US v. Lawrence Pettaway

Filing

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIAM OPINION filed. Originating case number: 2:10-cr-00161-MSD-DEM-2. Copies to all parties and the district court/agency. [1000178515]. [17-4359]

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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4359

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE L. PETTAWAY,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Mark S. Davis, District Judge. (2:10-cr-00161-MSD-DEM-2)

Submitted: October 19, 2017

Decided: October 23, 2017

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Timothy Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for
Appellant. Katherine Lee Martin, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia;
Alan Mark Salsbury, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lawrence L. Pettaway appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release and imposing a sentence of 36 months of imprisonment. Appellate counsel has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning the reasonableness of Pettaway’s
sentence. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is
unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). A
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately explains the
sentence after considering the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)
(2012); see also United States v. Slappy, ___, F.3d ___, ___, No. 16-4010, 2017 WL
4183191, at *3-5 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 2017); Thompson, 595 F.3d at 546-47. “And a
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court sufficiently states a proper basis
for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the sentence imposed.” Slappy, 2017
WL 4183191, at *3 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court’s explanation of Pettaway’s above policy
statement range sentence, in discussing the need for future deterrence in light of Pettaway’s
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background and criminal history and pointing out Pettaway’s repeated noncompliance with
the terms of his supervised release, easily satisfies this standard. Furthermore, we conclude
that an upward variance of 18 months from the top of the applicable policy statement range
is not unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 362, 367 (4th
Cir. 2011).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. This court requires that counsel inform Pettaway, in writing, of the right to petition
the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Pettaway requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Pettaway.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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