense attorney and received supporting evidence.
§ 3162(a)(2), which include “the seriousness of the offense; the
facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal;
and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this
chapter and on the administration of justice,” * and ruled that
Williams appeals this ruling, arguing that the court
Although not dispositive, “the presence or absence of
prejudice to the defendant” is also “relevant for a district
court’s consideration,” and may be considered in conjunction
with the third factor.
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326,
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erred in so finding that the first dismissal order was without
excludable, the district court “shall” dismiss the indictment
with or without prejudice on motion of the defendant.
§ 3162(a)(2); United States v. Henry, 538 F.3d 300, 304 (4th
district court must consider the specific factors set forth in
Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334.
The Supreme Court has instructed that, when reviewing a
district court’s judgment of how opposing considerations balance
should not lightly be disturbed” so long as the court “properly
considered” the statutory factors and did not make any clear
error in its relevant factual findings.
Id. at 337.
statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) and did not commit
clear error in its factual findings related to these factors.
We thus affirm the denial of Williams’ motion to dismiss the
second indictment on speedy trial grounds.
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Williams next maintains that the Government’s evidence on
the count of conviction was legally insufficient as it did not
adequately prove Williams’ possession, actual or constructive,
of a firearm.
We review the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion de
See United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir.
insufficient evidence, the jury’s verdict must be sustained “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.”
United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (alteration and internal quotation
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To convict a defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the
Government must establish that:
(1) the defendant was a felon;
(2) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a firearm; and
(3) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce.
v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
The trial transcript reveals that the Government
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produced sufficient evidence to establish each element of this
First, Williams stipulated that he had been convicted of a
Chesterfield County Police Department, who was driving the first
of several police vehicles pursuing Williams on December 21,
2013, observed Williams extend his arm out of his car window and
drop a firearm to the street.
Williams was the lone occupant of
Byerly and another officer recovered the firearm
Government and resolving all evidentiary contradictions in the
Government’s favor, see United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339,
343 (4th Cir. 2011), this testimony is sufficient to sustain the
jury’s guilty verdict, see United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d
1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997).
Williams asserts two challenges to his 95-month sentence.
application of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.2 (2015),
which resulted in a two-level increase in Williams’ base offense
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calculations, this court reviews the district court’s findings
States v. White, 771 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2014).
Section 3C1.2 provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f
the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing
from a law enforcement officer.”
This enhancement “is intended
to capture behavior that could be viewed as an obstruction of
justice, and thus requires that a defendant be aware that he or
she is fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”
v. Shell, 789 F.3d 335, 347 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation
defendant] was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the
risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk
constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.”
States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 255 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In overruling Williams’ objection to this enhancement, the
district court ruled that it was properly applied because, on
Williams’ top speed approached 70 mph.
The court opined that
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traveling at this excessive rate of speed on such a small road,
thoroughfare, created a substantial risk of death or serious
bodily injury to any of the drivers, including Williams.
readily conclude that these facts, which were established by the
which would be insufficient to warrant the enhancement.
We therefore conclude that the district court did not commit
clear error in applying this enhancement.
§ 4A1.3(b)(1), a criminal history category of VI substantially
(Appellant’s Br. at 19).
Williams goes on to particularize his
various criminal convictions, and the points assigned thereto,
suspended operators’ license, marijuana possession and assault
(Id. at 20).
To the extent that Williams’ argument could be construed as
a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence,
we find that he fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
afforded his within-Guidelines sentence.
See United States v.
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underlying this prosecution and the criminal judgment imposed
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
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