US v. Brock Campbell
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cr-00012-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. .. [16-4500]
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
BROCK CORDERRO LEE CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Bluefield. David A. Faber, Senior
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00012-1)
February 28, 2017
March 7, 2017
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Research & Writing Specialist, David R. Bungard, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Carol
A. Casto, United States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong, III, Assistant
United States Attorney, Beckley, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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Brock Corderro Lee Campbell appeals the district court’s
order revoking his supervised release, imposing a 10-month prison
term, and ordering him to reside in a halfway house for the first
9 months as a special condition of his 36-month term of supervised
On appeal, Campbell asserts that the district court
violated his right to due process when it relied on hearsay
information in imposing his sentence, and that the district court
abused its discretion when it imposed the halfway house condition.
Upon review of the record, we affirm.
To the extent that Campbell argues the district court violated
his due process rights by improperly using hearsay testimony when
sentencing court may “consider any relevant information before it,
including uncorroborated hearsay, provided that the information
has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its accuracy.”
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 1103(d)(3)
(excluding sentencing proceedings from proceedings governed by
Federal Rules of Evidence).
Here, the officer who testified at Campbell’s revocation
Campbell’s criminal activity before obtaining a search warrant.
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Campbell’s bedroom a white substance believed to be crack cocaine.
Campbell’s own admission to using hydrocodone and marijuana while
on supervised release supports the reliability of the officer’s
testimony and the court’s conclusion that Campbell had resumed
dealing drugs after his original term of imprisonment ended.
Additionally, Campbell had the opportunity to cross-examine the
concerning Campbell’s alleged drug dealing while on supervised
release was sufficiently reliable.
Campbell next argues that the district court erred when it
imposed as a special condition of his supervised release a ninemonth term in a halfway house.
“[W]e review a district court’s
imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse
United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 509 (4th
“A judge has significant flexibility in formulating special
conditions of supervised release,” including the ability to impose
a period of community confinement.
United States v. Marino, 833
supervised release “any condition set forth as a discretionary
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§ 3563(b)(11) (2012) (providing that district courts may require
defendants to “reside at . . . a community corrections facility”).
Courts may order special conditions of supervised release to the
extent those conditions (1) are “reasonably related” to the offense
and the defendant’s history, the need to deter criminal conduct,
the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the
deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve
those purposes; and (3) are “consistent with any pertinent policy
statements” in the Guidelines.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D) (2012).
The record establishes that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it included the halfway house condition as
part of Campbell’s supervised release.
Although Campbell does not
agree that living in a halfway house will provide him with the
assistance he needs following his release from prison, the record
shows that the district court relied on the supervised release
The Sentencing Guidelines further provide that “[c]ommunity
confinement may be imposed as a condition of probation or
supervised release.” USSG § 5F1.1. “‘Community confinement’ means
residence in a community treatment center, halfway house, . . . or
other community facility; and participation in gainful employment,
employment search efforts, community service, vocational training,
treatment, educational programs, or similar facility-approved
programs during non-residential hours.” USSG § 5F1.1, cmt. n.1.
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factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and tied those factors to
Campbell’s specific circumstances.
Campbell further argues that living in a halfway house for
nine months is a significant deprivation of liberty.
every supervised-release condition restricts a felon’s liberty.
Instead, the line separating a permissible condition from an
impermissible one depends on whether, given the facts of the case,
the particular restriction is clearly unnecessary.
§ 3553(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).
See 18 U.S.C.
Campbell’s confinement in a
halfway house may be inconvenient for Campbell and his family.
But the condition is not clearly unnecessary, especially given the
district court’s concern regarding Campbell’s backsliding into
drug use and his need for a stable living environment to further
his education and improve upon his job prospects.
States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 875-76 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that
discretion when it imposed on Campbell a special condition of
supervised release concerning the requirement to reside for nine
months in a halfway house.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
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