US v. Michael Miller

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cr-00368-CCE-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000030113].. [16-4336]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4336

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL SCOTT MILLER,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00368-CCE-1)

Submitted:

January 19, 2017

Decided:

February 24, 2017

Before TRAXLER, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Frank J.
Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Michael

Scott

Miller

pleaded

guilty

to

making

a

false

statement to a bank employee in negotiating a counterfeit check,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012); aggravated identity
theft,

in

violation

of

18

U.S.C.

§ 1028A(a)(1)

(2012);

production of counterfeit currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 471 (2012); and possession with intent to use and transfer
unlawfully

false

§ 1028(a)(3)

identification,

(2012),

conditioned

in
on

violation
his

right

of
to

district court’s denial of his suppression motion.

18

U.S.C.

appeal

the

The district

court sentenced Miller to 75 months of imprisonment and he now
appeals.

Finding no error, we affirm.

Miller

challenges

suppression motion.

the

district

court’s

denial

of

his

“We review the factual findings underlying

a motion to suppress for clear error and the district court’s
legal determinations de novo.”
226, 233 (4th Cir. 2012).

United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d

When the district court has denied a

defendant’s suppression motion, we construe the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government.
Here,
employee

officers
observed

were

called

stacks

of

to
what

Id.
a

motel

appeared

after
to

a

motel

be

uncut

counterfeit currency through the window of Miller’s motel room;
upon arrival, the officers were able to see the currency as
well.

One of the officers knocked on the door and announced his
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presence, after which the curtain was closed and the officers
heard

mumbling

and

rustling

in

the

room.

An

officer

then

entered the room to secure it, while the other officer left to
obtain

a

search

warrant.

In

denying

Miller’s

suppression

motion, the district court determined that the need to prevent
destruction

of

evidence

justified

the

officer’s

warrantless

entry.
The Fourth Amendment generally bars police from entering a
home without a warrant.
(2011).

See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460

The expectation of privacy enjoyed by occupants of a

home extends to guests of hotel or motel rooms.
States

v.

Warrantless

Stevenson,
entry

396

into

a

F.3d
home

538,
or

546

motel

(4th
room

See United
Cir.

is

2005).

permitted,

however, when exigent circumstances exist, including the need to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.

See United States

v. Taylor, 624 F.3d 626, 631 (4th Cir. 2010).

Thus, “where

police officers (1) have probable cause to believe that evidence
of illegal activity is present, and (2) reasonably believe that
evidence may be destroyed or removed before they could obtain a
warrant,” they may enter without a warrant.

United States v.

Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 269 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In

determining

whether

exigent

circumstances

support a warrantless entry, a court should consider:
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exist

to

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1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of
time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’
reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to
police guarding the site; (4) information indicating
the possessors of the contraband are aware that the
police are on their trail; and (5) the ready
destructibility of the contraband.
United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013).

The

inquiry

the

police

focuses
need

on

not

the

officers’

produce

concrete

danger of being destroyed.
making

this

determination

reasonable
proof

that

belief,

and

evidence

Moses, 540 F.3d at 270.
“should

not

engage

in

is

in

Courts

unreasonable

second-guessing of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances
that they faced.”

Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 639 (4th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the officers had probable cause to believe that the
motel room contained evidence of illegal activity based on their
observation
curtain.

of

the

counterfeit

currency

through

the

open

When they knocked on the door to the room, someone

closed the curtain, cutting off their view of that evidence, and
rustling and mumbling could be heard.

At that point, officers

knew that there was at least one person in the room and that he
was now aware the police were “on his trail.”
F.3d at 397.

See Yengel, 711

And because the officers could no longer see the

currency through the window and heard movement in the room, they

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had an objectively reasonable belief that the currency could be
destroyed before they could secure a warrant.
Miller also argues that if exigent circumstances existed,
the

officers

manufactured

announcing their presence.

the

exigency

by

knocking

and

Police may not rely on the exigent

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement if they have
created or manufactured the exigency.
However,

where

“the

police

did

not

King, 563 U.S. at 461.
create

the

exigency

by

engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction
of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”

Id. at 462.

There

is no police-created exigency “[w]hen law enforcement officers
who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door.”

Id. at 469.

Here, the officers did no more than knock on the door and
announce their presence.

This was not an actual or threatened

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

See United States v. Brown,

701 F.3d 120, 126 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing King and noting that
when police announce their presence, creating immediate fear of
detection

by

defendant,

police

prevent destruction of evidence).

may

still

act

reasonably

to

We conclude, therefore, that

the police did not create the exigency.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument

5

because

the

facts

and

legal

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contentions

are

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adequately

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presented

in

the

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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