US v. Leonidas Brown, Jr.

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:06-cr-00213-JRS-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000016672].. [16-4446]

Appeal: 16-4446

Doc: 26

Filed: 02/03/2017

Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEONIDAS BROWN, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00213-JRS-2)

Submitted:

January 26, 2017

Decided:

February 3, 2017

Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt,
Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Peter S. Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 16-4446

Doc: 26

Filed: 02/03/2017

Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:
Leonidas Brown, Jr., appeals the 24-month sentence imposed
upon revocation of his supervised release.

For the reasons that

follow, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
Brown pled guilty in 2006 to conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, followed by
five years of supervised release.

Brown’s sentence was later

reduced and he was released on September 22, 2014.
a

petition

to

revoke

Brown’s

supervised

In May 2016,

release

was

filed

alleging numerous violations of conditions of supervision.
At the revocation hearing, Brown admitted the violations
and

pled

guilty.

Counsel

detailed

Brown’s

long

history

of

mental health issues and previous attempts to comply with drug
counseling programs.

Counsel stated that she had identified an

appropriate long-term program to treat Brown’s mental health and
drug

abuse

sentence

of

problems,
time

and

served

requested
—

eight

that

the

weeks.

court

impose

Government

a

counsel

argued that Brown failed to abide by the terms of his supervised
release for two years, and that “the pattern here is one of just
a

complete

failure

to

do

anything

resources” available to Brown.

to

take

advantage

of

the

Government counsel went on to

note that “the guidelines are six to 12 months . . . [t]here is
a statutory maximum of 60 months.”

2

Appeal: 16-4446

Doc: 26

Filed: 02/03/2017

Pg: 3 of 5

At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court made
the following findings:
Well, it is a difficult and complicated process.
I have to look at all the facts, and the facts here
indicate to me that whatever the particular kind of
help that Mr. Brown needs we have been unable to
provide in the two years that he has been on
supervised release.
The tools that we have, and drug treatment and
mental health treatment and the constant monitoring to
impose discipline upon an undisciplined life has
obviously not worked. So the prospect of a continued
supervised release after a two-year failure at every
turn does not argue well for continued supervised
release. It is just that simple.
This is what I am going to do.
I am going to
impose a sentence of active incarceration of 24
months.
He will receive credit for time served. No
further supervised release following this period of
incarceration.
The court did not refer to the Guidelines Manual policy
statement and table suggesting a sentence of six to 12 months,
and

the

record

does

not

include

a

worksheet

calculating

the

applicable policy statement range.
We

will

affirm

a

sentence

imposed

after

revocation

of

supervised release unless that sentence is plainly unreasonable.
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006).
Brown

maintains

that

the

sentence

he

received

is

plainly

procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to consider
the applicable policy statement range.

A district court “need

not

imposing

be

sentence

as
as

detailed
it

or

must

specific
be

when

3

when

imposing

a

a

revocation

post-conviction

Appeal: 16-4446

Doc: 26

Filed: 02/03/2017

Pg: 4 of 5

sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir.

2010).

But

it

“must

consider

the

policy

statements

contained in Chapter 7, including the policy statement range, as
‘helpful

assistance,’

and

must

also

consider

the

applicable

§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Thompson, 595 F.3d at
547.
Here,

the

district

court

may

well

have

(at

least

implicitly) considered many of the applicable § 3553(a) factors.
But

it

failed

to

indicate

any

consideration

statement range for revocation sentences.

of

the

policy

The Government argues

that the court was aware of the policy statement range because
Government counsel mentioned it in his argument for a sentence
within the range.

However, the record contains no worksheet or

concession by Brown’s counsel that the Government’s statement
was

correct.

Moreover,

nothing

in

the

hearing

transcript

demonstrates, or implies, that the court considered the six to
12-month policy statement range during sentencing.

Therefore,

we conclude that Brown’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable.
“For a sentence to be plainly unreasonable, . . . it must
run afoul of clearly settled law.”
In

this

consider
settled.

case,
the
See

the

requirement

Chapter

7

Moulden,

that

policy
478

F.3d
4

Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548.
a

sentencing

statement
at

656.

range

court

must

is

clearly

Because

Brown’s

Appeal: 16-4446

Doc: 26

sentence

Filed: 02/03/2017

violated

Moulden’s

Pg: 5 of 5

clear

language,

it

was

plainly

unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Brown’s sentence and
remand to the district court for resentencing.

We dispense with

oral

contentions

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

and

materials

legal
before

this

court

are
and

argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

5