US v. Leonidas Brown, Jr.
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:06-cr-00213-JRS-2 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. .. [16-4446]
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
LEONIDAS BROWN, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond.
James R. Spencer, Senior
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00213-JRS-2)
January 26, 2017
February 3, 2017
Before MOTZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Frances H. Pratt,
Laura J. Koenig, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States
Attorney, Peter S. Duffey, Assistant United States Attorney,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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Leonidas Brown, Jr., appeals the 24-month sentence imposed
upon revocation of his supervised release.
For the reasons that
follow, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
Brown pled guilty in 2006 to conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, followed by
five years of supervised release.
Brown’s sentence was later
reduced and he was released on September 22, 2014.
In May 2016,
alleging numerous violations of conditions of supervision.
At the revocation hearing, Brown admitted the violations
mental health issues and previous attempts to comply with drug
Counsel stated that she had identified an
appropriate long-term program to treat Brown’s mental health and
argued that Brown failed to abide by the terms of his supervised
release for two years, and that “the pattern here is one of just
resources” available to Brown.
Government counsel went on to
note that “the guidelines are six to 12 months . . . [t]here is
a statutory maximum of 60 months.”
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court made
the following findings:
Well, it is a difficult and complicated process.
I have to look at all the facts, and the facts here
indicate to me that whatever the particular kind of
help that Mr. Brown needs we have been unable to
provide in the two years that he has been on
The tools that we have, and drug treatment and
mental health treatment and the constant monitoring to
impose discipline upon an undisciplined life has
obviously not worked. So the prospect of a continued
supervised release after a two-year failure at every
turn does not argue well for continued supervised
release. It is just that simple.
This is what I am going to do.
I am going to
impose a sentence of active incarceration of 24
He will receive credit for time served. No
further supervised release following this period of
The court did not refer to the Guidelines Manual policy
statement and table suggesting a sentence of six to 12 months,
applicable policy statement range.
supervised release unless that sentence is plainly unreasonable.
See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006).
procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to consider
the applicable policy statement range.
A district court “need
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sentence.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
contained in Chapter 7, including the policy statement range, as
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656
(4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Thompson, 595 F.3d at
implicitly) considered many of the applicable § 3553(a) factors.
statement range for revocation sentences.
The Government argues
that the court was aware of the policy statement range because
Government counsel mentioned it in his argument for a sentence
within the range.
However, the record contains no worksheet or
concession by Brown’s counsel that the Government’s statement
demonstrates, or implies, that the court considered the six to
12-month policy statement range during sentencing.
we conclude that Brown’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable.
“For a sentence to be plainly unreasonable, . . . it must
run afoul of clearly settled law.”
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 548.
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For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Brown’s sentence and
remand to the district court for resentencing.
We dispense with
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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