US v. Steve Washington
Filing
UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 3:98-cr-00018-1 Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000007251].. [16-4535]
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4535
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEVE DANTAY WASHINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington.
Robert C. Chambers,
Chief District Judge. (3:98-cr-00018-1)
Submitted:
January 18, 2017
Decided:
January 20, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christian M. Capece, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,
Research and Writing Specialist, Ann Mason Rigby, Assistant
Federal
Public
Defender,
Charleston,
West
Virginia,
for
Appellant.
Carol A. Casto, United States Attorney, Joseph F.
Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Huntington, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Steve
Dantay
Washington
appeals
the
district
court’s
judgment order revoking his supervised release and sentencing
him to 12 months in prison.
his
within-Policy
unreasonable.
We
have
supervised
On appeal, Washington claims that
Statement
range
sentence
is
plainly
We affirm.
routinely
release
recognized
revocation,
that,
“the
in
the
sentencing
context
court
of
a
retains
broad discretion to impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum.”
(4th
Cir.)
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373
(ellipsis
and
internal
quotation
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015).
marks
omitted),
“We will not disturb a
district court’s revocation sentence unless it falls outside the
statutory maximum or is otherwise plainly unreasonable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted).
sentence,
we
utilize
the
familiar
Id.
In reviewing a revocation
procedural
and
substantive
considerations employed for evaluating the reasonableness of an
original criminal sentence, but “we strike a more deferential
appellate posture than we do when reviewing original sentences.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A
revocation
sentence
is
procedurally
reasonable
if
the
district court considered the advisory Policy Statement range
and
the
18
U.S.C.
§
3553(a)
(2012)
supervised release revocation.
factors
applicable
to
Id.; United States v. Crudup,
2
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461
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F.3d
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433,
substantively
438–40
Pg: 3 of 4
(4th
reasonable
if
Cir.
the
2006).
district
A
court
sentence
is
“sufficiently
stated a proper basis” for the selected sentence, up to the
statutory
maximum.
Crudup,
461
F.3d
at
440.
Only
if
we
determine that a revocation sentence is unreasonable need we
consider “whether it is plainly so.”
In
exercising
its
sentencing
Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
discretion,
“the
[district]
court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust,
while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness
of
the
underlying
violator.”
violation
and
the
criminal
history
of
the
United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Washington contends that the revocation sentence imposed by
the district court is unduly punitive and fails to promote the
supervised
society.
release
goal
of
easing
his
transition
back
into
He points to his successful employment on supervised
release and the fact that, in comparison to his original crimes
of conviction, his supervised release violations, which involved
termination from a halfway house for repeated rules violations,
were relatively minor.
would
have
properly
He argues that a shorter prison term
punished
his
breach
of
trust
while
recognizing his progress towards rehabilitation.
The
current
supervised
revocation
release
were
not
violations
that
Washington’s
3
resulted
first.
As
in
the
defense
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counsel acknowledges, Washington’s earlier violations previously
resulted
in
revoked.
his
supervised
release
being
both
modified
and
Despite that history, when Washington violated the
terms of his supervised release by being ejected from a halfway
house after repeatedly breaking rules, the district court did
not immediately revoke his supervised release, but instead gave
Washington a second chance by allowing him to return to the
halfway house.
Only when Washington was kicked out a second
time did the court punish this breach of trust by revoking his
supervised
release
and
imposing
a
12-month
within-Policy
Statement Range term of imprisonment.
On this record, we uphold
the
revocation
reasonableness
of
the
selected
sentence.
See
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440 (holding that imposition of statutory
maximum term of imprisonment was substantively reasonable, given
that
the
district
“admitted
pattern
court
of
expressly
violating
relied
numerous
on
defendant’s
conditions
of
his
supervised release,” despite several extensions of leniency by
the district court).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense
with
contentions
are
oral
argument
adequately
because
presented
in
the
the
facts
and
legal
materials
before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4
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