US v. Curtis Richardson

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:15-cr-00492-RBH-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [999996334]. [16-4359]

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CURTIS RICHARDSON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:15-cr-00492-RBH-1)

Submitted:

November 30, 2016

Decided:

January 3, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Christopher Dolan
Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:
Curtis Richardson appeals his conviction and sentence of 57
months of imprisonment following his plea of guilty to being a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012).

Appellate counsel has

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), concluding that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but questioning whether: (1) the district court erred in denying
Richardson’s motion to dismiss for alleged violations of the Speedy
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (2012); (2) the district court erred
in denying Richardson’s motion in limine; and (3) the district
court erred in allowing Richardson to proceed pro se.

Richardson

has filed a pro se supplemental brief contending that two prior
state convictions used to enhance his sentence were invalid, and
the presentence report counted offenses that were too old to be
included in his criminal history score.

We affirm.

We review a district court’s legal conclusions with respect
to a motion to dismiss the indictment de novo, and its factual
findings for clear error.

United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166,

171 (4th Cir. 2014).
The

Speedy

information

or

Trial

Act

indictment

provides,

in

pertinent

charging

an

individual

part:
with

“Any
the

commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from
the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a
2

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 3 of 6

summons in connection with such charges.”

18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)

(2012).
Richardson contends that the Speedy Trial Act’s 30-day period
was triggered upon his state arrest on April 14, 2015.

However,

his argument is directly foreclosed by our decision in United
States v. Thomas, where we held that the 30-day period is triggered
upon a defendant’s arrest or indictment on federal charges, not
state charges.

55 F.3d 144, 148 (4th Cir. 1995); see United States

v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 451 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Thomas).
Richardson was indicted on the federal charge on July 28, 2015,
and arrested the next day, July 29.

Thus, we conclude there was

no violation of the Speedy Trial Act.
Next, we review de novo a district court’s refusal to allow
a justification defense.

United States v. Perrin, 45 F.3d 869,

871 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 200
(4th Cir. 2009).
To

establish

the

justification

defense

to

unlawfully

possessing a firearm, a defendant must show that he
(1)

was under unlawful and present threat of death or
serious bodily injury;

(2)

did not recklessly place himself in a situation
where he would be forced to engage in criminal
conduct;

(3)

had no reasonable legal alternative (to both the
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened
harm); and

3

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

(4)

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 4 of 6

[can show] a direct causal relationship between the
criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened
harm.

Ricks, 573 F.3d at 202 (internal quotation marks omitted).
defense is construed “very narrowly.”
497

F.3d

397,

404

(4th

Cir.

2007)

This

United States v. Mooney,
(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying
Richardson’s motion in limine.

Although Richardson may have had

a generalized fear, the record does not show that he was under any
immediate threat of serious bodily injury, and thus, Richardson
has not shown that he was entitled to the justification defense.
We review de novo a district court’s determination that a
defendant has waived his right to counsel.

United States v. Owen,

407 F.3d 222, 225 (4th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Ductan,
800 F.3d 642, 647 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015).
A defendant “may waive the right to counsel and proceed at
trial pro se only if the waiver is (1) clear and unequivocal,
(2) knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and (3) timely.”

United

States v. Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013); see Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court fully
complied with Faretta in granting Richardson’s motion to proceed
pro se after a thorough hearing.

Thus, we conclude the district

court did not err in allowing Richardson to proceed pro se.
4

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 5 of 6

We review a sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.”

United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d

349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007)).
In his pro se supplemental brief, Richardson contends that
two prior state convictions used to enhance his sentence were
invalid because they were uncounseled and not the result of knowing
and voluntary guilty pleas.

However, Richardson has presented

nothing more than an assertion that his prior convictions are
invalid.

Moreover, the PSR states that Richardson was represented

by counsel with respect to the marijuana charge, and the firearm
charge was dismissed and did not affect Richardson’s criminal
history score.

We conclude there was no error with respect to

these charges.
Finally, Richardson contends in his pro se supplemental brief
that the PSR counted offenses that were too old to be included in
his criminal history score.

In particular, he points to a second-

degree burglary charge that was committed in 1998, beyond the 15year applicable time period. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.2(e)(1) (2015).

However, USSG § 4A1.2(k)(2) provides that

in the case of a revocation of parole involving a felony, the
applicable

time

period

is

“the

incarceration on such sentence.”

date

of

last

release

from

Richardson’s parole for the

burglary charge was revoked in December 2005, and he was released
5

Appeal: 16-4359

Doc: 30

Filed: 01/03/2017

Pg: 6 of 6

from prison in July 2006, within 15 years of the possession of the
firearm and ammunition.

Thus, we conclude there was no sentencing

error.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

We

This court

requires that counsel inform Richardson, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review.

If Richardson requests that a petition be filed, but

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel

may

move

representation.

in

this

court

for

leave

to

withdraw

from

Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Richardson.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

6