US v. Muttaqin Abdullah

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:05-cr-00014-MBS-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999988460].. [16-4397]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4397

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MUTTAQIN F.
Pinckney,

ABDULLAH,

a/k/a

King,

a/k/a

Clayton

Montray

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia.
Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00014-MBS-1)

Submitted:

November 30, 2016

Before SHEDD and
Circuit Judge.

AGEE,

Circuit

Decided:

Judges,

and

December 16, 2016

HAMILTON,

Senior

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant.
Beth Drake, Acting United States
Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Muttaqin

F.

Abdullah

appeals

from

the

sentence

imposed

after he was resentenced for his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm.

At resentencing, the court imposed a

term of imprisonment of time served and a three-year term of
supervised release.
erred

in

imposing

On appeal, Abdullah contends that the court
supervised

release

because

he

had

already

served nearly a year and a half more than the statutory maximum
term of imprisonment.
Abdullah argues that the district court did not have the
authority to impose a sentence above the total maximum combined
sentences for term of imprisonment and supervised release.
suggests
release

that
to

if

be

this

court

available,

does

that

find
the

a

term

of

three-year

He

supervised

term

is

an

unreasonable sentence.

Because Abdullah was resentenced under

18

(2012),

U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(2)

the

imposition

of

supervised

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) became discretionary.
We review questions of law de novo.
666

F.3d

288,

292

(4th

Cir.

United States v. Strieper,

2012).

The

district

court’s

imposition of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
Abdullah acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that
“[s]upervised

release

fulfills

rehabilitative

ends,

distinct

from those served by incarceration” and that “[t]he objectives
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of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time
were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.”
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000).
Court

considered

whether

the

defendant

United

In Johnson, the

was

entitled

to

a

reduction in the term of his supervised release to compensate
him

for

two

and

a

half

years

of

time

served

over

what

available after some of his convictions were invalidated.

was
The

Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2012) did not entitle the
defendant to credit based on over service of an original term of
imprisonment, stating that § 3624(e) “does not reduce the length
of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in
prison.”

Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60.

Abdullah contends, however, that to impose a sentence in
excess of the statutory maximums for term of imprisonment and
supervised

release

maximum sentences.

violates

Congress’s

intent

in

creating

Abdullah posits that his case differs from

Johnson in that, in Johnson, the defendant would never serve the
maximum statutory sentence even if his supervised release was
revoked.

Here, if Abdullah’s supervised release were ever to be

revoked, and he served the maximum three years, he would serve 1
year, 4 months, and 27 days over the statutory maximum sentence
of

ten

years

and

three

supervised

release

years.

This

assertion, however, ignores that Johnson compels the conclusion
that the initial term of imprisonment and subsequent term of
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supervised release are separate sentences and not conglomerated
or subject to being served concurrently.
We have confirmed since Johnson that a supervised release
term

consecutive

to

a

term

of

imprisonment

cannot

be

served

concurrently to a term of imprisonment because the purpose of
supervised release is different from that of incarceration.

See

United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2014)
(evaluating

whether

civil

confinement

after

criminal

sentence

completed counted toward supervised release term); United States
v.

Buchanan,

638

F.3d

448,

451

(4th

Cir.

2011)

(considering

tolling of supervised release while defendant absconded).
Abdullah’s term of supervised release cannot begin until he
is

released

from

confinement.

Thus

it

is

not

possible

to

consider the initial term of imprisonment to fulfill at least a
portion of the supervised release term because the supervised
release term was not yet ripe.

See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57

(“the ordinary, commonsense meaning of release is to be freed
from

confinement”);

release

has

no

Neuhauser,

statutory

745

function

F.3d

at

until

129

(“supervised

confinement

ends”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Abdullah

does

not

challenge

the

three-year

supervised

release term on any basis other than it is an invalid option, or
at least is unavailable for the period of time that his sentence
was overserved.

We conclude, however, that the district court
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did not abuse its discretion in imposing the three-year term of
supervised

release

in

light

of

Abdullah’s

threatening

communication, during his initial sentencing, of the court and
murder victim’s family, and his numerous assaults and offenses
while in prison, including threatening and assaulting correction
officers.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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