US v. Freddie Badger

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:06-cr-00173-1. Copies to all parties and the district court. [1000088125]. [16-4775]

Appeal: 16-4775

Doc: 33

Filed: 05/25/2017

Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4775

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
FREDDIE LINDSEY BADGER,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge. (2:06-cr-00173-1)

Submitted: May 23, 2017

Decided: May 25, 2017

Before KING, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

L. Thompson Price, TOM PRICE LAW, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Timothy Doyle Boggess, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston,
West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 16-4775

Doc: 33

Filed: 05/25/2017

Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:
Freddie Lindsey Badger appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release and imposing a sentence of 18 months of imprisonment. Appellate
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning the reasonableness of
Badger’s sentence. We affirm.
A court may revoke supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release.”
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012).

18 U.S.C.

We review a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). Because Badger
admitted the violations of which the district court found him guilty, we conclude that the
court’s revocation decision was not an abuse of discretion.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We “will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is
unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the
sentence after considering the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors.

See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e); Thompson, 595 F.3d at 546-47. We presume that a sentence imposed within the
2

Appeal: 16-4775

Doc: 33

Filed: 05/25/2017

Pg: 3 of 3

Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2014).
The district court’s explanation of Badger’s sentence, in pointing out Badger’s
repeated noncompliance with the terms of his supervised release, easily satisfies this
standard. Furthermore, Badger’s sentence of 18 months of imprisonment is below the
Guidelines range and is therefore substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Badger, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Badger requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Badger.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

3