Freddie Casey v. Jack Hurley

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 7:15-cv-00674-JPJ-RSB Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [999983641]. Mailed to: Freddie Casey. [16-6927]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6927

FREDDIE EUGENE CASEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JACK S. HURLEY; MICHAEL L. DENNIS, Commonwealth Attorney;
DENNIS H. LEE, Commonwealth Attorney; HAROLD W. CLARKE,
Director Virginia Department of Corrections,
Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
James P. Jones, District
Judge. (7:15-cv-00674-JPJ-RSB)

Submitted:

November 22, 2016

Decided:

December 9, 2016

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Freddie Eugene Casey, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Freddie Eugene Casey, a Virginia prisoner serving a life
sentence

for

murder,

appeals

the

district

court’s

order

dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action
as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (2012).

We

affirm.
Casey claimed that his due process rights were violated
because

a

Virginia

state

court

denied

his

postconviction

motions, made pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2–327.1 (2015), for
DNA testing of certain evidentiary items.

According to Casey,

he has a due process right to have DNA testing of evidence
because the results may show he is actually innocent of the
murder.
We

This claim is without merit.
review

§ 1915A(b)(1),

de

novo

applying

a
the

district

court’s

same

dismissal

standards

as

reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013).

those

under
for

De’Lonta v.

The complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).
First, there is no substantive due process right to the
postconviction preservation and testing of DNA evidence.

Dist.

Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S.
52, 72 (2009); see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525
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(2011).

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Second,

with

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respect

to

the

claimed

violation

of

procedural due process, we note that Casey did not claim that
§ 19.2–327.1 is itself invalid or that the state court construed
the statute in such a way as to deny him procedural due process.
Rather, at best, he appeared to claim that, after the state
court denied his requests for DNA testing, the district court
had the authority to order that evidence be preserved and DNA
tests be performed.

As noted, Casey has no substantive due

process right to the relief he seeks.
review

of

the

state

court’s

adverse

To the extent Casey seeks
decisions,

the

district

court lacked jurisdiction to conduct such a review under the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine. *

See Skinner, 562 U.S. at 531–32; see

also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005).
We

therefore

affirm

the

district

court’s

order.

We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal issues
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

*D.C.

Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.
Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

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