US v. Arniel Carlton

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 4:15-cr-00031-AWA-DEM-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000051307].. [16-4516]

Appeal: 16-4516

Doc: 22

Filed: 03/29/2017

Pg: 1 of 6

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4516

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARNIEL LAMONT CARLTON,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:15-cr-00031-AWA-DEM-1)

Submitted:

March 21, 2017

Before WILKINSON and
Senior Circuit Judge.

THACKER,

Decided:

Circuit

Judges,

March 29, 2017

and

HAMILTON,

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scott W. Putney, SCOTT W. PUTNEY, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Amy E.
Cross, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia,
for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 16-4516

Doc: 22

Filed: 03/29/2017

Pg: 2 of 6

PER CURIAM:
Arniel

Lamont

Carlton

was

sentenced

to

48

months’

imprisonment upon entering a conditional guilty plea to being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012).
district

court’s

Carlton reserved the right to appeal the

denial

of

his

motion

to

suppress

evidence

obtained in a warrantless entry into and search of his home by
police and Carlton’s subsequent statements.
contends

that

police

lacked

probable

On appeal, Carlton

cause,

that

exigent

circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and search,
and that any statements attributable to him were tainted by the
initial search.

We affirm.

When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e
review

de

reasonable

novo

a

district

suspicion

and

court’s

probable

rulings

cause.”

Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016).

with
United

respect

to

States

v.

“Absent clear error,

we will not disturb factual findings made by a district court
after

an

evidentiary

hearing

on

suppression

issues.”

Id.

Because the Government prevailed on the suppression issue below,
“we

view

the

government.”

evidence

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

Id.

“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.”

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,

2

Appeal: 16-4516

459

Doc: 22

(2011)

Filed: 03/29/2017

(internal

Pg: 3 of 6

quotation

marks

omitted).

circumstances may justify warrantless entry.
rely

on

exigent

circumstances,

police

“need

But

exigent

Id. at 460.
only

possess

To
a

reasonable suspicion that such circumstances exist at the time
of the search or seizure in question.”
F.3d

625,

omitted).

639

(4th

Cir.

2002)

Figg v. Schroeder, 312

(internal

quotation

marks

“[C]ourts should not engage in unreasonable second-

guessing of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances that
they faced.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Exigencies

that

may

justify

a

warrantless

entry

or

protective sweep include concern for officer safety and the need
to

preserve

evidence.

Id.

“With

respect

to

officer

safety, . . . the protection of police officers is of particular
concern

in

cases”

involving

firearms

and

drugs.

States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2013).

United
“[P]olice

officers need to be assured that the persons with whom they are
dealing are not armed with, or able to gain immediate control
of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
[them].”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

With respect

to evidence preservation, officers may enter without a warrant
where they “reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or
removed before they could obtain a warrant.”

United States v.

Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

3

Appeal: 16-4516

Doc: 22

Filed: 03/29/2017

marks omitted).

Pg: 4 of 6

In determining whether exigent circumstances

exist, a court should consider:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of
time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’
reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to
police guarding the site; (4) information indicating
the possessors of the
contraband are aware that the
police
are
on
their
trail;
and
(5) the
ready
destructibility of the contraband.
United

States

v.

Yengel,

711

F.3d

392,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

397

(4th

Cir.

2013)

The inquiry focuses on the

officers’ reasonable belief rather than “concrete proof” of the
exigency.

Moses,

540

F.3d

at

270

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted).
Here, the officers had probable cause at the time of their
entry into Carlton’s home.

Although the underlying offense of

brandishing a firearm is a misdemeanor under Virginia law, Va.
Code

Ann.

§ 18.2-282

(2014),

the

circumstances

here

involved

“violence or threats of it,” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 744,
751 (1984).
We conclude that Carlton has shown no error in the district
court’s
officers’

ruling

that

warrantless

exigent
entry

circumstances

into

Carlton’s

justified
home,

protective sweep, and seizure of the shotgun.

the

subsequent

The officers’

concerns for safety and evidence preservation were objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.

4

See Moses, 540 F.3d at 270.

Appeal: 16-4516

Doc: 22

Filed: 03/29/2017

Pg: 5 of 6

Consideration of the Yengel factors confirms the existence of
exigent

circumstances.

See

Yengel,

711

F.3d

at

397.

Additionally, contrary to Carlton’s argument, the record reveals
that the exigencies were not officer-created.
U.S.

at

461

(precluding

reliance

on

See King, 563

exigent

circumstances

exception where officers manufactured exigency).

The officers

did not engage or threaten to engage in conduct violative of the
Fourth Amendment, id. at 462, and “[f]aulting the police for
failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible
time

after

obtaining

probable

cause

imposes

a

duty

nowhere to be found in the Constitution,” id. at 467.

that

is

Moreover,

the officers took only a quick look around Carlton’s home to
verify

that

no

one

else

was

present,

a

reasonable,

limited

intrusion for officer safety purposes that did not offend the
Fourth Amendment.

See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37

(1990); Watson, 703 F.3d at 693.
Absent

a

Fourth

Amendment

violation,

any

statements

attributable to Carlton were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
Moreover, Carlton admitted that he was apprised of his Miranda
rights before he made the inculpatory statements, and that he
understood

those

rights.

Therefore,

we

conclude

Carlton’s suppression motion was proper in all regards.

5

denial

of

Appeal: 16-4516

Doc: 22

Filed: 03/29/2017

Pg: 6 of 6

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
dispense

with

contentions

are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the
the

facts

We

and

legal

materials

before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

6