Paul Luxama v. John McHugh

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 1:15-cv-01586-CMH-JFA Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000004008]. Mailed to: Paul Luxama CENTURY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION 400 Tedder Road Century, FL 32535. [16-6830]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6830

PAUL LUXAMA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOHN MCHUGH, Secretary of the U.S. Army; DAVID D. VELLENFE,
JAG Counsel at Discharge proceedings; READ G. HARRIS, Major,
Assistant Adjutant of the UCMJ; B. BELL, Major, special
court-martial
convening
authority;
EDWARD
J.
YANGER,
President of the Army Review Agency; GERARD G. SCHWARZ,
Acting Director of the Army Review Board Agency,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:15-cv-01586-CMH-JFA)

Submitted:

December 29, 2016

Decided:

January 17, 2017

Before KING, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Paul Luxama, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Paul Luxama appeals the district court’s order denying his
motion to reopen his case.

We reverse the district court’s

order denying the motion to reopen, vacate the district court’s
order

dismissing

Luxama’s

complaint,

and

remand

for

further

proceedings.
Luxama filed a complaint in November 2015 in the Alexandria
Division of the Eastern District of Virginia (“first action”).
The court received letters from Luxama on December 28, 2015, and
February 2, 2016, requesting an update on the status of his
case.
when

The district court did not respond until March 4, 2016,
it

entered

pertaining

to

an

his

order

inmate

directing

trust

Luxama

account.

to

file

Having

forms

received

no

update on the status of his case, and having not yet received
the district court’s order, Luxama mailed an identical copy of
the complaint to the Richmond Division of the Eastern District
of

Virginia

Division

on

March

forwarded

the

17

(“second

complaint

to

action”).
the

The

Alexandria

Richmond
Division.

The Alexandria Division received the second complaint on March
30 and proceeded to open the second action.

After he received

the district court’s March 4 order, Luxama mailed two documents
on March 21.

On March 25, the Alexandria Division received

Luxama’s consent form authorizing collection of filing fees from
his

inmate

trust

account.

Luxama
2

also

mailed

a

“Voluntary

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Dismissal of Luxama v. McHugh, etc.” to the Richmond Division,
explaining that the court could dismiss his complaint because he
had previously filed an action in another court and that he had
filed

a

second

Alexandria
Richmond

complaint

Division

had

Division

Alexandria

received

again

Division.

because

he

his

forwarded

The

was
first

this

Alexandria

unaware

if

the

complaint.
document

Division

The

to

the

docketed

the

notice in Luxama’s first action on the same day it received
Luxama’s complaint in the second action.

The district court

construed Luxama’s notice as a motion to voluntarily dismiss and
dismissed Luxama’s first action without prejudice on April 7.
Luxama

filed

the

instant

motion

on

April

13,

again

explaining why he had sent a second complaint and that he had
intended
denied

to
the

dismiss
motion

the

second

because

action.

Luxama’s

The

second

district
action

court

remained

pending and he was not entitled to have two separate actions
involving the same matter pending at the same time.

On June 28,

the court dismissed the second action without prejudice under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a).
Because Luxama filed his motion to reopen his case within
28

days

of

the

district

court’s

order,

Luxama’s

properly considered under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

motion

is

See Robinson

v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 412 (4th Cir. 2010).

We

review a district court’s order denying a Rule 59(e) motion for
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abuse of discretion.

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Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 220

(4th Cir. 2014).

“A Rule 59(e) motion may only be granted in

three situations:

(1) to accommodate an intervening change in

controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available
at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.”
Racing,

Inc.,

674

Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto
F.3d

369,

378

(4th

Cir.

2012)

(internal

quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that—although understandable given the flurry
of papers crossing in the mail—the district court abused its
discretion in denying Luxama’s motion.

See GO Computer, Inc. v.

Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2007).

Having

received no responses to his requests asking for a status update
in

the

first

action,

Luxama

mailed

a

second

copy

of

complaint to a different division of the district court.

his
Once

he realized that the Alexandria Division had received his first
complaint, he then took action to remedy any confusion he caused
when he mailed a second copy of his complaint to the Richmond
Division.

Moreover,

because

Luxama’s

notice

of

voluntary

dismissal was sent to the Richmond Division, and Luxama mailed
his

consent

form

to

the

Alexandria

Division,

his

intent

was

clear to have the second action dismissed while proceeding with
the first action.

In light of the unique circumstances of this

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case, the district court should have granted the Rule 59 motion
and reopened the first action.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order denying
Luxama’s motion to reopen, vacate the district court’s order
dismissing his complaint, and remand for further proceedings.
We

dispense

contentions

with
are

oral

argument

adequately

because

presented

in

the

facts

and

the

materials

legal
before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

REVERSED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED

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