Intl. Refugee Assistance v. Donald J. Trump

Filing 150

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF by Potential Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Technology Leadership Counsel, Inc. in 17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233 in electronic and paper format. Method of Filing Paper Copies: mail. Date Paper Copies Mailed, Dispatched, or Delivered to Court: 11/17/2017. [1000199529] [17-2231, 17-2232, 17-2233, 17-2240] Gare Smith [Entered: 11/28/2017 05:44 PM]

Addendum

THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
IMMIGRATION ON THE U.S.
June 2017

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Special thanks to the following organizations for their support: Carbonite, CHEN PR, Foley Hoag, Goodsill
Anderson Quinn & Stifel, TripAdvisor, and WireStone.
And, thank you to the many individuals who contributed time and energy to our research and advocacy on
this important issue: Catherine Alford, Mohamad Ali, Amitay Alter, Almudena Arcelus, Grace Brittan, Kip
Brown, Marric Buessing, Kristyn Bunce DeFilipp, Sean Burpoe, Lenore Byers, Chris Carleton, Sonia Cheung,
Pierre-Yves Cremieux, Nick Dadson, Tracy Danner, Matt Driver, Akanksha Dua, Sorcha Evenhouse, Adam
Feifel, Catherine Fernan, Desiree Fish, Aaron Fix, Max Flignor, Sara Fraim, Emily Gao, Sam Green, Norman
Guadagno, Carro Halpin, Christopher Hart, Owen Hearey, Alex Henslovitz, Ryan Hiatt, Alison Hill, Hunter
Hillman, Victoria Hopcroft, Tom Hopcroft, Grace Howland, Samantha Jandl, Patrick Johnson, Seth Kalvert,
Steve Kaufer, Michael Keating, Sarah King, Olga Korolev, Nguyen Le, Jee-Yeon Lehmann, Christopher Llop,
Dana Louie, Tarek Makawi, Federico Mantovanelli, Rosamond Mate, Sean McCoy, Dan McFadden, Kate
McLeod, Liz Milsark, Pedro Mora, Ruth Morris, Liz Neyens, Amanda Nguyen, Caitlin O'Malley, Alec
Paulson, Shaked Peleg, Clemens Pilgram, Greg Rafert, Nina Roesner, Peter Rosenblum, Aidan Saavedra
Buckley, Kate Schoenbach, Shannon Seitz, Riddhima Sharma, Jesse Shea, Danielle Sheer, Yanying Sheng,
Eric Smiley, Mike Spinney, Ian Staeheli, Patricio Suarez Urtaza, Matt Summers, Neal Tan, Evelyn TaylorMcGregor, Brett Tobin, David Toniatti, Kate Uthe, Jahnvi Vaidya, Katie Williams, Frances Yen, Brad Young,
Tom Yu, Haimin Zhang, and Luise Zhong.
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INTRODUCTION
The Massachusetts Technology Leadership Council (MassTLC), the region’s largest non-profit technology
organization, joined the national conversation on the role that immigrants play in our economy with its
submission of amicus briefs in the District Court of Hawaii and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th and
9th Circuits. These briefs support the plaintiffs in those cases, who have sought to enjoin the President’s
Executive Orders restricting travel to the U.S. from certain countries.
While it is well understood within the technology community that diversity and the global mobility of
talent and ideas into our country are critical drivers of U.S. innovation, economic growth, and global
competitiveness, we felt that the submission of amicus briefs requires better documentation and
sourcing of these commonly held truths. This report reflects our work to document the impact that
immigrants have on our economy.
We entered this dialogue on behalf of the tech community in Massachusetts because, as a leading
technology state, we feel the acute impact that immigrants have in our economy. As Governor Charlie
Baker noted, “Massachusetts is a global community, and we all benefit from the shared experiences of
our partners from around the world to support our economy and educational institutions [and] make our
state the best place to live, work, and raise a family.”
This report illustrates a rich tapestry of unique impacts across the country. We hope this compilation of
research contributes to a productive dialogue about the important role immigrants play as critical drivers
of our national leadership in innovation, economic growth, and global competitiveness.
We encourage readers of this report to lend their voices to the conversation and use this research to
complement personal insights and experiences about the role of immigrants. We welcome broad
sharing of this report and have made it freely available for download at the following URL:
www.MassTLC.org/Immigration.
Thank you,

Thomas Hopcroft
President & CEO
Mass Technology
Leadership Council, Inc.

Mohamad Ali
President & CEO
Carbonite, Inc.
Trustee, MassTLC

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Steve Kaufer
President & CEO
TripAdvisor, Inc.
Member, MassTLC

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................................... 1
THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION ON THE TECH INDUSTRY ..................................................................................................... 1
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON INNOVATION AND THE ECONOMY ....................................................................... 3

A.
B.
II.

COST TO BUSINESSES IMPOSED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER............................................................................ 5
DEMAND FOR H-1B WORKERS....................................................................................................................................... 6
Massachusetts-Specific Facts ............................................................................................................................ 7
D. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN THE TECH INDUSTRY ............................................................................................................ 7
i.
Massachusetts-Specific Facts ............................................................................................................................ 8
E. THE ROLE OF IMMIGRANTS IN MEDICINE ......................................................................................................................... 9
i.
Massachusetts-Specific Facts .......................................................................................................................... 10
F.
IMPACT OF VISA RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN EMPLOYERS............................................................................................... 11
i.
Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on Risk and Instability of American Workforces ........................... 11
ii.
Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on the Competitiveness of U.S. Firms ............................................ 11
iii. Outsourcing ...................................................................................................................................................... 12
iv. Impact on Massachusetts ................................................................................................................................ 12
C.

i.

III.

IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY .................................................................. 15
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.

IV.

IMMIGRANTS IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS......................................................................................................................... 15
INNOVATORS FROM TARGETED COUNTRIES .................................................................................................................... 17
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON PATENT ACTIVITY ............................................................................................................... 18
COMMERCIAL VALUE OF IMMIGRANT PATENTS ............................................................................................................... 19
IMMIGRANTS PATENTING BY FIELD ................................................................................................................................ 19
SPILLOVER EFFECTS ON INNOVATION BY IMMIGRANTS ...................................................................................................... 20
IMPACT OF VISA RESTRICTIONS ON INNOVATION AND PATENTING...................................................................................... 22
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT STUDENTS ON INNOVATION AND PATENTING ................................................................................ 23
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON FIRMS............................................................................................................................... 24
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON PRODUCTIVITY ................................................................................................................... 25
IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY ......................................................................... 28

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON NEW BUSINESS STARTS BY SECTOR ................................................................................. 28
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND IMMIGRATION STATUS, PARTICULARLY IN HIGH-TECH SECTORS ............ 28
i.
Literature Review .............................................................................................................................................. 28
a. Share of Business Founders ......................................................................................................................... 29
b. Business Formation Rate ............................................................................................................................. 30
ii.
Descriptive Tables from Fortune 500 Companies ........................................................................................... 34
iii. Descriptive Tables from Survey of Business Owners, 2007 and 2012 ............................................................ 36
C. IMPACT OF NEW BUSINESSES STARTED BY IMMIGRANTS ................................................................................................... 43
i.
Estimates of Sales, Employment, and Payroll Generated by Immigrant-Owned Firms in 2012 ................... 43
ii.
Regional Differences ......................................................................................................................................... 44
A.
B.

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REGIONAL IMPACT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ........................................................................................... 45
STATE-BY-STATE FACTS FROM THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL .............................................................................. 45
STEM POST-BACCALAUREATE DEGREES BY STATE AND STUDENT U.S. RESIDENCY STATUS ................................................... 51
H-1B VISA AND GREEN CARD APPLICATIONS BY STATE .................................................................................................... 53
NUMBERS AND FRACTION OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS BY U.S. STATE, 2010-2015......................................................... 56
PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF IMMIGRANT POPULATIONS BY STATE, 2005-2015 ................................................................... 60
LEVELS AND PERCENTAGE CHANGES OF PETITIONS FOR SKILLED WORKERS, 2010-2016...................................................... 67
FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANT GENERATION, 2011-2013 ............................................................................................. 71

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
VI.

HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS .................................................................................................................... 76
CHARACTERISTICS OF HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS ........................................................................................................... 76
Education Levels ............................................................................................................................................... 76
Medical Professionals ....................................................................................................................................... 78
B. IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. MILITARY .............................................................................................................................. 80
C. IMMIGRANTS ENROLLED IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................. 82
i.
Degrees Conferred in the U.S. .......................................................................................................................... 83
ii.
Impact of Degrees Conferred in Massachusetts ............................................................................................. 84
iii. Economic Benefits of International Students .................................................................................................. 84

A.

i.
ii.

VII. AWARDS................................................................................................................................................ 86
THE NOBEL PRIZE ....................................................................................................................................................... 87
Nobel Laureates Affiliated with Universities in Massachusetts ..................................................................... 88
B. MACARTHUR FELLOWSHIP........................................................................................................................................... 89
C. RECOGNITIONS IN MEDICINE ........................................................................................................................................ 90
i.
Wolf Prize in Medicine ...................................................................................................................................... 90
ii.
Top Cancer Researchers ................................................................................................................................... 91
iii. Howard Hughes Investigators .......................................................................................................................... 92
D. OTHER PRIZES IN STEM .............................................................................................................................................. 92
i.
Fields Medal ...................................................................................................................................................... 92
ii.
Turing Award .................................................................................................................................................... 94
iii. National Medal of Science ............................................................................................................................... 95
iv. Intel Science Talent Search ............................................................................................................................... 96
v.
Breakthrough Prize ........................................................................................................................................... 98
vi. Simons Investigators ...................................................................................................................................... 100
vii. Blavatnik Awards ............................................................................................................................................ 100
E. MEMBERSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ................................................................................................ 100
F.
MEDAL OF FREEDOM ................................................................................................................................................ 100
G. THE CARNEGIE CORPORATION PRIDE OF AMERICA HONOREES ........................................................................................ 102
A.

i.

VIII. IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND TERRORISM ................................................................................................ 104
PUBLIC OPINION....................................................................................................................................................... 105
IMMIGRATION AND CRIME ......................................................................................................................................... 106
i.
Existing Research Finds No Impact of Immigration on Increasing Crime .................................................... 106
ii.
Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Criminals than Native-Born Individuals ........................................... 110
C. IMMIGRATION AND TERRORISM .................................................................................................................................. 113
A.
B.

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The Link between Immigration and Terrorism is Unclear ............................................................................. 113
Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Radicalized than Native-Born Individuals ........................................ 113
IMMIGRANTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE THE VICTIMS OF HATE CRIME ............................................................................... 115

RHETORIC AND HATE INCIDENTS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS .......................................................................... 118
HATE CRIMES AND BIAS INCIDENTS ............................................................................................................................. 119
ORGANIZED HATE GROUPS ........................................................................................................................................ 120
ANXIETY IN K-12 EDUCATION..................................................................................................................................... 121
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S TWITTER RHETORIC ..................................................................................................................... 121

A.
B.
C.
D.
X.

PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES AND OTHER SELECTED COUNTRIES ............................. 124
OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES .................................................................................................. 124
Department of Homeland Security Data – Summary Tables........................................................................ 126
a. Countries Covered Under Current Travel Ban .......................................................................................... 126
b. Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador ......................................................................................................... 128
B. WHERE IMMIGRANTS MOVE ...................................................................................................................................... 130
i.
Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 130
ii.
Literature Review ............................................................................................................................................ 131
iii. Descriptive Tables from the American Community Survey ........................................................................... 131
iv. Public Opinion on Immigration ...................................................................................................................... 139
C. HOW IMMIGRANTS SPEND THEIR TIME........................................................................................................................ 139
i.
Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 139
ii.
Descriptive Statistics from the 2003-2015 Current Population Survey and American Time Use Survey.... 140
D. APPENDIX: STATISTICS PERTAINING TO IRAQ ................................................................................................................. 143
A.

i.

XI.

THE IMPACT OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON THE U.S. TRAVEL INDUSTRY .............................................................. 145
CHANGES IN TRAVEL DEMAND BEFORE/AFTER TRAVEL BAN ........................................................................................... 145
Flight Search Data .......................................................................................................................................... 145
Flight Booking Data ........................................................................................................................................ 149
Additional Sources .......................................................................................................................................... 151
B. STATISTICS REGARDING TRAVEL AND TOURISM BY IMMIGRANTS ...................................................................................... 153
i.
Air Travel ......................................................................................................................................................... 153
ii.
Tourism Revenue ............................................................................................................................................ 153

A.

i.
ii.
iii.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. The Impact of Immigration on the Tech Industry
The technology industry is a critical driver of the U.S. economy. In Massachusetts alone, nearly
400,000 people work in jobs that are either in the technology sector, or are in technology-related
occupations in other sectors, together comprising about 13 percent of the state's total workforce.
The tech industry is a global enterprise, fueled in large part by immigration and international travel.
As of January 1, 2016, "[i]mmigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America's startup
companies valued at $1 billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product
development teams in over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies." More than half of Silicon
Valley's corporate founders are immigrants.
The integral role that immigrants play in the technology industry is one of job creation, innovation,
and leadership. Far from taking jobs, immigrants are creating jobs for the native-born population and
helping meet the needs of an industry constrained by a lack of skilled workers. By 2020, for example,
projections indicate that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open in the United States,
but domestic universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of those jobs. In
Massachusetts today, there are seventeen technology jobs for every person who graduates with a
college degree in computer science or information technology.
Immigrants are responsible for substantial economic growth. This is true of the U.S. economy where,
in 2015, immigrants contributed $2 trillion to the U.S. GDP, representing 11 percent of the country's
total GDP. It is also true of the Massachusetts economy, where one study found that if half of
Massachusetts' 3,608 advanced level graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) related fields, studying on temporary visas, remained in Massachusetts upon graduation, then
4,726 new jobs would be created for U.S.-born workers by 2021.
Research indicates that immigrant students are disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in
a STEM field – an area of critical domestic talent shortages – and that international students make up
over 30 percent of the post-baccalaureate degrees in STEM fields. Furthermore, individuals from Iran,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen – the six countries subject to the President’s revised
Executive Order – are more likely to have a bachelor's degree, approximately twice as likely to have a
graduate degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree relative to the native-born
population. In addition to this population being disproportionately educated and skilled, they are also
part of a population making immediate impacts on the U.S economy. During the 2015-16 academic
year alone, international students contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more
than 400,000 jobs.

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Immigrants also drive the development of inventions and other useful arts. For example, in 2011, 76
percent of patents awarded to the Top 10 patent-producing U.S. universities had an inventor that was
foreign-born. In recent years, foreign nationals contributed to more than three quarters of patents in
the fields of information technology, molecular and microbiology, and pharmaceuticals. The amount
of invention originating from immigrants can have dramatic effects on innovation, with discernable
spillover effects. One academic study noted that a 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the
overall U.S. population composed of immigrant college graduates, and a 0.7 percentage point
increase in that same share composed of post-graduate immigrants, led to an increase in patenting
by approximately 12 percent to 21 percent. Similarly, as little as a 0.45 percentage point increase in
immigrant scientists and engineers in the overall U.S. population increases patenting per capita by
approximately 13 to 32 percent. High-skilled immigration has an important and discernable impact on
patenting, a key indicator of innovation in the economy.
The highly-educated foreign-born scientists, mathematicians, and engineers also represent some of
the best in the field. Forty percent of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine, and
Physics since 2000 were awarded to immigrants. In 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize
in economics and scientific fields were foreign-born. From 2010-2015, four out of eight American
recipients of the Turing Award (for computing) were first or second generation immigrants. Since
1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal (for mathematics) recipients affiliated with a U.S. research
institution have been foreign-born (and all such recipients have been foreign-born since 2002). Forty
percent of National Medal of Science recipients in math or computer science are foreign-born. In
Massachusetts, 37 percent of Nobel Prize winners associated with MIT are foreign-born; 33 percent
of Nobel Prize winners who are current faculty or alumni at Harvard University are foreign-born; and
75 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with Boston University are foreign-born.
American companies that are household names—Microsoft, McDonald's, U.S. Steel—are led by
foreign-born CEOs. As of 2016, over 10 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.;
the same was true for 14 percent of Fortune 100 CEOs. In 2016, over 40 percent of Fortune 500 firms
were founded either by an immigrant or a child of immigrants. The same holds true in Massachusetts.
More than half of the Massachusetts-based Fortune 500 companies were founded by immigrants, or
by children of immigrants. Their impact on the Massachusetts economy has been significant,
generating over $130 billion in annual revenue, and employing nearly half a million people around the
world. At the beginning of this decade, over 17 percent of all business owners in Massachusetts were
foreign-born. In 2013, the same was true of nearly 19 percent of business owners in the greater
Boston area.
From 2006 to 2010, Massachusetts businesses owned by new immigrants had a total net business
income of $2.8 billion. Prominent American innovators, past and present, hail from countries directly
targeted by the Revised Travel Ban, including Steve Jobs; the co-founder of Apple whose father is
from Syria; Ali Hajimiri, an academic and entrepreneur who holds over 85 U.S. and European patents
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and is from Iran; and Joe Kiani, founder, chairman, and CEO of Masimo who is also from Iran. IranianAmericans either founded or lead mainstays of the technology sector like Twitter, Dropbox, Oracle,
and eBay. Similarly, several of the top venture capitalists who fund new technology companies were
born in Tehran.
The field of medicine has also benefitted greatly from immigrants. More than 25 percent of
physicians practicing in the United States are foreign-born. Importantly, foreign-born physicians are
disproportionately represented in rural clinics and public safety-net hospitals treating isolated and
vulnerable populations. The simple reason for this is that the United States does not produce enough
physicians to keep up with demand. A current deficit of 11,000 physicians is expected to grow as the
population grows and ages. It is estimated that U.S. will face a shortage of up to 94,700 doctors by
2025. Almost a third of the shortage will be primary care physicians. More than 8,400 doctors
working in the U.S. are from Iran and Syria, two of countries listed in the Revised Travel Ban. In
Massachusetts, almost 1 in 4 physicians graduated from a medical school outside of the United
States, suggesting non-U.S. origin.
B. The Implications of the Travel Ban on Innovation and the Economy
Creating unnecessary barriers for foreign innovators and job creators is likely to have an adverse
impact on the technology industry and threaten the innovation capacity and economic prosperity of
the United States in general, and Massachusetts specifically. Indeed, Massachusetts has one of the
highest numbers of applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits in the United States. A
potential impact of the executive order will be the destabilization of the workforce and the reduction
of U.S. competitiveness. Microsoft's public securities filings explain that "[c]hanges to U.S.
immigration policies that restrain the flow of technical and professional talent may inhibit our ability
to adequately staff our research and development efforts."
In addition to stifling recruiting from certain countries, the Revised Travel Ban could accelerate the
rise of technology hubs abroad, making such locales as Vancouver, London, and Singapore more
"attractive alternatives to existing hubs" of technology than the United States, and force companies
based abroad to put off opening offices in the United States. It will also likely result in the relocation
of foreign-born employees from the United States to other counties where they can reside without
fear of a sudden revocation of their rights to access their families and homes.
The Massachusetts technology sector expects to feel this impact acutely. As reported in the press,
numerous Boston-based businesses have expressed grave concerns regarding the Administration's
travel ban and its potential expansion. As Jeff Bussgang, a general partner at the venture capital firm
Flybridge and professor at Harvard Business School stated, the travel ban is "the innovation
economy's worst nightmare." Paul English, founder of the travel booking site Kayak and startup Lola,
expressed concern about a Mexican national hired to develop an app who was worried about

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traveling out of the country to visit his family. Leaders of Massachusetts-headquartered technology
companies from large to small—including GE, TripAdvisor, Carbonite, Brightcove, and Fuze—have
expressed concern over the direct impact that implementation of the original Travel Ban had on their
businesses. This anecdotal evidence is strongly supported by the empirical data contained in this
report: a high percentage of founders, managers, and employees of Massachusetts technology
companies are immigrants and potentially impacted by the Revised Travel Ban, either directly or
indirectly.
The impact of the Revised Travel Ban also inhibits the ability of the Massachusetts technology
industry to compete in the international marketplace. It discourages travel to the U.S. by potential
customers and investors, either because they are directly impacted by the ban, or out of concern that
the ban could be unexpectedly expanded. Indeed, this is not a theoretical concern. Flight bookings to
the United States from January 28, 2017 to February 4, 2017 dropped by 6.5 percent overall in
comparison to the previous year. Bookings to the United States from the six countries targeted by the
Revised Travel Ban have dropped by 80 percent. Companies are already considering moving jobs
outside of the U.S., locating businesses where employees live rather than enticing them to come to
the U.S. Moving these jobs out of the country reduces employment in domestic support jobs that will
be hired in proximity to these workers.
Similarly, the Revised Travel Ban discourages talented foreign students from attending local
educational institutions, from which the technology industry hires many engineers and scientists to
drive innovation in the United States. Foreign-born students already in the U.S. will be less likely to
remain, as they may be unable to receive or renew a visa, or may be fearful of that possibility. The
Revised Travel Ban will inevitably reduce the relative strength of the domestic industry in global
markets.
The technology industry, in Massachusetts as elsewhere, thrives on a culture of diversity, inclusivity,
and equal opportunity. We hope that by compiling this research and highlighting the impact of
immigration on the U.S. and Massachusetts economies, we can productively contribute to the
national conversation and are able to illustrate the significant impact immigrants have on the growth
and prosperity of our nation.

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COST TO BUSINESSES IMPOSED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORDER

One of the primary contributions of immigrants 1 to the United States is as members of the workforce.
From 1996 to 2010, immigrants accounted for roughly half of the U.S. labor force growth. 2 Strikingly,
immigrants have also been leaders in innovation and entrepreneurship, comprising over half of Silicon
Valley founders. 3 The executive order limiting work visas and immigration from select countries, however,
creates significant levels of uncertainty for immigrant workers and their employers and has the potential
to impose substantial costs on firms. The proposed order also increases incentives for firms to outsource
their operations, reducing employment prospects in the United States generally.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

By 2020, it is estimated that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open. However
U.S. universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of these jobs. There are
more than 500,000 open computing jobs, but less than 50,000 Americans graduate from
college with computer-science degrees every year.

•

The tech sector accounts for 20 percent of jobs in Massachusetts. At the same time, there is a
shortage of graduates in tech-related fields; there is one graduate with degrees in computer
science or information technology (IT) for every 17 technology jobs in Massachusetts.

•

In 2014, immigrants comprised 15.6 percent of the population in Massachusetts and 26.6
percent of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (“STEM”) jobs.

•

Almost 1 in 4 physicians in Massachusetts were graduates from a foreign medical school in
2016.

1

Unless otherwise noted, immigrants refer to foreign-born individuals who are residents of the United States.

2

Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny, “Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Working
Paper 1306, September 2013, available at
https://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/papers/2013/wp1306.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 8 (“Although
they make up only 16 percent of U.S. workforce, these immigrants account for a much larger share of its growth. Just over
half of the increase in the U.S. labor force between 1996 and 2010 was the result of immigration—legal and illegal”).

3

Kerr, William, “Why These Business School Professors Oppose Trump's Executive Order on Immigration,” Harvard Business
School Working Knowledge, January 31, 2017, available at http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-these-business-schoolprofessors-oppose-trump-s-executive-order-on-immigration, accessed March 25, 2017.

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Almost 60 percent of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by
immigrants or their children 4 and almost 20 percent of business owners in the Boston
metropolitan area were foreign-born.

C. Demand for H-1B Workers
•

The private sector accounts for the intensity of demand for H1-B workers:
o

o

•

Top H1-B demands are from firms such as Wal-Mart, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse,
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 5
Nearly two thirds of requests for H1-B visas are in STEM occupations with lower
percentages of workers contributing to the healthcare, business, finance, and life
sciences industries. 6

H1-B petitions approved in 2012, by detailed industry 7 (number of petitions; percent of approved
H1-B Petitions):
o

Computer Systems Design & Related Services (110,414; 42 percent)

o

Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools (16,167; 6.2 percent)

o

Software Publishers (5,367; 2.0 percent)

o

Management, Scientific, & Technical Consulting Services (4,915; 1.9 percent)

o

General Medical and Surgical Hospitals (4,533; 1.7 percent)

4

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 3.

5

“The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy,” American Immigration
Council, April 1, 2016, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/h1b-visa-program-fact-sheet,
accessed March 25, 2017.

6

“The H-1B Visa Program: A Primer on the Program and Its Impact on Jobs, Wages, and the Economy,” American Immigration
Council, April 1, 2016, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/h1b-visa-program-fact-sheet,
accessed March 25, 2017.

7

“Characteristics of H1B Specialty Occupation Workers: Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Report to Congress,” U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, June 26, 2013, available at
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/H-1B/h1b-fy-12-characteristics.pdf,
accessed March 25, 2017, p. 20 and Table 13A. Percent calculated as number of petitions in industry divided by total
number of petitions.

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Two thirds of foreign students pursue bachelor or higher level degrees in STEM, business,
management, and marketing fields in the United States as compared to 48 percent of Americanborn students. 8

i.
o

Massachusetts-Specific Facts
Boston is the city with the 6th highest number of H-1B visa sponsored MBAs. 9

D. The Role of Immigrants in the Tech Industry
•

The U.S. relies heavily on a steady stream of skilled engineers from other countries to help create
its products, as indicated by the number of H1-B petitions approved in related sectors. 10

•

The U.S. does not produce enough professionals to fill all open high-tech jobs:
o

•

There are almost five open positions for every software developer looking for work 11

By 2020, it is estimated that 1.4 million computer specialist positions will be open, however U.S.
universities will only produce enough graduates to fill 29 percent of these jobs. 12 There are more
than 500,000 open computing jobs, but less than 50,000 Americans graduate from college with
computer-science degrees every year. 13

8

Ruiz, Neil G. “The Geography of Foreign Students in U.S. Higher Education: Origins and Destinations,” Global Cities Initiative:
A Joint Project of Brookings and JPMorgan Chase, August 2014, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/Foreign_Students_Final.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 1.

9

Allen, Nathan, “Where MBAs Are Most Likely to Get an H1B Visa,” Poets & Quants, March 1, 2017, available at
http://poetsandquants.com/2017/03/01/mbas-likely-get-h1b-visa/, accessed March 10, 2017. This statistic is calculated
using data from the 13,000 users of the website https://www.transparentcareer.com/. According to Sheryle Dirks, Associate
Dean of Career Management at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, “Transparent’s data looks entirely
consistent with what we have seen and known to be true, specifically at Duke Fuqua over the past few years anecdotally, as
well as talking with our other business school counterparts.”

10

Wingfield, Nick and Mike Isaac, “Tech Industry Frets over Possible Immigration Changes,” The New York Times, January 27,
2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/business/technology-h-1b-visa-immigration.html, accessed March
25, 2017.

11

Koetsier, John, “Hiring and Hirable in 2013: Agile Developers,” VentureBeat, December 31, 2012, available at
https://venturebeat.com/2012/12/31/hiring-and-hirable-in-2013-agile-developers/, accessed March 27, 2017 (“…4.59 job
postings for each and every job-seeking agile developer.”). The statistic is calculated by talent discovery company Yoh and
jobs site CareerBuilder.

12

Nager, Adams and Robert D. Atkinson, “The Case for Improving U.S. Computer Science Education,” May 2016, available at
http://www2.itif.org/2016-computer-science-education.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 3 (“In 2011, Code.org projected
that the economy would add 1.4 million computing jobs by 2020, but educate just 400,000 computer science students by
then”). The statistics were calculated by the authors using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Code.org, Change the
Equation, and the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.

13

“Summary of Source Data for Code.org Infographics and Stats,” Code.org, 2015, available at
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1gySkItxiJn_vwb8HIIKNXqen184mRtzDX12cux0ZgZk/pub, accessed March 27, 2017

7

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June 2017

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

•

“Iranian-Americans founded or hold leadership positions at Twitter, Dropbox, Oracle, Expedia,
eBay, and Tinder. Top venture capitalists like Shervin Pishevar, Pejman Nozad, and brothers Ali
and Hadi Partovi, all of whom invest millions of dollars in technology startups, were born in
Tehran.” 14

•

“Immigrant founded engineering and technology firms employed approximately 560,000 workers
and generated $63 billion in sales in 2012. Immigrant founders from top venture-backed firms
have created an average of approximately 150 jobs per company in the United States.” 15

•

“In the United States as a whole, there are almost as many immigrants in white-collar jobs (46
percent) as in all other occupations combined.”
o

i.
o

“In some states, more than half [of immigrants] are in white-collar jobs… the perception
that nearly all immigrants work in low-wage jobs is clearly inaccurate.” 16

Massachusetts-Specific Facts
The tech sector is critical to the state’s economy. More than 294,000 people work
directly for the technology sectors in Massachusetts, which combined with over 96,000
tech occupations in other sectors and over 733,000 indirect jobs supported by the tech
sector, comprise approximately 35 percent of the workforce in Massachusetts. 17
Together, tech is responsible for 31% of Massachusetts Gross State Product. 18

(“…there were 580,940 bachelor’s degrees earned in STEM in 2015, and only 49,291 of those—8.48%—were in Computer
Science…There are more than 500,000 open computing jobs in the United States.”). The number of current open computing
jobs comes from the sum of the per-state jobs data from The Conference Board’s Help Wanted OnLine service. The number
of STEM and Computer Science graduates comes from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) IPEDS
Completions Survey, obtained using the National Science Foundation (NSF) WebCASPAR tool.
14

Waddell, Kaveh, “How Trump’s Immigration Rules Will Hurt the U.S. Tech Sector,” The Atlantic, February 1, 2017, available
at https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/how-trumps-immigration-rules-will-hurt-the-us-techsector/515202/, accessed March 11, 2017.

15

Stangler, Dane and Jason Wiens, “The Economic Case for Welcoming Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Kauffman Foundation,
September 8, 2015, available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/theeconomic-case-for-welcoming-immigrant-entrepreneurs, accessed March 25, 2017.

16

Costa, Daniel, David Cooper, and Heidi Shierholz, “Facts About Immigration and the U.S. Economy,” Economic Policy
Institute, August 12, 2014, available at http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-facts/, accessed March 25, 2017.

17

MassTLC, “The Connected Commonwealth: How the Massachusetts Tech Ecosystem is Creating New Growth
Opportunities,” 2016, available at http://www.masstlc.org/2016-state-of-technology-report/, accessed April 25, 2017, p. 14.

18

MassTLC, “The Connected Commonwealth: How the Massachusetts Tech Ecosystem is Creating New Growth
Opportunities,” 2016, available at http://www.masstlc.org/2016-state-of-technology-report/, accessed April 25, 2017, p. 15.

8

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

Put together, their output was worth $160 billion in 2013, the most recent year for which
statistics were available.” 19

o

“In the red-hot Massachusetts technology field, meanwhile, there are 17 jobs for every
one graduate with a degree in computer science or IT.” 20

o

In 2014, immigrants comprised 15.6 percent of the population in Massachusetts and 26.6
percent of STEM jobs. 21

o

“If half of Massachusetts’ 3,608 advanced level STEM grads on temporary visas stayed in
the state after graduation…4,726 jobs for U.S.-born workers would be created by
2021.” 22

E. The Role of Immigrants in Medicine
•

More than 25 percent of physicians practicing in the United States are foreign-born. 23 Foreignborn physicians are disproportionally represented in rural clinics and public safety-net hospitals
treating isolated and vulnerable populations. 24

•

The reason such doctors are in the U.S. in the first place is that America does not produce enough
physicians to keep up with demand. According to a report published by the Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC) in 2016, a current deficit of 8,200 primary care doctors and
2,800 psychiatrists is expected to grow as the population grows and ages. 25 The AAMC estimates

19

Adams, Dan, “Mass. Tech Sector Flourishing with Challenges Ahead,” Boston Globe, March 13, 2015, available at
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/03/12/report-mass-tech-sector-flourishing-but-challengesahead/BMzslVy0k1zB4cZVSH6DrK/story.html, accessed March 10, 2017.

20

“The Degree Gap: Honing in on College Access, Affordability and Completion in Massachusetts,” The Vision Project, June
2016, available at http://www.mass.edu/visionproject/_documents/2016%20The%20Degree%20Gap%20%20Vision%20Project%20Annual%20Report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 14.

21

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 13.

22

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 11, 2017, p. 14.

23

McCabe, Kristen, “Foreign-Born Health Care Workers in the United States,” Migration Policy Institute, June 27, 2012,
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/foreign-born-health-care-workers-united-states#4, accessed March 10,
2017 (“Of the roughly 853,000 health care professionals employed as physicians and surgeons in 2010, more than onequarter (27 percent) were foreign born.”).

24

Ross, Casey, and Max Blau, “US health care relies heavily on foreign workers. Trump's immigration ban is raising alarms,”
STAT, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.statnews.com/2017/01/30/trump-immigration-ban-health-workers/,
accessed March 10, 2017.

25

Dall, Tim, Terry West, Ritashree Chakrabarti, and Will Iacobucci, “The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand:
Projections from 2014 to 2025,” IHS Inc. and the Association of American Medical Colleges, April 5, 2016, available at
https://www.aamc.org/download/458082/data/2016_complexities_of_supply_and_demand_projections.pdf, accessed
March 11, 2017, p. 36.

9

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June 2017

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

that the U.S. will face a shortage of up to 94,700 doctors by 2025. Almost a third of the shortage
will be primary care physicians. 26 More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from the two
countries listed in the executive order – Syria and Iran. 27
o

o
•

The share of health care workers that are foreign-born was 5 percent in the 1960s and
was as high as 30 percent by the 1990s. 28
Healthcare has the largest percentage of foreign-born and foreign-trained workers of any
industry in the country. 29

Data on older Medicare patients admitted to hospital in the U.S. showed that patients treated by
graduates of foreign medical programs had lower mortality than patients cared for by U.S.
graduates. 30

i.
o

Massachusetts-Specific Facts
“This year’s Boston Business Journal list of the 50 largest employers in Massachusetts,
which excludes government jobs, totals more than 410,000 Bay State employees. Led by
No. 1-ranked Partners Health Care System’s 67,600 Massachusetts employees, the 13
health care companies on the list alone comprise more than 172,366 (in some cases this
includes per diem and temp workers) of those employees.” 31

26

Dall, Tim, Terry West, Ritashree Chakrabarti, and Will Iacobucci, “The Complexities of Physician Supply and Demand:
Projections from 2014 to 2025,” IHS Inc. and the Association of American Medical Colleges, April 5, 2016, available at
https://www.aamc.org/download/458082/data/2016_complexities_of_supply_and_demand_projections.pdf, accessed
March 11, 2017, p. 37, Exhibit 22.

27

Yasmin, Seema, “Trump Immigration Ban Can Worsen U.S. Doctor Shortage, Hurt Hospitals,” Scientific American, February 1,
2017, available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/trump-immigration-ban-can-worsen-u-s-doctor-shortagehurt-hospitals/, accessed March 10, 2017 (“More than 8,400 doctors working in the U.S. are from two countries listed in the
executive order—Syria and Iran—according to data from the American Medical Association.”).

28

Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, Artem Gulish, and Bennett H. Beach, “Healthcare Executive Summary,” Georgetown
Public Policy Institute Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2012, available at https://cew.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Healthcare.ExecutiveSummary.090712.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 12.

29

Carnevale, Anthony P., Nicole Smith, Artem Gulish, and Bennett H. Beach, “Healthcare Executive Summary,” Georgetown
Public Policy Institute Center on Education and the Workforce, June 2012, available at https://cew.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/Healthcare.ExecutiveSummary.090712.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 12 (“Healthcare has
largest proportion of foreign-born and foreign-trained workers in the country. Foreign-born workers make up nearly a
quarter (22 percent) of the healthcare workforce, nearly twice the national average.”).

30

Tsugawa, Yusuke, Anupam B. Jena, E. John Orav, and Ashish K. Jha, “Quality of Care Delivered by General Internists in US
Hospitals Who Graduated from Foreign versus US Medical Schools: Observational Study,” BMJ 356:j273, February 3, 2017,
available at http://www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j273, accessed March 25, 2017.

31

“The List: Health Care, Higher Ed Dominate Bay State’s Largest Employers,” Boston Business Journal, July 8, 2016, available
at http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/news/2016/07/08/the-list-health-care-higher-ed-dominate-bay-state.html, accessed
March 25, 2017.

10

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June 2017

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

“In 2016 almost 1 in 4 physicians in Massachusetts graduated from a foreign medical
school, a likely sign they were born elsewhere.” 32

F. Impact of Visa Restrictions on American Employers

i.

Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on Risk and Instability of American Workforces

•

According to Microsoft, “[c]hanges to U.S. immigration policies that restrain the flow of technical
and professional talent may inhibit our ability to adequately staff our research and development
efforts.” 33

•

The Computing Research Association, a non-profit organization representing computing
professionals in academia, government laboratories, and other areas, noted that the proposed
order “creates uncertainty and potential hardship among current students and researchers
already here making important contributions and endangers our leadership role in a key field.” 34

ii.

Potential Impact of the Proposed Order on the Competitiveness of U.S. Firms

•

The proposed executive order could accelerate the rise of technology hubs abroad. Vancouver,
London, and Singapore are “attractive alternatives to existing hubs in the West Coast of the
United States.” 35

•

Companies that are based abroad may put off opening offices in the United States:
o

“Already, the number of billion-dollar technology start-ups, commonly called ‘unicorns,’
that are located outside the United States has been increasing significantly. Fifteen years
ago, almost all were in the United States, while today 86 of the 191 unicorns are in
countries such as China and India. We can expect this trend to accelerate because the

32

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 15.

33

Microsoft Corporation, Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ending December 31, 2016, available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/789019/000119312516441821/d15167d10q.htm, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 58.

34

Wingfield, Nick and Mike Isaac, “Tech Industry Frets Over Possible Immigration Changes,” The New York Times, January 27,
2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/business/technology-h-1b-visa-immigration.html, accessed March
25, 2017.

35

Waddell, Kaveh, “How Trump’s Immigration Rules Will Hurt the U.S. Tech Sector,” The Atlantic, February 1, 2017, available
at https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/02/how-trumps-immigration-rules-will-hurt-the-us-techsector/515202/, accessed March 11, 2017.

11

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Trump administration has just added fuel to the fire of innovation abroad and
handicapped our own technology industry.” 36
•

“In fiscal year 2012, fewer than 5% of those who obtained U.S. permanent resident status were
professionals with advanced degrees, compared to over 9% of those granted permanent resident
status in Canada…Only 14% of U.S. green cards authorizing permanent residence – and a path to
citizenship – were granted for employment purposes in 2012, compared to the 62% of Canadian
immigrants who were admitted for economic reasons….Immigrants want to come to the United
States because they see opportunity in gaps in our economy that they have the skills to fill.
Instead, many are choosing Canada.” 37

iii.

Outsourcing

•

Research points to an inverse relationship between temporary immigration and product
outsourcing. When the number of H-1B visas issued by the U.S. government decreases, product
outsourcing increases. 38

•

Economic research on the effects of outsourcing on blue-collar and white-collar wages finds that
outsourcing can decrease the wage of native-born white-collar workers when outsourcing
industries are blue-collar worker intensive compared with non-outsourcing industries. 39 Using
U.S. product manufacturing data, outsourcing has been found to decrease the relative wage of
white-collar workers in the 1970s. 40

iv.
•

Impact on Massachusetts

According to Jerry Rubin, president of the Jewish Vocational Service, many key industries in
Boston, such as health care and food services, have labor shortages. “[With] the native-born

36

Wadhwa, Vivek, “Why Trump’s Travel Ban Is So Harmful to the Tech Economy,” The Washington Post, January 30, 2017,
available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/01/30/why-trumps-travel-ban-is-so-harmful-tothe-tech-economy/?utm_term=.54c1ef2a182a, accessed March 27, 2017.

37

Furchtgott-Roth, Diana, “U.S. Loses to Canada When It Comes to Immigration,” MarketWatch, October 18, 2013, available
at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/in-immigration-us-loses-out-to-canada-2013-10-18, accessed March 25, 2017.

38

Das, Simontini, Ajitava Raychaudhuri, and Saikat Sinha Roy, “Immigration versus Outsourcing: A Developing Country’s View,”
Journal of Economic Development, 37:2, June 2012, available at http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/37-2/5.pdf, accessed April 14,
2017, pp. 129-131.

39

Hsu, Kuang-Chung, “Does Outsourcing Always Benefit Skilled Labor?” Review of International Economics, 19:3, August 2011,
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00964.x/epdf, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 539554.

40

Hsu, Kuang-Chung, and Hui-Chu Chiang, “The Impact of International Outsourcing on U.S. Workers’ Wages: Rethinking the
Role of Innovation,” International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6:5, April 25, 2014, available at
http://ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/ijef/article/view/33719/20417, accessed April 14, 2017, p. 1.

12

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June 2017

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

population remaining relatively flat, the demand for bilingual workers soaring, and a large
number of workers reaching retirement age, immigrants are essential to keep the economy from
‘grinding to a screeching halt.’” 41
•

Immigration is a key source of growth for Boston’s labor supply. Between 1980 and 2010, the
number of foreign-born workers in Boston has tripled, while the number of native-born workers
grew by 4 percent. 42 In 2015, 32 percent of working age people moving into the Boston area
were immigrants who moved directly from abroad. 43

•

“3,806 H-1B denials for tech workers in the metro area cost computer workers [in Boston in
2007 and 2008 cost] 3,176 potential new jobs and $72.9M in aggregate wage growth in the two
years that followed. 964 H-1B denials for tech workers in the metro area cost computer workers
[in Worcester in 2007 and 2008 cost] 761 potential new jobs and $14.7M in aggregate wage
growth in the two years that followed.” 44

•

“58% of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by immigrants or their
children. Those firms generate $136.8B in annual revenue, and employ 466,892 people
globally.” 45

•

In 2010, 17.9% of all business owners in Massachusetts were foreign-born. 46

•

In 2013, 18.8% of business owners in the Boston metropolitan area were foreign-born. 47

41

Johnston, Katie. “MIT Study: Immigrants Vital to Boston’s Economy,” Boston Globe, May 17, 2017, available at
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/17/mit-study-immigrants-vital-bostoneconomy/l9PszENhVRsffVWvQVa1yO/story.html, accessed May 17, 2017.

42

Johnston, Katie. “MIT Study: Immigrants Vital to Boston’s Economy,” Boston Globe, May 17, 2017, available at
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/17/mit-study-immigrants-vital-bostoneconomy/l9PszENhVRsffVWvQVa1yO/story.html, accessed May 17, 2017. This statistic was provided by Marilynn Johnson,
author of “The New Bostonians: How Immigrants Have Transformed the Metro Area since the 1960s.”

43

Osterman, Paul, William Kimball, and Christine Riordan, “Boston’s Immigrants: An Essential Component of a Strong
Economy,” Jewish Vocational Service, May 10, 2017, available at https://jvsboston.org/images/pdf/Osterman%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf, accessed May 22, 2017, p. 7 and Table 5. This statistic was
calculated using American Community Survey data.

44

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 25, 2017, p. 21.

45

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 3
(“58% of Fortune 500 companies based in Massachusetts were founded by immigrants or their children. Those firms
generate $136.8B in annual revenue, and employ 466,892 people globally”).

46

Kallick, David Dyssegaard, “Immigrant Small Business Owners: A Significant and Growing Part of the Economy,” Fiscal Policy
Institute, June 2012, available at http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/immigrant-small-business-owners-FPI-20120614.pdf, accessed
March 10, 2017, p. 24 and Figure 24.

47

“Interactive: the Impact of Immigrants on Main Street Business and Population in U.S. Metro Areas,” Fiscal Policy Institute
and Americas Society/Council of the Americas, January 14, 2015, available at http://www.as-coa.org/articles/interactive-

13

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June 2017

•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

From 2006 to 2010, new immigrant business owners in Massachusetts had total net business
income of $2.8 billion, which makes up 14% of all net business income in the state. 48

impact-immigrants-main-street-business-and-population-us-metro-areas, accessed March 10, 2017. The “Foreign Born
Share of Business Owners” from the American Community Survey 2013 5-Year Data is 18.8% for the Boston-CambridgeQuincy, MA-NH Metropolitan Statistical Area.
48

Fairlie, Robert W., “Open for Business: How Immigrants are Driving Small Business Creation in the United States,”
Partnership for a New American Economy, August 2012, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/openforbusiness.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 33. This
statistic was calculated using data from the American Community Survey, 2006-2010.

14

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June 2017

III.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON INNOVATION AND PRODUCTIVITY

Academic and industry research have shown that immigration has a positive impact on innovation,
productivity, and leadership.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

Many iconic American brands are led by foreign-born CEOs. As of March 1, 2016, 10.8 percent
of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S, and 14 percent of Fortune 100 CEOs were
born outside of the U.S.

•

More than half of America’s startup companies valued at $1 billion dollars have immigrant
founders, and many key members of management or product development teams in these
startups are immigrants.

•

Many prominent American innovators, past and present, hail from countries directly targeted
by the Executive Order. These individuals include Steve Jobs, Ali Hajimiri, and Joe Kiani.

•

Academic research shows that there is a positive spillover effect of immigrant inventors and
college graduates on native-born inventors, indicating that immigrants boost the rate at which
native-born inventors file patents.

•

Innovation from the native-born population increases with expansions of the H-1B program
and the associated inflow of new workers.

•

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2013 that immigration reform that allows
for an increase in the number of noncitizens who could lawfully enter the United States
permanently or temporarily would boost real GDP by 5.4 percent by 2033, and add 9 million
workers to the labor force.

A. Immigrants in Leadership Positions
•

“Some of the most iconic American brands – such as Microsoft, McDonald’s and U.S. Steel – are
led by foreign-born CEOs.” 49
o

As of March 1, 2016, “10.8% of Fortune 500 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.” 50

49

“Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.

50

“Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.

15

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June 2017

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

As of March 1, 2016, “14.0% of Fortune 100 CEOs were born outside of the U.S.” 51

•

“Immigrants have started more than half (44 of 87) of America’s startup companies valued at $1
billion dollars or more and are key members of management or product development teams in
over 70 percent (62 of 87) of these companies.” 52

•

Immigrants are entrepreneurial and are job creators.
o

Immigrants were nearly twice as likely to start new businesses as the native-born
population as of 2015. 53


In 2014, 20.6% of entrepreneurs in the U.S. were immigrants, while making up
only 13.2% of the U.S. population. 54



Immigrants accounted for about a quarter of founders of new high-tech
companies with at least one million dollars in sales in 2006. 55



In Massachusetts, 29% of new high-tech companies with at least one million
dollars in sales in 2006 had at least one key founder who was foreign-born. 56

51

“Immigrant CEOs of the Fortune 500,” Boardroom Insiders, 2016, available at http://info.boardroominsiders.com/get-ourfortune-500-immigrant-ceo-list-for-free, accessed February 22, 2017.

52

Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrants and Billion Dollar Startups,” National Foundation for American Policy, March 2016, available
at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Immigrants-and-Billion-Dollar-Startups.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March-2016.pdf,
accessed March 10, 2017, p. 1 and Appendix 5. The article examines a list of billion dollar startups tracked by The Wall Street
Journal available at http://graphics.wsj.com/billion-dollar-club/. The article also uses a mixture of company-provided
information, company websites, CrunchBase, LinkedIn, and The Wall Street Journal to calculate the percent of immigrants
who are key members of management or product development teams. For more information, see Appendix 5 of the cited
article.

53

“Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 1.
This study was conducted using the 2013 American Community Survey 5-year data. See Kallick, David, “Bringing Vitality to
Main Street: How Immigrant Small Businesses Help Local Economies Grow,” Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas
Society/Council of the Americas, 2015, available at http://www.as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ImmigrantBusinessReport.pdf,
accessed March 21, 2017.

54

“Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.

55

Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Part I,” Technical Report 23, Duke Science, Technology
Innovation Papers, January 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed
March 10, 2017, p.4. The authors used information provided by Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, which contains
information on U.S. companies with more than $1 million in sales, and 20 or more employees, and company branches with
50 or more employees.

56

Wadhwa, Vivek, et al., “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Part I,” Technical Report 23, Duke Science, Technology
Innovation Papers, January 2007, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed
March 10, 2017, p.4. The authors used information provided by Dun & Bradstreet’s Million Dollar Database, which contains
information on U.S. companies with more than $1 million in sales, and 20 or more employees, and company branches with
50 or more employees.

16

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

In 2016, 40.2% of Fortune 500 firms were founded by either an immigrant or the child of
immigrants. 57

o

Businesses owned by immigrants employed over 5.9 million workers in 2007. 58

B. Innovators from Targeted Countries
•

Many prominent American innovators hail from countries directly targeted by the Executive
Order. For example,
o Steve Jobs (Syria), whose father, Abdul Fattah Jandali, was born in Homs, Syria, and
immigrated to the United States to study in the 1950s. 59 Jobs is a co-founder of Apple.
o Ali Hajimiri (Iran), an academic, entrepreneur, and Fellow at the National Academy of
Inventors, holds over 85 U.S. and European patents. Hajimiri is known for his research in
“electronics and photonics integrated circuits, and their applications in various
disciplines, including high-frequency and high-speed communications, sensing, imaging,
and bio-sensing.” In 2002, Hajimiri co-founded Axiom Microdevices. 60
o Joe Kiani (Iran), who is the founder, chairman, and CEO of Masimo Corporation has more
than 575 issued and pending patents worldwide. Kiani is prominent in the healthcare
technology industry, especially technology relating to sensors, signal processing, and
patient monitoring devices. Kiani’s company Masimo Corporation pioneered products
such as “Masimo Patient SafetyNetTM – the first remote monitoring and wireless clinician
notification system designed to help hospitals improve patient safety and clinical
outcomes by dramatically decreasing rescue events and costly ICU transfers.” 61

57

“Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.

58

“Reason for Reform: Entrepreneurship,” New American Economy, October 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Entrepreneur.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 2.

59

Baig, Edward C, “Steve Jobs' biological father was Syrian migrant, some note,” USA Today, November 16, 2015, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2015/11/16/steve-jobs-biological-father-syrian-migrant-somenote/75899450/, accessed March 19, 2017.

60

“Ali Hajimiri,” Caltech High-Speed Integrated Circuits, available at http://chic.caltech.edu/hajimiri/, accessed March 19,
2017.

61

“Company Overview of Masimo Corporation,” Bloomberg, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=541010&privcapId=31167, accessed March 19,
2017.

17

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

C. Impact of Immigrants on Patent Activity
•

Immigrants have a higher patenting rate than native-born individuals. 62
o

“Massachusetts’ immigrants also contribute to the state’s economic growth and
competitiveness by earning patents on cutting-edge research and products. In 2011,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) earned [i.e., granted] almost 168 patents,
placing it among the top 10 most productive [universities] in the country. More than 72
percent of those patents had at least one foreign-born inventor.” 63

o

At MIT, “the rate of patenting is higher for foreign-born students (34 percent) than for
U.S.-born students (30 percent).” 64

o

“…immigrants comprise a large and vital component of U.S. innovation with 35.5 percent
of U.S. innovators born outside the United States.” 65 “Another 10 percent of innovators
have at least one parent born abroad.” 66

o

“Over 17 percent of innovators are not even U.S. citizens, yet are nonetheless making
invaluable contributions to U.S. innovation. Immigrants born in Europe or Asia are over
five times more likely to have created an innovation in America than the average nativeborn U.S. citizen.” 67

62

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?,” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 37. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.

63

“The Contribution of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 22, 2017, p. 14.
The article uses data from a publication from the same organization. See Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing
the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June 2012, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf.

64

Granados, Samuel, “How Today’s Visa Restrictions Might Impact Tomorrow’s America,” The Washington Post, February 21,
2017, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/visas-impact/, accessed March 10, 2017, p.11.

65

In their study, ITIF “surveyed more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technologyintensive industries as award-winning innovators and international patent applicants.” Nager, Adams et al., “The
Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, February 2016,
available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-of-innovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922,
accessed March 10, 2017, p. 5.

66

Nager, Adams et al., “The Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, February 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-ofinnovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922, accessed March 10, 2017, pp. 1, 5. In their study, ITIF
“surveyed more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technology-intensive industries
as award-winning innovators and international patent applicants.”

67

Nager, Adams et al., “The Demographics of Innovation in the United States,” Information Technology & Innovation
Foundation, February 2016, available at http://www2.itif.org/2016-demographics-ofinnovation.pdf?_ga=1.211995860.1949709181.1488476922, accessed March 10, 2017, p. 5. In their study, ITIF “surveyed
more than 900 people who have made meaningful, marketable contributions to technology-intensive industries as awardwinning innovators and international patent applicants.”

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

•

“At the University of Illinois, for instance, nine out of 10 of the patents had at least one
foreign national listed as an inventor, and almost 64% of patents had a foreign inventor
who was not yet in a professorial role. This was despite the fact that in the fall of 2011,
fewer than 47% of the graduate students studying STEM on Illinois’s two patentproducing campuses were in the U.S. on temporary visas.” 68

In 2011, 76% of patents awarded to the Top 10 patent-producing U.S. universities had an
inventor that was foreign-born. 69

D. Commercial Value of Immigrant Patents
•

Immigrants’ contributions to innovation as measured by patent activity have also had a direct
positive impact on university revenue, as demonstrated by how the top 10 U.S. patent-producing
universities earned nearly $450 million in patent licensure revenue in FY 2010. 70

•

Patents filed by immigrants are more likely to be licensed or commercialized as compared to
patents filed by native-born inventors, and patents that are licensed or commercialized are more
likely to be beneficial to society. 71

E. Immigrants Patenting by Field
•

“Foreign nationals were listed as inventors on more than five out of six (84%) informationtechnology patents.” 72

68

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,
p. 7. The study pulled data on graduate students enrolled in each major to conduct calculations. The data were obtained
from University of Illinois at Chicago, Office of Institutional Research.

69

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,
p. 1. The study relies on data on patent assignees available from Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/. In most cases, when applying for a patent,
inventors submit an oath or power of attorney form on which they indicate their citizenship. The study accessed these
forms through the publicly-available Patent Application Information Retrieval, available at
http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair.

70

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,
p. 12. These figures were calculated using the results of the annual licensing survey from the Association of University
Technology Managers.

71

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle, “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?,” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 37. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.

72

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

•

“Almost eight out of ten (79%) patents for pharmaceutical drugs or drug compounds were
invented or co-invented by a scientist born abroad.” 73

•

“Immigrants contributed to 75% of patents in the molecular biology and microbiology fields.” 74

•

Immigrants make significant contributions to the Science, Technology, Engineering, and
Mathematics (“STEM”) fields.
o

99% of the patents from the top 10 patent-generating universities by foreign-born
inventors were in STEM fields, an area that will have a shortfall of 230,000 qualified
advanced-degree workers by the year 2018. 75

o

As an added benefit, “[e]very graduate with an advanced degree working in a STEMrelated field in the United States has been shown to create on average 2.62 additional
jobs for native-born workers. Sending those people away doesn’t protect American jobs,
it jeopardizes them.” 76

F. Spillover Effects on Innovation by Immigrants
•

Academic research shows that there is a positive spillover effect of immigrant inventors on
native-born inventors, indicating that immigrants boost the rate at which native-born inventors
file patents. 77

p. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the US Patent and
Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm.
73

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,
p. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database and the publically available Patent
Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) website, both of which are maintained by the US Patent and Trademark Office,
available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm, and http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/PublicPair.

74

“Patent Pending: How Immigrants are Reinventing the American Economy,” Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2012, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/patent-pending.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017,
p. 11. This statistic is based on data from the Patent Full-Text and Image Database maintained by the US Patent and
Trademark Office, available at http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm.

75

“Press Release: New Study Reveals Immigrants Are Behind More Than Three-Quarters of Patents From Top Ten PatentProducing American Universities,” New American Economy, June 26, 2012, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/news/press-release-new-study-reveals-immigrants-behind-three-quarters-patents-topten-patent-producing-american-universities/, accessed March 10, 2017.

76

“Press Release: New Study Reveals Immigrants Are Behind More Than Three-Quarters of Patents From Top Ten PatentProducing American Universities,” New American Economy, June 26, 2012, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/news/press-release-new-study-reveals-immigrants-behind-three-quarters-patents-topten-patent-producing-american-universities/, accessed March 10, 2017.

77

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed
March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

“The 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the population composed of
immigrant college graduates, and the 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of postcollege immigrants,” each increased patenting per capita in the U.S. by 12 to 21
percent. 78

o

A 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers in the U.S.
increased patenting per capita in the U.S. by 13 to 32 percent. 79

o

“Immigration could boost innovation indirectly through positive spillovers on fellow
researchers, the achievement of critical mass in specialized research areas, and the
provision of complementary skills such as management and entrepreneurship.” 80

o

The same positive spillover effect on patenting created through immigration may not be
replicable by incentivizing the native-born population alone. 81

o

There is also support for small crowding-in effects on native-born patenting from
immigration due to H-1B expansions. 82

78

Specifically, “The 1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the population composed of immigrant college graduates,
and the 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of post-college immigrants, each increased patenting per capita by about
12 percent based on least squares and 21 percent based on instrumental variables.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine
Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2,
no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data
from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.

79

Specifically, “The 0.45 percentage point increase in immigrant scientists and engineers increased patenting per capita by
about 13 percent based on least squares and 32 percent based on instrumental variables.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine
Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2,
no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 51. This is based on data
from the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates.

80

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 31.

81

Specifically, “One should be cautious in drawing the conclusion that innovation could be sustained by simultaneously
subsidizing natives to study science and engineering and cutting immigration of scientists and engineers. The additional
natives drawn into science and engineering might have lower inventive ability than the excluded immigrants, and such
natives might have contributed more to the US economy outside science and engineering.” Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine
Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2,
no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 52.

82

“Overall, a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 0.3%–0.7% increase in total invention for each standard
deviation growth in city dependency [upon the H-1B program].” Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of
Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508,
available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 475. This analysis was based on data from
the Current Population Survey, in addition to patent records from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

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•

Additionally, there is evidence that native-born inventors’ patents were not displaced by
immigrants that were admitted as a result of expansions in the H-1B visa program. 83

•

Moser et al conclude that German Jewish emigres who fled Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s
increased patenting in the United States by 31 percent. 84
o

Inventor-level data suggest that this increase in patenting can be attributed to emigrants
attracting U.S. inventors to their fields. 85

o

Data also indicate that the number of patents filed by native-born inventors who
collaborated with immigrant professors increased substantially in the 1940s and 1950s,
suggesting that “emigre professors helped to increase U.S. invention in the long run, by
training a new group of younger US invention in the long run, who then continued to
train other scientists.” 86

G. Impact of Visa Restrictions on Innovation and Patenting
•

Increases in high-skilled immigration due to expansions of the H-1B visa program are associated
with higher levels of patent contributions from immigrants.
o

“Total [science and engineering] employment and [the number of] invention [in the U.S.]
increases with higher [H-1B] admissions”. 87

83

Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.”
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed
March 10, 2017, p. 475. This analysis was based on data from the Current Population Survey, in addition to patent records
from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.

84

Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp.
3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3222. This conclusion is drawn from
an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to
faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.

85

Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp.
3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3222. This conclusion is drawn from
an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to
faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.

86

Moser, Petra, et al. “German Jewish Émigrés and U.S. Invention.” The American Economic Review, vol. 104, no. 10, 2014, pp.
3222–3255, available at www.jstor.org/stable/43495318, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3253. This conclusion is drawn from
an analysis of patent records available through Google Patents, available at https://patents.google.com, in addition to
faculty directories at German and Austrian universities, among other sources.

87

Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.”
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed
March 5, 2017, p. 473.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

o

Innovation from the native-born population also increases with expansions of the H-1B
program and the associated inflow of new workers. 88

o

Firms that employ H-1B workers show higher rates of innovation when the national H-1B
admission levels increase. 89

o

In Massachusetts, if all Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) for H-1B visas filed by
employers in 2014 had turned into visas, H-1B workers could have created an estimated
61,256 jobs for US-born workers by the year 2020. 90

H. Impact of Immigrant Students on Innovation and Patenting
•

Increase in the share of foreign graduate students and skilled immigrants have a positive and
strong impact on the generation of new ideas in the United States.
o

Patent quantity: increase in the presence of foreign graduate students provides a positive
and significant impact on patenting activity at both universities and private firms, thereby
contributing to American innovation. 91

o

Patent quality: increase in the share of skilled immigrants associated with a rise in
number of granted patents at universities. 92

88

“Overall, a 10% growth in the H-1B population corresponded with a 0.3%–0.7% increase in total invention for each standard
deviation growth in city dependency [upon the H-1B program].” Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of
Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.” Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508,
available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 475.

89

Kerr, William R., and William F. Lincoln. “The Supply Side of Innovation: H‐1B Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention.”
Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2010, pp. 473–508, available at www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651934, accessed
March 5, 2017, p. 503.

90

“The Contributions of New Americans in Massachusetts,” New American Economy, August 2016, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/nae-ma-report.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, pp. 2021. The data on visa demand are drawn primarily from the 2014 Annual Report produced by the Office of Foreign Labor
Certification within the U.S. Department of Labor. The multipliers use to produce these estimates originate in a 2011 report
released by Partnership for a New American Economy and the American Enterprise Institute.

91

Chellaraj, Gnanaraj and Maskus, Keith E. and Mattoo, Aaditya, “The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and International
Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3588, May 2005, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=744625, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3. This study used data from the U.S. Department of
Education Education Statistics Quarterly, the Institute for International Education Open Doors, the National Science
Foundation Science and Engineering Statistics, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract of the United States, and the Economic Report of the President.

92

Chellaraj, Gnanaraj and Maskus, Keith E. and Mattoo, Aaditya, “The Contribution of Skilled Immigration and International
Graduate Students to U.S. Innovation,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3588, May 2005, available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=744625, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 3. This study used data from the U.S. Department of
Education Education Statistics Quarterly, the Institute for International Education Open Doors, the National Science
Foundation Science and Engineering Statistics, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the U.S. Census Bureau Statistical
Abstract of the United States, and the Economic Report of the President.

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•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Academic research found that there are significant and positive spillovers on overall patenting
activity associated with an increase in the proportion of immigrant college graduates. 93
o

A “1 percentage point increase in immigrant college graduates’ population share
increases patent per capita by 9-18 percent.” 94

I.

Impact of Immigrants on Firms

•

Allowing for more H-1B visa holders benefits firms:
o

Research suggests that when the H-1B visa cap is increased, firms that perform large
amounts of research and development experience increased productivity and profits. 95


•

For example, an increase in the cap on H-1B visas of 110,000 visas from 85,000 to
195,000 may lead to a 16% increase in firm profits. 96

An increase in the supply of foreign-born workers can improve firm outcomes.
o

There is evidence that an increase in the supply of foreign-born workers in an area leads
to increased productivity, faster growth of capital, and better export performance for
firms in that area. 97

93

“For immigrant college graduates … a 1 percentage point increase in share increases patenting per capita by 8–10 percent in
least squares and 12–18 percent in instrumental variables, more than the 6 percent based on the individual-level data
(statistically significantly so in the case of the highest coefficient), and therefore implying positive spillovers.” Hunt, Jennifer,
and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5, 2017, p.
48. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File.

94

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 31. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File.

95

Ghosh, Anirban, Anna Maria Mayda, and Francese Ortega, “The Impact of Skilled Foreign Workers on Firms: an Investigation
of Publicy Traded U.S. Firms,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8684, November 2014, pp.1-47, available at
http://ftp.iza.org/dp8684.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.1. This study uses data from the Foreign Labor Certification Data
Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) Records, and Compustat.

96

Ghosh, Anirban, Anna Maria Mayda, and Francese Ortega, “The Impact of Skilled Foreign Workers on Firms: an Investigation
of Publicy Traded U.S. Firms,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8684, November 2014, pp.1-47, available at
http://ftp.iza.org/dp8684.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.24. This study uses data from the Foreign Labor Certification Data
Labor Condition Applications (LCAs) Records, and Compustat.

97

Mitaritonna, Cristina, Gianluca Orefice, Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants and Firms’ Productivity: Evidence from France,” IZA
Discussion Paper No. 8063, March 2014, pp.1-38, available at http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp8063.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017,
p.1. The study uses data from the Declaration Annuelle des Donnetes Sociales (DADS) databases, the O*NET Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) system, and the Annual Business survey (EAE). See also, Perri, Giovanni, “The Effect of
Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012,

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
•

These positive effects are especially potent for firms with fewer foreign-born
employees prior to the increase. 98

Immigrants promote more efficient allocation of tasks within firms.
o

Academic literature suggests that immigrant workers lead to tasks being assigned more
efficiently to both immigrant and native-born workers, increasing overall productivity. 99

•

“[C]ities whose employers faced large numbers of denials in the H-1B visa lotteries experienced
considerably less job creation and wage growth for American-born computer workers in the two
years that followed.” 100

J.

Impact of Immigrants on Productivity

•

Considering earnings, patenting, commercializing and licensing patents, publishing books or
papers and presenting at major conferences, immigrants on H-1B and J-1 visas outperformed
native-born individuals. 101

•

In 2015, immigrants contributed $2 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), which
represents 11 percent of its total GDP. 102

available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017,
pp. 348-358.
98

Mitaritonna, Cristina, Gianluca Orefice, Giovanni Peri, “Immigrants and Firms’ Productivity: Evidence from France,” IZA
Discussion Paper No. 8063, March 2014, pp.1-38, available at http://anon-ftp.iza.org/dp8063.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017,
p.1. The study uses data from the Declaration Annuelle des Donnetes Sociales (DADS) databases, the O*NET Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) system, and the Annual Business survey (EAE). See also, Perri, Giovanni, “The Effect of
Immigration on Productivity: Evidence from U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012,
available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017,
pp. 348-358.

99

Peri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigration on Productivity: Evidence From U.S. States,” The Review of Economics and
Statistics, 94, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 348-358, available at
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/REST_a_00137#.WPBnuvnyuUk, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 357. This
study uses data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS), the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the
National Economic Accounts. The author conjectures that “at least part of the positive productivity effects are due to an
efficient specialization of immigrants and natives in manual-intensive and communication-intensive tasks, respectively (in
which each group has a comparative advantage), resulting in a gain in overall efficiency” (see p. 357).

100

Peri Giovanni, Shish Kevin, Chad Sparber, and Angie Marek Zeitlin, “Closing Economic Windows: How H-1B Visa Denials Cost
U.S.-Born Tech Workers Jobs and Wages During the Great Recession,” The Partnership for a New American Economy, June
2014, pp. 1-36, available at http://www.renewoureconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/pnae_h1b.pdf, accessed
March 5, 2017, p.4. The study uses data from the U.S Citizenship and Immigration Services, the U.S. Department of Labor,
and the American Community Survey.

101

Murray, Sara, “H-1B, J-1 Immigrants More Productive Than Americans, Study Says,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2009,
available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/04/27/h-1b-j-1-immigrants-more-productive-than-americans-studysays/, accessed March 5, 2017.

102

“People on the Move: Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity,” McKinsey Global Institute, December 2016, available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Global%20Themes/Employment%20and%20Growth/

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•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in 2013 that a reform that seeks to “revise laws
governing immigration and the enforcement of those laws, allowing for a significant increase in
the number of noncitizens who could lawfully enter the United States permanently or
temporarily” 103 would boost real GDP by 5.4 percent by 2033, and add 9 million workers to the
labor force. 104
o

The CBO also finds that U.S. productivity would be about 0.7 percent higher in 2023 and
about 1.0 percent higher in 2033 under a reform scenario described above. 105

•

“The influx of immigrant college graduates in the 1990s increased U.S. GDP per capita by 1.4-2.4
percent.” 106

•

The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) estimates that immigration reform that would seek to increase
the growth of overall population and the workforce would increase GDP by 4.8 percent over 20
years. 107

Global%20migrations%20impact%20and%20opportunity/MGI-People-on-the-Move-Executive-summary-December2016.ashx, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 56. This study used data from McKinsey Global Institute, the OECD database, the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and others.
103

“The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,”
Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 1. All data are from the Congressional Budget Office.

104

The CBO calculated these numbers by comparing their economic projections under immigration reform to their baseline
economic projections for FY 2013 to 2023. See “The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity,
and Immigration Modernization Act,” Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 3; “The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2013 to 2023,” Congressional Budget Office, February 2013,
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/43907-BudgetOutlook.pdf,
accessed March 5, 2017. Data are from the Congressional Budget Office.

105

“The Economic Impact of S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,”
Congressional Budget Office, June 2013, available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-20132014/reports/44346-Immigration.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p. 1. All data are from the Congressional Budget Office.

106

Hunt, Jennifer, and Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?” American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 2, no. 2, 2010, pp. 31–56, available at www.jstor.org/stable/25760296, accessed March 5,
2017, p. 52. This study used data from the National Science Foundation National Survey of College Graduates, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, and the Harvard Business School Patent Data File.

107

The BPC study uses the CBO’s analysis on the economic impact of immigration reform bill S. 744 as a reference case in which
they construct their model on. The BPC has enlisted the help of Macroeconomic Advisers, LLC, in order to assess the
economic and budgetary impact of the reference case immigration reform. A description of their methodology and
assumptions can be found in Appendix A of the article. See “Immigration Reform: Implications for Growth, Budgets, and
Housing,” Immigration Task Force, Bipartisan Policy Center, October 2013, available at http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC_Immigration_Economic_Impact.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017. This study used data
from the Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration, the U.S. Census Bureau Annual Estimates of the
Resident Population by Single Year of Age and Sex for the United States, the U.S. Census Bureau National Population
Projections Summary Tables, and the National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Indicators and Science and
Engineering Doctorates

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•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Skilled immigration leads to macroeconomic benefits related to employment and wages.
o
o

•

“A one percentage point increase in the immigration share in the population increases
income per person by about 6%.” 108
Over the long run, a 1% increase in immigration flow to a state has been associated with
an up to 0.9% increase in income per worker in the state. 109

1,470 economists recently signed an open letter highlighting some of the benefits of immigration
to innovation and productivity:
o

“Immigration brings entrepreneurs who start new businesses that hire American
workers.” 110

o

“Immigration brings young workers who help offset the large-scale retirement of baby
boomers.” 111

o

“Immigration brings diverse skill sets that keep our workforce flexible, help companies
grow, and increase the productivity of American workers.” 112

o

“Immigrants are far more likely to work in innovative, job-creating fields such as science,
technology, engineering, and math that create life-improving products and drive
economic growth.” 113

108

Ortega, Francesc and Giovanni Peri, “Openness and income: The roles of trade and migration,” Journal of International
Economics, December 2013, pp. 231-251, available at
http://giovanniperi.ucdavis.edu/uploads/5/6/8/2/56826033/ortega_peri_openness_and_income_2014.pdf, accessed March
5, 2017, p.247 This study uses data from the NBER-UN dataset, and the International Trade database (BACI).

109

Peri, Giovanni, “The Effect of Immigrants on U.S. Employment and Productivity,” Federal Reserve Board of San Francisco
Economic Letter, 2010-26, August 30, 2010, pp. 1-5, available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/el201026.pdf, accessed March 5, 2017, p.3 . This paper summarizes research by Peri (2009) and Perri and Sparber (2009).

110

“An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April
12, 2017.

111

“An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April
12, 2017.

112

“An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April
12, 2017.

113

“An Open Letter from 1,470 Economists on Immigration,” New American Economy, April 2017, available at
http://www.newamericaneconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/NAE-Economist-Letter-April-2017.pdf, accessed April
12, 2017.

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IV.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTIVITY

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

The literature supports the idea that immigrants are more likely to start new businesses. The
rates of immigration entrepreneurship are typically higher for high-tech sectors of the
economy.

•

As of 2015, 14.6 percent of the Fortune 500 companies have a foreign-born CEO and 15.4
percent of the Fortune 500 Companies have a foreign-born founder. These percentages rise to
19.6 percent and 22.8 percent respectively when looking at high-tech industries.

•

Data from the Survey of Business Owners show high shares of business ownerships by
immigrants, especially in sectors that involve high-tech industries, and among recently-started
firms.

A. The Impact of Immigrants on New Business Starts by Sector
Immigrants are a vital part of new business growth and entrepreneurship, particularly among high-tech
sectors such as engineering and technology. 114 This section provides an overview of the literature that
examines the prevalence of entrepreneurship and ownership in immigrant populations. Along with the
prevalence rates in the data, ownership and new business start rates are calculated using publicly
available sources. These analyses are consistent with the literature and further suggest that immigrant
ownership has likely been increasing over the past decade. Using these prevalence measures and
characteristics of immigrant owned firms, an estimate of the aggregate impact of new businesses,
particularly those in high-tech sectors, founded by immigrants is determined for the U.S. economy.
B. The Relationship between Entrepreneurship and Immigration Status, Particularly in High-Tech
Sectors

i.

Literature Review

The literature supports the idea that immigrants are more likely to start new businesses. The rates of
immigration entrepreneurship are typically higher for high-tech sectors of the economy. There are two
measures used to evaluate immigrant entrepreneurship: the share of business founders and the business
formation rate.

114

Stangler, Dane and Jason Wiens, “The Economic Case for Welcoming Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” The Kauffman Foundation,
September 8, 2015, available at http://www.kauffman.org/what-we-do/resources/entrepreneurship-policy-digest/theeconomic-case-for-welcoming-immigrant-entrepreneurs, accessed March 7, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

a. Share of Business Founders
The literature supports the idea that the immigrant share of business founders is high relative to the
share of immigrants in the labor force.
•

“To measure business startup activity, we use panel data created by matching consecutive months of
the 2007-2011 Current Population Survey (CPS). Immigrants represent 24.9 percent of all new
business owners in the United States.” 115

•

“The immigrant share of new entrepreneurs rises dramatically in our sample from 16.7% in 1995 to
27.1% in 2008” 116

•

“Immigrant entrepreneurs now account for 28.5 percent of all new entrepreneurs in the United
States, up from just 13.3 percent in the 1997 Index. This is close to the two-decade high of 29.5
percent in the 2011 Index, reflecting the United States’ increasing population of immigrants but also
the much higher Rate of New Entrepreneurs among immigrants.” 117

These rates of immigrant ownership reported in the literature are higher than the share of immigrants in
the labor force. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that foreign-born workers accounted for 16.5% of
the labor force in 2014. 118
The literature also supports the idea that the rate of entrepreneurship is even higher for high-tech
businesses.
•

“We obtained responses from 2,054 engineering and technology companies founded in the
U.S. from 1995 to 2005. Of these companies, 25.3% reported that at least one of their key
founders was an immigrant.” 119

•

“We analyzed Silicon Valley data by selecting zip codes in the following counties: Santa Clara,
Alameda, San Mateo and Santa Cruz. We received responses from 126 companies that fit

115

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 6.

116

Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016,
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 15.

117

Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,”
The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start
up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 6.

118

“Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics – 2014”, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, May, 21,
2015, available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/forbrn_05212015.pdf, accessed March 10, 2017.

119

Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science,
Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 11.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

these criteria. Of these, 52.4% reported that their key founders were immigrants –
significantly higher than the California average of 38.8%.” 120
•

“What we have found thus far suggests that immigrants make a disproportionate
contribution to biotechnology entrepreneurship in Massachusetts. According to the U.S.
Census, foreign-born residents of Massachusetts are 14.4 percent of the total population. But
we find that 25.7 percent of biotechnology firms have foreign-born founders.” 121
b. Business Formation Rate

The business formation rate is another metric to measure immigrant entrepreneurship. This is the
percentage of people who become business owners from one month to the next. The literature shows
that immigrants have a higher business formation rate than native-born individuals and that the rates
have been increasing over time.
•

“Immigrants continue to be almost twice as likely as the native-born to become entrepreneurs,
with the Rate of New Entrepreneurs being 0.52 percent for immigrants, as opposed to 0.27
percent for the native-born.” 122

•

“The business formation rate per month among immigrants is 0.51 percent; that is, of 100,000
nonbusiness-owning immigrants, 510 start a business each month. This rate of business
formation is higher than the nonimmigrant rate of 0.28 percent, or 280 of 100,000 U.S.-born nonbusiness owners per month.” 123

•

“Business formation rates are even higher among immigrants than the nonimmigrant. The
business formation rate per month among immigrants is 0.62 percent (or 620 out of 100,000).
This monthly rate of business formation is much higher than the non-immigrant rate of 0.28
percent (or 280 of 100,000).” 124

120

Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science,
Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 31.

121

Monti, Daniel J., Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology
Industry,” The Immigrant Learning Center, Inc., June, 2007, available at http://www.ilctr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/08/immigrants_in_biotechnology-updated.pdf, accessed March 6, 2017, p. 12.

122

Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,”
The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start
up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 6.

123

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 67.

124

Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small
Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf,
accessed February 27, 2017, p. ii.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

See Table IV.1 for a full set of data sources relied on in the literature and Table IV.2 for a full summary of
the business formation estimates in the literature.
Table IV.1
Summary of Data Sources

Study

Year

Author

Immigrant
Entrepreneurship 126

2016
2015

Fairlie,
Morelix, et al

Immigration and
Entrepreneurship 128

2014

Fairlie and
Lofstrom

Immigrant Entrepreneurs
and Small Business
Owners 129

2012

Fairlie

High-Tech Immigrant
Entrepreneurship in the
United States 130

2009

2008

Fairlie

Independent
Survey/
Manual
Search

Hart, Acs, and
Tracy

Estimating the Contribution
of Immigrant Business
Owners to the Economy 131

Current
Population
Survey

Kerr and Kerr

The Kauffman Index –
Startup Activity National
Trends 127

American
Community
Survey

Restricted Access
U.S. Census
Bureau
Longitudinal
Data 125
x

x

x

x
x

x

x

125

The Restricted Access Longitudinal Data include the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics database and the
Longitudinal Business database.

126

Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016,
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017.

127

Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,”
The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start
up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017.

128

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.

129

Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small
Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf,
accessed February 27, 2017.

130

Hart, David M., Zoltan J. Acs, and Spencer L. Tracy, Jr., “High-tech immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States,” U.S.
Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, July, 2009, available at
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs349tot_0.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017.

131

Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business
Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Table IV.1 (continued)
Summary of Data Sources

Author

American
Community
Survey

Current
Population
Survey

Restricted Access
U.S. Census
Bureau
Longitudinal
Data 132

Independent
Survey/
Manual
Search

Study

Year

Estimating the Contribution
of Immigrant Business
Owners to the Economy 133

2008

Fairlie

America’s New Immigrant
Entrepreneurs 134

2007

Wadhwa,
Saxeian, et al.

x

Immigrant Entrepreneurs in
the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Industry 135

2007

Monti, SmithDoerr,
McQuaid

x

The Impact of Immigrant
Entrepreneurs and
Professionals on U.S.
Competitiveness 136

2006

Anderson and
Platzer

x

Silicon Valley’s New
Immigrant Entrepreneurs 137

1999

Saxeian

x

x

https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed
February 24, 2017.
132

The Restricted Access Longitudinal Data include the Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics database and the
Longitudinal Business database.

133

Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business
Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed
February 24, 2017.

134

Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science,
Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017.

135

Monti, Smith, Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology
Industry, June 2007, available at
http://www.issuelab.org/resource/immigrant_entrepreneurs_in_the_massachusetts_biotechnology_industry_2007,
accessed Match 4, 2017.

136

Anderson, Stuart and Michaela Platzer, “American Made: The Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S.
Competitiveness,” National Venture Capital Association, November, 2006, available at
http://www.contentfirst.com/AmericanMade_study.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017.

137

Saxeian, AnnaLee, “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Public Policy Institute of California, 1999, available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Table IV.2
Summary of Results: Immigrant Share of Business Founders and Business Formation Rates
Study

Data Range

Sample

Immigrant
Share of
Founders

Year

Authors

Immigrant
Entrepreneurship

2016

Kerr and Kerr

2008

The 11 states present in
the Longitudinal Employer
Household Dynamics
database by 1992 138

27.1% 139

The Kauffman Index –
Startup Activity National
Trends

2015

Fairlie, Morelix, et
al.

2014

U.S.

28.5% 140

Immigration and
Entrepreneurship

2014

Fairlie and
Lofstrom

2007-2011

U.S.

24.9% 141

Immigrant Entrepreneurs
and Small Business
Owners

2012

Fairlie

2010

Individuals ages 20-64
who do not own a
business in the first
survey month.

High-Tech Immigrant
Entrepreneurship in the
United States

2009

Hart, Acs, and
Tracy

2002-2006

"High impact" companies
in the high-tech sector

Business Formation
Rate

Immigrants: 0.51% 142
Native-born: 0.28%
Immigrants: 0.62% 143
Native-born: 0.28%

16% 144

138

States include CA, CO, FL, ID, IL, LA, MD, NC, OR, WA, and WI.

139

Kerr, Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, “Immigrant Entrepreneurship,” National Bureau of Economic Research, July, 2016,
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22385, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 15.

140

Fairlie, Robert W., Arnobio Morelix, E.J. Reedy, and Joshua Russell, “The Kauffman Index, Startup Activity National Trends,”
The Kauffman Foundation, August 2016, available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/microsites/kauffman_index/startup_activity_2016/kauffman_index_start
up_activity_national_trends_2016.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017, p. 13.

141

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 6.

142

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 7.

143

Fairlie, Robert W., “Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Small Business Owners, and their Access to Financial Capital,” U.S. Small
Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, May, 2012, available at https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs396tot.pdf,
accessed February 27, 2017, p. ii.

144

Hart, David M., Zoltan J. Acs, and Spencer L. Tracy, Jr., “High-tech immigrant Entrepreneurship in the United States,” U.S.
Small Business Association, Office of Advocacy, July, 2009, available at
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs349tot_0.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 5.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Table IV.2 (continued)
Summary of Results: Immigrant Share of Business Founders and Business Formation Rates
Study

Year

Authors

Data Range

Sample

Immigrant
Share of
Founders

Estimating the
Contribution of
Immigrant Business
Owners to the Economy

2008

Fairlie

1996-2007

U.S.

16.7% 145

America’s New Immigrant
Entrepreneurs

2007

Wadhwa, Saxeian,
et al.

1995-2005

U.S. engineering and
technology companies
with > $1 million in sales
or > 20 employees

U.S.:
25.3% 147
Silicon
Valley:
52.4% 148

Immigrant Entrepreneurs
in the Massachusetts
Biotechnology Industry

2007

Monti, SmithDoerr, McQuaid

2006

Biotechnology companies
founded in New England.
Excludes subsidiaries of
larger companies or
multi-national
corporations.

25.7% 149

The Impact of Immigrant
Entrepreneurs and
Professionals on U.S.
Competitiveness

2006

Anderson and
Platzer

1990-2005

U.S. venture capitalbacked public companies

25% 150

Silicon Valley’s New
Immigrant Entrepreneurs

1999

Saxeian

1980-1998

Percentage of technology
firms started between
1980 and 1998 with
Indian or Chinese
immigrant CEOs

Business Formation
Rate
Immigrants: 0.35% 146
Native-born: 0.27%

24% 151

145

Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business
Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed
February 24, 2017, p. 18.

146

Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business
Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed
February 24, 2017, p. 19.

147

Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science,
Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 11.

148

Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing, and Gary Gereff, “America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Duke Science,
Technology & Innovation Paper No. 23, January 4, 2007, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=990152, accessed March 3, 2017, p. 31.

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ii.

Descriptive Tables from Fortune 500 Companies

The literature has focused on all types of business, but there is also a publicly available dataset that
provides ownership and founder information for Fortune 500 companies in particular. Highlighted below
are statistics similar to those found in the literature, as well as some potential explanations for why the
figures may be different for the Fortune 500.
•

As shown in Table IV.3, in the 2015 list of Fortune 500 firms, 14.6 percent were headed by foreign
born CEOs and 15.4 percent were founded by foreign-born individuals. Of companies in the 2015
list in high-tech industries, 19.6 percent were headed by foreign-born CEOs, and 22.8 percent
were founded by foreign-born individuals.

•

The percentage of Fortune 500 companies with a foreign-born founder is lower than the
immigrant share of entrepreneurs reported in the literature using the recent Current Population
Survey data. As shown in Table IV.2, estimates using Census data from the past decade range
from 24.9 to 28.5 percent. However, the 15.4 percent share for Fortune 500 companies with a
foreign-born founder (Table IV.3) is consistent with the estimates using older data. For example,
data from 1996 to 2007 show immigrant entrepreneurship share of 16.7 percent 152 (Table IV.2).

•

In 2015, Fortune 500 companies with foreign-born CEOs generated over $1.6 trillion in revenue,
and those founded by foreign-born individuals generated over $1.8 trillion in revenue. 153 These
values are both larger than the entire GDP of Canada in 2015. 154 Furthermore, in 2015, Fortune
500 companies with foreign-born CEOs employed over 4 million people worldwide and Fortune
500 companies founded by foreign-born individuals employed over 3.7 million people worldwide.
Both of these numbers are larger than the entire population of Connecticut in 2015. 155

149

Monti, Smith, Laurel Smith-Doerr, and James McQuaid, “Immigrant Entrepreneurs in the Massachusetts Biotechnology
Industry, June 2007, available at
http://www.issuelab.org/resource/immigrant_entrepreneurs_in_the_massachusetts_biotechnology_industry_2007,
accessed Match 4, 2017, p. 2.

150

Anderson, Stuart and Michaela Platzer, “American Made: The Impact of Immigrant Entrepreneurs and Professionals on U.S.
Competitiveness,” National Venture Capital Association, November, 2006, available at
http://www.contentfirst.com/AmericanMade_study.pdf, accessed February 24, 2017, p. 13.

151

Saxeian, AnnaLee, “Silicon Valley’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs,” Public Policy Institute of California, 1999, available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017, p. 23.

152

Fairlie, Robert W, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” U.S. Small Business
Association, Office of Advocacy, November, 2008, available at
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed
February 24, 2017, p. 18.

153

Fortune, “Fortune 500,” available at http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/2015/, accessed March 2, 2017.

154

The World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product 2015,” available at http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf,
accessed March 17, 2017.

155

United States Census Bureau, “Annual Estimates of Resident Population,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmkhttps://factfinder.census.gov/faces

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Table IV.3
Percent of Foreign-Born CEOs and Founders among U.S. Fortune 500 Companies
2015

Notes:
[1] High-tech industries include: Computers and Office Equipment, Health Care: Pharmacy and Other Services, Information Technology Services,
Aerospace and Defense, Computer Software, Pharmaceuticals, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, Network and Other
Communications Equipment, Electronics and Electrical Equipment, Computer Peripherals, Medical Products and Equipment, Scientific,
Photographic and Control Equipment, Chemicals, and Energy.
[2] Information on founders was sourced from Partnership for a New American Economy’s “The New American Fortune 500” and supplemented
with information from online research on the country of origin for founders of companies that have been added to the list since 2010.
Sources:
[1] Fortune, “Fortune 500,” available at http://beta.fortune.com/fortune500/2015/, accessed March 2, 2017.
[2] Partnership for a New American Economy, “The 'New American' Fortune 500,” June 2011, available at
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/img/new-american-fortune-500-june-2011.pdf, accessed March 2, 2017, Appendix A.
[3] Biography, “Sergey Brin Biography,” November 2, 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/sergey-brin-12103333, accessed
March 30, 2017.
[4] Biography, “Rupert Murdoch Biography,” October 17, 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/rupert-murdoch-9418489,
accessed March 30, 2017.
[5] Viterbi, Andrew, “Reflections of an Educator, Researcher, and Entrepreneur,” 2016, available at http://www.biography.com/people/sergeybrin-12103333, accessed March 30, 2017.
[6] Blagg, Deborah, “Kumar Mahadeva,” September 1, 2013, available at https://www.alumni.hbs.edu/stories/Pages/storybulletin.aspx?num=2208, accessed March 30, 2017.
[7] Swartz, Jon, “SanDisk CEO Eli Harari Proves He’s No Flash in the Pan,” June 28, 2010 available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/profile/2010-06-27-sandisk-eli-harari_N.htm, accessed March 30, 2017.
[8] McFadden, Robert, “Sidney Harman, Newsweek Chairman, Is Dead at 92,” April 13, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/media/14harman.html, accessed March 30, 2017.
[9] Business Insider, “Meet the Richest Tech Tycoon in 14 Major Countries around the World,” July 19, 2014, available at
http://www.businessinsider.in/small-business/tech/slidelist/38639795.cms, accessed March 30, 2017.

iii.

Descriptive Tables from Survey of Business Owners, 2007 and 2012

Another publicly available data source cited but not used in the literature to determine foreign-born
ownership rates is the Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO) conducted by the
Census Bureau. This survey collects information on the characteristics of businesses and their owners.
The survey defines business ownership as possessing at least 51% of a business’s stock or equity,
sampling 1.75 million and 2.3 million nonfarm businesses with receipts of at least $1,000 that filed
Internal Revenue Service tax forms in 2012 and 2007, respectively. Respondents include firms with no
paid employees, in sectors 11 through 99 according to the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS), with the exceptions of NAICS 111,112, 482, 521, 525, 813, 814, and 92. The Census Bureau does

/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmkInfoplease.com,%20“State%20Population%20by%20Rank,%202015,
accessed March 17, 2017.

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not claim the CBO data to be representative of all U.S. businesses. Data from the 2012 SBO are only
provided as tabulated estimates of aggregate numbers and percentages of businesses in the United
States; microdata are available only for the 2007 SBO.
It should be noted that analyses based on the SBO are not directly comparable to analyses based on
datasets such as the CPS, which is employed in multiple studies on immigrant share of business founders
(see Table IV.1). Major differences include: 1) business owners who are primarily wage and salary workers
are included in the SBO, but excluded from the CPS; 2) the CPS data is collected at the individual level,
whereas the SBO data is collected at the business level (thus multiple businesses owned by one individual
count multiple times in the SBO but only once in the CPS); and 3) only the “majority owner” with at least
51% of a business is included in the SBO, while multiple “minority owners” with smaller shares of a
business are included in the CPS. 156
In 2012, approximately 14.4% of all businesses are estimated to be owned by immigrants (Table IV.4a);
this is slightly lower than the percentage of foreign-born business owners (15.0%) reported in 2007 (Table
IV.4b). The discrepancy may be due to a change in the immigrant-identifying question in the SBO: the
2007 survey identified foreign-born business owners, which included individuals born to Americans
overseas and were hence U.S. citizens by birth; the question in the 2012 survey was modified to identify
only business owners who were not U.S. citizens by birth. Both figures were higher than the percentage
of foreign-born individuals 157 in the general US population (12.9% in 2012, 12.6% in 2007), 158 reflecting a
higher share of business ownership among immigrants than those who are native-born.

156

U.S. Census Bureau, “Survey of Business Owners and Self-Employed Persons (SBO): Methodology,” February 9, 2016,
available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sbo/technical-documentation/methodology.html, accessed March
18, 2017; U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey (CPS): Methodology,” available at
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/technical-documentation/methodology.html, accessed March 30, 2017;
Fairlie, Robert W. and Alicia M. Robb, “Entrepreneurship, Self-Employment and Business Data: An Introduction to Several
Large, Nationally-Representative Datasets,” IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 4052, available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp4052.pdf,
accessed March 25, 2017, pp.8-10.

157

U.S. Census Bureau, “About Foreign-Born Population”, available at https://www.census.gov/topics/population/foreignborn/about.html, accessed March 18, 2017. “Foreign-born” refers to individuals who are not US citizens at birth, including
naturalized US citizens, lawful permanent residents, temporary migrants, humanitarian migrants, and unauthorized
migrants.

158

U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey – March 2012 Detailed Tables”, Characteristics of the Foreign-Born
Population by Nativity and U.S. Citizenship Status Estimates Table 1.1, available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2012/demo/foreign-born/cps-2012.html, accessed March 18, 2017 and U.S. Census
Bureau, “Current Population Survey – March 2007 Detailed Tables”, Characteristics of the Foreign-Born Population by
Nativity and U.S. Citizenship Status Table 1.1, available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2007/demo/foreignborn/cps-2007.html, accessed March 18, 2017. The percentage of foreign-born individuals is calculated as (Total population
– Native-born population)/Total population using data tables based on the Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the
Current Population Surveys in 2012 and 2007.

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The shares of foreign-born business owners are often even higher in sectors which involve “high tech”
industries (NAICS Code 33, 42, 44, 51,54), 159 at 18.0% and 16.4% for wholesale trade (42) 160, and 15.1%
and 18.0% in retail trade (44-45) in 2012 and 2007, respectively (Table IV.4a and Table IV.4b).
Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturers are more broadly included in the manufacturing sector and
biotech research is included in professional, scientific and technical services, thus it is harder to
determine using these aggregate codes whether similar rates are apparent in these particular subsectors.
Table IV.4a
Survey of Business Owners 2012 – All Sectors
Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector

Notes:
[1] Numbers of businesses were estimates based on the sample of 1.75 million businesses that responded to the 2012 SBO. Approximately 0.8%
all business owners did not report whether they were born US citizens. Business ownership is defined as having 51 percent or more of the stock
or equity in the business.
[2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses that reported the owner's nativity status.
[3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.
Source: United States Census, “2012 Survey of Business Owners,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.

159

U.S. Census Bureau, “Census Explorer Q&A,” How do you define the “tech” jobs in the People, Education and Income
Edition?, available at https://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/, accessed March 18, 2007. The page provides a hyperlink to
a spreadsheet showing “list of codes used” to identify “tech” companies at
https://www.census.gov/censusexplorer/naics_codes_used.xls, accessed March 18, 2007.

160

Computer & peripheral equip & software wholesale (421430), Other electronic parts & equipment whsle (421690),
Computer and computer peripheral equipment and software merchant wholesalers (423430),Other electronic parts and
equipment merchant wholesalers (423690),Computer and software stores (443120).

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Table IV.4b
Survey of Business Owners 2007 – All Sectors
Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector

Notes:
[1] Among all 2,165,680 businesses covered by the 2007 SBO, 1,503,184 (69.4%) had a majority owner, defined as an owner with 51% or more of
the stock or equity in the business. The majority owner's nativity status was reported by 847,154 (56.4%) such businesses.
[2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses which had a majority owner and reported the owner's nativity status.
[3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.
Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.

The higher share of immigrants in business ownership is even more apparent when examining recently
founded firms. In the 2007 SBO, over 20 percent of businesses started within the 5 years prior to the
survey were owned by foreign-born individuals (Table IV.5). These rates were even higher for trade and
retail start-ups where one-third and one-quarter were owned by foreign born individuals, respectively;
high-tech industries are directly involved in both sectors. In addition, as high as 36.7 percent of recently
founded accommodation and food services businesses were owned by foreign-born individuals.

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Table IV.5
Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Companies Founded in or after 2003
Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Owners, by NAICS Sector

Notes:
[1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 932,152 (62.0%) reported the year of establishment. A total of 300,666 (32.3%) such
businesses were start-ups, defined as businesses founded within 5 years of the survey (2003 - 2007), among which 240,252 (80.0%) reported the
majority owner's nativity status.
[2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of start-ups with a majority owner whose nativity status was reported.
[3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.
Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.

Similarly, when examining whether the founder of a business was foreign born, the percentage goes from
12 percent for the full sample (Table IV.6) to 17.3 percent for start-ups (Table IV.7).

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Table IV.6
Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Firms Owned by Founders
Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Founding-Owners, by NAICS Sector

Notes:
[1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 832,215 (54.8 percent) reported both the majority owner's founder and nativity
statuses.
[2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of businesses which had a majority owner and reported both the owner's founder
and nativity statuses.
[3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.
Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.

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Table IV.7
Survey of Business Owners 2007 – Companies Founded in or After 2003 by Current Owner
Percentage of Businesses with Foreign-Born Founding-Owners, by NAICS Sector

Notes:
[1] Among all 1,503,184 businesses with majority owners, 932,152 (62.0 percent) reported the year of establishment. A total of 300,666 (32.3
percent) such businesses were start-ups, defined as businesses founded within 5 years of the survey (2003 - 2007), among which 173,136 (57.6
percent) reported both the majority owner's founder and nativity statuses.
[2] Percentages reported were calculated out of the number of start-ups which had a majority owner and reported both the owner's founder and
nativity statuses.
[3] Asterisks indicate NAICS sectors that cover biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and high-technology firms.
Source: United States Census, “2007 Survey of Business Owners,” available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk, accessed March 1, 2017.

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C. Impact of New Businesses Started by Immigrants

i.

Estimates of Sales, Employment, and Payroll Generated by Immigrant-Owned Firms in 2012

Table IV.8 reports estimates of the impact of immigrant owned firms in the U.S. economy in 2012. The
estimates are calculated as the product of the total value for the U.S. 161 and the immigrant owned
business share. 162 For example,
Total sales generated by immigrant owned firms = total U.S. sales × percent of sales generated by
immigrant owned firms
Assumptions:
•

Fairlie and Loftstrom (2014) report the shares of total U.S. sales, employment, and payroll for
immigrant owned firms using 2007 Survey of Business Owners data. 163 Given the limitations of
the 2012 Survey of Business Owner data, these same estimates cannot be calculated for 2012.
Therefore, the following calculations assume that the immigrant owned firms’ shares were the
same in 2012 as they were in 2007.

•

Fairlie and Loftstrom’s estimates of employment, payroll, and sales use data limited to,
“businesses that are classified by the IRS as sole proprietorships, partnerships, 1120 corporations,
or employers, and that have sales of $1000 or more. It also excludes publicly held and other firms
not classifiable by owner status.” 164 The following calculations extend the analysis to all U.S. firms
reported in the Survey of Business Owners. The analysis assumes that the shares are the same for
Fairlie and Loftstrom’s sample of businesses as for the whole population of U.S. businesses.

161

Total U.S. sales, employment, and payroll are from the 2012 Survey of Business Owners available at
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF, accessed March 1, 2017.

162

The immigrant owned businesses’ shares of sales employment, and payroll are taken from Fairlie and Loftstrom (2014),
which used 2007 Survey of Business Owner data. Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, "Immigration and
Entrepreneurship," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April 23, 2015, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.

163

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017.

164

Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed March 1, 2017, p. 8.

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Table IV.8
Estimated Impact of Immigrant Owned Businesses on the U.S. Economy in 2012
Measure of 2012 Economic Impact
Metric
Total U.S.
Immigrant Owned
Business Share in
2007
Estimate for
Immigrant Owned
Businesses

Sales, Receipts, or Value
of Shipments (Millions)
$33,536,848.8
10.0%

Employment

Payroll (Millions)

115,249,007
9.9%

$5,236,446.1
8.8%

$3,353,684.8

11,409,652

$460,807.3

Sources:
[1] 2012 Survey of Business Owners.
[2] Fairlie, Robert W. and Magnus Lofstrom, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5298, April
23, 2015, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597992, accessed April 14, 2017.

ii.

Regional Differences

Immigrant owned firms’ contributions to the economy are even higher in some regions of the country.
Using data from the 2000 Census, Fairlie (2008) showed that, “The total business income generated by
immigrant business owners is $67 billion, 11.6 percent of all business income in the United States.
Immigrant business owners generate nearly $20 billion or one-quarter of all business income in California,
and nearly one-fifth of all business income in New York, Florida, and New Jersey.” 165

165

Fairlie, Robert, “Estimating the Contribution of Immigrant Business Owners to the U.S. Economy,” Small Business Office of
Advocacy, November 2008, available at
https://people.ucsc.edu/~rfairlie/papers/published/sba%20final%20report%20immigrant%20business.pdf, accessed April
14, 2017.

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V.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

REGIONAL IMPACT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

While immigration policy may be set at the national level, its importance is not distributed equally
across the United States.

•

In terms of number of foreign-born individuals with graduate degrees, the top five states are
California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. However, the states with the highest
percentage of individuals with graduate degrees are Connecticut, Texas, Illinois, Oklahoma, and
Kansas.

•

States such as California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois have the largest number of
immigrants and immigrants from the six banned countries. States with the lowest number of
immigrants are typically in the upper-plains and Appalachia regions of the United States.

•

States with relatively small immigrant populations – West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Alaska, and Montana – have experienced the largest percentage increases in the share of
immigrants in their population and labor force.

•

Examination of labor certification and residence applications across states also reveals spatial
differences.
o

o

New Jersey, Washington, California, the District of Columbia, and Delaware had the
most applications for permanent residence applications per 1,000 persons in 2016.

o

The most applications for temporary agricultural work permits are made in California,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Washington.

o
•

In 2016, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, and
Massachusetts had the most applications for skilled employment visas per 1,000
persons.

The most applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits are made in
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Texas.

Finally, there are state-level differences in the fiscal effects of immigrants. Between 2011 and
2013, Alaska, the District of Columbia, Wyoming, New York, and California had the highest state
and local expenditures per immigrant independent person.
A. State-by-State Facts from the American Immigration Council

Table V.1 presents data for each state on the percentage of the population that is foreign-born in 2013,
the percentage of businesses owned by foreign-born individuals in 2010, and net business income from
immigrant businesses in 2010. Tables V.2 to V.4 present data on each of these measures, respectively, by
state ranking.

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•

California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Nevada were the states with the highest
percentage of foreign-born individuals in 2013.

•

In 2010, the states with the highest percent of businesses owned by foreign-born individuals
were California, New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Hawaii.

•

The net business income from foreign-born-owned businesses is highest in California by a
substantial margin, followed by Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and Illinois.

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Table V.1
State-by-State Facts from American Immigration Council

Notes:
[1] These figures are reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2013.
[2] These figures are reported by the Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas for the year 2010.
[3] These figures represent total net business income of new immigrant business owners according to Robert Fairlie of the
University of California, Santa Cruz for the year 2010.
Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.

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Table V.2
States by Percent Foreign-Born

Note: These figures are reported by the U.S. Census Bureau for the year 2013.
Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.

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Table V.3
States by Percent of Foreign-Born Business Owners

Note: These figures are reported by the Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of the Americas for the year 2010.
Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.

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Table V.4
States by Income from Immigrant Businesses

Note: These figures represent total net business income of new immigrant business owners according to Robert Fairlie of the
University of California, Santa Cruz for the year 2010.
Source: American Immigration Council, State Fact Sheets, available at https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/topics/stateby-state, accessed April 12, 2017.

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B. STEM Post-Baccalaureate Degrees by State and Student U.S. Residency Status
Table V.5 reports statistics from the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
Statistics on STEM post-baccalaureate degrees awarded by each state in 2009 by nationality.
•

The states with the highest percentage of individuals with graduate degrees are Connecticut,
Texas, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Kansas.

•

The states with the highest percentage of foreign-born individuals with graduate degrees are
California, New York, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania.

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Table V.5
STEM Post-Baccalaureate Degrees by State and Student U.S. Residency Status

Source: U.S. Department of Education, “Integrated Post-Secondary Education Data System (IPEDS),” 2009 (compiled July 26,
2012). Taken from the following report: U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Information Technology Industry Council, Partnership for a
New American Economy, “Help Wanted: The Role of Foreign Workers in the Innovation Economy,” available at
https://www.itic.org/dotAsset/31303e8c-d2be-47ca-a3db-f41649bcbb02.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.

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C. H-1B Visa and Green Card Applications by State
Table V.6 reports data on applications for skilled employment (e.g., H-1B Visas), and Table V.7 reports
data on applications for permanent residence (i.e., Green Cards). Applications for H-1B visas and Green
Cards can proxy for foreign-born individuals’ intent to immigrate to a specific state.
•

Skilled Employment:
o
o

None of these states appeared among the top five states for the metrics presented in
Tables V.1 to V.5 above.

o

New York, California, and Massachusetts are not included among the top ten states for H1B Visa applications.

o
•

Table V.6 shows that the highest percentage growth in H-1B Visa applications occurred in
Montana, followed by Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Georgia, and Vermont.

In 2016, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Delaware, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
had the most applications for skilled employment visas per 1,000 persons.

Permanent Residence:
o

Table V.7 shows that the highest percentage increases in employment-based Green Card
applications occurred in Washington, South Carolina, Texas, Oregon, and North Carolina.

o

With the exception of Texas, these states are not among the top five states based on the
metrics presented in Tables V.1 to V.5 above.

o

New Jersey, Washington, California, the District of Columbia, and Delaware had the most
applications for permanent residence applications per 1,000 persons in 2016.

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Table V.6
Labor Condition Applications for Skilled Employment Visas (H-1B, H-1B1, E-3) by State
Fiscal Years 2010-2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Table V.7
Labor Certification Applications for Permanent Residence Applications by State
Fiscal Years 2010-2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

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D. Numbers and Fraction of Immigrant Populations by U.S. State, 2010-2015
The following table and maps present statistics for each state on the number of immigrants, the number
of immigrants from the six banned countries, immigrants’ fraction of the population, immigrants’ fraction
of the labor force, and the fraction of all immigrants from the six banned countries. In general, states such
as California, New York, Texas, Florida, and Illinois have the largest number of immigrants and immigrants
from the six banned countries. States with the lowest number of immigrants are typically in the upperplains and Appalachia regions of the U.S.
Below, we summarize our findings on the states that have the highest and the lowest values of the each
of aforementioned statistics over the 2010 to 2015 time period. We also present data on the
Massachusetts. Figures V.1 to V.5 present these statistics for 2010-2015 spatially on a map of the United
States.
•

All Immigrants:
o Largest: California, New York, and Texas are the top 3 in terms of immigrant population.
o Smallest: The bottom 3 are North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. In general, the upperplains, parts of Appalachia, and parts of New England are towards the bottom.
o Massachusetts: 1,046,391

•

Immigrants from Six Banned Countries:
o Largest: California has the largest number of immigrants from the 6 countries, by a large
margin.
o Smallest: Montana has no immigrants from the 6 countries.
o Massachusetts: 11,350

•

Immigrants’ Fraction of the Population:
o Largest: California, New York, and New Jersey are top the list.
o Smallest: Parts of the upper-plains, the Midwest, and parts of Appalachia are towards the
bottom.
o Massachusetts: 15.6%

•

Immigrants’ Fraction of the Labor Force:
o Largest: California, New York, and New Jersey top the list. Florida and Nevada are also
high on this list.
o Smallest: West Virginia, Montana, and Mississippi comprise the bottom three.
o Massachusetts: 18.0%

•

Fraction of Six Banned Countries Relative to All Immigrants:
o Largest: The upper-plains and the rust belt essentially have the highest percentage of
immigrants from the 6 countries. Minnesota, West Virginia, Maine, South Dakota, and
North Dakota make up the top 5.
o Smallest: New Mexico, Florida, and Hawaii are the bottom three.
o Massachusetts: 1.1%
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Table V.8
Numbers and Fractions of Immigrants, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.1
Number of Immigrants, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.2
Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.3
Immigrants’ Fraction of the Population, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.4
Immigrants’ Fraction of the Labor Force, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.5
Fraction of 6 Banned Countries Relative to All Immigrants, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

E. Percentage Changes of Immigrant Populations by State, 2005-2015
The percentage change in the “Number of Immigrants” corresponds to the percentage change in the total
number of immigrants within the state over the 5 year interval (2005-2010 or 2010-2015). The
percentage change in the “Number of Immigrants from the 6 Banned Countries” is calculated similarly,
but only for immigrants from Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia.
The percentage change in “Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population” corresponds to the percentage
change in the fraction of immigrants residing in the state over the 5 year interval. Note, this is a
percentage increase relative to the fraction of immigrants in the base year – it is not a percentage point
increase. The percentage change in “Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force” is calculated similarly, but
its calculations are with respect to the fraction of immigrants in the labor force. The percentage change in
the “Fraction of All Immigrants that come from 6 Banned Countries” corresponds to the percentage
increase in the share of immigrants that come from Syria, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Somalia. The
fraction is calculated out of all immigrants in the state.
Tables V.9 and V.10 present these summary statistics for each state in the periods 2005-2010 and 20102015. Below, we summarize our findings on the states that have the highest and the lowest values of the
each of aforementioned statistics over the 2010 to 2015 time period. We also present data on the
Massachusetts. Figures V.6 to V.10 present these statistics for 2010-2015 spatially on a map of the United
States.

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Percentage Changes, 2005-2010:
• Number of Immigrants:
o Largest: Wyoming, Kentucky, Iowa, Alabama
o Smallest or Most Negative: Montana, Michigan, New Hampshire
o Massachusetts: +7.49%
• Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries:
o Largest: Alaska, Mississippi, Alabama, Maine, North Dakota
o Smallest or Most Negative: Missouri, New Hampshire, Idaho
o Massachusetts: +52.37%
• Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population:
o Largest: Kentucky, Iowa, Alabama, Vermont
o Smallest or Most Negative: Colorado, Michigan, Idaho, Arizona, New Hampshire, Montana
o Massachusetts: +1.65%
• Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force:
o Largest: Alabama, Wyoming, Iowa, South Dakota, Louisiana, Kentucky
o Smallest or Most Negative: Colorado, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Arizona, West
Virginia, Montana
o Massachusetts: +3.24%
• Fraction of All Immigrants that Come from 6 Banned Countries:
o Largest: Alaska, Mississippi, North Dakota, Maine, Rhode Island, Delaware
o Smallest or Most Negative: Iowa, District of Columbia, Arkansas, Missouri, New Hampshire,
Idaho
o Massachusetts: +41.75%
Percentage Changes, 2010-2015:
• Number of Immigrants:
o Largest: North Dakota, West Virginia, Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware
o Smallest or Most Negative: Vermont, Alabama, New Mexico, Maine
o Massachusetts: +12.76%
• Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries:
o Largest: West Virginia, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Kansas, New
Hampshire
o Smallest or Most Negative: Iowa, Alaska, Oklahoma, Maine, Mississippi
o Massachusetts: -6.39%
• Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population:
o Largest: West Virginia, North Dakota, Alaska, South Dakota, Delaware
o Smallest or Most Negative: Hawaii, New Mexico, Alabama, Maine
o Massachusetts: + 8.82%

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•

•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force:
o Largest: West Virginia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Alaska
o Smallest or Most Negative: California, Hawaii, Alabama, Mississippi
o Massachusetts: +8.85%
Fraction of All Immigrants that Come from 6 Banned Countries:
o Largest: West Virginia, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin
o Smallest or Most Negative: Maine, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Alaska, Mississippi
o Massachusetts: -16.98%

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Table V.9
Percentage Change in Immigrants 2005-2010

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Table V.10
Percentage Change in Immigrants 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.6
Percentage Change in Number of Immigrants, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.7
Percentage Change in Number of Immigrants from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.8
Percentage Change in Immigrants’ Fraction of State Population, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.9
Percentage Change in Immigrants’ Fraction of State Labor Force, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.10
Percentage Change in Fraction of All Immigrants that come from 6 Banned Countries, 2010-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

F. Levels and Percentage Changes of Petitions for Skilled Workers, 2010-2016
The demand for foreign skilled labor can be measured by examining data on Labor Condition Applications
(“LCA”). Whenever a U.S. company wants to hire a foreign worker through the H-1B, E-3, or H-1B1 visa
programs, the petition needs to be certified by the U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training
Administration’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification (“OFLC”).
•

Temporary Agricultural Work Permits:
o

•

The most applications for temporary agricultural work permits are made in California,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Washington.

Temporary Non-Agricultural Work Permits:
o

The most applications for temporary non-agricultural work permits (often used in resorts,
among other areas) are made in Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Texas.

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Figure V.11
Labor Condition Applications per 1000 Persons in Fiscal Year 2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.12
Annual Growth in Labor Condition Applications, Fiscal Years 2010-2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.13
Employment-Based Green Card Applications per 1000 People in Fiscal Year 2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.14
Annual Growth in Employment-Based Green Card Applications, Fiscal Years 2010-2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Figure V.15
Agricultural Temporary Work Visa Certifications per 1000 Persons in FY 2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

Figure V.16
Non-Agricultural Temporary Work Visa Certifications per 1000 Persons in FY 2016

Note: The U.S. Government's Fiscal Year starts on October 1st of the preceding calendar year and runs until September 30th.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “Disclosure Data,” available at
https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/performancedata.cfm, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] U.S. Census Bureau, “State Population Totals Tables: 2010-2016,” available at
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html, accessed April 4, 2017.

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G. Fiscal Effects of Immigrant Generation, 2011-2013
One recent study considers the fiscal effects of immigration for the period 2011-2013. The authors use
the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement in their analysis combined with data on state
government expenditures and revenues. They note the importance of accounting for second generation
immigrants separately, which differentiates it from some previous analyses. When second generation
immigrants are of working age and treated as independent individuals, they contribute revenues that
exceed costs. The analysis is done at the level of the “independent person unit,” which is defined as “one
independent adult plus an assignment of any dependent children in whole or in part.” 166 Tables V.11-V.13
summarize findings from this study.
•

For the United States as a whole, first generation independent person units cost the states on
net about $1,600 each, while second generation independent person units contribute on net
to state and local budgets about $1,700 each, and third-plus generation independent person
units contribute on net to state and local budgets about $1,300 each. 167

•

These estimates of the fiscal impact imply that the total annual aggregate impact of the first
generation and their dependents, averaged across 2011-13, is a cost of $57.4 billion, while
the second and third-plus generation individuals (and their children) create benefits of $30.5
billion and $223.8 billion, respectively. Note that the surplus revenues raised the amount to
$197 billion, which equals the surplus across all 50 states. (Calculated by totaling the
unrounded estimates of net fiscal effects by state multiplied by the average number of
independent persons in each year.) 168

•

This overall pattern is largely driven by the larger education costs for first generation
independent person units, which include more children on average than units of the other
two generations. By the second generation, immigrants are a net win for the states as a

166

Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

167

Estimates are constructed from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC). First generation immigrants:
individuals who were born abroad who are noncitizens or naturalized citizens. Second generation individuals: individuals
who were born in the United States with at least one foreign-born parent. Third-plus generation individuals: individuals who
were born in the United States with two native-born parents. The institutional portion of Medicaid spending ($72 billion) is
excluded due to missing this population in our data, which widens the gap between aggregate U.S. revenues and
expenditures. After, all but two states have positive budget balances (compared with seven negative-balance states when all
expenditure flows are included).
Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

168

Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

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whole, given that they have fewer children on average than first generation units and are
contributing in revenues more than they cost in expenditures. 169
•

Although per unit spending on the second generation independent person units is slightly
more than it is on the third-plus generation units, the per unit net difference between
revenues and expenditures is the most positive for second generation independent person
units. 170

•

The relative contribution or burden of any independent person unit is driven largely by that
unit’s demographic and economic characteristics – most notably the number of dependents
in the unit and the unit’s income levels. Because first generation units tend to have less
income and more dependents than units in the second or third-plus generation, they are
more costly to state and local governments. However, the children of immigrants who are
being educated grow up to become second generation adults, the group that, in general (but
not always), contributes the most, when assessed in terms of independent person units, to a
given state’s fiscal health. 171

169

Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

170

Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

171

Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

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Table V.11
State and Local Revenues per Independent Person Unit, by Immigrant Generation by State
2011-2013

Source: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

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Table V.12
State and Local Expenditures per Independent Person Unit, by Immigrant Generation by State 2011-2013

Source: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

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Table V.13
Net Difference between State and Local Revenues and Expenditures Independent Person Unit by Immigrant
Generation by State 2011-2013

Source: Blau, Francine D., Christopher Mackie, “The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration,” The National Academies
Press, 2016, available at https://www.nap.edu/read/23550/chapter/11, accessed February 20, 2017, pp. 381-442.

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VI.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

HIGH-SKILLED IMMIGRANTS

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

From 2000 to 2010, over 75,000 non-citizens enlisted in the U.S. military.

•

Non-resident students earned 13.8 and 11.9 percent of the Master’s and Doctor’s degrees conferred in the
2013/14 school year, respectively. Furthermore, non-resident students were disproportionately more likely
to get their degrees in a STEM field, with international students making up over 30 percent of the postbaccalaureate degrees in STEM fields. This finding is even more distinct when looking at degrees in
mathematics and statistics, where 46.3 and 49.2 percent of Master’s and Doctor’s degrees, respectively,
were given to non-residents.

•

International students during the 2015/16 school year contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S. economy and
supported more than 400,000 jobs.

•

Individuals from the six banned countries are more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, approximately twice as
likely to have a post-baccalaureate’s degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree relative to the
native-born population.

•

Immigrants accounted for 31 percent of physicians from 2011-2015 while only making up 20 percent of the
prime-working age population (ages 25-54).

•

Among native-born individuals aged 25 to 54, 0.1 percent work in an engineering occupation with a Doctor’s
degree, compared to 0.5 percent of foreign-born individuals aged 25 to 54. This difference is even more
pronounced when focused on the six banned countries, where 1.1 percent of 25 to 54 year olds work in
engineering with a Doctor’s degree.

A. Characteristics of High-Skilled Immigrants

i.

Education Levels

•

As shown in Figure VI.1, while prime-working aged foreign-born individuals are more likely
than native-born individuals to have a high-school degree or less, foreign-born individuals are
twice as likely to have a doctoral degree. One percent of native-born individuals aged 25 to
54 have a doctoral degree whereas two percent of foreign-born individuals do.

•

This difference is even more pronounced when looking at the six countries targeted by
President Trump’s most recent ban. Individuals from the six banned countries are more likely
to have a bachelor’s degree, approximately twice as likely to have a post-baccalaureate’s
degree, and four times as likely to have a doctoral degree, relative to the native-born
population.

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•

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A recent study focusing on the immigration population in Boston found that 41 percent of
immigrants have a college degree or higher. 172 In comparison, the national average of
foreign-born individuals with a college degree or higher is approximately 30 percent.

Figure VI.1
Educational Attainment of 25 to 54 Year-Olds by Nativity Status
2011-2015

Notes:
[1] “Some College” includes individuals that reported having attained an Associate’s degree as well as individuals that reported
attending college without receiving a Bachelor’s degree.
[2] “Post baccalaureate’s degree” includes individuals that reported having attained some sort of Master’s or professional degree
beyond a Bachelor’s degree.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

172

Osterman, Paul, Kimball, William, and Christine Riordan, “Boston’s Immigrants: An Essential Component of a Strong
Economy,” JVS, May 10, 2017, available at https://jvs-boston.org/images/pdf/Osterman%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf,
accessed May 21, 2017, p. 4.

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ii.

Medical Professionals

•

As shown in Table VI.1, immigrants accounted for 31 percent of physicians from 2011-2015
while only making up 20 percent of the prime-working age population (ages 25-54).

•

While the majority of immigrants are located on the coasts of the U.S., foreign-born
physicians are much more likely to locate in the center of the country. For example, only six
percent of Ohio’s prime working age population is foreign-born, but 29 percent of Ohio’s
physicians are foreign-born. Similarly, only six percent of Kentucky’s prime working age
population is foreign-born, but 26 percent of the state’s physicians are foreign-born.

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Table VI.1
Foreign-Born Share of Physicians by State
2011-2015

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Foreign-born individuals are also more likely to work in engineering or life sciences. 0.1 percent of
native-born individuals aged 25 to 54 work in an engineering occupation with a Doctor’s degree
compared to 0.5 percent of foreign-born individuals aged 25 to 54. This difference is even more
pronounced when focused on the six banned countries, where 1.1 percent of 25 to 54 year olds
work in engineering with a Doctor’s degree. Similarly, 0.4 percent of 25 to 54 year old nativeborn individuals work in the life sciences with a Doctor’s degree in comparison to 1.6 percent of
foreign-born individuals and 1.4 percent of individuals born in the six banned countries.
Table VI.2
Share of 25 to 54 Year-Olds Working in Engineering and Life Sciences
by Education and Nativity Status
2011-2015

Note: “Post baccalaureate’s degree” includes individuals that reported having attained some sort of Master’s or professional
degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

B. Immigrants in the U.S. Military
Immigrants are an important part of the U.S. military and have contributed in significant ways to the
safety of the American people.
•

173

From 2000 to 2010, over 75,000 non-citizens enlisted in the U.S. military. 173

Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,”
Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p.
21.

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•

From 2000 to 2010, the monthly average number of non-citizen enlisted accessions to the
U.S. military was 582.8 per month, compared with an average of 14,795 per month among
citizens. On average, non-citizen accessions comprised 3.8 percent of total accessions. 174

•

The Navy has the largest proportion of non-citizen accessions with 5 percent. The Army and
Marines have 3.8 and 4 percent, respectively. Non-citizen enlisted accessions in the Air Force
and Coast Guard account for 2.2 and 1.7 percent, respectively. 175
Table VI.3
Non-citizen Accessions by Military Branch
2000-2010

Notes:
[1] Non-citizens are defined as those who are not citizens at the time of enlistment.
[2] Total accessions reflect the total number of accessions from FY 2000 to FY 2010.
[3] The sum of individual branches does not equal the Total for “Non-citizen Accessions” due to rounding.
Source: Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,”
Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p. 2123.

•

Mexico is the largest source of non-citizen accessions for every service branch except for the
Navy (for which the Philippines is the largest). Other top birth countries among non-citizen
accessions are Jamaica, South Korea, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colombia, and Haiti. 176

174

Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,”
Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017,
pp. 26-28.

175

Yalcinkaya, Huseyin, “The Effect of Executive Order 13269 on Noncitizen Enlisted Accessions in the U.S. Military,”
Dissertation at the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2013, available at
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32921/13Mar_Yalcinkaya_Can.pdf?sequence=1, accessed April 4, 2017, p.
28.

176

Hattiangadi, et al., “Non-citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” Center for Naval Analyses, April 2005, available at
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0011092.A2.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017, pp. 23-24.

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Table VI.4
Top 5 Countries of Origin among Non-citizens by Military Branch
1995-2003

Notes:
[1] Non-citizens are defined as those who are not citizens at the time of enlistment.
[2] Countries are listed in descending order by the number of non-citizens from each country.
[3] Data from the Coast Guard are not available.
[4] Top 5 countries constituted the following share of total non-citizen accessions in each branch:
Army - 39%; Air Force - 43%; Navy - 46%; Marine Corps - 43%.
Source: Hattiangadi, et al., “Non-citizens in Today’s Military: Final Report,” Center for Naval Analyses, April 2005, available at
https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0011092.A2.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017, pp. 23-24.

•

Only U.S. citizens are eligible for security clearance in the U.S. military. Therefore, non-U.S.
citizens are generally not employed in duties that may require access to classified
information. 177 Furthermore, only U.S. citizens are permitted to become officers. 178 These job
limitations suggest that non-citizen members may have a higher casualty rate than citizen
members. Indeed, a 2005 article from USA Today found that “[s]ome 142 non-citizen troops
died in Iraq and Afghanistan. Non-citizens’ casualty rates represent 8% of the total despite
being less than 3% of active duty military personnel.” 179

C. Immigrants Enrolled in U.S. Higher Education Institutions
Immigrants and foreign students are vital components of U.S. institutions of higher education, especially
in graduate degree programs and STEM fields.

177

32 C.F.R. § 154.16.c –Security Clearance, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/32/154.16, accessed April 4,
2017.

178

10 U.S.C § 532.a.1 - Qualifications for original appointment as a commissioned officer, available at
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/532, accessed April 4, 2017.

179

“Military Recruiting Slips Among Foreign Nationals,” USA Today, April 14, 2005, available at
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-04-14-foreign-recruits_x.htm, accessed April 4, 2017.

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i.

Degrees Conferred in the U.S.

•

As shown in Table VI.5, during the 2013/14 school year, nearly two million Bachelor’s degrees
were conferred at U.S. postsecondary institutions. Of those, only 3.7 percent were to nonresidents. However, the non-residents share of mathematics and statistics degrees was
nearly 3 times higher, with non-residents making up 11.6 percent of the mathematics and
statistics degrees in the U.S.

•

Non-resident students made up a much higher share of the Master’s and Doctor’s degrees
conferred in 2013/14, 13.8 and 11.9 percent, respectively. Furthermore, non-resident
students were disproportionately more likely to get their degrees in a STEM field, with
international students making up over 30 percent of the post-baccalaureate degrees in STEM
fields. This finding is even more notable when looking at degrees in mathematics and
statistics, where 46.3 and 49.2 percent of Master’s and Doctor’s degrees, respectively, were
earned by non-residents.
Table VI.5
Degrees Conferred by Postsecondary Institutions by Field of Study and Native Status
2013/14 School Year

Note: STEM fields include fields classified as biological and biomedical studies; computer and information sciences; engineering;
engineering technologies and engineering-related fields; mathematics and statistics; physical science technologies; psychology;
and social sciences.
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System,
Fall 2014, Completions component, prepared September 2015, available at https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/, accessed April
4, 2017.

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ii.

Impact of Degrees Conferred in Massachusetts

•

As shown in Table VI.6, non-residents make up an even higher share of the degrees conferred
in Massachusetts. For example, 7.4 percent of Bachelor’s degrees, 29.1 percent of Master’s
degrees, and 20.8 percent of Doctor’s degrees at the ten largest four-year institutions in
Massachusetts were earned by non-residents.

•

The share is even more pronounced at certain institutions. For example, 44.3 percent of
Master’s degrees and 41.1 percent of Doctor’s degrees earned from Massachusetts Institute
of Technology are earned by non-residents.
Table VI.6
Degrees Conferred at Ten Largest Four-Year Institutions in Massachusetts
2014/15 School Year

Source: Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, available at
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/login.aspx?gotoReportId=5, accessed April 4, 2017.

iii.

Economic Benefits of International Students

•

International students make up a significant portion of the student body at several leading
universities, e.g. NYU (25%), USC (24%), Columbia (32%), Carnegie Mellon (40%), Cornell
(21%), and Harvard (22%). 180 In total, 1.044 million international students were enrolled in
U.S. institutions during the 2015/16 school year. 181

•

International students also bring foreign money into the United States in the form of college
enrollment expenses, including tuition and living expenses. During the 2015/16 school year,

180

Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for Education Statistics, available at
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/login.aspx?gotoReportId=5, accessed April 4, 2017.

181

Institute of International Education, Open Doors Data, available at https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/OpenDoors/Data/International-Students/Enrollment-by-Institutional-Type, accessed April 4, 2017.

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of the 427,313 international undergraduate students, 81.2 percent relied primarily on
personal and family funds to pay for their studies. During the same year, 57.6 percent of the
383,935 international graduate students also relied on personal and family funds. 182
•

NAFSA, a nonprofit association dedicated to international education, estimated that
international students during the 2015/16 school year contributed $32.8 billion to the U.S.
economy and supported more than 400,000 jobs. 183 In Massachusetts specifically, 59,436
international students contributed $2.3 billion and supported over 31,500 jobs during the
2015/16 school year. 184

182

Institute of International Education, Open Doors Data, available at https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/OpenDoors/Data/International-Students/Primary-Source-of-Funding/2015-16, accessed April 4, 2017.

183

NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, available at http://nafsa.org/economicvalue, accessed April 4, 2017. The
economic value from international students studying in the U.S. is calculated as the expenses of enrollment (e.g., tuition and
fees and room and board) plus living expenses for dependents minus any U.S. support given to the students. The number of
jobs created equals the number of direct and indirect jobs created by the dollars brought into the U.S. by international
students. Direct jobs are calculated as the economic value divided by the amount of dollars needed to support one U.S. job.
Indirect jobs are jobs that are created and/or supported indirectly from the direct job’s existence. This is a multiplier effect
in which the spending from a directly-supported job will help to indirectly create and/or support other jobs in the
workplace. Baumgartner, Jason, “The Economic Value of International Student Enrollment to the U.S. Economy,” NAFSA,
November 2016, available at https://istart.iu.edu/nafsa/files/docs/Methodology_Economic_Impact_2016_FINAL.pdf,
accessed April 4, 2017.

184

NAFSA International Student Economic Value Tool, available at
http://www.nafsa.org/Policy_and_Advocacy/Policy_Resources/Policy_Trends_and_Data/NAFSA_International_Student_Eco
nomic_Value_Tool/#stateData, accessed April 4, 2017. The economic value from international students studying in the U.S.
is calculated as the expenses of enrollment (e.g., tuition and fees and room and board) plus living expenses for dependents
minus any U.S. support given to the students. The number of jobs created equals the number of direct and indirect jobs
created by the dollars brought into the U.S. by international students. Direct jobs are calculated as the economic value
divided by the amount of dollars needed to support one U.S. job. Indirect jobs are jobs that are created and/or supported
indirectly from the direct job’s existence. This is a multiplier effect in which the spending from a directly-supported job will
help to indirectly create and/or support other jobs in the workplace. Baumgartner, Jason, “The Economic Value of
International Student Enrollment to the U.S. Economy,” NAFSA, November 2016, available at
https://istart.iu.edu/nafsa/files/docs/Methodology_Economic_Impact_2016_FINAL.pdf, accessed April 4, 2017.

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VII.

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

AWARDS

The contribution of immigrants to the American society and economic growth is significant. Through
immigration, the United States has been the beneficiary of world-class talent and groundbreaking
research, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. The talents
and achievements of immigrants to the U.S. and the massive contributions they have made to America
and the world are evinced in the international and national recognitions immigrants have received.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

40 percent of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics since 2000
were awarded to immigrants. In 2016, all six American winners of the Nobel Prize in economics and
scientific fields were foreign-born.

•

Most Nobel Prizes earned by foreign-born scientists were awarded only after the Immigration and
Nationality Act was passed in 1965, which eliminated discriminatory national origin quotas and
increased employment-based green cards. Between 1901 and 1959, immigrants won 25 Nobel
Prizes in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics, but won 79 prizes in these fields – more than three
times as many – between 1960 and 2016.

•

From 2010 to 2015, four out of eight U.S. Turing Award recipients were first or second generation
immigrants.

•

Since beginning in 1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a United States
research institution has been foreign born. Since 2002, all Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a
U.S. research institution were foreign-born.

•

40 percent of National Medal of Science recipients in Mathematics or Computer Science are
foreign-born.

•

42 percent of the researchers at the top seven U.S. cancer research centers are foreign-born.

•

83 percent (33 of 40) of the finalists of the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, the leading science
competition for U.S. high school students, were the children of immigrants, and 75 percent of the
finalists had parents who worked in America on H-1B visas.

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A. The Nobel Prize
“Immigrants have been awarded 40 percent, or 31 of 78, of the Nobel Prizes won by Americans in
Chemistry, Medicine and Physics since 2000. In 2016, all 6 American winners of the Nobel Prize in
economics and scientific fields were immigrants.” 185
Table VII.1
American Nobel Prize Winners in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics by Nativity Status
2000 – 2016

Source: National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes”, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at
http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed
March 26, 2017.

•

“One can see the increasing influence and importance of immigrants on science in America over the
past half century. Between 1901 and 1959, immigrants won 25 Nobel Prizes in Chemistry, Medicine
and Physics, but won 79 prizes in these fields – more than three times as many – between 1960 and
2016.” 186

•

“Most Nobel Prizes earned by foreign-born scientists were awarded only after the Immigration and
Nationality Act was passed in 1965, which eliminated discriminatory national origin quotas and
increased employment-based green cards.” 187

185

National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes,” NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at
http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed
February 21, 2017.

186

National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes,” NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at
http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed
February 21, 2017.

187

Vilcek Foundation, “Immigrant Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at
http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html,
accessed February, 21, 2017.

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Figure VII.1
American Foreign-Born Nobel Prize Winners in Chemistry, Medicine and Physics
1901-1959 and 1960-2016

Source: National Foundation for American Policy, “Immigrants and Nobel Prizes”, NFAP Policy Brief, October 2016, available at
http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Immigrants-and-Nobel-Prizes.NFAP-Policy-Brief.October-2016.pdf, accessed
March 26, 2017.

i.

Nobel Laureates Affiliated with Universities in Massachusetts

•

37 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with (i.e., current or former full-time
or visiting faculty or staff and alumni) the Massachusetts Institute of Technology are foreignborn. 188

•

32 percent of Nobel Prize winners who are current faculty or alumni of Harvard University are
foreign-born. 189

188

MIT, “Nobel Prize,” available at http://web.mit.edu/ir/pop/awards/nobel.html¸ accessed March 24, 2017; place of birth from
biographies at Nobelprize.org, “Nobel Prize Facts,” available at https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/facts/, accessed
March 24, 2017.

189

Harvard University, “Nobel Laureates,” available at http://www.harvard.edu/about-harvard/harvard-glance/honors/nobellaureates, accessed March 24, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

75 percent of Nobel Prize winners who have been affiliated with Boston University are foreignborn. 190

B. MacArthur Fellowship
•

The MacArthur Fellowship is awarded to support individuals who have shown “exceptional
creativity in their work and the prospect for still more in the future” across a wide range of fields,
including the sciences, arts, and social sciences. 191

•

Each year, between 20 and 25 Fellows are selected to receive a $625,000 grant paid over five
years, with no strings attached. 192,193 Fellows are selected on the criteria of being:
o

On the precipice of great discovery or innovation;

o

Financially limited from the fulfillment of their discovery or innovation; and

o

A resident or a citizen of the United States, not holding elective office.

•

25 percent of all MacArthur Fellows from 2000 to 2016 were foreign-born. 194 In the same period,
32 percent of the fellows working in the STEM fields were foreign-born (see Figure VII.2 below).

•

Three fellows are from countries banned in the executive order: 195
o

2003: Nawal M. Nour (born in Sudan), obstetrician and gynecologist

o

2013: Dina Katabi (born in Syria), computer scientist

o

2014: Khaled Mattawa (born in Libya), a translator and poet

190

Boston University, “Nobel Laureates,” available at https://www.bu.edu/provost/awards-publications/facultyachievement/national-awards-and-distinctions/nobel-laureates/, accessed March 24, 2017, and “List of Nobel Laureates by
University Affiliation,” available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_by_university_affiliation accessed
March 24, 2017.

191

MacArthur Foundation, “MacArthur Fellows,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/,
accessed March 20, 2017.

192

MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” 2017, available at
https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017. The grant
amount was increased from $500,000 in 2013.

193

MacArthur Foundation, “MacArthur Fellows,” 2017, available at https://www.macfound.org/programs/fellows/strategy/,
accessed March 18, 2017.

194

MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” 2017, available at
https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017. Foreign-born
recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to non-American parents.
Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was
assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.

195

MacArthur Foundation, “Creativity on the Move - International,” 2016, available at https://www.macfound.org/maps/3/#,
accessed March 20, 2017.

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Figure VII.2
Share of Foreign-Born among MacArthur Fellowship Recipients in STEM Fields
2000-2016

Notes:
[1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to nonAmerican parents.
[2] Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was
assumed to be native-born.
Sources:
[1] MacArthur Foundation, “Directory of Fellows, 1981-2016,” February 2017, available at
https://www.macfound.org/media/fellows_pdf/Fellows_1981-2016_Feb_2017.pdf, accessed March 18, 2017.
[2] Source documents for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace are available upon request.

C. Recognitions in Medicine

i.
•

Wolf Prize in Medicine

The aim of the Wolf Foundation is to award prizes to outstanding scientists and artists –
irrespective of nationality, race, color, religion, sex, or political views – for achievements in the
interest of mankind and friendly relations among peoples. 196 Since 1978, prizes in the science
field include Agriculture, Chemistry, Mathematics, Medicine, and Physics. 197

196

Wolf Foundation, “About,” available at
http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3000&language=eng, accessed March 30, 2017.

197

Wolf Foundation, “Prizes,” available at http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3020, accessed
March 30, 2017.

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•

The Wolf Prize has been considered a significant predictor of the Nobel Prize, with more than a
third of its recipients going on to win the Nobel Prize. 198

•

36.8 percent of all U.S.-affiliated scientists to have won the Wolf Prize are foreign-born. 40
percent of all U.S.-affiliated scientists to have won the Wolf Prize in the last 16 years are foreignborn. 199

ii.

Top Cancer Researchers

•

“The researchers at the top 7 cancer centers come from more than 50 countries. Among the 56
countries, the leading country of origin for cancer researchers is China, followed, in order, by
India, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, Lebanon, South Korea, France, Japan,
Israel, Australia, Greece, Spain, Brazil, Taiwan and Argentina. Researchers from China account for
21 percent of the foreign-born cancer researchers at the 7 centers (and 8 percent of all cancer
researchers at the 7 centers). India was the country of origin for 10 percent of the foreign-born
researchers, followed by Germany and Canada at 7 percent, and the United Kingdom at 6
percent.” 200

•

Overall, 42 percent of the researchers at the top 7 cancer research centers are foreign-born,
whereas only 13 percent of the U.S population is foreign-born. 201

198

Judy Siegel-Itzkovich, “Wolf Prizes in the Sciences and Arts Presented to Nine North Americans,” January 29, 2015, available
at http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Health/Wolf-Prizes-in-the-sciences-and-arts-presented-to-nine-North-Americans389466, accessed March 30, 2017.

199

Wolf Foundation, “About,” available at
http://www.wolffund.org.il/index.php?dir=site&page=content&cs=3000&language=eng, accessed March 30, 2017. Foreignborn recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories. Recipients’ birthplaces
were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be nativeborn. Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.

200

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of Immigrant to Cancer Research in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, February 2013,
available at
http://www.kauffman.org/~/media/kauffman_org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/2013/03/nfap_contributions_im
migrants_to_cancer_research.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.

201

Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrant Scientists Invaluable to the United States,” Frontlines, May/June 2015, available at
https://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/ie_mayjun15_front_lines.pdf, accessed March 31, 2017.

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Table VII.2
Share of Foreign-Born Cancer Researchers at America’s Top Cancer Centers
2010

Note: The author conducted an analysis of 1,500 biographies of cancer researchers on staff at the seven comprehensive cancer
centers that received the highest amount of P30 grants from the National Cancer Institute in 2010 based on cancer center
website research and direct interviews with individual researchers and cancer center staff.
Source: Anderson, Stuart, “Immigrant Scientists Invaluable to the United States,” Frontlines, May/June 2015, available at
https://www.nafsa.org/_/File/_/ie_mayjun15_front_lines.pdf, accessed March 27, 2017.

iii.
•

Howard Hughes Investigators

The Investigator Program at the Howard Hughes Medical Institute provides long-term funding for
researchers in biomedical science. In 2015, at least 12 of the 26 appointed investigators (46
percent) were foreign-born. 202

D. Other Prizes in STEM

i.
•

Fields Medal

The Fields Medal is regarded as “mathematics’ closest analog to the Nobel Prize.” 203 It is
awarded every four years by the International Mathematical Union to one to four recipients
under the age of 40. 204

202

The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in Stem,” available at
http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html,
accessed March 27, 2017.

203

Wolfram MathWorld, “Fields Medal,” 2017, available at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FieldsMedal.html, accessed March
20, 2017.

204

Wolfram MathWorld, “Fields Medal,” 2017, available at http://mathworld.wolfram.com/FieldsMedal.html, accessed March
20, 2017.

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•

Since its inception in 1936, 63 percent of Fields Medal recipients affiliated with a United States
research institution have been foreign-born. 205 Moreover, since 2002, all Fields Medal recipients
affiliated with a U.S. research institution were foreign-born. 206

•

In 2014, Maryam Mirzakhani, born in Iran, became the first woman to be awarded the Fields
Medal since its inception in 1936. 207 After two consecutive victories in the International
Mathematical Olympiad, she started a Ph.D. program at Harvard University. She is currently a
professor of mathematics at Stanford University. 208
Figure VII.3
Number of Fields Medalists Affiliated with a U.S. Institution at the Time of the Award
2000-2016

Note: Recipients' birthplaces were identified through Internet research.
Sources:
[1] “List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/, accessed March 20,
2017.
[2] Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.

205

“List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/,
accessed March 20, 2017. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be
found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace is
available upon request.

206

“List of Fields Medalists,” Math Union, 2014, available at http://www.mathunion.org/general/prizes/fields/prizewinners/,
accessed March 20, 2017. Recipients’ birthplaces were identified through Internet research. If the birthplace could not be
found, the recipient was assumed to be native-born. Source document for each foreign-born recipient’s birthplace is
available upon request.

207

Carey, Bjorn, “Stanford’s Maryam Mirzakhani Wins Fields Medal,” August 12, 2014, available at
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/august/fields-medal-mirzakhani-081214.html, accessed March 20, 2017.

208

Carey, Bjorn, “Stanford’s Maryam Mirzakhani Wins Fields Medal,” August 12, 2014, available at
http://news.stanford.edu/news/2014/august/fields-medal-mirzakhani-081214.html, accessed March 20, 2017.

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ii.
•

Turing Award

The A. M. Turing Award recognizes major contributions of lasting importance to computing. It is
sometimes referred to as the “Nobel Prize” of Computing. 209
o

Since the award’s creation in 1966, 11 of the 51 U.S. winners (22 percent) have been
immigrants, and 14 of the 51 U.S. winners (27 percent) have been first or second
generation immigrants. 210

o

From 2010 to 2015, 4 of the 8 U.S. Turing Award recipients (50%) were first or second
generation immigrants.
Figure VII.4
Share of Turing Award Recipients by Immigrant Generation
1966-2015

Notes:
[1] First-Generation immigrants are people born outside the United States and its surrounding territories to parents neither of whom was a U.S.
citizen.
[2] Second-Generation immigrants are people born in the United States or its surrounding territories, with at least one first-generation parent.
[3] Recipients' parents whose birthplace could not be identified were assumed to have been born in the U.S.
Sources:
[1] A.M. Turing Award, “Alphabetical Listing of A.M. Turing Award Winners,” available at http://amturing.acm.org/alphabetical.cfm, accessed
March 20, 2017.
[2] A.M. Turing award winner profiles for each recipient, available at http://amturing.acm.org, accessed March 20, 2017.

209

Association for Computing Machinery, “A. M. Turing Award,” available at http://amturing.acm.org/, accessed February 21,
2017.

210

Complete list of Turing Award winners is available at http://amturing.acm.org/alphabetical.cfm, accessed February 21, 2017.
Data on award winners’ country of birth are available on each winner’s Turing Award profile.

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iii.
•

National Medal of Science

The President’s National Medal of Science was established in 1959 as the President’s Award to
individuals “deserving of special recognition by reason of their outstanding contributions to
knowledge in the physical, biological, mathematical, or engineering sciences.” 211 Successful
candidates must be U.S. citizens or permanent residents who are applying for U.S. citizenship. 212
Figure VII.5
National Medal of Science Recipients by Nativity Status
1962-2014

Sources:
[1] National Science Foundation, “The President's National Medal of Science,” available at
https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/results.jsp, accessed March 27, 2017.
[2] Recipient birthplaces were identified from their biographies available from National Science & Technology Medals
Foundation, “Laureates,” available at https://www.nationalmedals.org/laureates, accessed March 27, 2017.

•

Of the 506 recipients of the National Medal of Science, 28 percent were foreign-born. 213 More
granularly,

211

National Science Foundation, “National Medal of Science,” available at https://www.nsf.gov/od/nms/medal.jsp, accessed
March 24, 2017.

212

National Science Foundation, “Medal of Science Fact Sheet,” available at
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100684, accessed March 24, 2017.

213

National Science & Technology Medals Foundation, “Laureates,” 2017, available at
https://www.nationalmedals.org/laureates/, accessed March 24, 2017.

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o

41 percent of recipients in Mathematics or Computer Science were foreign-born;

o

33 percent of recipients in Physics and Engineering were foreign-born;

o

24 percent of recipients in Biology were foreign-born;

o

13 percent of recipients in Chemistry were foreign-born; and

o

13 percent of recipients in Behavioral and Social Science were foreign-born.

iv.

Intel Science Talent Search

•

“The Intel Science Talent Search (Intel STS) is the nation's most prestigious pre-college science
competition. Intel STS alumni have made extraordinary contributions to science and hold more
than 100 of the world’s most coveted science and math honors, including the Nobel Prize and the
National Medal of Science. Students are selected based upon their scientific research and also on
their overall potential as future leaders of the scientific community.” 214

•

Each year, Intel STS recognizes 300 students as semifinalists. From that pool, 40 finalists are
invited to Washington D.C. to compete for the top prizes. 215

•

“Previously known as the Westinghouse Science Talent Search or the ‘Junior Nobel Prize,’ more
than 95 percent of winners of the Intel Science Talent Search (STS) traditionally have pursued
science as a career, with 70 percent earning Ph.D.’s or M.D.’s.” 216

•

A review of the finalists of Intel STS shows that children of immigrants are a “vital part of
America’s future in science and mathematics.” 217
o

“83 percent (33 of 40) of the finalists of the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, the leading
science competition for U.S. high school students, were the children of immigrants.” 218

214

Student Science, “Intel STS 2016 Finalists,” 2015, available at https://student.societyforscience.org/intel-sts-2016-finalists,
accessed March 20, 2017.

215

Student Science, “Intel STS 2016 Finalists,” 2015, available at https://student.societyforscience.org/intel-sts-2016-finalists,
accessed March 20, 2017.

216

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 3.

217

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 3. Research was conducted by the author through interviews with the finalists and
their parents.

218

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.

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o

o

“Parents who were international students were also more likely to have a child as a
finalist than native-born parents. A total of 27 of the 40 children – 68 percent – had a
parent who came to America as an international student.” 220

o
•

“Moreover, 75 percent – 30 out of 40 – of the finalists had parents who worked in
America on H-1B visas. That compares to 7 children who had both parents born in the
United States.” 219

“At the 2016 Intel Science Talent Search, 7 of the 9 top awards were earned by the
children of immigrants, including first place prizes for innovation and basic research.” 221

The share of finalists with foreign-born parent(s) has been increasing over time. As shown in
Figure VII.6 below, in 2004, 60 percent (24 of 40) of the finalists had at least one foreign-born
parent. In 2011, 70 (28 of 40) percent had at least one foreign-born parent, and in 2016, 83
percent (33 out of 40) of the finalists had at least one foreign-born parent.

219

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.

220

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 1.

221

Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March 2017,
available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 2.

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Figure VII.6
Intel Science Talent Search Finalists by Nativity Status of Parents
2004, 2011, and 2016

Notes:
[1] If a finalist had at least one parent who was born outside the U.S. and its territories, then he/she is defined as a “finalist with a
foreign-born parent.”
[2] The data are based on interviews with finalists and their parents by the National Foundation for American Policy.
Source: Anderson, Stuart, “The Contributions of the Children of Immigrants to Science in America,” NFAP Policy Brief, March
2017, available at http://nfap.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Children-of-Immigrants-in-Science.NFAP-Policy-Brief.March2017.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 5.

v.

Breakthrough Prize

The Breakthrough Prize was founded by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs to honor and to support “important,
primarily recent, achievements in the categories of Fundamental Physics, Life Sciences, and
Mathematics.” 222 The first prizes were awarded in 2012 in Fundamental Physics; prizes in Life Sciences
and Mathematics began in 2013 and 2015, respectively. 223 Laureates receive $3 million each in prize
money. 224

222

“About,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at https://breakthroughprize.org/About, accessed March 20, 2017.

223

“Breakthrough Prizes Laureates 2012-2017,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2016,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2013,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2015,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2017,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2012, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2013,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2017, accessed
March 20, 2017.

224

“About,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at https://breakthroughprize.org/About, accessed March 20, 2017.

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As shown in Figure VII.7 below, 43 percent of Breakthrough Prize winners who were affiliated
with a U.S. institution at the time of the award were foreign-born. In Fundamental Physics, 60
percent of the U.S.-affiliated winners were foreign-born and in Mathematics, 67 percent of the
winners were foreign-born.
Figure VII.7
Share of Foreign-Born Breakthrough Prize Winners
Affiliated with a U.S. Institution at the Time of the Award
2012-2017

Notes:
[1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to non-American
parents.
[2] Recipients birthplaces were identified Internet research. If birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be nativeborn.
Sources:
[1] “Breakthrough Prizes Laureates 2012-2017,” Breakthroughprize.org, 2017, available at
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2016,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/3/P1/Y2017, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2013,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2015,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2016, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/2/P1/Y2017,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2012, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2013,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2014, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015,
https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2015, https://breakthroughprize.org/Laureates/1/P1/Y2017, accessed March 20, 2017.
[2] Source document for each foreign-born recipient's birthplace is available upon request.

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vi.

Simons Investigators

The Simons Foundation selects Investigators working in mathematics, physics, theoretical computer
sciences, and mathematical modeling of living systems. Eleven of the sixteen Simons Investigators in
2014 were immigrants living in the U.S. 225

vii.

Blavatnik Awards

The Blavatnik Awards are given in the life sciences, physical sciences, engineering, and chemistry. One
out of three winners in 2014 was foreign-born. Six of nine winners and finalists were foreign-born in
2014. 226
E. Membership in the National Academy of Sciences
•

“Members are elected to the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] in recognition of their
distinguished and continuing achievements in original research. Membership is a widely accepted
mark of excellence in science and is considered one of the highest honors that a scientist can
receive. U.S. immigrants constitute 29% of current NAS members in applied mathematics, 21% in
Biochemistry, 37% in engineering sciences, and 36% in mathematics.” 227

F. Medal of Freedom
•

The Presidential Medal of Freedom is an award bestowed by the President of the United States
that was established in 1963 by President John F. Kennedy. It replaced the Medal of Freedom
previously established by President Harry S. Truman in 1945 to honor civilian service during
World War II. 228

225

The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at
http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html,
accessed March 11, 2017.

226

The Vilcek Foundation, “Immigration Nation, American Success: Achievements in STEM,” available at
http://www.vilcek.org/news/current-news/past-news/immigrant-nation-american-success-achievements-in-stem.html,
accessed March 11, 2017.

227

Hanson, Gordon, H. and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Talent, Immigration, and U.S. Economic Competitiveness,” Compete
America Coalition, May 2013, available at
https://gps.ucsd.edu/_files/faculty/hanson/hanson_publication_immigration_talent.pdf, accessed March 20, 2017, p. 14.

228

National Archives, “Executive Order 9586 – The Medal of Freedom,” available at https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/codification/executive-order/09586.html, accessed March 27, 2017.

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•

It is the nation’s highest civilian honor presented to individuals who have made “especially
meritorious contributions to the security or national interests of the United States, to world
peace, or to cultural or other significant private endeavors.” 229

•

Recipients have included individuals who have made significant contributions to wide range of
areas, including the arts, business and economics, education, history, humanitarian service, law,
media, military service, philanthropy, politics and government, religion, sports, and science and
technology.

•

As shown in Figure VII.8 below, foreign-born recipients and second-generation immigrants
accounted for 29 percent of all Presidential Medal of Freedom recipients since its inception and
28 percent of recipients in the area of science and technology. 230

•

Between 1990 and 2016, over 29 percent of the recipients in the area of science and technology
were foreign-born or second-generation immigrants. As a point of reference, in 2012, first- and
second-generation immigrants accounted for about 24 percent of the U.S. adult population; this
share was even lower in the previous decades in which the medal was awarded. 231

229

Obama White House, “The Presidential Medal of Freedom,” 2016, available at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/campaign/medal-of-freedom, accessed March 27, 2017.

230

Science and Technology areas are medicine, science, space exploration, and computing.

231

Pew Research Center, “Second-Generation Americans,” February 7, 2013, available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans/, accessed March 27, 2017.

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Figure VII.8
Share of Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients by Nativity Status
All Years (1963-2016) and 1990-2016

Notes:
[1] Foreign-born recipients are defined as individuals who were born outside the United States and its territories to nonAmerican parents. Second-generation immigrants are defined as individuals born in the United States or its territories with at
least one foreign-born parent.
[2] Recipients birthplaces were identified Internet research. If birthplace could not be found, the recipient was assumed to be
native-born.
[3] Science & technology fields are defined as medicine, science, space exploration, and computing.
Sources:
[1] United States Senate, "Presidential Medal of Freedom Recipients," available at
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/Presidential_Medal_of_Freedom_Recipients.htm, accessed
March 27, 2017.
[2] Pew Research Center, “Second-Generation Americans,” February 7, 2013, available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/07/second-generation-americans/, accessed March 27, 2017.
[3] Source document for each first- and second-generation immigrant’s birthplace and/or parent’s birth place is available upon
request.

G. The Carnegie Corporation Pride of America Honorees
•

232

“Every July 4th, Carnegie Corporation of New York salutes the legacy of Andrew Carnegie by
recognizing an inspiring group of well-known naturalized citizens from all walks of life—the ‘Pride
of America.’” 232

Carnegie Corporation of New York, “About,” 2015, available at http://greatimmigrants.carnegie.org/about/, accessed March
20, 2017.

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The 2016 honorees include: 233
o

o

The CEO of Google, the Cofounder of Venmo, the Cofounder and CEO of Whatsapp, the
CTO of Uber Technologies, the President and CEO of Sprint, and Chairman of the
Americas of McKinsey & Company.

o

A former U.S. Secretary of the Interior, a Brigadier General of the U.S. Army, a retired U.S.
Army Captain, a Judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and two U.S.
ambassadors.

o

233

The President of Johns Hopkins University, the Dean of the Stern School of Business at
New York University, and the Provost and Chief Academic Officer of Carnegie Melon
University.

Actors, journalists, scientists, industrialists, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, a Grammy
Award-winning singer, an Olympic five-time gold medalist, an artist, a chef, a ballerina, an
author, and others.

Carnegie Corporation of New York, “2016 Great Immigrant Honorees: The Pride of America,” June 30, 2016, available at
https://www.carnegie.org/news/articles/2016-great-immigrants-pride-america/, accessed March 20, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

IMMIGRATION, CRIME, AND TERRORISM

Contrary to popular belief, studies generally find that immigration may reduce crime rates over time.
Empirical data also suggests that immigrants are no more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized than
native-born Americans. Regrettably, the prevalence of this public belief makes immigrants, especially
those with Islamic belief, more likely to be the victims of hate crime.

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

Studies find that immigration does not increase the crime rate. In the long run, immigration
decreases the crime rate, especially the violent crime rate.

•

Academic literature shows that immigrants are less likely to be criminals than U.S. native-born
population.

•

Investigation of the Annual Survey of Jails shows that overall, immigrants account for less than
5 percent of the total inmate population in the surveyed jail detention facilities.

•

The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) 234 shows that
o

o
•

234

Among the 1,473 crimes reported in this dataset, immigrants account for less than 15
percent of the individuals that were radicalized in the United States.
Individuals from the six countries in the Executive Order account for only 2.3 percent of
the individuals that were radicalized in the United States.

UCR Hate Crime Data show that the percentage of total reported hate crimes that have been
committed against Muslims in the United States and in Massachusetts spiked after the 9/11
terrorist attacks.

Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) includes a sample of individuals espousing Islamist,
far right, far left, or single issue ideologies who have radicalized within the United States to the point of committing
ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an
extremist organization whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. START,
“Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at
http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March
22, 2017.

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A. Public Opinion
A large portion of the American population believes that immigration increases crime across the United
States. Compared to immigrants of other ethnicities, Latin American and Middle Eastern immigrants are
believed to have a greater negative impact on the United States.
•

Pew Research Center American Trends Panel Survey (March/April 2015) 235
o

o

34 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are making social and
moral values worse nationally.

o

Only 20 percent of respondents viewed the impact of Middle Eastern immigrants as
positive (compared to 26 percent for Latin American immigrants, 44 percent for
European immigrants, and 47 percent for Asian immigrants).

o
•

50 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are making crime
worse nationally. 36 percent of respondents say that immigrants in the United States are
making crime worse in their local communities.

49 percent of respondents think immigration should be decreased.

Pew Research Center Survey (September 2014) 236
o

•

50 percent of respondents believe that Islam is more likely than other religions to
encourage violence among believers (increased from 25 percent in 2002).

German Marshall Fund (2010) 237
o
o

•

32 percent believe legal immigrants increase crime.
58 percent believe illegal immigrants increase crime.

Gallup Poll (June 2007) 238
o

58 percent of respondents think immigration is making crime worse.

o

37 percent of respondents think immigration is making social and moral values worse.

235

Pew Research Center, “Chapter 4: U.S. Public Has Mixed Views of Immigrants and Immigration,” in Modern Immigration
Wave Brings 59 Million to U.S., Driving Population Growth and Change Through 2065: Views of Immigration’s Impact on U.S.
Society Mixed, September 2015, available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-28_modern-immigrationwave_REPORT.pdf, accessed February 22, 2017.

236

Pew Research Center, “Growing Concern about Rise of Islamic Extremism at Home and Abroad,” September 2014, available
at http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/09/9-10-14-Islamic-Extremism-release.pdf, accessed February 22, 2017.

237

Bansak, Cynthia et al., “Frontiers of Immigration Research,” in Economics of Immigration, Routledge: New York: 2015.

238

Gallup, “Immigration,” available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx, accessed February 22, 2017.

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National Identity Survey by International Social Survey Programme (1995 and 2003) 239
o People in OECD countries believe immigrants increase crime rates (~30 percent in the
United States).

B. Immigration and Crime

i.

Existing Research Finds No Impact of Immigration on Increasing Crime

Existing research and empirical evidence show little support of the public belief that immigration
increased crime in the United States.
•

•

239

As illustrated in Figure VIII.1, between 2010 and 2014, the increase of the share of immigrants in
the total U.S. population coincides with the decreasing trend in the rate of criminal offenses. This
relationship is also present at the state level.
Figure VIII.2 plots the correlation coefficients between the rate of crime offences and the
immigrant share for each state in the United States between 2010 and 2014. A negative
correlation coefficient means that an increase in the immigrant share is correlated with a
decrease in the crime rate. Among the 51 states, the correlation coefficient is negative for 42
states.

Bianchi, Milo, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti. “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?” Journal of the European Economic
Association 10(6), 2012: 1318-1347, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01085.x/full,
accessed March 24, 2017, Figure 1.

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Figure VIII.1
Comparison of the Immigrant Share in the U.S. Population and Rate of Criminal Offenses
2010 – 2014

Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Data: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race,
Summarized Yearly, 2014,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36400.v1.
[2] Brown, Anna, and Renee Stepler, “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States,” 2005-2013 and 2014, available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-about-the-data/ and
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states/.

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Figure VIII.2
Correlation Coefficients between Rate of Crime Offenses and Immigrant Share in the United States
2010 – 2014

Note: The correlation coefficient is a measure that determines the degree to which two variables' movements are associated.
The range of values for the correlation coefficient is -1.0 to 1.0. In particular, a negative correlation coefficient means that an
increase in the immigrant share is correlated with a decrease in the crime rate.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Data: Arrests by Age, Sex, and Race,
Summarized Yearly, 2014,” Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36400.v1, accessed March 24, 2017.
[2] Brown, Anna, and Renee Stepler, “Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States,” 2005-2013 and 2014, available at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states-about-the-data/ and
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/04/19/statistical-portrait-of-hispanics-in-the-united-states/, accessed March 24, 2017.

The academic literature finds that not only is there a lack of a positive relationship between immigration
and crime, the empirical evidence generally indicates that immigration might actually reduce crime,
especially violent crime, over time. Studies tend to support the observation of one sociologist, who noted,
“Cities of concentrated immigration are some of the safest places around.” 240 The literature has found:
•

“[C]ities with high crime rates tend to have large numbers of immigrants. However, controlling
for the demographic characteristics of the cities, recent immigrants appear to have no effect on
crime rates.” 241

240

Sampson, Robert J., “Rethinking Crime and Immigration,” Contexts 7(1), Winter 2008: 28-31, available at
https://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/01/contexts_winter08_sampson.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 30.

241

Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Cross-city Evidence on the Relationship between Immigration and Crime,”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 17(2), June 1998: 457-493, available at

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•

“After controlling for a host of demographic and economic characteristics, […] immigration does
not increase crime rates, and some aspects of immigration lessen crime in metropolitan
areas.” 242

•

“[A] systematic, but small impact of immigration on crime.” 243

•

“[C]ities with the largest increases in immigration between 1990 and 2000 experienced the
largest decreases in homicide and robbery during the same time.” 244

•

“Consistent with the revitalization thesis, results show that the increased size of the foreign-born
population reduces lethal violence over time. Specifically, we find that neighborhoods with a
larger share of immigrants have fewer total, non-Latino White, and Latino homicide victims.” 245

•

As a response to President Trump’s campaign message, one study tested whether immigrants
were responsible for the violent and drug-related crime in the United States. “Data uniformly
show no association between immigrant population size and increased violent crime. However,
there appears to be a small but significant association between undocumented immigrant
populations and drug-related arrests. […] Results largely contradict the Trump Hypothesis: no
evidence links Mexican or undocumented Mexican immigrants specifically to violent or drugrelated crime. Undocumented immigrant associations with drug-related crime are minimal,
though significant. The Trump Hypothesis consequently appears to be biased toward rhetoric
rather than evidence.” 246

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199822)17:3%3C457::AID-PAM4%3E3.0.CO;2-F/abstract,
accessed March 24, 2017.
242

Reid, Lesley Williams, Harald E. Weiss, Robert M. Adelman, and Charles Jaret. “The Immigration–Crime Relationship:
Evidence across US Metropolitan Areas.” Social Science Research 34(4), March 2005: 757-780, available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0049089X05000104, accessed March 24, 2017, 757.

243

Spenkuch, Jörg L, “Understanding the Impact of Immigration on Crime,” American Law and Economics Review 16(1),
September 2013: 177-219, available at https://academic.oup.com/aler/article-abstract/16/1/177/135166/Understandingthe-Impact-of-Immigration-on-Crime?redirectedFrom=fulltext, accessed March 24, 2017, 177.

244

Wadsworth, Tim, “Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment of the Influence of Immigration on
Changes in Violent Crime between 1990 and 2000,” Social Science Quarterly 91(2), April 2010: 531-533, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2010.00706.x/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017. 533.

245

Martinez, Ramiro, Jacob I. Stowell, and Matthew T. Lee, “Immigration and Crime in an Era of Transformation: A Longitudinal
Analysis of Homicides in San Diego Neighborhoods, 1980–2000,” Criminology 48(3), August 2010: 797-829, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2010.00202.x/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017, 797.

246

Green, David, “The Trump Hypothesis: Testing Immigrant Populations as a Determinant of Violent and Drug‐Related Crime in
the United States,” Social Science Quarterly 97(3), May 2016: 506-524, available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ssqu.12300/abstract, accessed March 24, 2017, 506.

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•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

These findings also largely carry over to studies conducted in Canada, 247 the UK, 248 and Italy. 249

ii.
•

Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Criminals than Native-Born Individuals

“No matter how you look at the issue, the inescapable conclusion is that immigrants are, on
average, less prone to criminality than the U.S. native-born population.” 250
o

o

“According to an original analysis of data from the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS)
conducted by the authors of this report, roughly 1.6 percent of immigrant males age 1839 are incarcerated, compared to 3.3 percent of the native-born. This disparity in
incarceration rates has existed for decades, as evidenced by data from the 1980, 1990, and
2000 decennial censuses. In each of those years, the incarceration rates of the native-born
were anywhere from two to five times higher than that of immigrants.” 251
“The 2010 Census data reveals that incarceration rates among the young, less educated
Mexican, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan men who make up the bulk of the unauthorized
population are significantly lower than the incarceration rate among native-born young
men without a high-school diploma. In 2010, less-educated native-born men age 18-39
had an incarceration rate of 10.7 percent—more than triple the 2.8 percent rate among
foreign-born Mexican men, and five times greater than the 1.7 percent rate among
foreign-born Salvadoran and Guatemalan men.” 252

247

Zhang, Haimin, “Immigration and Crime: Evidence from Canada,” CLSRN Working Paper, April 2014 available at
http://www.clsrn.econ.ubc.ca/workingpapers/CLSRN%20Working%20Paper%20no.%20135%20-%20Zhang.pdf, accessed
March 24, 2017.

248

Bell, Brian, Francesco Fasani, and Stephen Machin, “Crime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves,” Review
of Economics and Statistics 95(4), 2013: 1278-1290, available at
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/59323/1/CEP_Bell_Fasani_Machin_Crime-and-immigration_2013.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.

249

Bianchi, Milo, Paolo Buonanno, and Paolo Pinotti. “Do Immigrants Cause Crime?” Journal of the European Economic
Association 10(6), 2012: 1318-1347, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2012.01085.x/full,
accessed March 24, 2017.

250

Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,”
American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit
ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 4.

251

Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,”
American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit
ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 1.

252

Ewing, Walter A., Daniel E. Martínez, and Rubén G. Rumbaut, “The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States,”
American Immigration Council Special Report, July 2015: 1-25, available at
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_unit
ed_states.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 1-2.

110

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•

For the male population ages 18 to 39 “the incarceration rate of the U.S.-born (3.51 percent) was
four times the rate of the foreign-born (0.86 percent). The latter was half the 1.71 percent rate for
non-Hispanic white natives, and thirteen times less than the 11.6 percent incarceration rate for
native black men. The advantage for immigrants vis-à-vis natives applies to every ethnic group
without exception. Almost all of the Asian immigrant groups have lower incarceration rates than
the Latin American groups (the exception involves foreign-born Laotians and Cambodians, whose
rate of 0.92 percent is still well below that for non-Hispanic white natives).” 253

•

“[I]mmigrants are significantly less antisocial despite being more likely to have lower levels of
income, less education, and reside in urban areas.” 254

•

“[F]irst generation immigrants are less likely to be involved in serious offending and to evidence
persistence in offending, and appear to be on a path toward desistance much more quickly than
their peers.” 255

•

The Investigation of the Annual Survey of Jails 256 shows that, among most of the jail detention
facilities, immigrants constitute only a small share of the total inmate population in the majority of
the jail detention facilities between 2010 and 2014 (Table VIII.1). Over all, immigrants account for
less than 5 percent of the total inmate population in the surveyed jail detention facilities. 257 Around
50 percent of these immigrant inmates were likely to be detained due to immigration violation, as
oppose to violation of other criminal codes. 258

253

Rumbaut, Rubén G., Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz Komaie, Charlie V. Morgan, and Rosaura Tafoya-Estrada, “Immigration and
Incarceration: Patterns and Predictors of Imprisonment among First- and Second-Generation Young Adults,” Immigration
and Crime: Ethnicity, Race, and Violence, 2006: 64-89, available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2631709, accessed March 24, 2017, 64.

254

Vaughn, Michael G., Christopher P. Salas-Wright, Matt DeLisi, and Brandy R. Maynard, “The Immigrant Paradox: Immigrants
are Less Antisocial than Native-born Americans,” Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology 49(7), 2014:1129-1137,
available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00127-013-0799-3, accessed March 24, 2017.

255

Bersani, Bianca E., Thomas A. Loughran, and Alex R. Piquero, “Comparing Patterns and Predictors of Immigrant Offending
among a Sample of Adjudicated Youth,” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 43(11), 2014: 1914-1933, available at
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10964-013-0045-z, accessed March 24, 2017.

256

The Annual Survey of Jails gathered data from a nationally representative sample of local jails on jail inmate populations, jail
capacity, and related information. U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Survey of Jails,” available at
https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go2300.html, accessed March 22, 2017.

257

The total inmate population is 2,986,670. Among them, 148,752 of the total inmate population are non-citizens.

258

Among the 148,752 non-citizen inmates, 73,741 of them have U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement flag.

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Table VIII.1
The Proportion of Non-Citizens within Jail Detention Facilities
2010 – 2014
Proportion of Non-Citizens in
Facility

Count of Facilities within
Proportion Range

Average ICE Inmates as
Proportion of Total in These
Facilities

1% or Less

2,577

0.29%

1% to 10%

1,334

1.53%

10% to 25%

314

6.83%

25% to 50%

118

22.32%

50% to 75%

34

39.78%

75% to 100%

32

6.12%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, “Annual Survey of Jails,” available at https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/go2300.html, accessed
March 22, 2017.

•

These statistics are consistent with the results of a study by U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO). Among their study sample, GAO found that “the criminal aliens had an average of 7 arrests,
65 percent were arrested at least once for an immigration offense[.]” 259

•

“[Ruled] out deportation as an important mechanical factor for the observed differences in
institutionalization” because “[f]irst, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act increased
the list of criminal acts for which noncitizens must be detained.” And “[s]econd, the speed of
removal of deportable aliens may critically affect immigrants’ institutionalization rates.” 260

•

“[T]he process of migration selects individuals who either have lower criminal propensities or are
more responsive to deterrent effects than the average native. Immigrants who were already in
the country reduced their relative institutionalization probability over the decades; and the newly
arrived immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s seem to be particularly unlikely to be involved in
criminal activity, consistent with increasingly positive selection along this dimension.” 261

259

U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Criminal Alien Statistics: Information on Incarcerations, Arrests, and Costs,” GAO11-187, March 2011: 1-64, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017, 19.

260

Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Why Are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective
Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 13229, July 2007: 128, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13229.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.

261

Butcher, Kristin F., and Anne Morrison Piehl. “Why Are Immigrants' Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on Selective
Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 13229, July 2007: 128, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13229.pdf, accessed March 24, 2017.

112

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C. Immigration and Terrorism

i.

The Link between Immigration and Terrorism is Unclear

There are fewer studies on the relationship between immigration and terrorism.
•

“[I]migrants stemming from terrorist-prone states moving to another country are indeed an
important vehicle through which terrorism does diffuse. Having said that, the findings also highlight
that migrant inflows per se actually lead to a lower level of terrorist attacks.” 262

•

“[M]ore migration generally (i.e., when immigration is not necessarily linked to terrorism in the
migrants’ countries of origin) into a country is associated with a lower level of terrorist attacks.” 263

ii.

Immigrants Are No More Likely to Be Radicalized than Native-Born Individuals

Empirical analyses suggest that immigrants are no more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized than
native-born individuals.
•

The Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) 264 shows that, among
the 1,473 crimes reported in this dataset, immigrants account for less than 15% of the individuals
that were radicalized in the United States (Table VIII.2).

262

Bove, Vincenzo, and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78(2), 2016: 572-588,
available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/684679, accessed March 24, 2017.

263

Bove, Vincenzo, and Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” The Journal of Politics 78(2), 2016: 572-588,
available at http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/684679, accessed March 24, 2017.

264

Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States dataset (“PIRUS”) includes a sample of individuals espousing Islamist,
far right, far left, or single issue ideologies who have radicalized within the United States to the point of committing
ideologically motivated illegal violent or non-violent acts, joining a designated terrorist organization, or associating with an
extremist organization whose leader(s) has/have been indicted of an ideologically motivated violent offense. START,
“Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at
http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March
22, 2017.

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Table VIII.2
Residency Status of Individuals Radicalized in the United States
1948 – 2004 265
Residency Status
Born Citizen

Number of Individuals

Percent of Total

1,253

85.06%

Naturalized Citizen

61

4.14%

Legal Permanent Resident

41

2.78%

Temporary Resident

9

0.61%

Undocumented Resident

9

0.61%

100

6.79%

1,473

100.00%

Unknown
Total

Source: START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at
http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22,
2017.

265

The years during which the 1,473 individuals’ activity first came to public attention. START, “Profiles of Individual
Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individualradicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.

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Individuals from the six countries in the Executive Order account for only 2.3% of the individuals
that were radicalized in the United States (Table VIII.3).
Table VIII.3
Number of Individuals Radicalized in the United States by Country of Origin
U.S. and the Six Countries in the Executive Order
1948 – 2004 266
Country of Origin
United States

Number of Individuals

Percent of Total

1,253

85.06%

Somalia

25

1.70%

Yemen

5

0.34%

Iran

1

0.07%

Sudan

1

0.07%

Syria

1

0.07%

Libya

0

0.00%

Total

1,473

100.00%

Source: START, “Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at
http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individual-radicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22,
2017.

D. Immigrants Are More Likely to Be the Victims of Hate Crime
The academic research and empirical evidences shows that immigrants do not increase crime rates, nor
are they more likely to be criminals or to be radicalized. If anything, the prevalence of negative public
belief regarding immigrants, especially those with Islamic belief, makes these immigrants more likely to
be the victims of hate crime.
•

“Muslim immigrants living in states with the sharpest increase in hate crimes also exhibit: greater
chances of marrying within their own ethnic group; higher fertility; lower female labour force
participation; and lower English proficiency.” 267

•

“Literature prior to 9/11 indicated that the most frequently targeted minority groups that were
victims of hate crimes were Blacks, followed by Jews … Following 9/11, however, there was a

266

The years during which the 1,473 individuals’ activity first came to public attention. START, “Profiles of Individual
Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS),” available at http://www.start.umd.edu/publication/profiles-individualradicalization-united-states-preliminary-findings, accessed March 22, 2017.

267

Gould, Eric D., and Esteban F. Klor. “The Long‐run Effect of 9/11: Terrorism, Backlash, and the Assimilation of Muslim
Immigrants in the West.” The Economic Journal 126.597 (2016): 2064-2114, available at
https://scholars.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/eklor/files/2015_ej.pdf, accessed April 3, 2017.

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significant rise in the number of attacks on individuals who were or perceived to be of Arab and/or
Muslim descent.” 268
•

“[C]ounties experiencing increases in general hate crime, far-right hate crime, and non-right-wing
terrorism see associated increases in far-right hate crime, far-right terrorism, and far-right hate
crime, respectively.” 269

•

Figure VIII.3 and Figure VIII.4 show the percentage of total reported hate crimes that have been
committed against Muslims in the United States and in Massachusetts, respectively. There was a
noticeable spike after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Figure VIII.3
Reported Hate Crimes against Muslims in the United States
1992 - 2014

Note: Anti-religous hate crimes include Anti-Jewish, Anti-Catholic, Anti-Protestant, Anti-Other Religions, Anti-Multi Religious, and AntiAthiesm/Agnosticism incidents.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Hate Crime Data,” 2014, Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36397.v1, accessed March 1, 2017.

268

Nelson, Matthew S., et al. “Hate Crimes in Post-9/11 Pennsylvania: Case Characteristics and Police Response Revisited.”
Race and Justice 6.4 (2016): 303-324, available at
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Alese_Wooditch/publication/284723886_Hate_Crimes_in_Post911_Pennsylvania_Case_Characteristics_and_Police_Response_Revisited/links/5657c2ee08ae4988a7b5831b.pdf, accessed
April 3, 2017.

269

Mills, Colleen E., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. “Extreme Hatred Revisiting the Hate Crime and Terrorism
Relationship to Determine Whether They Are ‘Close Cousins’ or ‘Distant Relatives’.” Crime & Delinquency (2015):
0011128715620626, available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0011128715620626, accessed April 3,
2017.

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Figure VIII.4
Reported Hate Crimes against Muslims in the Massachusetts
1992 - 2014

Notes:
[1] Anti-religious hate crimes include Anti-Jewish, Anti-Catholic, Anti-Protestant, Anti-Other Religions, Anti-Multi Religious, and
Anti-Atheism/Agnosticism incidents.
[2] There were no reported hate crimes in Massachusetts before 2000.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Uniform Crime Reporting Program Data: Hate Crime Data,”
2014, Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR36397.v1, accessed March 1, 2017.

117

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

RHETORIC AND HATE INCIDENTS AGAINST IMMIGRANTS

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

In the ten days following the election, Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) recorded 867 hate
incidents, not including instances of online harassment. The number of incidents recorded peaked
on November 9th, the day following the election.

•

SPLC reports that between 2015 and 2016, the number of hate groups in the U.S. increased from
892 to 917, an increase of 3 percent. In the same one year period, the number of anti-Muslim hate
groups increased 197 percent - from 34 groups in 2015 to 101 in 2016.

•

According to SPLC’s online survey of over 10,000 K-12 educators:
o

o

“Eight in 10 report heightened anxiety on the part of marginalized students, including
immigrants, Muslims, African Americans and LGBT students.”

o

“Four in 10 have heard derogatory language directed at students of color, Muslims,
immigrants and people based on gender or sexual orientation.”

o

•

“Nine out of 10 educators who responded have seen a negative impact on students’ mood
and behavior following the election; most of them worry about the continuing impact for
the remainder of the school year.”

“Over 2,500 educators described specific incidents of bigotry and harassment that can be
directly traced to election rhetoric. These incidents include graffiti (including swastikas),
assaults on students and teachers, property damage, fights and threats of violence.

An analysis of President Trump’s tweets indicates that the number of tweets mentioning
“Muslims,” “Mexicans,” and “immigrants” increased by 219 percent from 2014 to 2015, when he
entered the presidential race.

118

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A. Hate Crimes and Bias Incidents
•

In the ten days following the election, Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) recorded 867 hate
incidents, not including instances of online harassment. 270 The number of incidents recorded peaked
on November 9th, the day following the election. 271
Figure IX.1272
Number of Reported Hate Incidents in the Ten Days Following Election Day

•

In the first 34 days following the election, SPLC counted 1,094 hate instances. 273

270

Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After:
Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available
at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March
27, 2017.

271

Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After:
Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available
at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March
27, 2017.

272

Amend, Alex, Troy Dabney, Cassie Miller, Angbeen Saleem, Will Tucker, and Alexandra Werner-Winslow, “Ten Days After:
Harassment and Intimidation in the Aftermath of the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, November 29, 2016, available
at https://www.splcenter.org/20161129/ten-days-after-harassment-and-intimidation-aftermath-election, accessed March
27, 2017.

273

“Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16,
2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.

119

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•

According to the SPLC, 37% of these 1,094 incidents “directly referenced either President-elect
Trump, his campaign slogans, or his infamous remarks about sexual assault.” 274

•

According to the SPLC, “there was even evidence that Trump’s attacks on Muslims during 2015 —
when he called for a ban on Muslims entering the U.S., suggested a registry for Muslims already here,
and proposed to surveil mosques — had had an effect that early. The FBI reported that anti-Muslim
hate crimes went up by 67% in 2015, while other categories rose only slightly.” 275
B. Organized Hate Groups

•

The SPLC also noted a spike in the distribution of “white nationalist (47 reports), KKK (7), and antiSemitic posters and fliers [following the election]. In total, [the SPLC] captured 57 separate incidents
with a spike coming on the first Monday following the election.” 276

•

SPLC reports that between 2015 and 2016, the number of hate groups in the U.S. increased from 892
to 917, an increase of 3 percent. 277 In the same one year period, the number of anti-Muslim hate
groups increased 197 percent - from 34 groups in 2015 to 101 in 2016. 278

A study from FiveThirtyEight found a strong overlap between commenters who post in the r/The_Donald
subreddit and other “hate-based” discussion pages. Using latent semantic analysis, an approach that
measures the co-occurrence of commentators across several Reddit discussion pages, researchers found
that when they filtered out commenters from the r/The_Donald who also commented on the most
popular general political discussion pages (e.g., r/politics), the remaining commenter pool was most
similar to a number of “hate-based” discussion pages with such as characteristics as “virulently
misogynistic” and “open and enthusiastic racism.” No hate-based discussion pages resulted from
performing the same process for discussion pages dedicated to other presidential candidates. 279

274

“Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16,
2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.

275

Potok, Mark, “The Trump Effect,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2017/trump-effect, accessed March 27, 2017.

276

“Update: 1,094 Bias-Related Incidents in the Months Following the Election,” Southern Poverty Law Center, December 16,
2016, available at https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/16/update-1094-bias-related-incidents-month-followingelection, accessed March 27, 2017.

277

Potok, Mark, “The Year in Hate and Extremism,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism, accessed March 27, 2017.

278

Potok, Mark, “The Year in Hate and Extremism,” Intelligence Report, February 15, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism, accessed March 27, 2017.

279

Martin, Trevor, “Dissecting Trump’s Most Rabid Online Following,” FiveThirtyEight, March 23, 2017, available at
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/dissecting-trumps-most-rabid-online-following/, accessed March 28, 2017.

120

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C. Anxiety in K-12 Education
•

The SPLC also conducted an online survey with K-12 educators. More than 10,000 individuals
responded, with the following results: 280
•

“Nine out of 10 educators who responded have seen a negative impact on students’ mood
and behavior following the election; most of them worry about the continuing impact for the
remainder of the school year.” 281

•

“Eight in 10 report heightened anxiety on the part of marginalized students, including
immigrants, Muslims, African Americans and LGBT students.” 282

•

“Four in 10 have heard derogatory language directed at students of color, Muslims,
immigrants and people based on gender or sexual orientation.” 283

“Over 2,500 educators described specific incidents of bigotry and harassment that can be directly traced
to election rhetoric. These incidents include graffiti (including swastikas), assaults on students and
teachers, property damage, fights and threats of violence.” 284
D. President Trump’s Twitter Rhetoric
•

An analysis of President Trump’s tweets indicates that the number of tweets mentioning “Muslims,”
“Mexicans,” and “immigrants” increased by 219 percent from 2014 to 2015, when he entered the
presidential race.

280

Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern
Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March
27, 2017.

281

Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern
Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March
27, 2017.

282

Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern
Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March
27, 2017.

283

Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern
Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March
27, 2017.

284

Costello, Maureen B., “The Trump Effect: The Impact of the 2016 Presidential Election on Our Nation’s Schools,” Southern
Poverty Law Center, Richard Cohen and Adrienne van der Valk, eds., November 28, 2017, available at
https://www.splcenter.org/20161128/trump-effect-impact-2016-presidential-election-our-nations-schools, accessed March
27, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

In addition, as shown in Table IX.1, President Trump’s tweets have focused more consistently on
“Muslims” and “Islam” compared to “Mexican” and “Immigrant”.
Table IX.1
Number of Trump’s Tweets over Time

Note: Categories are identified by appearance of the key word.
Source: “Trump Twitter Archive”, available at
http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com, accessed March 27, 2017.

•

Using a time-series sentiment analysis of President Trump’s tweets, it is possible to identify spikes
in negativity and positivity. 285 We are able to measure sentiment through the AFINN dataset,
which lists English words rated from negative five to positive five by Finn Årup Nielsen from the
Technical University of Denmark. (see Figure VIII.2). 286
o

As shown in Figure VIII.2, the average sentiment of Trump’s tweets is negative in the
month of March and the period of June to August of 2016. This negative sentiment
corresponds with two of the three peaks in retweets over that year, with about 2.5
million retweets in March and about 4 million retweets in July. This pattern indicates the
particularly pervasive nature of President Trump’s negative rhetoric.

285

Textual data processed using the tidytext package in R. See: Silge J and Robinson D (2016). “tidytext: Text Mining and
Analysis Using Tidy Data Principles in R,” available at http://doi.org/10.21105/joss.00037, accessed April 14, 2017.

286

For example, see Nielsen, Finn Årup, “A new ANEW: Evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in microblogs”,
Proceedings of the ESWC2011 Workshop on ‘Making Sense of Microposts’: Big things come in small packages 718 in CEUR
Workshop Proceedings: 93-98. May, 2011, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2903, accessed April 14, 2017.

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Figure IX.2
Analysis of Sentiment and Retweet of Trump’s Tweets
Jan 01, 2016 – Dec 31, 2016

Note: Sentiment score of each month is calculated as the average of the sentiment score of each tweet posted by President
Trump in that month.
Sources:
[1] “Trump Twitter Archive,” available at http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com, accessed March 27, 2017.
[2] Nielsen, Finn Årup, “A new ANEW: Evaluation of a word list for sentiment analysis in microblogs”, Proceedings of the
ESWC2011 Workshop on ‘Making Sense of Microposts’: Big things come in small packages 718 in CEUR Workshop Proceedings:
93-98. May, 201, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2903, accessed April 14, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

PROFILE OF IMMIGRANTS FROM THE SIX COUNTRIES AND OTHER SELECTED
COUNTRIES

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

Many of the immigrants from the countries affected by the Executive Order are well educated,
have high income, and become U.S. citizens at a higher rate than the other foreign-born
naturalized citizens.

•

Immigrants cluster in certain areas when moving to the U.S.

•

The share of a state’s population that is foreign born is positively correlated with the share of
people in the state that believe that immigrants strengthen American society.

•

Immigrants from countries affected by the Executive Order spend more time on education and
less time on housework and other work relative to a population of native-born U.S. population
with similar characteristics.

•

Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend more time on housework and less
time on personal activities such as leisure and sports relative to a population of native-born
U.S. population with similar characteristics.

A. Overview of Immigrants from the Six Countries
•

Individuals Affected: The Executive Order issued by President Trump on March 6, 2017,
suspends entry into the U.S. for 90 days of people without current visas from the following
countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Additionally, the order bans
refugees for 120 days and caps refugees at 50,000 people for 2017. 287
o

In 2015, green cards were issued to 31,258 individuals from these countries. 288

o

In 2015, there were nearly 65,000 temporary visits from the six targeted countries,
including: recreational or business travelers (49,412); students enrolled on nonimmigrant visas (12,205); temporary workers on non-immigrant work visas and their
families (883); Fiancés of U.S. citizens (669).

287

Executive Order, “Executive Order Protecting The Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into The United States,” March 6,
2017, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states, accessed April 7, 2017.

288

Singhvi, Anjali, and Alicia Parlapiano, “Trump’s New Immigration Ban: Who is Barred and Who is Not,” The New York Times,
March 6, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/trump-travel-bangroups.html?_r=0, accessed March 9, 2017.

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o
o
•

Individuals from these countries comprised 3.6 percent of new legal permanent
residents from 1999 to 2015.
The ban does not apply to U.S. citizens, dual nationals with a passport from a country
not affected by the ban, diplomats, or government officials.

Education: Many immigrants from these six countries are well educated. 289
o

Approximately 90 percent of those people from Iran and Libya have at least a high
school education. 290

o

Many immigrants from these countries have earned bachelor’s degrees and
advanced degrees: Iran (54 percent), Libya (59 percent), Sudan (36 percent), and
Syria (37 percent). The U.S. national average is approximately 30 percent.

•

Income: Immigrants from Iran have a median income greater than the U.S. median income
($54,645); the median income of immigrants from Syria and Libya is similar to the U.S.
median. Immigrants from Yemen, Sudan, and Somalia earn a median income significantly
below the U.S. median.

•

Arrival Dates: Nearly half of Iranian immigrants arrived in the U.S. before 1990, while about
two thirds of Somalis and Sudanese have moved to the U.S. since 2000.

•

Citizenship: The majority of immigrants from these six countries become U.S. citizens at a rate
above the overall percentage of foreign-born naturalized citizens (46.6 percent).

289

Fessenden, Ford, et al., “Immigrants From Banned Nations: Educated, Mostly Citizens and Found in Every State,” The New
York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/politics/trumpimmigration-ban-demographics.html, accessed February 17, 2017.

290

Fessenden, Ford, et al., “Immigrants From Banned Nations: Educated, Mostly Citizens and Found in Every State,” The New
York Times, January 30, 2017, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/politics/trumpimmigration-ban-demographics.html, accessed February 17, 2017.

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i.

Department of Homeland Security Data – Summary Tables
a. Countries Covered Under Current Travel Ban
Table X.1
Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Country of Birth
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.2
Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status
by Broad Class of Admission and Country of Birth
Fiscal Year 2015

Notes:
[1] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure.
[2] A dash represents zero.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

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Table X.3
Refugee Arrivals by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Notes:
[1] Libya did not appear in the DHS dataset.
[2] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure.
[3] A dash represents zero.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.4
Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Notes:
[1] D indicates that data are withheld by the DHS to limit disclosure.
[2] A dash represents zero.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.5
Individuals Granted Asylum Defensively by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Note: Libya did not appear in the DHS dataset.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

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Table X.6
Persons Naturalized by Country of Birth
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.7
Aliens Apprehended by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Notes:
[1] Beginning in 2008, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO.
[2] Beginning in 2009, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO and administrative arrests conducted under the
287(g) program.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

b. Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador
Table X.8
Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Country of Birth
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

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Table X.9
Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by
Broad Class of Admission and Country of Birth
Fiscal Year 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.10
Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.11
Individuals Granted Asylum Defensively by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

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Table X.12
Persons Naturalized by Country of Birth
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Table X.13
Aliens Apprehended by Country of Nationality
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015

Notes:
[1] Beginning in 2008, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO.
[2] Beginning in 2009, data include administrative arrests conducted by ICE ERO and administrative arrests conducted under the
287(g) program.
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

B. Where Immigrants Move

i.

Summary

•

Immigrants cluster in certain geographical areas when moving to the U.S.

•

Data from the American Community Survey are used to examine immigrant populations by
state. Immigrants from Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya combined make up the
largest share of the state immigrant population Minnesota (6.6 percent), followed by
Michigan and West Virginia.

•

Immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, and Guatemala combined make up the largest share of
the state immigrant population in New Mexico (68.9 percent), followed by Texas and Arizona.

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ii.
•

Literature Review

A review of the literature on immigration patterns finds:
o

o

Seventy-four percent of the U.S. immigrant population is clustered in six states:
California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois. 293

o

Immigrants are more geographically concentrated when English is not the first
language spoken at home. 294

o

•

More educated immigrants are more likely to live outside of these top 25 SMSAs, are
more likely to move after initial settlement in the United States, and are generally
less geographically concentrated. 292

o

iii.

New immigrants to the United States are concentrated in the top Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). Three quarters of new immigrants are
concentrated in the top 25 SMSAs. 291

Ninety-four percent of the foreign born in the U.S. live in urban areas. 295

Descriptive Tables from the American Community Survey

Data from the American Community Survey are used to summarize where immigrants move from
the six countries included in the executive order, as well as immigrants from Mexico and Central
America. The analysis counts all foreign-born residents of the United States as immigrants, even if
they have since been naturalized.

291

Bartel, Ann P., “Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics 7(4), pp. 371-391, available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/298213, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 389.

292

Bartel, Ann P., “Where Do the New U.S. Immigrants Live?” Journal of Labor Economics 7(4), pp. 371-391, available at
http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/298213, accessed February 25, 2017, p. 390.

293

Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor,
August 2004, pp. 1-24 , available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231,
accessed February 25, 2017, p. 3.

294

Chiswick, Barry R and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor,
August 2004, pp. 1-24 , available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231,
accessed February 25, 2017, p. 12.

295

Chiswick, Barry R and Paul W. Miller, “Where Immigrants Settle in the United States,” The Institute for the Study of Labor,
August 2004, pp. 1-24, available at http://legacy.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/papers/viewAbstract?dp_id=1231,
accessed February 25, 2017, p. 6.

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Table X.14
Number of Immigrants by State
Executive Order Six Countries

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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•

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Immigrants from Iran make up 0.9 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.15
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Iran

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

•

Immigrants from Libya make up 0.03 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.16
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Libya

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Immigrants from Somalia make up 0.2 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.17
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Somalia

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

•

Immigrants from Sudan make up 0.09 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.18
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Sudan

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Immigrants from Syria make up 0.2 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.19
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Syria

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

•

Immigrants from Yemen make up 0.12 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.20
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Yemen

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Mexico and Central America are also major sources of immigrants to the United States.
Table X.21
Number of Immigrants by State
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico

Note: Tables for Central America include immigrant populations from El Salvador and Guatemala. These two countries make up the largest
proportion of Central American immigrants coming to the U.S. (Migration Policy Institute, “Central American Immigrants in the United States,”
September 25, 2015, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-immigrants-united-states, accessed March 4, 2017.)
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and M. Sobek,
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0,
accessed April 4, 2017.

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Immigrants from Mexico make up 26.8 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and reside
predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.22
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Mexico

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

•

Immigrants from El Salvador make up 2.9 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and
reside predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.23
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, El Salvador

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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Immigrants from Guatemala make up 2.1 percent of the total U.S. immigrant population, and
reside predominately in the following ten states:
Table X.24
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Guatemala

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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iv.
•

Public Opinion on Immigration

A relationship can be seen between where immigrants move, and public opinion on immigration
in those states. The foreign born share of a total state population is positively correlated with the
share of state respondents that believe that immigrants strengthen American society.
Figure X.1
Foreign Born Share of Total State Population vs. Public Opinion on Immigration

Sources:
[1] U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover, and
M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.
[2] PRRI, 2015 Atlas of American Values, available at http://ava.publicreligion.org/, accessed March 15, 2017.

C. How Immigrants Spend Their Time

i.
•

Summary

Immigrants from Iran, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, and Libya spend more time on
education and less time on housework and other work relative to a population of native-born
U.S. population with similar characteristics. Among working adults age 25 and older,
immigrants from these countries work more and continue to invest more time in education
compared to the native-born U.S. population.
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Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend more time on housework and
sleep and less time on personal activities such as leisure and sports relative to the nativeborn U.S. population.

ii.
•

Descriptive Statistics from the 2003-2015 Current Population Survey and American Time
Use Survey

Compared to a U.S. population of similar age, sex, and states of residence, immigrants from
the six countries spend approximately four hours more per week on education. They spend
approximately 0.13 hours (or 7 minutes) more per week on average on spiritual activities.

Figure X.2
Hours per Week Spent on Activity
Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from One of the Six Predominantly Muslim Countries Identified in the
Executive Order to U.S.-Born Population

Notes:
[1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is
equal to the immigrant population.
[2] Results are based on 283 U.S. immigrants born in Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen; and 1,271 U.S.-born
respondents.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at
https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.

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•

Among working age adults age 25 and older, immigrants from the six countries invest more
time in education, work, and sleep compared to U.S.-born population of similar age, sex, and
state residence. They spend approximately 4.0 hours less per week on personal activities
such as leisure and sports.

Figure X.3
Hours per Week Spent on Activity
Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from One of the Six Predominantly Muslim Countries Identified in the
Executive Order to U.S.-Born Population
Working Population At Least 25 Years Old

Notes:
[1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is
equal to the immigrant population.
[2] Results are based on 168 U.S. immigrants born in Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, or Yemen; and 637 U.S.-born respondents.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at
https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Compared to a U.S. population of similar age, sex, and states of residence, immigrants from
Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador spend approximately 3.4 hours more per week on
housework. They sleep more than three hours more than the U.S. population, but they
spend 6.6 fewer hours on personal activities.

Figure X.4
Hours per Week Spent on Activity
Comparison of U.S. Immigrants from Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador to U.S.-Born Population

Notes:
[1] U.S.-born observations are weighted such that the age, sex, and state of residence composition of the U.S.-born population is
equal to the immigrant population.
[2] Results are based on 7,326 U.S. immigrants born in Mexico, Guatemala, or El Salvador; and 19,243 U.S.-born respondents.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey, 2003-2015, available at
https://www.bls.gov/tus/data.htm, accessed March 15, 2017.

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D. Appendix: Statistics Pertaining to Iraq
Appendix Table X.1
Select Immigration Statistics for Iraq: 2006 to 2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

Appendix Table X.2
Iraqi Born Persons: Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status by Broad Class of Admission: Fiscal Year
2015

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, 2015,” available at
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2015, accessed February 21, 2017.

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Appendix Table X.3
Top Ten States of Immigrant Residence, Iraq

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2010-2015 Pooled Data, S. Ruggles, K. Genadek, R. Goeken, J. Grover,
and M. Sobek, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0, University of Minnesota (distributor), available at
http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0, accessed April 4, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

THE IMPACT OF THE TRAVEL BAN ON THE U.S. TRAVEL INDUSTRY

KEY TAKEAWAYS
•

Flight bookings from January 28 to February 4, 2017, have dropped by 6.5 percent overall in
comparison to the previous year:
Bookings from the at-issue countries have dropped by 80 percent. Bookings from the
Middle East have dropped by 23 percent.

o

•

Flight searches for the United States dropped by 17 percent on January 27, 2017, compared to
Obama’s final two weeks in office.
The decline in demand is not limited to the targeted countries. Demand in 103 of 122
countries studied showed a decline in searches for flights to the United States, with China
being one of the largest drops (over 40 percent).

o

•

Spending by tourists (including general spending and airfare) from the Middle East has increased
from 2.4 to 3.5 percent of total tourist spending in the United States from 2010 to 2015.

•

The tourism trade balance with the Middle East increased from a deficit of $1.1 billion in 2010 to a
surplus of $2.4 billion in 2015.
A. Changes in Travel Demand Before/After Travel Ban

i.
•

Flight Search Data

About Hopper:
o

o

296

Hopper is a mobile application that uses predictive analysis of flight price data to provide
users with deals on flights. 296
Hopper published two reports analyzing flight searches following the travel ban – one on
February 7, 2017, and an updated analysis on February 23, 2017. They compared
average daily flight search queries for flights to the US originating in 122 countries during
the period starting three weeks prior to President Trump's inauguration (January 20,
2017) to February 1, 2017.

“About,” Hopper, available at http://www.hopper.com/corp/about.html, accessed April 6, 2017.

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o
•

Hopper collected the data – the results of consumer airfare searches – for the study from
several unnamed “Global Distribution System partners.” 297

Initial Findings:
o

“Flight search demand from international origins to the US has dropped 17% overall since
Trump's inauguration and implementation of the travel ban, compared to the final weeks
of the Obama presidency.” 298

o

“Flight search demand to the US has fallen in 94 of 122 origin countries.” 299

o

“Weekly search demand for flights to the US is down 33% from countries included in the
travel ban.” 300

Table XI.1
Percentage Change in Flight Search Demand from Pre-Inauguration to Announcement and Implementation
of Travel Ban
Before
Inauguration: 12/29
– 1/18

After Travel Ban
Announced:
1/26 – 2/1

Banned 301

371,590

247,616

Percentage
Change
-33%

Skipped 302

1,542,859

1,244,192

-19%

61,552,322

50,898,344

-17%

Other

Source: Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed
February 21, 2017.

297

Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 21, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed
April 14, 2017; Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research,
February 23, 2017, available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travelto-the-us-update, accessed April 3, 2017.

298

Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed
February 21, 2017.

299

Surry, Patrick, “Initial Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 7, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us, accessed
April 21, 2017.

300

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

301

Banned countries are Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Sudan. Hopper has no data for Yemen.

302

“Skipped” countries are selected Muslim-majority countries not affected by the travel ban: Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Indonesia, Qatar, UAE, and Azerbaijan.

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•

The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

Updated Findings:
o

“Flight search demand was weakest on the day the travel ban was announced [on
January 27]; down 17% compared to Obama's final two weeks in office.” 303

o

Demand recovered slightly after the Executive Order was successfully challenged in
multiple US District courts, but as of February 23 was still well below expected levels. 304

o

The decline in demand is not limited to the targeted countries. In fact, according to
Hopper, 103 of 122 countries studied showed a decline in searches for flights to the
United States, with China being one of the largest drops (over 40%). 305

o

The average decline in demand was about 22%. 306

o

Hopper also provides analysis comparing the change from expected daily demand in
2016 and 2017 respectively. That analysis shows that daily flight demand has remained
below expectations for most of the days since the travel ban was announced. Notably,
the change from expected daily demand was typically positive during the same period in
2016. 307

303

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

304

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

305

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

306

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

307

Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper Research, February 23, 2017,
available at http://www.hopper.com/research/initial-effects-of-the-travel-ban-on-international-travel-to-the-us-update,
accessed April 3, 2017.

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Table XI.2
Top 6 Countries with Largest Negative Percentage Change in Flight Search Demand
12/29 – 1/18

1/26 – 2/21

Percentage Change

20,194,053

11,981,180

-40.7%

Bahrain

99,747

59,218

-40.6%

Sudan

13,312

7,962

-40.2%

128,424

76,847

-40.2%

30,313

18,766

-38.1%

331,335

206,082

-37.8%

China

Iraq
Uganda
Saudi Arabia

Source: Surry, Patrick, “UPDATE - Effects of the Travel Ban on International Travel to the US,” Hopper
Research, February 23, 2017, available at
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/15EgtC4szaY32KUkpVRNOokkjntqmkE65ASaLylEX8PE/pubhtml,
accessed April 3, 2017.

•

Kayak Data:
o

o

Analyses of daily searches on Kayak for flights to the U.S. between equivalent periods in
2017 and 2016 show a decline in demand of 8.5% from the seven at-issue countries in
the period immediately following the first executive order.

o

308

Kayak is a technology company that searches travel websites, such as online travel
agencies and airline, hotel, and car rental websites, to consolidate information for
travelers. 308

Daily searches from Muslim-majority not at-issue countries declined by 15.3% in the
same period.

“About Kayak,” Kayak, available at https://www.kayak.com/about, accessed May 17, 2017.

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Table XI.3
Percentage Change in Daily Average Searches
for Flights to the U.S. from 2016 to 2017
1/1 - 1/19

1/27 - 4/6

Seven At-Issue Countries

22.6%

-8.5%

Other Muslim-Majority Countries

5.3%

-15.3%

Europe

-3.6%

-2.1%

Russia

-5.4%

-14.6%

Notes:
[1] The table shows the percentage change in the daily average searches for flights to
the U.S. between equivalent periods in 2017 and 2016.
[2] President Trump got sworn in on January 20, 2017.
[3] President Trump signed the first travel ban executive order on January 27, 2017.
[4] The Seven At-Issue Countries are Libya, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, Sudan, and
Yemen.
[5] The Other Muslim-Majority Countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh,
Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
Source: Kayak Travel Data from January 1 - April 6, 2016; January 1 - April 6, 2017.

ii.
•

Flight Booking Data

About ForwardKeys:
o

ForwardKeys is a market research firm focused on the global travel industry. 309

o

ForwardKeys analyzes millions of travel booking transactions each day and publishes both
historical data and predictions of future travel patterns. 310

309

“ForwardKeys – Who We Are,” ForwardKeys, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenuemanagement/article/forwarddata.html, accessed April 6, 2017.

310

“ForwardKeys – Who We Are,” ForwardKeys, available at https://forwardkeys.com/revenuemanagement/article/forwarddata.html, accessed April 6, 2017.

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o

o
•

In February 2017, ForwardKeys published a study on the impact of the travel ban on air
travel to the US based on data collected from over 200,000 travel agencies globally. 311
The study was covered by Reuters, who cited it as evidence that travel ban negatively
impacted global demand for travel to the US. 312

Initial Reports (as of February 4, 2017):
o

o

The effect is not limited to the countries listed in the ban: net international air travel
bookings were down 6.5% compared to the same period in 2016 while cancellations
were up 12%. 314

o

As of February 4, airfare already booked for the following three months was 14.7% lower
among the seven countries affected by the ban compared to the prior year. 315

o
•

Between January 28, 2017, and February 4, 2017 (the week following the initial travel
ban) air travel bookings from Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen
decreased 80% compared to the same period in 2016. 313

Year-over-year booking trends from every region of the world were lower on February 4
than they had been on January 27. 316

Additional Reports as of February 25, 2017:
o

Following the suspension of the ban on February 4, 2017, flight bookings increased
modestly, but decreased again following the announcement on February 17 that a new
ban would be enacted. In the period from February 5 to February 16, total international

311

“Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed
April 3, 2017.

312

“Trump Travel Restrictions Hit Demand for Visits to U.S.: Study,” Reuters, February 7, 2017, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigration-travel-idUSKBN15N007, accessed April 6, 2017.

313

“Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed
April 3, 2017.

314

“Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed
April 3, 2017.

315

“Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed
April 3, 2017.

316

“Trump Travel Ban Impact on Air Travels to the U.S.A.,” ForwardKeys, February 8, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USA.html, accessed
April 3, 2017.

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flight bookings to the US were 2.2% higher than they had been during the same period in
2016. However, following the announcement of the new ban, flight bookings from
February 17 to February 25 were 4.0% lower compared to the same period in 2016. 317
Table XI.4
Percentage Change in Flight Bookings to the United States by Origin Region
from 2016 to 2017
1/28 – 2/4

2/5 – 2/16

2/17 – 2/25

Seven At-Issue
Countries

-80%

-1.1%

-4.0%

Middle East &
Africa

-23%

-9.7%

-5.7%

Asia Pacific

-14%

3.9%

2.6%

Europe

-7.5%

-0.2%

-3.8%

2.3%

6.4%

-0.9%

-6.5%

2.2%

-4.0%

The Americas
Overall

Source: “Middle East Meltdown: US Travel to Islamic countries collapses in wake of
Trump Ban,” ForwardKeys, March 6, 2017, available at
https://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-onair-travels-to-the-USA-update.html, accessed April 3, 2017.

iii.
•

Additional Sources

Emirates Airlines reported that booking rates to the United States fell 35% following the
travel ban. Emirates noticed an “instantaneous” effect and had not fully recovered as of
March 9, 2016. However, the chief executive of Qatar Airways stated that his airline had not
experienced a decline in demand for flights to the US. 318

317

“Middle East Meltdown: US Travel to Islamic countries collapses in wake of Trump Ban,” ForwardKeys, March 6, 2017,
available at http://forwardkeys.com/revenue-management/article/trump-travel-ban-impact-on-air-travels-to-the-USAupdate.html, accessed April 3, 2017.

318

“Emirates Airlines Concerned About Latest U.S. Travel Order,” CNBC, March 9, 2017, available at
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/emirates-airlines-concerned-about-latest-us-travel-order.html, accessed March 12,
2017.

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•

The Global Business Travel Association (GBTA) polled its members and found that 30% of
companies expected to reduce overall business travel. 319

•

According to the GBTA, for every 1% of annual decrease in business travel spending, the
United States loses roughly 71,000 jobs, $5 billion in GDP, $3 billion in wages, and $1.2 billion
in tax revenue. 320

•

According to the GBTA, in the week following the travel ban, general uncertainty among
travelers caused a loss of approximately $185 million in travel bookings. 321

•

Cheapflights.com saw international searches for flights to the United States drop following
the ban. 322
o

From January 27 to January 29, search volume decreased 38% compared to the
previous weekend.

o

From February 10 to February 14, search volume decreased 16% compared to the
average volume in January.

•

Swedish search engine Flygresor.se noted a 47% decline in searches for flights to the United
States following the enactment of the travel ban, compared to the same period in 2016. 323

•

A study by Tourism Economics (a research firm associated with Oxford Economics) found that
Los Angeles County alone could potentially lose 800,000 international visitors in the next

319

“Press Release: President Trump's Travel Ban Creates Likely Short- and Long-term Travel Disruption,” GBTA, February 2,
2017, available at
http://www.gbta.org/PressReleases/Pages/rls_020217.aspx?Source=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Egbta%2Eorg%2Flists%2Fnew
s%2FAllitems_all%2Easpx, accessed April 6, 2017.

320

McCormick, Mike, “The Ruling on the Travel Ban: A Lose-Lose Scenario for Business Travel and the Economy,” GBTA,
February 9, 2017, available at http://blog.gbta.org/2017/02/09/the-ruling-on-the-travel-ban-a-lose-lose-scenario-forbusiness-travel-and-the-economy/, accessed March 2, 2017.

321

McCormick, Mike, “The Ruling on the Travel Ban: A Lose-Lose Scenario for Business Travel and the Economy,” GBTA,
February 9, 2017, available at http://blog.gbta.org/2017/02/09/the-ruling-on-the-travel-ban-a-lose-lose-scenario-forbusiness-travel-and-the-economy/, accessed March 2, 2017.

322

Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed
March 12, 2017.

323

Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed
March 12, 2017.

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three years due to the travel ban, which would amount to approximately $736 million in
tourism-related spending. 324
B. Statistics Regarding Travel and Tourism by Immigrants

i.
•

Air Travel

In 2015, 1,343,347 people visited the United States from the Middle East, representing a 9.6
percent increase from 2014. 325
Table XI.5
Middle East Arrivals to the United States over Time
2010

Number of Arrivals
As % of Overseas
Arrivals
% Change from
Prior Year

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

735,549

810,688

925,398

1,058,122

1,225,500

1,343,347

2.8%

2.9%

3.1%

3.3%

3.5%

3.5%

10.5%

10.2%

14.1%

14.3%

15.8%

9.6%

Source: Monthly Arrivals to the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/research/monthly/arrivals/index.asp.

ii.
•

Tourism Revenue

Tourism from the Middle East represented $8.67 billion of “exports” in 2015. The United
States had a positive $2.36 billion net balance of trade with the Middle East for travel and
tourism. 326

324

Vora, Shivani, “After Travel Ban, Interest in Trips to U.S. Declines,” New York Times, February 20, 2017, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/20/travel/after-travel-ban-declining-interest-trips-to-united-states.html, accessed
March 12, 2017.

325

“I-94 Program: 2015 Monthly Arrivals Data,” Table C – Section 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, ITA, National Travel and
Tourism Office, June 2016, available at http://travel.trade.gov/view/m-2015-I-001/index.asp, accessed April 14, 2017.

326

“U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017.

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The Economic Impact of Immigration on the U.S.

The 1.3 million tourists who visited the US from the Middle East in 2015 spent $8.1 billion
during their visits (excluding airfare), amounting to roughly $6,200 per person. 327
o

This is about $3,000 more, per capita, than tourists from Europe, who spent
approximately $3,200 per person (excluding airfare) in the United States in 2015. 328

•

While the greatest number of tourists come from North America (Canada, Mexico), these
tourists spend much less per visit than people who come from farther. 329

•

European tourists, while still a large percentage of total arrivals, are decreasing in number. 330

•

Spending by tourists (including general spending and airfare) from the Middle East has
increased from 2.4% to 3.5% of total tourist spending in the United States from 2010 to 2015.
331

o

Excluding airfare, the percentage increased 2.7% to 4.0%. Middle Eastern visitors’
spending on airfare has decreased from 1.5% to 1.4% of total foreign spending on
airfare to the United States. 332

327

“2015 Market Profile: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and
Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Middle_East_Market_Profile.pdf, accessed April 6,
2017.

328

“2015 Market Profile: Europe,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and
Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Europe_Market_Profile.pdf,
accessed April 6, 2017.

329

Martin, Hugo, “Foreign Tourists’ Spending in U.S. Rises to New Record,” LA Times, February 22, 2013, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/22/business/la-fi-foreign-tourists-20130222, accessed April 6, 2017.

330

Martin, Hugo, “Foreign Tourists’ Spending in U.S. Rises to New Record,” LA Times, February 22, 2013, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/22/business/la-fi-foreign-tourists-20130222, accessed April 6, 2017.

331

“U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017; “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.

332

“U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration,
National Travel and Tourism Office, available at http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middleeast.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017; “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of
Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.

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Table XI.6
Middle East Travel and Tourism Receipts
as a Percentage of All International Travel and Tourism Receipts
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Middle East Receipts:
Overall

2.4%

2.7%

2.6%

3.2%

3.5%

3.5%

Middle East Receipts:
Excluding Airfare

2.7%

3.0%

2.9%

3.6%

4.0%

4.0%

Middle East Receipts: Airfare

1.5%

1.5%

1.5%

1.5%

1.4%

1.4%

Sources:
[1] “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade
Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/middle-east.pdf, accessed March 9, 2017.
[2] “U.S. Travel and Tourism Balance of Trade: All Countries (Total),” U.S. Department of Commerce, International
Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2006-2015-new.pdf, accessed April 21, 2017.

•

New York City in particular will be affected by a declining volume in tourists from the Middle
East. In 2015, 41% of all tourists originating in the Middle East visit New York City. 333
Meanwhile, foreign tourists in the city spend about four times as much, on average, as
domestic tourists. 334

333

“2015 Market Profile: Middle East,” U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and
Tourism Office, available at
http://travel.trade.gov/outreachpages/download_data_table/2015_Middle_East_Market_Profile.pdf, accessed April 6,
2017.

334

McGeehan, Patrick, “New York Expects Fewer Foreign Tourists, Saying Trump is to Blame,” New York Times, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/28/nyregion/new-york-foreign-tourists-trump-policies.html?_r=0, accessed April 3,
2017.

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www.MassTLC.org

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