Hale v. State of Mississippi, et al

Filing

PUBLISHED OPINION FILED. [07-60997 Affirmed] Judge: EGJ , Judge: JES , Judge: PRO. Mandate pull date is 11/04/2010; granting motion for partial dismissal of appeal filed by Appellees NFN McCleave, NFN Woodall, NFN Trinca and Wexford Health Services [6548554-2], granting motion for partial dismissal of appeal filed by Appellee Mr. Patrick Arnold [6548371-2]; dismissing as moot motion requesting the court to enter an order which first adjudicates filed by Appellees NFN McCleave, NFN Woodall, NFN Trinca and Wexford Health Services [6548554-3] [07-60997]

Hale v. State of Mississippi, et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Fifth Circuit FILED
N o . 07-60997 October 14, 2010 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk J O H N ASHLEY HALE, P la in t if f -A p p e lla n t , versu s R O N A L D KING, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; M A R G A R E T BINGHAM, Superintendent of Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; C H R I S T O P H E R EPPS, Commissioner of Mississippi Department of Corrections; MIKE HATTEN, Health Service Administrator of Wexford for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; JOHN DOE, Physician at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; D O C T O R ZANDU, Psychiatrist at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility; D O C T O R PATRICK ARNOLD, Physician for Correctional Medical Services at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; DOCTOR WILLIAMS, Psychiatrist of Correctional Medical Services for Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; DOCTOR TRINCA, Physician for Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; M I R I A M MOULDS, Kitchen Supervisor at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution; J O H N DOE 2, Chief Executive Officer of Correctional Medical Services for Mississippi Department of Corrections; JOHN DOE 3, Chief Executive Officer of Wexford at Southern Mississippi Correctional Institution for Mississippi Department of Corrections; DOCTOR MCCLEAVE; DOCTOR WOODALL; WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES, Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Mississippi

B e fo r e JOLLY, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. P E R CURIAM:

T h e district court held that the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (" A D A " ), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, does not validly abrogate state sovereign imm u n it y with respect to the claims of disabled inmates who were denied access t o prison educational and work programs. Hale v. Mississippi, No. 2:06-CV-245, 2 0 0 7 WL 3357562 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 9, 2007). Because Congress's authorization o f those claims is not "congruent and proportional" to the enforcement of the E q u a l Protection Clause, we affirm.

I. W h ile a state prisoner, John Hale filed a pro se complaint in forma pauperis against prison officials in their official capacity, alleging violations of the A D A .1 Specifically, he claims they discriminated against him in violation of title I I of the ADA2 because he suffers from Hepatitis C, post-traumatic stress disord er, chronic depression, intermittent explosive disorder, and antisocial persona lit y disorder. Under prison regulations, those health problems required Hale t o be classified as "medical class III," a designation limiting his work and pro-

Hale also raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting inadequate medical treatment and denial of proper diet. Those were dismissed, and Hale does not appeal as to them. Title II provides that "[s]ubject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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No. 07-60997 g r a m assignments, thus giving him fewer opportunities to earn "meritorious e a r n e d time." Hale maintains that because of his classification, the defendants p r e v e n t e d him from using the community work centers, accessing the satellite a n d regional prison facilities, working in the kitchen, and attending school. T h e district court dismissed on the ground that the officials are entitled t o state sovereign immunity. The court acknowledged that Congress can abrog a t e state sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that it did so in the ADA. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2004). Nonet h e le s s , the court reasoned that Congress's § 5 powers do not extend to creating c a u s e s of actions for ADA violations that are not "congruent and proportional" t o violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U .S . 507, 520 (1997). After Hale filed his pro se brief on appeal, we appointed counsel to file a s u p p le m e n t a l brief to address the question "whether Title II of the ADA validly a b r o g a t e s Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for claims that violate Tit le II but are not actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." The United S t a te s intervened and submitted a brief supporting Hale's position.

II. T h e district court acted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which allows it to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it "fails to state a claim on which r e lie f may be granted." We review such dismissals de novo. Praylor v. Tex. Dep't o f Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005). The ADA provides that "[a] State shall not be immune" from suits under t h e act because of sovereign immunity. 42 U.S.C. § 12202. Congress has the p o w e r to abrogate state sovereign immunity with such unequivocal statements, b u t only where it "act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (alteration in orig3

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No. 07-60997 in a l) (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). There is only o n e source of such authority: the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth A m e n d m e n t . Id. at 364. "Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to t h e extent that the statute is appropriate § 5 legislation." Id. Nonetheless, "no one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to `enforce . . . the provisions' of the Amendment by creating private remedies against the S t a te s for actual violations of those provisions." Georgia, 546 U.S. at 158 (alterat io n in original). Thus, the ADA validly abrogates sovereign immunity insofar a s it "creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct t h a t actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 159. T h e parties agree that none of the defendants' alleged misconduct violates t h e Fourteenth Amendment. Where there is no such violation, there is a threes t e p process for determining whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign imm u n it y with respect to that conduct. The court must determine, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State's alleged c o n d u c t violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also v i o la t e d the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misc o n d u c t violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendm e n t , whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign imm u n it y as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. Id . A. T h e defendants and the United States contend that the district court failed t o apply the first step of the Georgia test because it did not determine whether H a l e had established a prima facie title II claim. Thus, they argue that we s h o u ld remand to complete that inquiry. Step one of Georgia does not require a prima facie showing of a title II c la im . The purpose of step one, understood in context, is to ensure that the court

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No. 07-60997 k n o w s "precisely what conduct [the plaintiff] intend[s] to allege in support of his T it le II claims." Id. Remand was necessary in Georgia because the pro se litig a n t had pleaded a number of "`frivolous claims'SSsome of which are quite far a fie ld from actual constitutional violations . . ., or even from Title II violations." Id. Thus, it was not obvious which conduct the Court was supposed to evaluate a s part of the sovereign immunity inquiry. By contrast, Hale's pleadings are pellu c id , and the district court identified the precise conduct that he alleges violated t h e ADA.3 Accordingly, "[w]e see little need for a remand when the issue before u s is a purely legal one, namely, whether the ADA validly abrogated state sovere ig n immunity with respect to the claims of the type advanced by the plaintiff[]." Klingler v. Dir., Dep't of Revenue, State of Mo., 455 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2006). The United States contends that deciding the sovereign immunity question w it h o u t ensuring that Hale has stated a proper ADA claim risks unnecessarily d e c id in g a constitutional question.4 That argument misunderstands the nature o f sovereign immunity, which rests on the principle that "the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity to be required to answer the comp la in t s of private parties in federal courts."5 To limit the indignity a state may s u ffe r and to vindicate its "right not to be haled into court," "a state has a right

Hale v. Mississippi, 2007 WL 3357562, at *2 ("In his Amended Complaint, plaintiff also alleges claims for violations of the ADA against defendants Mr. Epps, Mr. Hatten, and Mr. King. Plaintiff claims he was discriminated and retaliated against. Specifically, he claims that he was denied access to the satellite and regional facilities, was denied the ability to work in the prison kitchen, and was denied the ability to go to school, because he was classified as `medical class III' and/or a `psychiatric C.'"). See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable."). Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002); accord P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-46 (1993) (holding that sovereign immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability").
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No. 07-60997 t o an early determination of the issue."6 Consequently, courts often must rule o n sovereign immunity even though further litigation might have resolved the s u it on non-constitutional grounds.

B. W e thus proceed to the third prong of the Georgia test to determine whethe r Congress's § 5 power supports its purported abrogation of sovereign immunit y . "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits c o n d u c t which is not itself unconstitutional . . . ." City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. Congress's § 5 power, however, "is not unlimited." Id. To determine w h e t h e r a particular application of the ADA falls within it, we must (1) "identify t h e constitutional right or rights that Congress sought to enforce when it enacte d Title II"; (2) ascertain whether Congress enacted title II in response to a hist o r y and pattern of unconstitutional conduct; and (3) decide "whether the rights a n d remedies created by Title II are congruent and proportional to the constitut io n a l rights it purports to enforce and the record of constitutional violations add u c e d by Congress." Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522-33 (2004) (describing C ity of Boerne's application to title II). Hale contends he was discriminated against when he was denied educat io n a l training and access to prison work programs because of his medical disab ilit y . Therefore, his claims implicate title II's attempt to enforce the Equal Protectio n Clause's "prohibition on irrational disability discrimination." Id. at 522.7

Smith v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1988); accord Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[A] defendant's entitlement under immunity doctrine [is] to be free from suit and the burden of avoidable pretrial matters . . . ."). There are "a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees" that title II attempts to enforce. Lane, 541 U.S. at 522-23. Lane particularly addressed the right implicated in that (continued...)
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No. 07-60997 C o n g r e s s enacted title II partially in response to governmental units' discriminat io n against the disabled, including "a pattern of unequal treatment in the adm in is t r a t io n of a wide range of public services, programs, and activities, includin g the penal system." Id. at 525. We may therefore move to step three of the City of Boerne test. When det e r m in in g whether title II is an appropriate response to the history of unconstit u t io n a l treatment, we do not "examine the broad range of Title II's applications a ll at once," id. at 530, but instead focus on the particular application at issue, equal access to prison education and work programs, see id. That requirement i s not "congruent and proportional" to Congress's goal of enforcing the Equal P r o t e c t io n Clause's prohibition on irrational disability discrimination. Under t h a t clause, disabled individuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification c o m m a n d in g heightened review of laws discriminating against them. See Garr e tt, 531 U.S. at 366 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 4 4 6 (1985). Consequently, disability discrimination is subject only to rational-basis rev ie w , under which there is no constitutional violation so long as "there is a rat io n a l relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate gove r n m e n t a l purpose." Id. at 367 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). The state need not justify its own actions; rather, "the burden is upon the challe n g in g party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could p r o v id e a rational basis for the classification." Id. (citation and internal quotat io n marks omitted).

(...continued) case, the "right of access to the courts" protected by the Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 523; see also id. at 540 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[B]ecause the Court ultimately upholds Title II `as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts,' the proper inquiry focuses on the scope of those due process rights." (citation omitted)). We therefore focus on the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition of irrational disability discrimination.

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No. 07-60997 I n Garrett, id. at 373, the Court emphasized the deference afforded to s t a t e s under rational-basis review in evaluating title I of the ADA under step t h r e e of City of Boerne. Title I requires employers to provide reasonable accomm o d a t io n s to disabled employees, a duty that fails step three because it "far exc e e d s what is constitutionally required": F o r example, whereas it would be entirely rational (and therefore c o n s t it u t io n a l) for a state employer to conserve scarce financial res o u r c e s by hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities, t h e ADA requires employers to "mak[e] existing facilities used by e m p lo y e e s readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disa b ilit ie s ." The ADA does except employers from the "reasonable acc o m m o d a t io [n ]" requirement where the employer "can demonstrate t h a t the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the o p e r a tio n of the business of such covered entity." However, even w it h this exception, the accommodation duty far exceeds what is c o n s t it u t io n a lly required in that it makes unlawful a range of altern a t iv e responses that would be reasonable but would fall short of im p o s in g an "undue burden" upon the employer. I d . at 372 (citations omitted, brackets in original). The same reasoning applies t o title II's requirement that states provide disabled individuals access to state p rog ram s. H a le and the United States object that the requirements of title II are limit e d in scope, because a state can show that it is entitled to certain exceptions, t h u s lessening the extent to which title II's protection surpasses that of the E q u a l Protection Clause. For example, the state need not comply with title II if it can show that providing access "would fundamentally alter the nature of the s e r v ic e , program, or activity," 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), or "would result in . . . und u e financial and administrative burdens," id. § 35.150(a)(3). Nonetheless, for at least three reasons, title II limits state activity far m o r e than does rational-basis review. First, a state prison may rationally deny d is a b le d prisoners access to certain programs, even where its reasons fall short

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No. 07-60997 o f avoiding an "undue burden" or preventing fundamental alterations to a prog r a m . For example, a state may seek to protect the health of a disabled prisoner b y preventing him from engaging in overly strenuous activity. Second, title II " m a k e s it the employer's duty to prove that it would suffer such a burden, ins t e a d of requiring (as the Constitution does) that the complaining party negate r e a s o n a b le bases for the employer's decision." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 967. Finally, t h e Equal Protection Clause's requirements are even more minimal here than in Garrett, because courts are not well positioned to second-guess the rationality o f a state's administration of its prisons.8 I n summary, Congress's § 5 power is not congruent and proportional and t h e r e fo r e does not justify title II's requirement of equal access for disabled inm a t e s to prison educational and work programs. It follows that title II does not v a lid ly abrogate state sovereign immunity for that class of claims. The judgment o f dismissal is AFFIRMED.

See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 94 (2006) ("[I]t is `difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.'" (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973)); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) ("Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.").

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